Part 8 (2/2)

{36} It follows, from this, that a commercial people never become so degraded as those who obtain wealth by other means; but, then, it also follows, that they exist a much shorter time after they become so, and that wealth and power leave them much more speedily.

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The purpose of this inquiry being, to examine the effects of wealth, and its operation in the decline of nations; it appears to be of considerable importance to remove the error, in which historians and other writers have so long persevered, relative to the two greatest republics of antiquity; particularly as their example applies the most readily, and is the most frequently applied to two rival nations of modern times; although the parallel is extremely imperfect in almost every particular, and in some directly inadmissible. {37}

It cannot but be attended with some advantage to set this matter right.

It may, perhaps, tend in some degree to prevent the French from attempting to imitate the Romans, when we shew them that a state, whether a whole people, or a single city, exempted from taxes, and living by the tribute of other countries, must, at all events, be dependent on its armies. In short, military government and tributary revenue are inseparable. We see how closely they were connected in ancient Rome. It is fit that its imitators should know at what rate they pay (and in what coin) for those exemptions from taxes, occasioned by the burthens imposed upon other nations.

In general we find, that all nations are inclined to push to the extreme those means by which they have attained wealth or power; and it will also be found that their ruin is thereby brought on with greater rapidity.

{37} The reader must see the allusion is to England and France; but, in point of time, their situation is absolutely different. France is farther advanced in luxury than England. Rome was far behind Carthage.

The Romans exceeded their rivals in perseverance; in following up their plans, and in attention to their liberty. The contrary is the case with France and England.

The French, indeed, resemble the Romans in restlessness and ambition; but not in their mode of exerting the former, or of gratifying the latter: the resemblance, therefore, is a very faint one, even where it does hold at all. The English, in whatever they may resemble the Carthaginians, such as they have been represented, neither do it in their want of faith and honour, nor in their progress towards decline.

The different wars with Rome, in which Carthage came off a loser and became tributary, though only for a limited time, were not the only causes of its decline. The trade of Alexandria, which was better situated for commerce, had diminished the resources of Carthage; so that it was, in every sense of the word, a falling nation. It will be seen, in the subsequent part of this inquiry, how, from the different modes of making war and also the different effects of wealth in the present times, the comparison is still less founded.

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Had the Romans stopped the career of conquest at an earlier period, they probably would not have so soon sunk into a state of corruption.

It is very probable, that if Caesar had never attempted the useless conquest of Britain, he never would have succeeded in conquering the liberties of his own country. The reputation of having conquered an island, and the pa.s.sage of the British Channel, made way for the pa.s.sage of the Rubicon, and the battle of Pharsalia.

Conquerors must be paid as well as common soldiers: and though every man may have his price, and money and dignities may be a sufficient reward for the most part, there are some who despise any reward under that of royal power.--Caesar was one of those men; and both ancient and modern history shew, that though, perhaps, in his abilities, he has had no equal, there have been others who have rated theirs at as high a price.

The Romans at last became sensible, when too late, that they had pushed the spirit of conquest too far; and, as they had something great in all they did, they had the magnanimity to retract their error.

The greatest extent of the Roman empire being from the north of England to the Gulf of Persia, they consequently abandoned Britain, and those conquests in Asia, which were the most difficult to keep.

The river Euphrates became the boundary, the Emperor Adrian having, in a voluntary manner, given up all the country to the north of that river, situated on its left bank.

The decline of the empire might have been as regular as the rise of the republic, had it not been for the different characters of the emperors; some of whom did honour to human nature, from their possessing almost every virtue, while others were such monsters, that their crimes excite the highest degree of horror and indignation, and are almost beyond credibility.

It is but justice to the Romans to observe, that though they robbed and conquered, yet their policy was to instruct, improve, and civilize those whom they had robbed and conquered, wherever they stood in want of it. They aimed, in every case, at making the most of the circ.u.mstances in which they were placed, and they very truly conceived, that it was more profitable and advantageous, to rule over a civilized than a rude people. [end of page #39]

After the great influx of wealth had corrupted Rome, its public expenses increased at an enormous rate, till at last that portion of the tribute exacted from the provinces, which it pleased the armies and the generals to remit to Rome, became unequal to the expenditure.

Taxation of every kind then became necessary, in Italy itself, and the evils that attend the multiplication of imposts were greatly augmented by the ignorant manner in which they were laid on, by men who understood little but military affairs, added to the severe manner in which were they =sic= levied by a rude, imperious, and debauched soldiery.

The characters of soldier and citizen, which had been so long united, ceased to have any connection. Soon after this, the corruption of manners became general; and, at last, the Romans unable to find soldiers amongst themselves, were obliged to retain barbarians to fight in their defence, {38} and to bribe the Persians, and other nations, to leave them in a state of tranquility.

No nation that ever yet submitted to pay tribute, has long preserved its independence. The Romans knew this well; and if any one, having had recourse to that expedient, has escaped ruin, it has been from some other circ.u.mstance than its own exertion; or it has sometimes been the effort of despair when pushed to extremity.

Though, in many respects, Montesquieu's opinion of the affairs of Rome is by no means to be taken, yet his short account of the whole is unexceptionally just.

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