Part 2 (1/2)

The problem as to how far aircraft would reduce the value of cavalry idely discussed before the war It was seen that by day aircraft could obtain quicker and more accurate inforht reconnaissance, of round by fighting This was found to be so during the retreat, when, in addition to the direct value of aircraft for long-distance reconnaissance, an indirect asset of great importance lay in the release of the cavalry for battle action in assistance of the infantry The question has becoround targets has developed, but although wethe Retreat fro to make the use of cavalry a problem of extreme difficulty in European wars, and it is possible that, in addition to their reconnaissance functions, aircraft will supersede the shock tactics and delaying action of cavalry, though thisof the past, cavalry are converted intowere, therefore, chiefly studied from the point of view of reconnaissance In addition to the possibility of being shot at by other aircraft, an iround Before the war reconnaissances were carried out at heights varying froenerally considered that the aeroplane was safe frohts above 3,000 feet

Serious difficulties affecting the ular supply of fuel and the selection of landing grounds when h behind the front line as not to entail waste of ti out and back over friendly territory This was later brought ho the Retreat fro attention was paid to bettering their power of reconnaissance by air photography, their value in co-operation with artillery by wireless equip and their offence and defence by armament

The value of a correct initiative and the aeroplane's role as an offensive weapon were fully appreciated and brought out in the Training Manual of the Royal Flying Corps which we coh, and which was published early in 1914 by the War Office It says:--

”It is probable that one phase of the struggle for the command of the air will resolve itself into a series of combats between individual aeroplanes, or pairs of aeroplanes If the pilots of one side can succeed in obtaining victory in a succession of such combats, they will establish apilots of the enemy, and be left free to carry out their duties of reconnaissance The actual tactics ed, the object of the pilot being to obtain for his passenger the free use of his oeapon while denying to the ene aeroplane will be the first object In the case of fast reconnaissance aeroplanes it will often be advisable to avoid fighting, in order to carry out a mission or to deliver information; but it must be borne in mind that this will be sohting, a fixed determination to attack and ill be the surest road to victory”

Speaking generally, the evolution of thebehind, followed upon the evolution of air tactics

As soon as experience, often hard won at the cost of a valuable life, opened up new fields of activity for aircraft, the designer and constructor evolved new designs to meet the new requirements It was no small achievement in this period to have solved the problem of inherent stability, both in theory and practice, so successfully, that from the aerodynamic standpoint our machines in 1914 compare favourably with those in use at the end of the war

In dealing with the evolution of thethe three years prior to the war there are three land to the Air Battalion failed to reach their destination for Ar Corps was for etically and ust, 1914, four squadrons flew to France with ree of stability and were not inferior to any of those possessed by other countries When it is remembered in what a short ti that attention had been chiefly confined to the probleine and speed and reliability Wireless, bounnery had been discussed and experiress was made comparable to that effected under war conditions

Machines and engines before the ere chiefly French It is interesting to note those hich No 3 Squadron, one of the first to be formed, commenced its career in May, 1912 They consisted of one 50 horse-power Gnome Nieuport, one Deperdussin, which by the as privately owned, one Gnome Bristol, two Gnome Bleriot monoplanes, one Avro and one Bristol box-kite biplane By September, 1912, the Squadron possessed fourteento the number of accidents incurred by them, the use of monoplanes was temporarily forbidden, and it was not until April, 1913, that the Squadron was fully equipped with BE and Maurice Farhts

These types for, which also included Codys, Breguets, Avros, and, later, Sopwiths The BE2c was produced by the Royal Aircraft Factory in the auturee of stability by flying from Aldershot to Froyle and from Froyle to Fleet, distances of 6-3/4 and 8 miles respectively, without the use of ailerons or elevators The progress made is illustrated by the fact that at the Army Man[oe]uvres of 1913 twelve machines covered 4,545 hts, accurate observations being ht of 6,000 feet, without serious radual substitution of BE's for Farround of the all-round efficiency and superior fighting qualities of the fore of standardization, but it was objected by the War Office that the Farmans were the only machines that could mount weapons in front--an objection which was not h the airscreas introduced--and that the slower Fares for observation, an idea which was long prevalent As a result, a compromise was effected, and two squadrons were equipped with BE's and tith hohts of Farmans, Bleriots and Avros

At the outbreak of war thewere the BE2 tractor with a 70 horse-power Renault engine, a speed of 73 miles an hour, and a climb of 3,000 feet in nine minutes; and a Henri Farman pusher with a speed of 60 miles an hour, and a climb of 3,000 feet in fourteenclear observation of the ground, and partly in this connection staggered planes were introduced, cul in the BE2c's, which were not, however, available for service in any numbers until 1915

To sum up, the technical development of aircraft has taken place, and will continue side by side with the evolution of the uses to which aircraft can be put While due attention was paid to problems connected with the anticipated duties of aircraft ancillary to that of reconnaissance, owing to the short space of ti Corps and the outbreak of war, to the difficulties connected with the engine, and to causes inseparable from peace conditions, develop a stable and reliable ood field of view

CONCLUSIONS

The foregoing outline of the development of aviation from the earliest times up to the war--a story of human endeavour and achieveers and difficulties--is not without value in endeavouring to assess that which has since occurred

At the beginning of the year 1912 the Royal Flying Corps did not exist

At the beginning of the Great War, in 1914, England found herself with an air service which, though much smaller than those of Geranized, trained and equipped, that it placed her at a bound in the front rank of aviation

The ine still unequal to the tasks laid upon it Civil Aviation practically did not exist

I shall now describe the extension of air duties under war conditions; the increasing value of aircraft for general action and air tactics and their developy

This resulted in the expansion of our flying corps from a total of 1,844 officers and men, and seven squadrons with some 150 machines fit for war use, to a total of nearly 300,000 officers and men, and 201 squadrons and 22,000 machines in use at the end of the war, and in the evolution of the ard it, not only as a weapon of war, but as a new method of transport for commercial purposes in peace

CHAPTER II

WAR

GENERAL REMARKS ON WAR DEVELOPMENT