Part 49 (2/2)
15.-Sure Methods of preserving the three Principles I shall not be able to make myself rightly understood till the reader has perused the four following chapters.
16.-Distinctive Properties of a Republic It is natural for a republic to have only a small territory; otherwise it cannot long subsist. In an extensive republic there are men of large fortunes, and consequently of less moderation; there are trusts too considerable to be placed in any single subject; he has interests of his own; he soon begins to think that he may be happy and glorious, by oppressing his fellow-citizens; and that he may raise himself to grandeur on the ruins of his country.
In an extensive republic the public good is sacrificed to a thousand private views; it is subordinate to exceptions, and depends on accidents. In a small one, the interest of the public is more obvious, better understood, and more within the reach of every citizen; abuses have less extent, and, of course, are less protected.
The long duration of the republic of Sparta was owing to her having continued in the same extent of territory after all her wars. The sole aim of Sparta was liberty; and the sole advantage of her liberty, glory.
It was the spirit of the Greek republics to be as contented with their territories as with their laws. Athens was first fired with ambition and gave it to Lacedaemon; but it was an ambition rather of commanding a free people than of governing slaves; rather of directing than of breaking the union. All was lost upon the starting up of monarchy-a government whose spirit is more turned to increase of dominion.
Excepting particular circ.u.mstances,30 it is difficult for any other than a republican government to subsist longer in a single town. A prince of so petty a state would naturally endeavor to oppress his subjects, because his power would be great, while the means of enjoying it or of causing it to be respected would be inconsiderable. The consequence is, he would trample upon his people. On the other hand, such a prince might be easily crushed by a foreign or even a domestic force; the people might any instant unite and rise up against him. Now as soon as the sovereign of a single town is expelled, the quarrel is over; but if he has many towns, it only begins.
17.-Distinctive Properties of a Monarchy A monarchical state ought to be of moderate extent. Were it small, it would form itself into a republic; were it very large, the n.o.bility, possessed of great estates, far from the eye of the prince, with a private court of their own, and secure, moreover, from sudden executions by the laws and manners of the country-such a n.o.bility, I say, might throw off their allegiance, having nothing to fear from too slow and too distant a punishment.
Thus Charlemagne had scarcely founded his empire when he was obliged to divide it; whether the governors of the provinces refused to obey; or whether, in order to keep them more under subjection, there was a necessity of parcelling the empire into several kingdoms.
After the decease of Alexander his empire was divided. How was it possible for those Greek and Macedonian chiefs, who were each of them free and independent, or commanders at least of the victorious bands dispersed throughout that vast extent of conquered land-how was it possible, I say, for them to obey?
Attila's empire was dissolved soon after his death; such a number of kings, who were no longer under restraint, could not resume their fetters.
The sudden establishment of unlimited power is a remedy which in those cases may prevent a dissolution: but how dreadful the remedy, which after the enlargement of dominion opens a new scene of misery!
The rivers hasten to mingle their waters with the sea; and monarchies lose themselves in despotic power.
18.-Particular Case of the Spanish Monarchy Let not the example of Spain be produced against me; it rather proves what I affirm. To preserve America she did what even despotic power itself does not attempt: she destroyed the inhabitants. To preserve her colony, she was obliged to keep it dependent even for its subsistence.
In the Netherlands, she essayed to render herself arbitrary; and as soon as she abandoned the attempt, her perplexity increased. On the one hand the Walloons would not be governed by Spaniards; and on the other, the Spanish soldiers refused to submit to Walloon officers.31 In Italy she maintained her ground, merely by exhausting herself and by enriching that country. For those who would have been pleased to have got rid of the King of Spain were not in a humor to refuse his gold.
19.-Distinctive Properties of a despotic Government A large empire supposes a despotic authority in the person who governs. It is necessary that the quickness of the prince's resolutions should supply the distance of the places they are sent to; that fear should prevent the remissness of the distant governor or magistrate; that the law should be derived from a single person, and should s.h.i.+ft continually, according to the accidents which incessantly multiply in a state in proportion to its extent.
20.-Consequence of the preceding Chapters If it be, therefore, the natural property of small states to be governed as a republic, of middling ones to be subject to a monarch, and of large empires to be swayed by a despotic prince; the consequence is, that in order to preserve the principles of the established government, the state must be supported in the extent it has acquired, and that the spirit of this state will alter in proportion as it contracts or extends its limits.
21.-Of the Empire of China Before I conclude this book, I shall answer an objection that may be made to the foregoing doctrine.
Our missionaries inform us that the government of the vast Empire of China is admirable, and that it has a proper mixture of fear, honor, and virtue. Consequently I must have given an idle distinction in establis.h.i.+ng the principles of the three governments.
But I cannot conceive what this honor can be among a people who act only through fear of being bastinadoed.32 Again, our merchants are far from giving us any such accounts of the virtue so much talked of by the missionaries; we need only consult them in relation to the robberies and extortions of the mandarins.33 I likewise appeal to another unexceptionable witness, the great Lord Anson.
Besides, Father Perennin's letters concerning the emperor's proceedings against some of the princes of the blood34 who had incurred his displeasure by their conversion, plainly show us a settled plan of tyranny, and barbarities committed by rule, that is, in cold blood.
We have likewise Monsieur de Mairan's, and the same Father Perennin's, letters on the government of China. I find, therefore, that after a few proper questions and answers the whole mystery is unfolded.
Might not our missionaries have been deceived by an appearance of order? Might not they have been struck with that constant exercise of a single person's will-an exercise by which they themselves are governed, and which they are so pleased to find in the courts of the Indian princes; because as they go thither only in order to introduce great changes, it is much easier to persuade those princes that there are no bounds to their power, than to convince the people that there are none to their submission.35 In fine, there is frequently some kind of truth even in errors themselves. It may be owing to particular and, perhaps, very extraordinary circ.u.mstances that the Chinese government is not so corrupt as one might naturally expect. The climate and some other physical causes may, in that country, have had so strong an influence on their morals as in some measure to produce wonders.
The climate of China is surprisingly favorable to the propagation of the human species.36 The women are the most prolific in the whole world. The most barbarous tyranny can put no stop to the progress of propagation. The prince cannot say there like Pharoah, ”Let us deal wisely with them, lest they multiply.” He would be rather reduced to Nero's wish, that mankind had all but one head. In spite of tyranny, China by the force of its climate will be ever populous, and triumph over the tyrannical oppressor.
China, like all other countries that live chiefly upon rice, is subject to frequent famines. When the people are ready to starve, they disperse in order to seek for nourishment; in consequence of which, gangs of robbers are formed on every side. Most of them are extirpated in their very infancy; others swell, and are likewise suppressed. And yet in so great a number of such distant provinces, some band or other may happen to meet with success. In that case they maintain their ground, strengthen their party, form themselves into a military body, march up to the capital, and place their leader on the throne.
From the very nature of things, a bad administration is here immediately punished. The want of subsistence in so populous a country produces sudden disorders. The reason why the redress of abuses in other countries is attended with such difficulty is, because their efforts are not immediately felt; the prince is not informed in so sudden and sensible a manner as in China.
The Emperor of China is not taught like our princes, that if he governs ill he will be less happy in the other life, less powerful and less opulent in this. He knows that if his government be not just he will be stripped both of empire and life.
As China grows every day more populous, notwithstanding the exposing of children,37 the inhabitants are incessantly employed in tilling the lands for their subsistence. This requires a very extraordinary attention in the government. It is their perpetual concern that every man should have it in his power to work, without the apprehension of being deprived of the fruits of his labor. Consequently this is not so much a civil as a domestic government.
Such has been the origin of those regulations which have been so greatly extolled. They wanted to make the laws reign in conjunction with despotic power; but whatever is joined to the latter loses all its force. In vain did this arbitrary sway, laboring under its own inconveniences, desire to be fettered; it armed itself with its chains, and has become still more terrible.
China is, therefore, a despotic state, whose principle is fear. Perhaps in the earliest dynasties, when the empire had not so large an extent, the government might have deviated a little from this spirit; but the case is otherwise at present.
1 See Plutarch in the lives of Timoleon and Dio.
2 It was that of the Six hundred, of whom mention is made by Diodorus.
3 Upon the expulsion of the tyrants, they made citizens of strangers and mercenary troops, which gave rise to civil wars.-Aristot. ”Polit.” lib. V. cap. iii. The people having been the cause of the victory over the Athenians, the republic was changed.-Ibid. cap. iv. The pa.s.sion of two young magistrates, one of whom carried off the other's boy, and in revenge the other debauched his wife, was attended with a change in the form of this republic.-Ibid. lib. VII. cap. iv.
4 Aristot. ”Polit.” lib. V. cap. iv.
5 Ibid.
6 The aristocracy is changed into an oligarchy.
7 Venice is one of those republics that has enacted the best laws for correcting the inconveniences of an hereditary aristocracy.
8 Justin attributes the extinction of Athenian virtue to the death of Epaminondas. Having no further emulation, they spent their revenues in feasts, frequentius cnam, quam castra visentes. Then it was that the Macedonians emerged from obscurity, 1. 6.
9 Compilation of works made under the Mings, related by Father Du Halde.
10 During the reign of Tiberius statues were erected to, and triumphal ornaments conferred on, informers; which debased these honors to such a degree, that those who had really merited them disdained to accept them. Frag. of Dio, LVIII., taken from the Extract of Virtues and Vices, by Constantine Porphyrogenitus. See in Tacitus in what manner Nero, on the discovery and punishment of a pretended conspiracy, bestowed triumphal ornaments on Petronius Turpilia.n.u.s, Nerva, and Tigellinus.-”Annal.” book XIV. See likewise how the generals refused to serve, because they condemned the military honors: pervulgatis triumphi insignibus.-Tacit. ”Annal.” book XIII.
11 In this state the prince knew extremely well the principle of his government.
12 Herodian.
13 Aristot. ”Polit.” book II. chap. 10.
14 They always united immediately against foreign enemies, which was called ”Syncretism.”-Plut. ”Mor.” p. 88.
15 ”Repub.” lib. IX.
16 Plutarch's ”Morals,” treatise ”whether a man advanced in years ought to meddle with public affairs.”
17 ”Repub.” lib. V.
18 The Gymnic art was divided into two parts, dancing and wrestling. In Crete they had the armed dances of the Curetes; at Sparta they had those of Castor and Pollux; at Athens the armed dances of Pallas, which were extremely proper for those that were not yet of age for military service. ”Wrestling is the image of war,” said Plato (”Laws,” book VII.). He commends antiquity for having established only two dances, the pacific and the Pyrrhic. See how the latter dance was applied to the military art, Plato, ibid.
19 ......”Aut libidinosae.” Ladaeas Lacedaemonis palaestras.”-Mart. lib. IV. ep. 55.
20 Plutarch's ”Morals,” in the treatise ent.i.tled ”Questions concerning the affairs of the Romans.”
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