Part 6 (2/2)

121. In 449 In 449 BCE BCE, when the Decemvirs were forced to abdicate.122. Machiavelli is quoting Livy, Book III, chapter 65. Machiavelli is quoting Livy, Book III, chapter 65.123. Machiavelli quotes Machiavelli quotes Bellum Catilinae Bellum Catilinae, 51, 27, in Latin: in Latin: Quod omnia mala exempla bonis initiis orta sunt in Latin: Quod omnia mala exempla bonis initiis orta sunt. Regarding Bellum Catilinae Bellum Catilinae, see note 250 to Book III, chapter 6, below.124. In chapter 33 above, t.i.tled ”When a Problem Within a State or Against a State Has Grown, It Is Better to Bide One's Time Than to Tackle It with Full Force.” In chapter 33 above, t.i.tled ”When a Problem Within a State or Against a State Has Grown, It Is Better to Bide One's Time Than to Tackle It with Full Force.”

CHAPTER FIFTY.

ON HOW A SINGLE COUNCIL OR MAGISTRATE SHOULD NOT BE ABLE TO BLOCK THE PROCEEDINGS OF A STATE.

When t.i.tus Quinctius Cincinnatus and Gnaeus Julius Mento were consuls in Rome they were always at odds, and this brought all the proceedings of the republic to a halt.125 As a result, the Senate decided to create a dictator to do what the consuls were unable to do because of their constant wrangling. The consuls, however, though they disagreed about everything else, did agree on one thing: They did not want a dictator. So the Senate had no other recourse than to turn to the tribunes for help. The tribunes, with the backing of the Senate, forced the consuls to obey. This demonstrates the usefulness of the office of tribune, which was valuable not only in keeping the ruthless ambition of the powerful against the plebeians in check, but also the conflict of the plebeians among themselves. It demonstrates too that one should never establish an inst.i.tution in a state that will enable the few to block a decision that might be vital in keeping the state from harm. For example, if you give a council power to distribute honors and rewards, or give a magistrate the power to direct an affair, it makes sense either to impose a stipulation that will compel these authorities to act in all circ.u.mstances, or to set things up in such a way that if they do not want to act, someone else can and will. Otherwise such an inst.i.tution is defective and dangerous, as it would have been in Rome had the power of the tribunes not been able to oppose the obstinacy of the consuls. In the Republic of Venice, it is the Greater Council that distributes the honors and rewards. There were times, however, when members of this council, out of contempt or false conviction, did not appoint successors to magistrates and those who administered Venice's empire. This led to great turmoil, because suddenly Venice and its foreign dominions lacked legitimate judges. Nor could anything be done unless all the members of the Greater Council were satisfied or dissuaded from their false conviction. This problem would have brought Venice to a bad end if prudent citizens had not made provision for it. When the opportunity presented itself, they pa.s.sed a law that no Venetian magistrate inside or outside Venice could vacate his post unless a successor had been appointed. This removed the possibility of the council impeding public actions and so endangering the republic. As a result, the Senate decided to create a dictator to do what the consuls were unable to do because of their constant wrangling. The consuls, however, though they disagreed about everything else, did agree on one thing: They did not want a dictator. So the Senate had no other recourse than to turn to the tribunes for help. The tribunes, with the backing of the Senate, forced the consuls to obey. This demonstrates the usefulness of the office of tribune, which was valuable not only in keeping the ruthless ambition of the powerful against the plebeians in check, but also the conflict of the plebeians among themselves. It demonstrates too that one should never establish an inst.i.tution in a state that will enable the few to block a decision that might be vital in keeping the state from harm. For example, if you give a council power to distribute honors and rewards, or give a magistrate the power to direct an affair, it makes sense either to impose a stipulation that will compel these authorities to act in all circ.u.mstances, or to set things up in such a way that if they do not want to act, someone else can and will. Otherwise such an inst.i.tution is defective and dangerous, as it would have been in Rome had the power of the tribunes not been able to oppose the obstinacy of the consuls. In the Republic of Venice, it is the Greater Council that distributes the honors and rewards. There were times, however, when members of this council, out of contempt or false conviction, did not appoint successors to magistrates and those who administered Venice's empire. This led to great turmoil, because suddenly Venice and its foreign dominions lacked legitimate judges. Nor could anything be done unless all the members of the Greater Council were satisfied or dissuaded from their false conviction. This problem would have brought Venice to a bad end if prudent citizens had not made provision for it. When the opportunity presented itself, they pa.s.sed a law that no Venetian magistrate inside or outside Venice could vacate his post unless a successor had been appointed. This removed the possibility of the council impeding public actions and so endangering the republic.

125. In 431, during the wars with the Volsci and Aequi, t.i.tus Quinctius Cincinnatus and Gnaeus Julius Mento were elected consuls. Livy (Book IV, chapter 26) writes: ”The consuls' perverse discord and constant wrangling in the Senate greatly alarmed the Romans.” In 431, during the wars with the Volsci and Aequi, t.i.tus Quinctius Cincinnatus and Gnaeus Julius Mento were elected consuls. Livy (Book IV, chapter 26) writes: ”The consuls' perverse discord and constant wrangling in the Senate greatly alarmed the Romans.”

CHAPTER FIFTY-ONE.

ON HOW A REPUBLIC OR PRINCE MUST MAKE A SHOW OF DOING OUT OF GENEROSITY WHAT HE MUST DO FROM NECESSITY.

Prudent men know how to make a merit of each of their actions even when necessity forces them to take these actions. The Roman Senate was prudent in this way when it chose to pay men in military service out of public funds even though the men had always been accustomed to supporting themselves. The Senate realized that otherwise it would be impossible to wage war over long periods and that the Roman armies would be unable to lay siege to cities or dispatch the soldiers far from Rome. The Senate saw that it was necessary to be able to do both, and so decided that salaries would be paid to the soldiers, but in such a way that made a merit of what in fact necessity was forcing it to do. The plebeians so welcomed this gift that all Rome went wild with happiness, and regarded the Senate's decision as a great benefit that they could never have hoped for or sought on their own.126 The tribunes did their best to abolish this resolution, arguing that as the plebeians would have to pay taxes in order to cover the military salaries, it would burden them, not provide relief, but the tribunes did not manage to convince the plebeians. The Senate even managed to increase the plebeians' enthusiasm in the way it distributed taxes, by imposing the heaviest and largest taxes on the n.o.bility, taxes which would have to be paid first. The tribunes did their best to abolish this resolution, arguing that as the plebeians would have to pay taxes in order to cover the military salaries, it would burden them, not provide relief, but the tribunes did not manage to convince the plebeians. The Senate even managed to increase the plebeians' enthusiasm in the way it distributed taxes, by imposing the heaviest and largest taxes on the n.o.bility, taxes which would have to be paid first.

126. Livy (Book IV, chapter 60) writes: ”It is told that nothing was ever welcomed by the plebeians with such rejoicing They flocked to the Senate, grasped the senators' hands as they emerged, saying that they were rightly called 'Fathers,' and proclaiming that now no man, while he had any strength left, would spare his body or blood for such a generous state.” Livy (Book IV, chapter 60) writes: ”It is told that nothing was ever welcomed by the plebeians with such rejoicing They flocked to the Senate, grasped the senators' hands as they emerged, saying that they were rightly called 'Fathers,' and proclaiming that now no man, while he had any strength left, would spare his body or blood for such a generous state.”

CHAPTER FIFTY-THREE.

ON HOW, DECEIVED BY A FALSE KIND OF GOOD, THE POPULACE OFTEN DESIRES ITS OWN RUIN, AND HOW EASILY IT IS MOVED BY GREAT HOPES AND BOLD PROMISES.

After the city of Veii was defeated, the populace of Rome came upon the idea that it might be good if half the Romans went to live in Veii.127 They reasoned that as Veii was rich in territory and buildings and was also close to Rome, half the population of Rome could be made richer without great upheaval. The Senate and the wiser Romans, however, considered this so futile and dangerous that they openly declared they would rather face death than consent to such an idea. Consequently, when the matter came up for debate, the plebeians were so incensed against the Senate that arms and bloodshed would have ensued had not the Senate used some elderly and esteemed citizens as a s.h.i.+eld, the reverence the plebeians had for them putting a halt to the clamor. They reasoned that as Veii was rich in territory and buildings and was also close to Rome, half the population of Rome could be made richer without great upheaval. The Senate and the wiser Romans, however, considered this so futile and dangerous that they openly declared they would rather face death than consent to such an idea. Consequently, when the matter came up for debate, the plebeians were so incensed against the Senate that arms and bloodshed would have ensued had not the Senate used some elderly and esteemed citizens as a s.h.i.+eld, the reverence the plebeians had for them putting a halt to the clamor.128 Two things are of note here. First, the populace will often be misled by a deceptive appearance of good, and consequently end up desiring its own ruin; for if the populace is not made to understand what is good and what is bad by someone it trusts, endless danger and harm can come to a state. Two things are of note here. First, the populace will often be misled by a deceptive appearance of good, and consequently end up desiring its own ruin; for if the populace is not made to understand what is good and what is bad by someone it trusts, endless danger and harm can come to a state.129 And when fate has it that the populace does not have faith in anyone, as sometimes happens, having been duped in the past by men or events, this inevitably leads to ruin. In his discourse And when fate has it that the populace does not have faith in anyone, as sometimes happens, having been duped in the past by men or events, this inevitably leads to ruin. In his discourse De monarchic De monarchic, Dante says that the populace at times shouts: ”Long live their death! Death to their life!”130 Because of this lack of faith, states sometimes do not reach good decisions, as I have said above about the Venetians: When all their enemies came together and a.s.saulted them, the Venetians did not manage to decide, before they were ruined, to give back territories they had occupied (which had given rise to the conspiracy of princes Because of this lack of faith, states sometimes do not reach good decisions, as I have said above about the Venetians: When all their enemies came together and a.s.saulted them, the Venetians did not manage to decide, before they were ruined, to give back territories they had occupied (which had given rise to the conspiracy of princes131 and the war that was waged against them), even though giving back these territories would have won over some of their enemies. and the war that was waged against them), even though giving back these territories would have won over some of their enemies.

Therefore, in considering what it is easy to persuade a populace of, or what is difficult, the following distinction can be made: What you must persuade it of appears at first glance a gain or a loss, or appears courageous or cowardly. And when the populace sees a gain in the matters placed before it, even if there is a loss hiding behind these matters, it will always be easy to persuade it to follow that path as long as it seems courageous, even if it leads to the ruin of the republic. Likewise, it will always be difficult to convince the populace about those decisions where there is seeming cowardice or loss, even if behind them there is hidden security and gain. My point is confirmed by countless examples, Roman and foreign, ancient and modern. From this arose the bad opinion in Rome concerning Fabius Maximus,132 who could not persuade the Roman populace that it would be good for the republic to proceed slowly in the Punic War, and to endure Hannibal's attacks without confronting them. The populace considered this option cowardly, and did not see the value hidden behind it, nor did Fabius Maximus present enough reasons to convince them. The Roman populace was so blinded by its opinion that even though it had committed the error of authorizing Fabius's Master of the Horse who could not persuade the Roman populace that it would be good for the republic to proceed slowly in the Punic War, and to endure Hannibal's attacks without confronting them. The populace considered this option cowardly, and did not see the value hidden behind it, nor did Fabius Maximus present enough reasons to convince them. The Roman populace was so blinded by its opinion that even though it had committed the error of authorizing Fabius's Master of the Horse133 to fight Hannibal, though Fabius was against it, the Roman army would have been destroyed if Fabius had not with his prudence saved the day. But the Roman populace did not learn from this, and went ahead and made Varro consul for no other merit than his promises in Rome's public places and squares to defeat Hannibal if he were given the authority to do so. to fight Hannibal, though Fabius was against it, the Roman army would have been destroyed if Fabius had not with his prudence saved the day. But the Roman populace did not learn from this, and went ahead and made Varro consul for no other merit than his promises in Rome's public places and squares to defeat Hannibal if he were given the authority to do so.134 The result was the utter disaster at Cannae and the near destruction of Rome. The result was the utter disaster at Cannae and the near destruction of Rome.

I would also like to put forward another Roman example: Hannibal had been in Italy for nine or ten years, killing Romans throughout the land, when Marcus Centennius Paenula, a man of very humble origins (though he did hold a position of rank in the army), came to the Senate and declared that if he were given the authority to gather an army of volunteers anywhere in Italy he pleased, he would in short order deliver Hannibal dead or alive.135 The Senate saw his demand as extremely rash, but felt that if it were to turn him down and the populace were to find out, much turmoil and resentment against senatorial order would have ensued. So Paenula's request was granted, as the Senate preferred to put all those who followed him in danger than to spark new anger in the people, knowing that such a decision would be popular and how difficult it would be to dissuade the people from it. So Paenula marched out with a disorderly and unruly rabble to find Hannibal, and at the very first encounter was routed and killed along with all the men who followed him. The Senate saw his demand as extremely rash, but felt that if it were to turn him down and the populace were to find out, much turmoil and resentment against senatorial order would have ensued. So Paenula's request was granted, as the Senate preferred to put all those who followed him in danger than to spark new anger in the people, knowing that such a decision would be popular and how difficult it would be to dissuade the people from it. So Paenula marched out with a disorderly and unruly rabble to find Hannibal, and at the very first encounter was routed and killed along with all the men who followed him.

In Greece, in the city of Athens, a most grave and prudent man by the name of Niceas could not persuade the populace that it was a bad idea to invade Sicily, so when this idea was adopted against the wishes of the wise, the result was the complete destruction of Athens. When Scipio was made consul and wanted to conquer Africa, promising the destruction of Carthage, the Senate was unresolved, as Fabius Maximus was against it. So Scipio threatened to put the matter before the people, knowing very well how they liked such enterprises.

One could also give examples from our own city of Florence: Ercole Bentivoglio, along with Antonio Giacomini, commander of the Florentine troops, after having routed Bartolommeo d'Alviano at San Vincenti, besieged the city of Pisa. This campaign had been agreed to by the populace following the bold promises of Ercole Bentivoglio, even though many wise citizens condemned it. But the wise could do nothing, forced as they were by the will of the people, which was based on the rash promises of the commander. Hence I suggest that there is no easier way to ruin a republic where the populace has power than to engage it in bold campaigns, because where the populace carries weight in the deliberations, bold campaigns will be always accepted: Whoever might be of a different opinion will not be able to do anything about it. But if this causes the ruin of the state, it also causes-and this even more often-the ruin of the citizens in charge of such enterprises, because when the populace has taken victory for granted, when the defeat comes it does not accuse Fortune or the circ.u.mstances of war but the commander's wickedness and ignorance. In most cases he is then killed, imprisoned, or banished, as happened to countless Carthaginian generals and many Athenians. Previous victories are of no use to them because their present defeat cancels everything. This was the case with our Florentine general Antonio Giacomini, who, failing to conquer Pisa as he had promised and as the populace had been certain he would, fell into such disgrace with the people that, despite his countless successes in the past, he remained alive more because of the indulgence of those in power than that of the people.

127. Rome defeated Veii, a wealthy and important Etruscan city-state that lay ten miles northwest of Rome (modern Veio), after a decade-long siege in 395 Rome defeated Veii, a wealthy and important Etruscan city-state that lay ten miles northwest of Rome (modern Veio), after a decade-long siege in 395 BCE BCE. Machiavelli is closely following the text of Livy (Book V, chapter 24).128. Machiavelli closely follows Livy's text (Book V, chapter 25). Machiavelli closely follows Livy's text (Book V, chapter 25).129. The second thing of note is discussed at the beginning of the following chapter. The second thing of note is discussed at the beginning of the following chapter.130. In fact, Dante's In fact, Dante's Il Convivio (The Banquet) Il Convivio (The Banquet), I, 2.131. Machiavelli is referring to the League of Cambrai, formed in 1508 by Pope Julius II with the Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian I, Louis XII of France, and Ferdinand II of Aragon against Venice, with the aim of dividing its territorial possessions among them. Machiavelli is referring to the League of Cambrai, formed in 1508 by Pope Julius II with the Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian I, Louis XII of France, and Ferdinand II of Aragon against Venice, with the aim of dividing its territorial possessions among them.132. Fabius Maximus Quintus (d. 203 Fabius Maximus Quintus (d. 203 BCE BCE) was a Roman commander and statesman whose cautious delaying tactics during the war against Hannibal gave Rome time to recover its strength and take the offensive. Machiavelli is discussing the events described by Livy in Book XXII, chapters 2527.133. Fabius's effective delay tactics sparked controversy in Rome and a quarrel with Minucius Rufus, his Master of the Horse and second in command. In an unprecedented action, the people of Rome then divided the command between Minucius and Fabius. Fabius's effective delay tactics sparked controversy in Rome and a quarrel with Minucius Rufus, his Master of the Horse and second in command. In an unprecedented action, the people of Rome then divided the command between Minucius and Fabius.134. The Roman consuls of 216 The Roman consuls of 216 BCE BCE, Lucius Aemilius Paulus and Gaius Terentius Varro, set out to meet Hannibal in the disastrous Battle of Cannae with eighty thousand men, of whom only fourteen thousand escaped. (Livy, Book XXII, chapter 35.)135. Livy (Book XXV, chapter 19) comments: ”The promise was foolish, but just as foolish was the credence it received. As though the skills of an ordinary soldier could be the same as those of a commander.” Livy (Book XXV, chapter 19) comments: ”The promise was foolish, but just as foolish was the credence it received. As though the skills of an ordinary soldier could be the same as those of a commander.”

CHAPTER FIFTY-FOUR.

ON THE EXTENT TO WHICH A MAN OF GRAVITY AND RESPECT CAN HALT AN AROUSED MULt.i.tUDE.

The second thing of note concerning my discussion in the previous chapter is that nothing is as effective at halting an aroused mult.i.tude as its reverence for a man of gravity and authority who confronts them. Virgil does not say without reason: Yet if they see a man who is revered through goodness and merit, they will fall mute and crowd around him to listen to his words.136 Therefore a man who is given command of an army, or who finds himself in a city where there is turmoil, must step before the crowd with as much dignity as he can, surrounded by all the insignia of his rank, in order to make himself more revered. A few years ago Florence was divided into two factions, the Frateschi and the Arrabbiati, as they called themselves.137 These factions came to blows and the Frateschi were crushed. Among them was Pagolantonio Soderini, a citizen of repute in those days, and during the turmoil the armed mob headed to his house to sack it. His brother Francesco, then the Bishop of Volterra and today a cardinal, happened to be there, and the instant he heard the clamor and saw the crowd, put on his most venerable garment and over it the episcopal vestment. He confronted the armed crowd, and by his august presence and words managed to stop them. This incident was admired and celebrated throughout the city for many days. These factions came to blows and the Frateschi were crushed. Among them was Pagolantonio Soderini, a citizen of repute in those days, and during the turmoil the armed mob headed to his house to sack it. His brother Francesco, then the Bishop of Volterra and today a cardinal, happened to be there, and the instant he heard the clamor and saw the crowd, put on his most venerable garment and over it the episcopal vestment. He confronted the armed crowd, and by his august presence and words managed to stop them. This incident was admired and celebrated throughout the city for many days.

Hence I conclude that the best and most certain way of halting an aroused mult.i.tude is the presence of a man who appears venerable and is revered. Thus, to return to the incident discussed in the previous chapter, it can be seen with what obstinacy the Roman plebeians entertained the idea of moving to Veii because they judged it sensible and did not perceive the dangers it concealed, and how there would have been endless turmoil and upheaval had the Senate not used grave and revered men to halt the plebeians' frenzy.

136. Machiavelli quotes Virgil's Machiavelli quotes Virgil's Aeneid Aeneid, 1.151-52, in Latin: Tum pietate gravem ac meritis si forte virum quem/Conspexere, silent, arrectisque auribus adstant Tum pietate gravem ac meritis si forte virum quem/Conspexere, silent, arrectisque auribus adstant.137. The Frateschi were the followers of Savonarola, the Arrabbiati opposed him. The Frateschi were the followers of Savonarola, the Arrabbiati opposed him.

CHAPTER FIFTY-FIVE.

ON HOW EASILY THINGS CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED IN A STATE WHERE THE POPULACE IS NOT CORRUPTED, AND ON HOW ONE CANNOT CREATE A PRINc.i.p.aLITY WHERE THERE IS EQUALITY, OR A REPUBLIC WHERE THERE IS NO EQUALITY.

I have already discussed at length what is to be feared or hoped for from a corrupted state,138 but it nevertheless strikes me as fitting to consider a decision of the Roman Senate concerning Camillus's vow to give Apollo one-tenth of the spoils gathered from the people of Veii. but it nevertheless strikes me as fitting to consider a decision of the Roman Senate concerning Camillus's vow to give Apollo one-tenth of the spoils gathered from the people of Veii.139 These spoils had come into the hands of the Roman plebeians, and as the Senate was unable to check their value, it pa.s.sed an edict that everyone should deliver to the treasury a tenth of what they had plundered. To the plebeians' relief, however, the Senate ultimately decided on a different course of action, having settled on another way of pleasing Apollo, and this decision was not carried out. These spoils had come into the hands of the Roman plebeians, and as the Senate was unable to check their value, it pa.s.sed an edict that everyone should deliver to the treasury a tenth of what they had plundered. To the plebeians' relief, however, the Senate ultimately decided on a different course of action, having settled on another way of pleasing Apollo, and this decision was not carried out.140 Nevertheless, it is evident to what extent the Senate had confidence in the plebeians' honesty, and how it thought that no one would refrain from delivering exactly what the edict commanded. It is also evident that the plebeians did not think of cheating by giving less than they owed, since they strove instead to free themselves of the edict by voicing their outright indignation at it. This example, along with many others already cited, shows how much honesty and pious integrity this populace possessed, and how much good one could expect of it. In fact, nothing good is to be expected where such honesty is lacking, as we see from the states of our era which are so corrupted-Italy above all others. Even France and Spain have some of that corruption, though one does not see as much tumult in those countries as Italy faces every day. In those other countries this does not come so much from the populace's honesty, which is to a large extent absent, as it does from their having a king who keeps them united, not only through his expertise and skill, but with the help of inst.i.tutions that are not yet corrupted. This honesty and pious integrity are very apparent in Germany, with the result that many of its states are free, and observe their laws, so that no one dares occupy them, from within or without. Nevertheless, it is evident to what extent the Senate had confidence in the plebeians' honesty, and how it thought that no one would refrain from delivering exactly what the edict commanded. It is also evident that the plebeians did not think of cheating by giving less than they owed, since they strove instead to free themselves of the edict by voicing their outright indignation at it. This example, along with many others already cited, shows how much honesty and pious integrity this populace possessed, and how much good one could expect of it. In fact, nothing good is to be expected where such honesty is lacking, as we see from the states of our era which are so corrupted-Italy above all others. Even France and Spain have some of that corruption, though one does not see as much tumult in those countries as Italy faces every day. In those other countries this does not come so much from the populace's honesty, which is to a large extent absent, as it does from their having a king who keeps them united, not only through his expertise and skill, but with the help of inst.i.tutions that are not yet corrupted. This honesty and pious integrity are very apparent in Germany, with the result that many of its states are free, and observe their laws, so that no one dares occupy them, from within or without.141 In order to demonstrate how true it is that there is a good measure of this ancient honesty in the German states, I would like to give an example similar to the one cited above concerning the Roman Senate and plebeians. When the German states need to spend an amount of money for the benefit of the public, the empowered magistrates or councils solicit from all citizens one or two percent of what each has in revenue. When this decision has been made according to the inst.i.tutions of the state, each citizen presents himself before the tax collectors and, taking an oath to pay the proper sum, drops whatever his conscience compels him to donate into a box set up for that purpose. The man who pays is the sole witness of the amount he pays. From this we can conjecture how much honesty and pious integrity is still present in these men, and it must be a.s.sumed that everyone pays the correct sum, otherwise the tax revenue antic.i.p.ated based on previous collections would not have tallied with the amount received. Should the amounts not tally, the deception would be discovered and another method of collection would have been inst.i.tuted. Such honesty is all the more admirable in our times, when it has become rarer. In fact, it now seems to exist only in Germany. In order to demonstrate how true it is that there is a good measure of this ancient honesty in the German states, I would like to give an example similar to the one cited above concerning the Roman Senate and plebeians. When the German states need to spend an amount of money for the benefit of the public, the empowered magistrates or councils solicit from all citizens one or two percent of what each has in revenue. When this decision has been made according to the inst.i.tutions of the state, each citizen presents himself before the tax collectors and, taking an oath to pay the proper sum, drops whatever his conscience compels him to donate into a box set up for that purpose. The man who pays is the sole witness of the amount he pays. From this we can conjecture how much honesty and pious integrity is still present in these men, and it must be a.s.sumed that everyone pays the correct sum, otherwise the tax revenue antic.i.p.ated based on previous collections would not have tallied with the amount received. Should the amounts not tally, the deception would be discovered and another method of collection would have been inst.i.tuted. Such honesty is all the more admirable in our times, when it has become rarer. In fact, it now seems to exist only in Germany.

There are two reasons for this. The first is that the Germans have not had extensive contact with their neighbors, because neither they nor their neighbors travel to each other's lands; each is content with his goods and produce, and happy enough to clothe himself in the wool his land provides. This has removed the reason for any contact and the source of any corruption, because the Germans have not been able to pick up French, Spanish, or Italian customs, these nations taken together being the corruption of the world. The second reason is that the states that have an uncorrupted and vital civic order do not allow for any of their citizens to act or live in the manner of a ”gentleman”: In fact the citizens maintain equality among themselves and are great enemies of the gentlemen and men of substance of that land. If by chance they get their hands on any of these worthies, they are killed as the source of corruption and the reason for turmoil.

I shall clarify what the t.i.tle ”gentleman” signifies. A gentleman lives in idleness and luxury off the profits of his possessions; he does not concern himself with the cultivation of the land, or submit himself to any of the toil necessary to live. In every state and land such men are pernicious, but even more pernicious are those men who have even greater fortunes, with castles and subjects who obey them. The Kingdom of Naples, the Papal States, the Romagna, and Lombardy are filled with both these kinds of gentleman. This is the reason that no republic or vital civic order has ever come about in those lands, because men of this kind are entirely hostile to any form of civil life. To introduce a republic into such states would be impossible, but if someone wanted to reorganize them entirely-that is, if someone were to serve as arbitrator-his only recourse would be to establish a kingdom. This is because where there is so much corruption that laws are not sufficient to halt it, one must combine laws with a larger force. This larger force must be a royal hand that with extreme and absolute authority restrains the excessive ambition and corruption of the powerful. This idea is supported by the example of Tuscany, where for a long time three republics-Florence, Siena, and Lucca-existed over a relatively small territory. Although the other states of Tuscany are in a sense subservient to them, it is evident from their spirit and their inst.i.tutions that they maintain, or at least would like to maintain, their liberty. This has come about because in Tuscany there is no lord of the castle and very few if any gentlemen, but rather the kind of equality that would enable a ruler w

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