Part 12 (2/2)

As to the situation of General Greene, Brigadier General Merritt says:

”The difficulty in gaining an avenue of approach to the Spanish line lay in the fact of my disinclination to ask General Aguinaldo to withdraw from the beach and the 'Calle Real,' so that Greene could move forward. This was overcome by instructions to General Greene to arrange, if possible, with the insurgent brigade commander in his immediate vicinity to move to the right and allow the American forces un.o.bstructed control of the roads in their immediate front. No objection was made, and accordingly General Greene's brigade threw forward a heavy outpost line on the ”Calle Real” and the beach and constructed a trench, in which a portion of the guns of the Utah batteries was placed.

”The Spanish, observing this activity on our part, made a very sharp attack with infantry and artillery on the night of July 31. The behavior of our troops during this night attack was all that could be desired, and I have, in cablegrams to the War Department, taken occasion to commend by name those, who deserve special mention for good conduct in the affair. Our position was extended and strengthened after this and resisted successfully repeated night attacks, our forces suffering, however, considerable loss in wounded and killed, while the losses of the enemy, owing to the darkness, could not be ascertained.

”The strain of the night fighting and the heavy details for outpost duty made it imperative to re-enforce General Greene's troops with General MacArthur's brigade, which had arrived in transports on the 31st of July. The difficulties of this operation can hardly be overestimated. The transports were at anchor off Cavite, five miles from a point on the beach where it was desired to disembark the men. Several squalls, accompanied by floods of rain, raged day after day, and the only way to get the troops and supplies ash.o.r.e was to load them from the s.h.i.+p's side into native lighters (called 'cascos') or small steamboats, move them to a point opposite the camp, and then disembark them through the surf in small boats, or by running the lighters head on to the beach. The landing was finally accomplished, after days of hard work and hards.h.i.+p; and I desire here to express again my admiration for the fort.i.tude and cheerful willingness of the men of all commands engaged in this operation.

”Upon the a.s.sembly of MacArthur's brigade in support of Greene's, I had about 8,500 men in position to attack, and I deemed the time had come for final action. During the time of the night attacks I had communicated my desire to Admiral Dewey that he would allow his s.h.i.+ps to open fire on the right of the Spanish line of intrenchments, believing that such action would stop the night firing and loss of life, but the Admiral had declined to order it unless we were in danger of losing our position by the a.s.saults of the Spanish, for the reason that, in his opinion, it would precipitate a general engagement, for which he was not ready. Now, however, the brigade of General MacArthur was in position and the Monterey had arrived, and under date of August 6 Admiral Dewey agreed to my suggestion that we should send a joint letter to the Captain General notifying him that he should remove from the city all non-combatants within forty-eight hours.”

The joint note of General Merritt and Admiral Dewey was as follows:

_Headquarters U.S. Land and Naval Forces_, Manila Bay, Philippine Islands, August 7, 1898.

The General in Chief Commanding Spanish Forces in Manila.

Sir: We have the honor to notify your excellency that operations of the land and naval forces of the United States against the defenses of Manila may begin at any time after the expiration of forty-eight hours from the hour of receipt by you of this communication, or sooner if made necessary by an attack on your part.

This notice is given in order to afford you an opportunity to remove all non-combatants from the city.

Very respectfully,

_Wesley Merritt_, Major-General, United States Army, Commanding Land Forces of the United States.

_George Dewey_, Rear-Admiral, United States Navy, Commanding United States Naval Forces on Asiatic Station.

The notable words in this are those ”against the defenses of Manila,”

instead of against the city itself--the usual way--the city was to be spared if possible.

Manila, August 7, 1898.

The Governor-General and Captain-General of the Philippines to the Major-General of the Army and the Rear Admiral of the Navy, commanding, respectively, the Military and Naval Forces of the United States.

Gentlemen: I have the honor to inform your excellencies that at half-past 12 to-day I received the notice with which you favor me, that after forty-eight hours have elapsed you may begin operations against this fortified city, or at an earlier hour if the forces under your command are attacked by mine.

As your notice is sent for the purpose of providing for the safety of non-combatants, I give thanks to your excellencies for the humane sentiment you have shown, and state that, finding myself surrounded by insurrectionary forces, I am without places of refuge for the increased numbers of wounded, sick, women, and children who are now lodged within the walls.

Very respectfully, and kissing the hands of your excellencies,

_Formire Jaudenes_, Governor-General and Captain-General of the Philippines.

The second paragraph of the Governor-General and Captain-General's letter indicates a sense of helplessness, and credits the insurgents with surrounding the city so that there was no refuge. August 9th there was a second joint note from Major-General Merritt and Rear Admiral Dewey, in the terms following:

”The Governor-General and Captain-General of the Philippines.

”Sir: The inevitable suffering in store for the wounded, sick, women, and children, in the event that it becomes our duty to reduce the defenses of the walled town in which they are gathered, will, we feel a.s.sured, appeal successfully to the sympathies of a general capable of making the determined and prolonged resistance which your excellency has exhibited after the loss of your naval forces and without hope of succor.

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