Part 16 (1/2)

[Footnote 350: _Globe_, 31 Cong., 1 Sess., App., p. 371. I have italicized one phrase because of its interesting relation to the Kansas-Nebraska Act.]

[Footnote 351: _Globe_, 31 Cong., 1 Sess., App., p. 373.]

[Footnote 352: Stephens, Const. View of the War between the States, II, pp. 178 ff.]

[Footnote 353: For an account of this interesting episode, see Stephens, War Between the States, II, pp. 202-204. Boyd, not McClernand, was chairman of the House Committee, but the latter introduced the bills by agreement with Richardson.]

[Footnote 354: _Globe_, 31 Cong., 1 Sess., pp. 662, 757.]

[Footnote 355: See Sheahan, Douglas, pp. 132-134. See also Douglas's speech in the Senate, Dec. 23, 1851, and the testimony of Jefferson Davis, _Globe_, 31 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 1830.]

[Footnote 356: _Globe_, 31 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 1115.]

[Footnote 357: _Ibid._, p. 1116.]

[Footnote 358: _Globe_, 31 Cong., 1 Sess., pp. 1134-1135.]

[Footnote 359: _Ibid._, p. 1135.]

[Footnote 360: _Ibid._, p. 1134.]

[Footnote 361: _Ibid._, pp. 1143-1144.]

[Footnote 362: _Globe_, 36 Cong., 1 Sess., App., pp. 305-306; also Cutts, Const.i.tutional and Party Questions, pp. 80-81.]

[Footnote 363: _Globe_, 31 Cong., 1 Sess., App., pp. 1480-1481.

Rhodes, History of the United States, I, p. 181.]

[Footnote 364: Rhodes, History of the United States, I, pp. 182-183.]

[Footnote 365: _Globe_, 32 Cong., 1 Sess., App., p. 66.]

[Footnote 366: _Globe_, 31 Cong., 1 Sess., pp. 1829-1830.]

[Footnote 367: _Ibid._, p. 1830.]

[Footnote 368: See his speech in Chicago; Sheahan, Douglas, p. 169.]

[Footnote 369: When Douglas reported the bills, he announced that there was a difference of opinion in the committee on some points, in regard to which each member reserved the right of stating his own opinion and of acting in accordance therewith. See _Globe_, 31 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 592.]

CHAPTER X

YOUNG AMERICA

When Douglas reached Chicago, immediately after the adjournment of Congress, he found the city in an uproar. The strong anti-slavery sentiment of the community had been outraged by the Fugitive Slave Law. Reflecting the popular indignation, the Common Council had adopted resolutions condemning the act as a violation of the Const.i.tution and a transgression of the laws of G.o.d. Those senators and representatives who voted for the bill, or ”who basely sneaked away from their seats and thereby evaded the question,” were stigmatized as ”fit only to be ranked with the traitors, Benedict Arnold and Judas Iscariot.” This was indeed a sorry home-coming for one who believed himself ent.i.tled to honors.

Learning that a ma.s.s-meeting was about to indorse the action of the city fathers, Douglas determined to face his detractors and meet their charges. Entering the hall while the meeting was in progress, he mounted the platform, and announced that on the following evening he would publicly defend all the measures of adjustment. He was greeted with hisses and jeers for his pains; but in the end he had the satisfaction of securing an adjournment until his defense had been heard.

It was infinitely to his credit that when he confronted a hostile audience on the next evening, he stooped to no cheap devices to divert resentment, but sought to approve his course to the sober intelligence of his hearers.[370] It is doubtful if the Fugitive Slave Law ever found a more skillful defender. The spirit in which he met his critics was admirably calculated to disarm prejudice. Come and let us reason together, was his plea. Without any attempt to ignore the most obnoxious parts of the act, he pa.s.sed directly to the discussion of the clauses which apparently denied the writ of _habeas corpus_ and trial by jury to the fugitive from service. He reminded his hearers that this act was supplementary to the Act of 1793. No one had found fault with the earlier act because it had denied these rights. Both acts, in fact, were silent on these points; yet in neither case was silence to be construed as a denial of const.i.tutional obligations. On the contrary, they must be a.s.sumed to continue in full force under the act. Misapprehension arose in these matters, because the recovery of the fugitive slave was not viewed as a process of extradition. The act provided for the return of the alleged slave to the State from which he had fled. Trial of the facts by jury would then follow under the laws of the State, just as the fugitive from justice would be tried in the State where the alleged crime had been committed. The testimony before the original court making the requisition, would necessarily be _ex parte_, as in the case of the escaped criminal; but this did not prevent a fair trial on return of the fugitive. Regarding the question of establis.h.i.+ng the ident.i.ty of the apprehended person with the fugitive described in the record, Douglas a.s.serted that the terms of the act required proof satisfactory to the judge or commissioner, and not merely the presentment of the record. ”Other and further evidence”

might be insisted upon.

At various times Douglas was interrupted by questions which were obviously contrived to embarra.s.s him. To all such he replied courteously and with engaging frankness. ”Why was it,” asked one of these troublesome questioners, ”that the law provided for a fee of ten dollars if the commissioner decided in favor of the claimant, and for a fee of only five dollars if he decided otherwise? Was this not in the nature of an inducement, a bribe?” ”I presume,” said Douglas, ”that the reason was that he would have more labor to perform. If, after hearing the testimony, the commissioner decided in favor of the claimant, the law made it his duty to prepare and authenticate the necessary papers to authorize him to carry the fugitive home; but if he decided against him, he had no such labor to perform.”