Part 17 (1/2)
Among the States which had led off in his favor was California; and it was a representative of California who first sounded the charge for Douglas's cohorts in the House. In any other place and at any other time, Marshall's exordium would have overshot the mark. Indeed, in indorsing the attack of the _Review_ on the old fogies in the party, he tore open wounds which it were best to let heal; but gauged by the prevailing standard of taste in politics, the speech was acceptable.
It so far commended itself to the editors of the much-abused _Review_ that it appeared in the April number, under the caption ”The Progress of Democracy vs. Old Fogy Retrograder.”
To clear-headed outsiders, there was something fact.i.tious in this parade of enthusiasm for Douglas. ”What most surprises one,” wrote the correspondent of the New York _Tribune_, ”is that these Congressmen, with beards and without; that verdant, flippant, smart detachment of Young America that has got into the House, propose to make a candidate for the Baltimore convention without consulting their masters, the people. With a few lively fellows in Congress and the aid of the _Democratic Review_, they fancy themselves equal to the achievement of a small job like this.”[389] As the first of June approached, the older, experienced politicians grew confident that none of the prominent candidates could command a two-thirds vote in the convention. Some had foreseen this months beforehand and had been casting about for a compromise candidate. Their choice fell eventually upon General Franklin Pierce of New Hamps.h.i.+re. Friends were active in his behalf as early as April, and by June they had hatched their plot.
It was not their plan to present his name to the convention at the outset, but to wait until the three prominent candidates (Ca.s.s, Douglas, and Buchanan) were disposed of. He was then to be put forward as an available, compromise candidate.[390]
Was Douglas cognizant of the situation? While his supporters did not abate their noisy demonstrations, there is some ground to believe that he did not share their optimistic spirit. At all events, in spite of his earlier injunctions, only eleven delegates from Illinois attended the convention, while Pennsylvania sent fifty-five, Tennessee twenty-seven, and Indiana thirty-nine. Had Douglas sent home the intimation that the game was up? The first ballot told the story of his defeat. Common rumor had predicted that a large part of the Northwest would support him. Only fifteen of his twenty votes came from that quarter, and eleven of these were cast by Illinois. It was said that the Indiana delegates would divert their strength to him, when they had cast one ballot for General Lane; but Indiana cast no votes for Douglas. Although his total vote rose to ninety-two and on the thirty-first ballot he received the highest vote of any of the candidates, there was never a moment when there was the slightest prospect of his winning the prize.[391]
On the thirty-fifth ballot occurred a diversion. Virginia cast fifteen votes for Franklin Pierce. The schemers had launched their project.
But it was not until the forty-ninth ballot that they started the avalanche. Pierce then received all but six votes. Two Ohio delegates clung to Douglas to the bitter end. With the frank manliness which made men forget his less admirable qualities, Douglas dictated this dispatch to the convention: ”I congratulate the Democratic party upon the nomination, and Illinois will give Franklin Pierce a larger majority than any other State in the Union,”--a promise which he was not able to redeem.
If Douglas had been disposed to work out his political prospects by mathematical computation, he would have arrived at some interesting conclusions from the balloting in the convention. Indeed, very probably he drew some deductions in his own intuitive way, without any advent.i.tious aid. Of the three rivals, Ca.s.s received the most widely distributed vote, although Douglas received votes from as many States.
While they drew votes from twenty-one States, Buchanan received votes from only fifteen. Ca.s.s and Douglas obtained their highest percentages of votes from the West; Buchanan found his strongest support in the South. Douglas and Ca.s.s received least support in the Middle States; Buchanan had no votes from the West. But while Ca.s.s had, on his highest total, thirty per centum of the whole vote of the Middle States, Douglas was relatively weak in the Middle States rather than in the South. On the basis of these figures, it is impossible to justify the statement that he could expect nothing in future from New England and Pennsylvania, but would look to the South for support for the presidency.[392] On the contrary, one would say that his strong New England following would act as an equipoise, preventing too great a dip toward the Southern end of the scales. Besides, Douglas's hold on his own const.i.tuents and the West was contingent upon the favor of the strong New England element in the Northwest. If this convention taught Douglas anything, it must have convinced him that narrow, sectional policies and undue favor to the South would never land him in the White House. To win the prize which he frankly coveted, he must grow in the national confidence, and not merely in the favor of a single section, however powerful.[393]
Pledges aside, Douglas was bound to give vigorous aid to the party candidates. His term as senator was about to expire. His own fortunes were inseparably connected with those of his party in Illinois. The Was.h.i.+ngton _Union_ printed a list of his campaign engagements, remarking with evident satisfaction that Judge Douglas was ”in the field with his armor on.” His itinerary reached from Virginia to Arkansas, and from New York to the interior counties of his own State.
Stray items from a speech in Richmond suggest the tenuous quality of these campaign utterances. It was quite clear to his mind that General Scott's acceptance of the Whig nomination could not have been written by that manly soldier, but by _Politician_ Scott under the control of _General_ Seward. Was it wise to convert a good general into a bad president? Could it be true that Scott had promised the entire patronage of his administration to the Whigs? Why, ”there had never been a Democratic administration in this Union that did not retain at least one-third of their political opponents in office!”[394] And yet, when Pierce had been elected, Douglas could say publicly, without so much as a blush, that Democrats must now have the offices. ”For every Whig removed there should be a competent Democrat put in his place ...
The best men should be selected, and everybody knows that the best men voted for Pierce and King.”[395]
The outcome of the elections in Illinois was gratifying save in one particular. In consequence of the redistricting of the State, the Whigs had increased the number of their representatives in Congress.
But the re-election of Douglas was a.s.sured.[396] His hold upon his const.i.tuency was unshaken. With right good will he partic.i.p.ated in the Democratic celebration at Was.h.i.+ngton. As an influential personage in Democratic councils he was called upon to sketch in broad lines what he deemed to be sound Democratic policy; but only a casual reference to Cuba redeemed his speech from the commonplace. ”Whenever the people of Cuba show themselves worthy of freedom by a.s.serting and maintaining independence, and apply for annexation, they ought to be annexed; whenever Spain is ready to sell Cuba, with the consent of its inhabitants, we ought to accept it on fair terms; and if Spain should transfer Cuba to England or any other European power, we should take and hold Cuba anyhow.”[397]
Ambition and a buoyant optimism seemed likely to make Douglas more than ever a power in Democratic politics, when a personal bereavement changed the current of his life. His young wife whom he adored, the mother of his two boys, died shortly after the new year. For the moment he was overwhelmed; and when he again took his place in the Senate, his colleagues remarked in him a bitterness and acerbity of temper which was not wonted. One hostage that he had given to Fortune had been taken away, and a certain recklessness took possession of him. He grew careless in his personal habits, slovenly in his dress, disregardful of his a.s.sociates, and if possible more vehemently partisan in his public utterances.
It was particularly regrettable that, while Douglas was pa.s.sing through this domestic tragedy, he should have been drawn into a controversy relating to British claims in Central America. It was rumored that Great Britain, in apparent violation of the terms of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, had taken possession of certain islands in the Bay of Honduras and erected them into the colony of ”the Bay Islands.”
On the heels of this rumor came news that aroused widespread indignation. A British man-of-war had fired upon an American steamer, which had refused to pay port dues on entering the harbor of Greytown.
Over this city, strategically located at the mouth of the San Juan River, Great Britain exercised an ill-disguised control as part of the Mosquito protectorate.
In the midst of the excited debate which immediately followed in Congress, Ca.s.s astonished everybody by producing the memorandum which Bulwer had given Clayton just before the signing of the treaty.[398]
In this remarkable note, the British amba.s.sador stated that his government did not wish to be understood as renouncing its existing claims to Her Majesty's settlement at Honduras and ”its dependencies.”
And Clayton seemed to have admitted the force of this reservation. For his part, Ca.s.s made haste to say, he wished the Senate distinctly to understand that when he had voted for the treaty, he believed Great Britain was thereby prevented from establis.h.i.+ng any such dependency.
His object--and he had supposed it to be the object of the treaty--was to sweep away all British claims to Central America.
Behind this imbroglio lay an intricate diplomatic history which can be here only briefly recapitulated. The interest of the United States in the Central American States dated from the discovery of gold in California. The value of the control of the means of transportation across the isthmus at Nicaragua became increasingly clear, as the gold seekers sought that route to the Pacific coast. In the latter days of his administration, President Polk had sent one Elijah Hise to cultivate friendly relations with the Central American States and to offset the paramount influence of Great Britain in that region. Great Britain was already in possession of the colony of Belize and was exercising an ill-defined protectorate over the Mosquito Indians on the eastern coast of Nicaragua. In his ardor to serve American interests, Hise exceeded his instructions and secured a treaty with Nicaragua, which gave to the United States exclusive privileges over the route of the proposed ca.n.a.l, on condition that the sovereignty of Nicaragua were guaranteed. The incoming Whig administration would have nothing to do with the Hise _entente_, preferring to dispatch its own agent to Central America. Though Squier succeeded in negotiating a more acceptable treaty, the new Secretary of State, Clayton, was disposed to come to an understanding with Great Britain. The outcome of these prolonged negotiations was the famous Clayton-Bulwer treaty, by which both countries agreed to further the construction of a s.h.i.+p ca.n.a.l across the isthmus through Nicaragua, and to guarantee its neutrality. Other countries were invited to join in securing the neutrality of this and other regions where ca.n.a.ls might be constructed. Both Great Britain and the United States explicitly renounced any ”dominion over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito coast or any part of Central America.”[399]
The opposition would have been something less than human, if they had not seized upon the occasion to discredit the outgoing administration.
Ca.s.s had already introduced a resolution reaffirming the terms of the famous Monroe message respecting European colonization in America, and thus furnis.h.i.+ng the pretext for partisan attacks upon Secretary of State Clayton. But Ca.s.s unwittingly exposed his own head to a sidelong blow from his Democratic rival from Illinois, who affected the role of Young America once more.
It is impossible to convey in cold print the biting sarcasm, the vindictive bitterness, and the reckless disregard of justice, with which Douglas spoke on February 14th. He sneered at this new profession of the Monroe Doctrine. Why keep repeating this talk about a policy which the United States has almost invariably repudiated in fact? Witness the Oregon treaty! ”With an avowed policy, of thirty years' standing that no future European colonization is to be permitted in America--affirmed when there was no opportunity for enforcing it, and abandoned whenever a case was presented for carrying it into practical effect--is it now proposed to beat another retreat under cover of terrible threats of awful consequences when the offense shall be repeated? '_Henceforth_' no 'future' European colony is to be planted in America '_with our consent!_' It is gratifying to learn that the United States are never going to 'consent' to the repudiation of the Monroe doctrine again. No more Clayton and Bulwer treaties; no more British 'alliances' in Central America, New Granada, or Mexico; no more resolutions of oblivion to protect 'existing rights!' Let England tremble, and Europe take warning, if the offense is repeated. 'Should the attempt be made,' says the resolution, 'it will leave the United States _free to adopt_ such measures as an independent nation may justly adopt in defense of its rights and honor.' Are not the United States now _free_ to adopt such measures as an independent nation may _justly adopt_ in defense of its _rights and honor_? Have we not given the notice? Is not thirty years sufficient notice?”[400]
He taunted Clayton with having suppressed the Hise treaty, which secured exclusive privileges for the United States over the ca.n.a.l route, in order to form a partners.h.i.+p with England and other monarchical powers of Europe. ”Exclusive privileges” were sacrificed to lay the foundation of an alliance by which European intervention in American affairs was recognized as a right!
It was generally known that Douglas had opposed the Clayton-Bulwer treaty;[401] but the particular ground of his opposition had been only surmised. Deeming the injunction of secrecy removed, he now emphatically registered his protest against the whole policy of pledging the faith of the Republic, not to do what in the future our interests, duty, and even safety, might compel us to do. The time might come when the United States would wish to possess some portion of Central America. Moreover, the agreement not to fortify any part of that region was not reciprocal, so long as Great Britain held Jamaica and commanded the entrance to the ca.n.a.l. He had always regarded the terms of the British protectorate over the Mosquito coast as equivocal; but the insuperable objection to the treaty was the European partners.h.i.+p to which the United States was pledged. The two parties not only contracted to extend their protection to any other practicable communications across the isthmus, whether by ca.n.a.l or railway, but invited all other powers to become parties to these provisions. What was the purport of this agreement, if it did not recognize the right of European powers to intervene in American affairs; what then became of the vaunted Monroe Doctrine?
To the undiplomatic mind of Douglas, our proper course was as clear as day. Insist upon the withdrawal of Great Britain from the Bay Islands!
”If we act with becoming discretion and firmness, I have no apprehension that the enforcement of our rights will lead to hostilities.” And then let the United States free itself from entangling alliances by annulling the Clayton-Bulwer treaty.[402]