Part 7 (1/2)
The following paragraph is copied verbatim from Thornton's letter; he is connected with Torrens and in habits of familiar intimacy, so that I am inclined to think he draws his inference from that quarter: ”Pray give a hint in private to Generals Brock and Sheaffe, that if the former were to ask for a brigade at home, or on European service, and the latter to be put on the staff in Canada, I am almost certain they would succeed.”
_Lieut.-Colonel Torrens to Major-General Brock_.
HORSE GUARDS, October 17, 1811.
I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 6th of July, and I beg you will be convinced that I should derive much satisfaction from the power of complying with your wishes as far as my situation might enable me to facilitate the accomplishment of the object you have expressed of returning to England.
I have made known your wishes to the commander-in-chief, and his royal highness has expressed every inclination to comply with them. But until another officer shall join the station, you will be readily aware of the difficulty his royal highness would have in withdrawing you, by leave of absence or otherwise, during the present state of public affairs with the American government.
Should you wish, however, to quit the Canadian staff with a view to serve in Europe, his royal highness will not object to your return to this country, under the arrangement of your being immediately succeeded by another officer. And as Major-General Sheaffe is on the spot, and has strong claims to employment on the staff, his royal highness will have no objection to furnish Sir George Prevost with an authority to employ that officer in your room, provided he has not yet left Canada.
I trust this arrangement may be acceptable to you. An official communication to the effect of this note will be made to Sir George Prevost.
_Colonel Baynes to Major-General Brock_.
QUEBEC, November 21, 1811.
We fortunately received yesterday the last batch of recruits for the 41st regiment, as from the present state of the weather and appearance of the river, I fear their situation would have been very desperate. They have, poor devils, been sixteen weeks and four days on their pa.s.sage, and have suffered much from dysentery. Four men have died, and several are sick; but as the former detachment recovered fast when landed and taken care of, I doubt not that these will also: they amount to three hundred, and are in general very fine young men. What a n.o.ble battalion they will make when brought together; and the officers say that about 200 more were left at the depot, for want of room in the transport.
What do you think of the president's speech? In any government more consistent, it would mean war. I think that he has committed himself more openly and more unjustifiably than could have been expected, in the relation of the affair of the Little Belt, by accusing that poor little sloop of a wanton act of aggression by attacking a huge American frigate, when Commodore Rodgers himself admits that he was for nearly eight hours the chasing vessel.
Governor Gore has revived the formation of the Glengary Fencibles, and I have shewn Sir George what pa.s.sed on a former occasion. I hope the latter will be able to provide for his school-fellow, Major-General Sheaffe,[39] and he expresses himself very anxious to do so.
_Major-General Brock to Lieut.-General Sir G. Prevost, Bart., at Quebec_.
YORK, December 2, 1811.
The information contained in the message of the president to congress, relative to the existing differences between England and the United States, will justify, I presume to think, the adoption of such precautionary measures as may be necessary to meet all future exigencies. Under this impression, I beg leave to submit to your excellency such observations as occur to me, to enable you to form a correct judgment; of the actual state of this province.
The military force which heretofore occupied the frontier posts being so inadequate to their defence, a general opinion prevailed that no opposition, in the event of hostilities, was intended. The late increase of ammunition and every species of stores, the subst.i.tution of a strong regiment, and the appointment of a military person to administer the government, have tended to infuse other sentiments among the most reflecting part of the community; and I feel happy in being able to a.s.sure your excellency, that during my visit last week at Niagara, I received the most satisfactory professions of a determination on the part of the princ.i.p.al inhabitants to exert every means in their power in the defence of their property and support of the government. They look with confidence to your excellency for such additional aid as may be necessary, in conjunction with the militia, to repel any hostile attempt against this province.
I shall beg leave to refer your excellency to the communications of Lieut.-Governor Gore with Sir James Craig, for a correct view of the temper and composition of the militia and Indians. Although perfectly aware of the number of improper characters who have obtained extensive possessions, and whose principles diffuse a spirit of insubordination very adverse to all military inst.i.tutions, I am however well a.s.sured that a large majority would prove faithful. It is certain that the best policy to be pursued, should future circ.u.mstances call for active preparations, will be to act with the utmost liberality, and as if no mistrust existed; for, unless the inhabitants give an active and efficient aid, it will be utterly impossible for the very limited number of the military, who are likely to be employed, to preserve the province.
The first point to which I am anxious to call your excellency's attention, is the district of Amherstburg. I consider it the most important, and, if supplied with the means of commencing active operations, must deter any offensive attempt on this province, from Niagara westward. The American government will be compelled to secure their western frontier from the inroads of the Indians, and this cannot be effected without a very considerable force. But before we can expect an active co-operation on the part of the Indians, the reduction of Detroit and Michilimakinack must convince that people, who conceive themselves to have been sacrificed, in 1794,[40] to our policy, that we are earnestly engaged in the war. The Indians, I am made to understand, are eager for an opportunity to avenge the numerous injuries of which they complain. A few tribes, at the instigation of a Shawnese,[41]
of no particular note, have already, although explicitly told not to look for a.s.sistance from us, commenced the contest. The stand which they continue to make upon the Wabash, against about 2,000 Americans, including militia and regulars, is a strong proof of the large force which a general combination of the Indians will render necessary to protect so widely extended a frontier.
The garrisons of Detroit and Michilimakinack do not, I believe, exceed seventy rank and file each; but the former can be easily reinforced by the militia in the neighbourhood, which, though not numerous, would be ample for its defence, unless a.s.sailed by a force much superior to any we can now command. The Americans will probably draw their princ.i.p.al force, either for offence or defence, from the Ohio, an enterprising, hardy race, and uncommonly expert on horseback with the rifle. This species of force is formidable to the Indians, although, according to reports which have reached me by different channels, but not official, they lately repelled an attack of some magnitude. Unless a diversion, such as I have suggested, be made, an overwhelming force will probably be directed against this part of the province. The measure will, however, be attended with a heavy expense, especially in the article of provision, for, not only the Indians who take the field, but their families, must be maintained.
The numeral force of the militia in the vicinity of Amherstburg exceeds by a trifle seven hundred rank and file; consequently, very little a.s.sistance can be derived from that source in any offensive operation. Should, therefore, the aspect of affairs hereafter give stronger indications of a rupture, I propose augmenting the garrison of Amherstburg with two hundred rank and file from Fort George and York. Such a measure I consider essentially necessary, were it only calculated to rouse the energy of the militia and Indians, who are now impressed with a firm belief, that in the event of war they are to be left to their fate. Great pains have been taken to instil this idea into their minds, and no stronger argument could be employed than the weak state of that garrison.
The army now a.s.sembled upon the Wabash, with the ostensible view of opposing the Shawnese, is a strong additional motive in my mind in support of this measure; for I have no doubt that, the instant their service in the field terminates, a large portion of the regulars will be detached to strengthen the garrison of Detroit. I have prepared Colonel Proctor for such an event, and after weighing the inconvenience to which the service would be exposed if the district were placed under a militia colonel, (an event obvious, unless superseded by a regular officer of equal rank) I have directed Lieut.-Colonel St. George to be in readiness to repair to Amherstburg and a.s.sume the command; and I hope his situation of inspector of militia will not be considered a bar to the arrangement. The state of the roads will probably stop this projected movement until the end of this month or beginning of the next; nor do I intend that the troops should leave their present quarters, unless urged by some fresh circ.u.mstances. I therefore look to receive your excellency's commands previous to their departure.
From Amherstburg to Fort Erie, my chief dependance must rest on a naval force for the protection of that extensive coast; but, considering the state to which it is reduced, extraordinary exertions and great expense will be required before it can be rendered efficient. At present, it consists only of a s.h.i.+p and a small schooner--the latter of a bad construction, old, and in want of many repairs; yet she is the only king's vessel able to navigate Lake Huron, whilst the Americans have a sloop, and a fine brig capable of carrying twelve guns, both in perfect readiness for any service. If, consequently, the garrison of St. Joseph's is to be maintained, and an attack on Michilimakinack undertaken, it will be expedient to hire, or purchase from the merchants, as many vessels as may be necessary for the purpose. The Americans can resort to the same means, and the construction and number of their vessels for trade will give them great advantage: besides, their small craft, or boats, in which troops could be easily transported, exceed ours considerably; indeed, we have very few of that description. I therefore leave it to your excellency's superior judgment to determine whether a sufficient number of gun-boats for both lakes, so constructed as to draw little water, ought not be added to our means of offence and defence. It is worthy of remark, that the only American national vessel on Lake Ontario, built two years ago, and now lying in Sackett's harbour, has remained without seamen until within the last fortnight, when the officers began to enter men as fast as possible. A lieutenant with a party came to Buffalo, a tolerably large village opposite Fort Erie, and procured several hands, but, not satisfied, a petty officer was sent to our side to inveigle others. The magistrates, hearing of this, sent to apprehend him; but he escaped with difficulty.
The strait between Niagara and Fort Erie is that which, in all probability, will be chosen by the Americans for their main body to penetrate with a view to conquest. All other attacks will be subordinate, or merely made to divert our attention.
About three thousand militia could, upon an emergency, be drawn by us to that line, and nearly five hundred Indians could also be collected; therefore, with the regulars, no trifling force could hope for success, provided a determined resistance were made; but I cannot conceal from your excellency, that unless a strong regular force be present to animate the loyal and to control the disaffected, nothing effectual can be expected. A protracted resistance upon this frontier will be sure to embarra.s.s the enemy's plans materially. They will not come prepared to meet it, and their troops, or volunteer corps, without scarcely any discipline, so far at least as control is in question, will soon tire under disappointment. The difficulty which they will experience in providing provisions will involve them in expenses, under which their government will soon become impatient.