Part 13 (1/2)
”We therefore, submit, without prejudice to the high sentiments of honor and duty which your excellency entertains, that surrounded on every side as you are by a constantly increasing force, with a powerful fleet in your front and deprived of all prospect of reinforcement and a.s.sistance, a most useless sacrifice of life would result in the event of an attack, and therefore every consideration of humanity makes it imperative that you should not subject your city to the horrors of a bombardment. Accordingly, we demand the surrender of the city of Manila and the Spanish forces under your command.”
The Captain-General wanted time to hear from Madrid, and was refused.
The language of General Greene, in stating the fact that he took possession of the intrenchments of the insurgents, is in these words:
”On the morning of July 29, in compliance with verbal instructions received the previous day from the Adjutant-General of the Eighth Army Corps, I occupied the insurgent trenches, from the beach to the Calle Real, with one battalion Eighteenth United States Infantry, one battalion First Colorado Infantry, and four guns--two from each of the Utah batteries--these trenches being vacated at my request by the insurgent forces under Brigadier-General Noriel. As these trenches were badly located and insufficient in size and strength, I ordered another line constructed about 100 yards in advance of them, and this work was completed, mainly by the First Colorado, during the night of July 29-30. The length of this line was only 270 yards, and on its right were a few barricades, not continuous, occupied by the insurgents, extending over to the large rice swamp, just east of the road from Pasay to Paco (shown on the accompanying map). Facing these was a strong Spanish line, consisting of a stone fort, San Antonio de Abad, near the beach, intrenchments of sandbags and earth about seven feet high and 10 feet thick, extending in a curved direction for about 1,200 yards and terminating in a fortified blockhouse, known as No 14, beyond our right on the Pasay road. It faced our front and enveloped our right flank.”
General Greene, reporting the fighting on his front, says of the Spanish position and first attack.
Mounted in and near the stone fort were seven guns in all, viz., three bronze field guns of 3.6 inches caliber, four bronze mountain guns of 3.2 inches caliber, and in the vicinity of Blockhouse No. 14 were two steel mountain guns of 3.2 inches caliber. The line was manned throughout its length by infantry, with strong reserves at Malate and at the walled city in its rear.
Shortly before midnight of July 31-August 1 the Spaniards opened a heavy and continuous fire with both artillery and infantry from their entire line. Our trenches were occupied that day by the two battalions of the Tenth Pennsylvania Infantry, one foot battery (H), nearly 200 strong, of the Third Artillery, and four guns, two of Battery A and two of Battery B, Utah Artillery. For about an hour and a half the firing on both sides, with artillery and infantry, was very heavy and continuous, our expenditure of ammunition being 160 rounds of artillery and about 60,000 rounds of infantry. That of the Spaniards was nearly twice as much.
The American loss was ten killed and forty-three wounded.
General Greene says: ”Major Cuthbertson, Tenth Pennsylvania, reports that the Spaniards left their trenches in force and attempted to turn our right flank, coming within 200 yards of his position. But as the night was intensely dark, with incessant and heavy rain, and as no dead or wounded were found in front of his position at daylight, it is possible that he was mistaken and that the heavy fire to which he was subjected came from the trenches near Block House 14, beyond his right flank, at a distance of about 700 yards. The Spaniards used smokeless powder, the thickets obscured the flash of their guns, and the sound of the Mauser bullets penetrating a bamboo pole is very similar to the crack of the rifle itself.
”This attack demonstrated the immediate necessity of extending our intrenchments to the right and, although not covered by my instructions (which were to occupy the trenches from the bay to Calle Real, and to avoid precipitating an engagement), I ordered the First Colorado and one battalion of the First California, which occupied the trenches at 9 a. m., August 1, to extend the line of trenches to the Pasay road. The work was begun by these troops, and continued every day by the troops occupying the trenches in turn, until a strong line was completed by August 12, about 1,200 yards in length, extending from the bay to the east side of the Pasay road. Its left rested on the bay and its right on an extensive rice swamp, practically impa.s.sible. The right flank was refused, because the only way to cross a smaller rice swamp, crossing the line about 700 yards from the beach, was along a cross-road in rear of the general line. As finally completed the works were very strong in profile, being five to six feet in height and eight to ten feet in thickness at the base, strengthened by bags filled with earth.
”The only material available was black soil saturated with water, and without the bags this was washed down and ruined in a day by the heavy and almost incessant rains. The construction of these trenches was constantly interrupted by the enemy's fire. They were occupied by the troops in succession, four battalions being usually sent out for a service of twenty-four hours, and posted with three battalions in the trenches, and one battalion in reserve along the crossroad to Pasay; Cossack posts being sent out from the latter to guard the camp against any possible surprise from the northeast and east. The service in the trenches was of the most arduous character, the rain being almost incessant, and the men having no protection against it; they were wet during the entire twenty-four hours, and the mud was so deep that the shoes were ruined and a considerable number of men rendered barefooted. Until the notice of bombardment was given on August 7, any exposure above or behind the trenches promptly brought the enemy's fire, so that the men had to sit in the mud under cover and keep awake, prepared to resist an attack, during the entire tour of twenty-four hours.
”After one particularly heavy rain a portion of the trench contained two feet of water, in which the men had to remain. It could not be drained, as it was lower than an adjoining rice swamp, in which the water had risen nearly two feet, the rainfall being more than four inches in twenty-four hours. These hards.h.i.+ps were all endured by the men of the different regiments in turn, with the finest possible spirit and without a murmur of complaint.”
This is a vivid picture of hard service. General Greene continues:
”August 7 the notice of bombardment after forty-eight hours, or sooner if the Spanish fire continued, was served, and after that date not a shot was fired on either side until the a.s.sault was made on August 13. It was with great difficulty, and in some cases not without force, that the insurgents were restrained from opening fire and thus drawing the fire of the Spaniards during this period.
”Owing to the heavy storm and high surf it was impossible to communicate promptly with the division commander at Cavite, and I received my instructions direct from the major-general commanding, or his staff officers, one of whom visited my camp every day, and I reported direct to him in the same manner. My instructions were to occupy the insurgent trenches near the beach, so as to be in a good position to advance on Manila when ordered, but meanwhile to avoid precipitating an engagement, not to waste ammunition, and (after August 1) not to return the enemy's fire unless convinced that he had left his trenches and was making an attack in force. These instructions were given daily in the most positive terms to the officer commanding in the trenches, and in the main they were faithfully carried out.
”More ammunition than necessary was expended on the nights of August 2 and 5, but in both cases the trenches were occupied by troops under fire for the first time, and in the darkness and rain there was ground to believe that the heavy fire indicated a real attack from outside the enemy's trenches. The total expenditure of ammunition on our side in the four engagements was about 150,000 rounds, and by the enemy very much more.
”After the attack of July 31-August I, I communicated by signal with the captain of the U. S. S. Raleigh, anch.o.r.ed about 3,000 yards southwest of my camp, asking if he had received orders in regard to the action of his s.h.i.+p in case of another attack on my troops. He replied:
”Both Admiral Dewey and General Merritt desire to avoid general action at present. If attack too strong for you, we will a.s.sist you, and another vessel will come and offer help. ”In repeating this message, Lieutenant Tappan, commanding U. S. S. Callao, anch.o.r.ed nearer the beach, sent me a box of blue lights, and it was agreed that if I burned one of these on the beach the Raleigh would at once open fire on the Spanish fort.”
General Merritt speaks of the Colorado skirmishers leaving their breastworks when the navy ceased firing on the 13th of August, and advancing swiftly, finding the Spanish trenches deserted, ”but as they pa.s.sed over the Spanish works they were met by a sharp fire from a second line, situated in the streets of Malate, by which a number of men were killed and wounded, among others the soldier who pulled down the Spanish colors still flying on the fort and raised our own.”
General Greene is complimentary to the officers and who conducted the reconnaissances while he was at Camp Dewey twenty-five days, and states:
”Captain Grove and Lieutenant Means, of the First Colorado, had been particularly active in this work and fearless in penetrating beyond our lines and close to those of the enemy. As the time for attack approached, these officers made a careful examination of the ground between our trenches and Fort San Antonio de Abad, and, finally, on August 11, Major J. F. Bell, United States Volunteer Engineers, tested the creek in front of this fort and ascertained not only that it was fordable, but the exact width of the ford at the beach, and actually swam in the bay to a point from which he could examine the Spanish line from the rear. With the information thus obtained it was possible to plan the attack intelligently. The position a.s.signed to my brigade extended from the beach to the small rice swamp, a front of about 700 yards.
”After the sharp skirmish on the second line of defense of the Spaniards, and after Greene's brigade moved through Malate, meeting a shuffling foe, the open s.p.a.ce at the luneta, just south of the walled city, was reached about 1 p. m. A white flag was flying at the southwest bastion, and I rode forward to meet it under a heavy fire from our right and rear on the Paco road. At the bastion I was informed that officers representing General Merritt and Admiral Dewey were on their way ash.o.r.e to receive the surrender, and I therefore turned east to the Paco road. The firing ceased at this time, and on reaching this road I found nearly 1,000 Spanish troops who had retreated from Santa Ana through Paco, and coming up the Paco road had been firing on our flank. I held the commanding officers, but ordered these troops to march into the walled city. At this point, the California regiment a short time before had met some insurgents who had fired at the Spaniards on the walls, and the latter in returning the fire had caused a loss in the California regiment of 1 killed and 2 wounded.
”My instructions were to march past the walled city on its surrender, cross the bridge, occupy the city on the north side of the Pasig, and protect lives and property there. While the white flag was flying on the walls yet, very sharp firing had just taken place outside, and there were from 5,000 to 6,000 men on the walls, with arms in their hands, only a few yards from us. I did not feel justified in leaving this force in my rear until the surrender was clearly established, and I therefore halted and a.s.sembled my force, prepared to force the gates if there was any more firing. The Eighteenth Infantry and First California were sent forward to hold the bridges a few yards ahead, but the second battalion, Third Artillery, First Nebraska, Tenth Pennsylvania, and First Colorado were all a.s.sembled at this point. While this was being done I received a note from Lieutenant-Colonel Whittier, of General Merritt's staff, written from the Captain-General's office within the walls, asking me to stop the firing outside, as negotiations for surrender were in progress.”
And General Greene continues: ”I then returned to the troops outside the walls and sent Captain Birkhimer's battalion of the Third Artillery down the Paco road to prevent any insurgents from entering. Feeling satisfied that there would be no attack from the Spanish troops lining the walls, I put the regiments in motion toward the bridges, brus.h.i.+ng aside a considerable force of insurgents who had penetrated the city from the direction of Paco, and were in the main street with their flag expecting to march into the walled city and plant it on the walls. After crossing the bridges the Eighteenth United States Infantry was posted to patrol the princ.i.p.al streets near the bridge, the First California was sent up the Pasig to occupy Quiapo, San Miguel, and Malacanan, and with the First Nebraska I marched down the river to the Captain of the Port's office, where I ordered the Spanish flag hauled down and the American flag raised in its place.”
The insurgents were disposed to disregard the white flag and the process of the capitulation, but ”a considerable force” of them was ”brushed aside.” General Greene's losses before Manila were 16 killed and 66 wounded: his force 5,100. He remarks: ”The resistance encountered on the 13th was much less than antic.i.p.ated and planned for, but had the resistance been greater the result would have been the same, only the loss would have been greater. Fortunately, the great result of capturing this city, the seat of Spanish power in the East for more than three hundred years, was accomplished with a loss of life comparatively insignificant.”
Captain T.B. Mott, detached from General Merritt's temporarily, served on General Greene's staff, and received this mention: