Part 3 (1/2)

CO-OPERATION WITH THE ARMY

_Reconnaissance_

In the event of France and England declaring war concurrently against Gereneral staffs before the war had been that the British Expeditionary Force should be e, Mons, area and take up a line on the left flank of the French Arland had withheld her declaration until three days after the French, and on landing in France the first words I heard said by a Frenchlaise arrive mais on a manque le premier plan” It was not until after the arrival of GHQ at Ah late, it was decided that the advanced line should be taken up

The Royal Flying Corpsaerodroe 12 miles from Mons on the 16th

On the 19th the first reconnaissance was carried out, and the entire country over which the Ger, as far as Brussels and Louvain, was kept under observation One of the best reconnaissances ever ust 21st, which discovered the 2nd Gerh Ninhove and Grae we had to retire on the 24th to Le Cateau, on the 25th to St Quentin, on the 26th to La Fere, on the 28th to Cone, on the 30th to Senlis, on the 31st to Juilly, on September 2nd to Serris, on the 3rd to Touquin, on the 4th to Melun, where ere thankful at last to get orders again to advance on the 7th to Touquin, and on the 9th to Coulo Fere-en-Tardennois on the 12th for the Battle of the Aisne

Of the many recollections of the early days one which will reest in ees, of the poor people we left behind And the glare of villages burning by the hand of the Boche It was indeed war

Valuable reconnaissances werethe whole Retreat from Mons to the Marne in spite of the tremendous difficulties involved by constant rounds, but, in the words of Sir John French, ”It was the tiave which chiefly enabled er and disaster There can be no doubt indeed that even then the presence and co-operation of aircraft saved the very frequent use of cavalry patrols and detailed supports” The Royal Flying Corps was an i the British Expeditionary Force to escape von Kluck's nearly successful efforts to secure another and a British Sedan

The reconnaissance resulting in thethe whole of the as that of Septe the critical operations on the Marne, which formed one of the decisive battles in the world's history, when von Kluck's turning ainst the French left was accurately reported and Marshal Joffre was enabled to ly ”The precision, exactitude and regularity of the news brought in,” he said in a e to the British Co of pilots and observers” The reports of the German air service, on the other hand, would appear from von Kluck's movements to have been of no assistance to him

The system adopted from the first was for the pilot or observer, or both, i their report to RFC

Headquarters, whence the Commander, or his staff officer, accompanied them to GHQ, where the map was filled in in accordance with the report GHQ could then ask questions and obtain any further inforive, while RFC Headquarters could ascertain what further reports were ently required The form of the reports, which were ready printed, had been ht out at RFC Headquarters in peace and experimented with at the Concentration Camp

The maps thus coust 31st and Septeh it was soet the information put on the map for pro of Septeht that German cavalry ithin a few miles, GHQ made a very hurried departure, and I was unable to find anyone to whoive very important reports

It was at the Battle of the Marne that machines were for the first ti-distance reconnaissance was carried out by otherfrom Headquarters Later on, this systeanization, squadrons being allotted to, and reporting direct to, Corps for tactical reconnaissance, artillery co-operation and contact patrols, and to Ar

The last phase of the war of movement was the race for the Channel Ports and it devolved upon aircraft to observe the enemy's movements from his centre and left flank to meet the Allied movement to the coast, to observe the movements of the four newly-formed corps which caian and British forces at Antwerp and Ostend Information was very difficult to obtain and on one occasion I flew from the Aisne to Antwerp, under Sir John French's instructions, in order as far as possible to clear up the general situation when our GHQ was in doubt as to whether Antas co piece of work There was a light drizzle, and the forest of Cone had to be flown over at about 200 feet The BE could not h only a short halt was made at Amiens for the purpose, it was too late to fly direct to Antwerp Instead, a landing was h, which was selected froes, to which town I rode on a borrowed bicycle At Bruges there was great consternation and uncertainty as to the position at Antwerp, but the Coetic driver at h

After ed to find our way into Antwerp by about ian Coh the Gerh the South-Eastern sector and his troops were very hard pressed (and pointing repeatedly to a piece of an 18-inch German shell in the corner of the room, he said, ”Mais qu'est-ce qu'on peut faire avec ces choses-la!”), he hoped to be able to hold out for a ti as et clear of Antwerp, reaching Bruges again at 315 am At 4 am we set out and found a very wet machine in a wetter field and after considerable difficulty and flying through the top of the surrounding hedge, struggled into the upper air on the way back to Headquarters at Fere-en-Tardennois

During the Battles of the Aisne and of Ypres strategical reconnaissance was carried out by the few machines available at Headquarters Shephard, the best reconnaissance officer I have ever knoas killed later, used to fly his BE2 without observer over the greater part of Belgiu, closely packed, and extraordinarily valuable report Tactical reconnaissance to a depth of 15 to 20 miles was done by units attached to Corps

After the Battle of the Aisne, which was the turning point in the evolution from the war of h still the basis of air work, tended to become a matter of routine, while raphy and artillery spotting by wireless--were developed

_Photography_

Though experiraphy from the air before the war, principally by Fletcher, Hubbard and Laws, and its value to survey was recognized, it had not become of practical utility

We only took one official caust 13th, 1914, and it was not until Septeraphy was made, when five plates were exposed over positions behind the enereat value as an aid to observation in trench warfare was, however, very apparent, fresh brains were brought to the task, Moore-Brabazon, Campbell and Dr

Swan, and by the end of the year better success was obtained, though positions even then had to be filled in by the observer with red ink

Experireat iraphy was universal At the Battle of the Soraphed as soon as they were seen, and the camera did invaluable work in the reconnaissance of the Hindenburg Line during the Gerraphs was a daily occurrence On Septeraphs was raphy, very remarkable in itself, is even more so when it is reuns drove ourup to 20,000 and even 22,000 feet, at which heights the negatives had to be as distinct as those taken at 4,000 in the earlier days of the war

At the beginning of the Dardanelles operations our apparatus consisted of one caraphs were taken by Butler in April, 1915, from a H Farman machine at necessarily low altitudes Butler ounded in June and was succeeded by Thomson, who alone made 900 exposures and sent in 3,600 prints

In addition to the assistance of air photography to reconnaissance, the war gave it great i It was, in fact, the onlythe maps of country held by the enemy, which in certain cases, as at Gallipoli and in Palestine, were very inaccurate