Part 3 (1/2)

Nothing can bring a prince more esteem than great feats and extraordinary actions. In our time we have Ferdinand of Aragon, the present king of Spain, who could almost be called a new prince because he started out as a weak monarch, but through fame and glory has become the foremost king of Christendom. If you consider his deeds, you will find that they are great, some of them even extraordinary. At the beginning of his reign he attacked Granada, an exploit that was to establish the cornerstone of his state. He did this quite casually, without the least concern that anyone might hinder him. He kept the attention of the barons of Castile trained on his enterprise, and, with their minds on this war, they did not think of introducing any changes. Before they realized what was happening, he had overshadowed them in prestige and power. He managed to build up his army with funds from the Church and the people, and during the long war in Granada he firmly established this army, which subsequently brought him much honor. To launch ever greater campaigns, he invariably made use of religion, resorting to a pious cruelty, robbing the Marranos88 and routing them from his kingdom. No example of an extraordinary act is more pitiful and strange. Under the same mantle he attacked Africa. He campaigned in Italy, recently invaded France, and has always plotted and carried out great feats that have captured the imagination of his people and kept their eyes on the outcome. He has launched these exploits in such quick succession that he has never given anyone an opportunity to conspire against him. and routing them from his kingdom. No example of an extraordinary act is more pitiful and strange. Under the same mantle he attacked Africa. He campaigned in Italy, recently invaded France, and has always plotted and carried out great feats that have captured the imagination of his people and kept their eyes on the outcome. He has launched these exploits in such quick succession that he has never given anyone an opportunity to conspire against him.

It also befits a prince to take extraordinary action in internal affairs, such as the exploits told of Bernabo of Milan.89 When someone does something in civil life that is extraordinarily good or bad, the prince should find a way to reward or punish this person that will be much talked about. Above all, a prince must endeavor in all his actions to give the impression of being a superior man of extraordinary intelligence. When someone does something in civil life that is extraordinarily good or bad, the prince should find a way to reward or punish this person that will be much talked about. Above all, a prince must endeavor in all his actions to give the impression of being a superior man of extraordinary intelligence.

A prince is also revered when he is a true friend and a true enemy-in other words, when he declares himself without reservation in favor of one man against another. This kind of resolution is always more useful than if he remains neutral, because if two powerful neighbors come to blows, these neighbors will either be of the kind where you have to fear the winner, or not. In either case it will be more useful for you to take a position and wage an honest war. In the case where you have to fear the winner, if you do not commit yourself, you will fall prey to whoever wins, to the delight and satisfaction of whoever loses. Neither side will have reason or cause to come to your a.s.sistance, for the winner will not want the kind of ally who did not come to his aid in adversity, nor will the loser give you refuge, since you were not prepared to share his fate with your weapons drawn.

Antiochus was summoned to Greece by the Aetolians to expel the Romans. He sent orators to the Achaeans, who were allies of Rome, urging them to remain neutral, while Roman orators were urging them to take up arms for the Roman cause. The Achaeans weighed the matter in their council. When Antiochus's emissary argued that they should stay neutral, the Roman emissary replied: ”Though they tell you not to intervene in our war, nothing would be further from your interests. Once you have lost esteem and character, you will end up as the victor's prize” (Quod autem isti dic.u.n.t non interponendi vos bello, nihil (Quod autem isti dic.u.n.t non interponendi vos bello, nihil magis alienum rebus vestris est; sine gratia, sine dignitate, praemium victoris eritis). magis alienum rebus vestris est; sine gratia, sine dignitate, praemium victoris eritis).90 He who is not your ally will always urge you to remain neutral, while your ally will urge you to come to his aid with your arms. The irresolute prince will most often follow the path of neutrality in order to avoid immediate danger, and will most often come to ruin. But when a prince boldly declares himself for one of the two sides, even if that side wins and is powerful and he remains in principle at its mercy, that side will be obliged to him and bound by contract of allegiance, and men are never so deceitful that they would subjugate someone in such a striking display of ingrat.i.tude after he had come to their aid. Furthermore, victories are never so decisive that the victor can wholly disregard justice. If the prince supported the losing side, that side will receive him and help him to the extent that it can, and he will become its companion in a destiny that may well resurge once more. He who is not your ally will always urge you to remain neutral, while your ally will urge you to come to his aid with your arms. The irresolute prince will most often follow the path of neutrality in order to avoid immediate danger, and will most often come to ruin. But when a prince boldly declares himself for one of the two sides, even if that side wins and is powerful and he remains in principle at its mercy, that side will be obliged to him and bound by contract of allegiance, and men are never so deceitful that they would subjugate someone in such a striking display of ingrat.i.tude after he had come to their aid. Furthermore, victories are never so decisive that the victor can wholly disregard justice. If the prince supported the losing side, that side will receive him and help him to the extent that it can, and he will become its companion in a destiny that may well resurge once more.

When they who fight one another are such that you need not fear whoever wins, it is all the more prudent for you to take sides. That way, you instigate the ruin of a ruler with the help of another ruler, who, were he wise, would be eager to save him. In this case, it is impossible for the side you are helping not to win, and in winning it remains in your debt. Here I would like to note that a prince should avoid forming an alliance with a power stronger than himself merely in order to attack another, unless, as I have said before, necessity compels him. Because if that power wins, he will end up its prisoner, and princes must do their utmost to avoid ending up in another's power. The Venetians allied themselves with France against the Duke of Milan even though they could have avoided this alliance, and it resulted in their ruin. If one cannot avoid such an alliance, as happened with the Florentines when the armies of the pope and Spain attacked Lombardy then the prince must enter alliances for the reasons I have given. Nor should any state believe it can always make secure choices: In fact, all choices should be considered dubious, because it is in the nature of things that you can never escape one setback without running into another. Wisdom consists of knowing how to recognize the respective qualities of the setbacks and choosing the lesser evil.91 A prince must also prove himself someone who admires ability, furthering skillful men and honoring those who excel in what they do. He must also make certain that his citizens can go about their work unhampered-in trade, agriculture, and all the other professions-so that no one will be afraid of acc.u.mulating possessions out of fear that they might be taken away, or afraid of starting a business for fear of taxes. The prince must reward whoever wants to do these things and whoever wants to improve either the city or the state in some way. Furthermore, at certain times of the year, he has to keep the population busy with feasts and spectacles, and, as every city is divided into guilds and clans, he must also keep those groups in mind, meeting with them from time to time, and always showing himself as humane and munificent. He must always remain within the bounds of his majesty and dignity, which must never be absent.

88. Spanish Jews who converted to Christianity but continued practicing judaism secretly. Spanish Jews who converted to Christianity but continued practicing judaism secretly.89. Bernabo Visconti (132385), Lord of Milan, raised spectacular sums of money by unscrupulous taxation to fight constant wars, and gained great influence throughout Europe by providing enormous dowries for his many illegitimate daughters, whom he married off strategically to the European, particularly German, high n.o.bility. (Among his sons-in-law were Leopold III of Austria, Stephan III of Bavaria, and Eberhard III of Wurttemberg.) Bernabo Visconti (132385), Lord of Milan, raised spectacular sums of money by unscrupulous taxation to fight constant wars, and gained great influence throughout Europe by providing enormous dowries for his many illegitimate daughters, whom he married off strategically to the European, particularly German, high n.o.bility. (Among his sons-in-law were Leopold III of Austria, Stephan III of Bavaria, and Eberhard III of Wurttemberg.)90. A slightly altered quotation from Livy, Book x.x.xV, chapter 49. A slightly altered quotation from Livy, Book x.x.xV, chapter 49.91. See also See also Discourses Discourses, Book I, chapter 6: ”If one looks carefully, this pattern can be observed in all human affairs: One can never remove one problem without another one's arising.”

CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO.

OF THE ADVISERS OF PRINCES.

The choice of advisers is very important for a prince: Advisers are able or not, depending on the prince's wisdom. One can a.s.sess a prince's intelligence by looking at the men with whom he surrounds himself. If they are capable and loyal, one can consider the prince prudent, because he was able to discern their ability and managed to keep them loyal. But when these men are lacking in quality, one can consider the prince as deficient, because it is in choosing his advisers that he can make his first mistake. Anyone who knew Antonio da Venafro, the minister of Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, considered Pandolfo a most capable man for having chosen da Venafro.

There are three kinds of intelligence: One kind can understand on its own, the second can understand through others, and the third can understand neither on its own nor through others. The first kind is excellent, the second good enough, the third useless. Hence, if Pandolfo was not in the first category, he was at least in the second, because even if a prince does not possess great intelligence, if he can judge the good or bad that a man says or does, then he can distinguish between his adviser's good and bad deeds, and praise the good and punish the bad. The adviser cannot hope to deceive him, and so behaves well.

There is a dependable method by which a prince can know his adviser. When the prince sees that the adviser is more intent on furthering his own interest than that of the prince, and that his actions aim to further his own goals, this adviser will never be a good one, and the prince will never be able to trust him. A man who has the prince's affairs of state in hand must never think of himself but always of the prince, and must never involve the prince in matters that have nothing to do with him. And yet the prince, in order to keep the adviser loyal, must not forget to honor him and make him rich, obliging him by sharing with him honors and responsibilities, so that the adviser sees that he cannot exist without the prince. But the prince must also ensure that these many honors do not lead the adviser to desire even more honors, nor that great wealth lead him to desire even greater wealth, nor that his many responsibilities make him fear change. If advisers and princes are of this kind, they can have confidence in one another. If they are not, then things will end badly for one or the other.

CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE.

OF THE WAY IN WHICH FLATTERERS MUST BE AVOIDED.

I do not wish to pa.s.s over an important point, a danger that a prince can escape only if he is extremely careful or has chosen his advisers well. This danger is the flatterers that fill all princely courts, because men are so self-congratulatory in the things they do, and so willing to deceive themselves, that they find it difficult to escape this plague, and in attempting to escape it they often run the risk of losing their standing. The only way for a prince to guard himself from flattering adulation is to make it understood that he will not be offended if he is told the truth. Then again, however, if every man is free to tell him the truth at will, the prince quickly becomes a figure of contempt. Therefore a prudent prince must approach the matter in an altogether different way: For his government, he must choose men who are wise and give them, and n.o.body else, free rein to speak their minds-but only on matters on which he consults them. Nevertheless, he must confer with them on every important issue, listen to their opinions, and then reach a decision on his own and in his own way. He must give his counselors to understand that the more freely they speak, the more he will rely on them. The prince must not listen to anyone other than these counselors, and he must carry out his decisions, unyielding in what he has decided. A prince who acts otherwise will either come to ruin because of his flatterers, or grow increasingly irresolute by following conflicting advice, which will result in his losing respect.

I would like to cite an example from our time. Father Luca, the counselor to the current emperor Maximilian, has said of His Majesty the Emperor that he never consults anybody, yet still has never managed to do what he wants. This resulted from his behavior, which is contrary to what I advised above. The emperor is a secretive man and does not inform anyone of his plans, nor does he take advice. But when his plans become clear as he starts putting them into effect, the men surrounding him begin to caution him. As the emperor is easily swayed, he yields, abandoning his plans. Consequently, what he does one day he undoes the next. One can never tell what he wants or intends to do, nor can one rely on his decisions.

Therefore a prince must be prepared to take counsel, but only when he seeks counsel. In fact, he should discourage anyone from offering counsel when he has not asked for it. But he must be an expert questioner and a patient listener to the truth in all matters on which he does seek counsel. If the prince realizes that someone is not telling him the truth, he must show his anger.

It is a common error to consider a prince prudent not because of his nature but on account of the good counselors with whom he surrounds himself. Yet it is an infallible rule that a prince who is not wise cannot be advised well, unless Fortune has placed him in the hands of one who is very wise and guides him in every matter. In this case the prince might fare well, but not for long, because soon enough that counselor will seize his state from him. Yet if a prince who is lacking in wisdom takes counsel from more than one man, he will invariably be given conflicting advice and find himself unable to reconcile it on his own. The counselors will have their own interests at heart, and the prince will not be able to keep them in check or see through their ruses. And all counselors are of this kind, because men never turn out to be faithful unless necessity makes them. Therefore it is to be concluded that good counsel, from whomever it comes, must be sparked by the wisdom of the prince, and not that the wisdom of the prince be sparked by good counsel.

CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR.

OF REASONS WHY I ITALIAN PRINCES HAVE LOST THEIR STATES.

If the strategies I have mentioned above are carefully followed, a new prince will seem like an old, established prince. He will be more stable and secure in his state than if he had developed within it, because the actions of a new prince are more closely observed than those of a hereditary prince. If these actions are seen to be skillful, they will sooner attract and bind men to the new prince than an old bloodline would, because men are more inspired by things of the present than things of the past. If men see good in the present, they are content and do not yearn for anything else. In effect, they will stand by this prince in every way, as long as he is not otherwise lacking. He will have twice the glory, having established a new princ.i.p.ality and having strengthened it with good laws, arms, allies, and good examples, just as a prince who is born a prince will have twice the shame if he loses his princ.i.p.ality through lack of prudence.

If one considers the rulers of our time in Italy who have lost their states-such as the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan, and others-one can discern a common military weakness, as I have already discussed at length. One will also observe that some of these rulers had the populace against them, and that others had the populace on their side but did not know how to protect themselves against the n.o.bles. States that are powerful enough to send an army into battle can be lost only through such defects.

Philip of Macedon (not Alexander the Great's father, but the king who was defeated by t.i.tus Quintus)92 did not have much power compared to the might of the Romans and Greeks who were attacking him. And yet, being a military man who knew how to inspire the populace and secure himself against his n.o.bles, he managed to sustain a war against the Greeks and Romans for many years, and though he finally had to give up a few cities, he nevertheless kept his kingdom. did not have much power compared to the might of the Romans and Greeks who were attacking him. And yet, being a military man who knew how to inspire the populace and secure himself against his n.o.bles, he managed to sustain a war against the Greeks and Romans for many years, and though he finally had to give up a few cities, he nevertheless kept his kingdom.

Therefore our Italian princes who were established in their princ.i.p.alities for many years and then lost them should blame their indolence and not Fortune. In times of peace they did not think that things might change (it is a common fault not to antic.i.p.ate storms when the sea is calm), and with the advent of adversity our princes thought of escape, not defense. They hoped that the populace, angered by the victors' offensive ways, would call them back. Such a strategy might be good when others are lacking, but it is a mistake to prefer this remedy over others, because you should never let yourself fall in the hope that someone will be there to help you up. Either you will not be helped up, or, if you are, your continuing safety will be in question, because your defense was not sparked by you but by your cowardice, and defenses are secure and lasting only if they are sparked by your skill.

92. Philip V of Macedon (d. 179 Philip V of Macedon (d. 179 BCE BCE).

CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE.

ON THE EXTENT TO WHICH F FORTUNE WIELDS POWER IN THE AFFAIRS OF MEN, AND ON HOW THIS IS TO BE RESISTED.

I am not unaware that many believe that the things of this world are governed to such an extent by Fortune and G.o.d that men, with all their foresight, cannot change them; that in fact there is no improving them. Those who believe this deem that they need not toil and sweat, but can let themselves be governed by Fortune. This opinion has been more prevalent in our time because of the great upheavals that we have witnessed and witness every day, and which are beyond anything we could have foreseen, and there have been times when even I have to some extent inclined to this opinion. Nevertheless, Fortune seems to be the arbiter of half our actions, but she does leave us the other half, or almost the other half, in order that our free will may prevail. I would compare Fortune to one of those violent torrents that flood the plains, destroying trees and buildings, hurling earth from one place to another. Everyone flees this torrent, everyone yields to its force without being able to stand up to it. As this is the torrent's nature, man should not neglect to prepare himself with dikes and dams in times of calm, so that when the torrent rises it will gush into a channel, its force neither so harmful nor so unbridled. The same is true with Fortune, who unleashes her force in places where man has not taken skillful precautions to resist her, and so channels her force to where she knows there are no dikes or dams to hold her back. If you consider Italy, which has been the scene of so many changes and has set so many changes in motion, you will find that it is a field without dikes or dams. Had Italy been protected with the appropriate skill, as Germany, Spain, and France were, this flood either would not have caused the great changes it did or would not have come at all.

So much for opposing Fortune in general terms. To limit myself more to particulars, I would like to remark that one can see a prince prospering one day and coming to ruin the next without having changed his nature or conduct in any way. I believe this is due, first and foremost, to the causes that I have already discussed at some length, namely, that the prince who relies entirely on Fortune will fall when Fortune changes. In my view, he who conforms his course of action to the quality of the times will fare well, and conversely he whose course of action clashes with the times will fare badly. One sees that men will proceed in different ways as they strive toward the common goal of wealth and glory: Some will proceed cautiously, others recklessly; some with force, others with guile; some with patience, others rashly. And in each of these ways one can prevail. If we take two cautious men, one might attain his goal and the other not; similarly, two men might succeed through entirely different courses of action, one through caution, the other through recklessness. The reason for this is the nature of the times that either conforms to or conflicts with their courses of action. Hence two men operating differently can obtain the same result, while when two men operate in the same way, one might achieve his goal, the other not. This also depends on the turning of Fortune's wheel from good to bad, because if a man acts with caution and patience and the wheel turns in a way that favors his course of action, he will flourish; but should the wheel turn again, he will be ruined if he does not change his manner of proceeding. One cannot find a man prudent enough to be capable of adapting to these changes, because man cannot deviate from that to which nature inclines him. Moreover, if he has always prospered by walking down a certain path, it will be difficult to persuade him to leave it. Consequently, when the time comes for a cautious man to act impetuously, he will not be able to do so, and will come to ruin. Even if he could adapt his nature to the times and circ.u.mstances, his Fortune would not change.

Pope Julius II acted impetuously in everything he undertook, and he found both the times and the circ.u.mstances in such agreement with this course of action that he always succeeded. Consider the first campaign that he launched against Bologna in the days when Giovanni Bentivoglio was still alive.93 The Venetians were not pleased, nor was the King of Spain, and as for France, Julius was still in the midst of negotiations with them over this campaign. And yet Julius, wild and impetuous as he was, set out right away, heading the campaign himself. This move stopped the Venetians and Spaniards in their tracks: the former out of fear, the latter because of their desire to regain the entire Kingdom of Naples, while the King of France found himself drawn in despite himself. Seeing that Julius had already made his move, and wanting to ally himself with Julius in order to weaken the Venetians, the French king judged it impossible to refuse him troops without openly offending him. Hence, by his impetuous move, Julius achieved what no other pontiff could have achieved with all the prudence in the world. Had he waited for all the negotiations to be completed and everything arranged before setting out from Rome, as any other pontiff would have done, he would never have succeeded, because by then the King of France would have discovered a thousand excuses and the others a thousand doubts. I will not touch on Pope Julius's other actions, which have all been of the same kind and have all been successful. Moreover, the shortness of his life did not allow him to experience reverses, because if times had changed so as to compel him to act with caution, he would have come to ruin, for he could never have deviated from the way nature inclined him. The Venetians were not pleased, nor was the King of Spain, and as for France, Julius was still in the midst of negotiations with them over this campaign. And yet Julius, wild and impetuous as he was, set out right away, heading the campaign himself. This move stopped the Venetians and Spaniards in their tracks: the former out of fear, the latter because of their desire to regain the entire Kingdom of Naples, while the King of France found himself drawn in despite himself. Seeing that Julius had already made his move, and wanting to ally himself with Julius in order to weaken the Venetians, the French king judged it impossible to refuse him troops without openly offending him. Hence, by his impetuous move, Julius achieved what no other pontiff could have achieved with all the prudence in the world. Had he waited for all the negotiations to be completed and everything arranged before setting out from Rome, as any other pontiff would have done, he would never have succeeded, because by then the King of France would have discovered a thousand excuses and the others a thousand doubts. I will not touch on Pope Julius's other actions, which have all been of the same kind and have all been successful. Moreover, the shortness of his life did not allow him to experience reverses, because if times had changed so as to compel him to act with caution, he would have come to ruin, for he could never have deviated from the way nature inclined him.

Therefore, I conclude that when Fortune changes and men rigidly continue in their ways, they will flourish so long as Fortune and their ways are in accord, but they will come to ruin the moment these are in discord. In my view, however, it is better to be impetuous than cautious, because Fortune is a woman, and if you wish to dominate her you must beat and batter her. It is clear that she will let herself be won by men who are impetuous rather than by those who step cautiously. Therefore, like a woman, she is more partial to young men, because they are less cautious, wilder, and command her with greater audacity.

93. Giovanni Bentivoglio (14431508) had been Gonfalonier of Bologna until Pope Paolo II made him chief senator for life in 1466. He was expelled from Bologna in 1506 by Pope Julius II. Giovanni Bentivoglio (14431508) had been Gonfalonier of Bologna until Pope Paolo II made him chief senator for life in 1466. He was expelled from Bologna in 1506 by Pope Julius II.