Part 50 (1/2)
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid., Table propositions, book II.
23 Book I.
24 ”Livy,” book III. 20.
25 ”Livy,” book III.
26 ”The people here referred to were several young officers, who, in despair, proposed to retire, but were restrained by Scipio.”-Crevier.
27 About a hundred years after.
28 See Book XI. chap. xii.
29 See ”Dio,” book x.x.xVII. Cicero's life in Plutarch, Cicero to Atticus, book IV. letters 10 and 15. Asconius on Cicero, de divinatione.
30 As when a petty sovereign supports himself between two great powers by means of their mutual jealousy; but then he has only a precarious existence.
31 See the ”History of the United Provinces,” by M. Le Clerc.
32 ”It is the cudgel that governs China,” says Father Du Halde.
33 Among others, De Lange's relation.
34 Of the family of Sourmama, ”Edifying Letters,” 18th collection.
35 See in Father Du Halde how the missionaries availed themselves of the authority of Canhi to silence the mandarins, who constantly declared that by the laws of the country no foreign wors.h.i.+p could be established in the empire.
36 See ”Lettres Persanes,” cxx.
37 See the order of Tsongtou for tilling the land, in the ”Edifying Letters,” 21st collection.
Book IX
Of Laws in the Relation they Bear to a Defensive Force 1.-In what Manner Republics provide for their Safety IF a republic be small, it is destroyed by a foreign force; if it be large, it is ruined by an internal imperfection.
To this twofold inconvenience democracies and aristocracies are equally liable, whether they be good or bad. The evil is in the very thing itself, and no form can redress it.
It is, therefore, very probable that mankind would have been, at length, obliged to live constantly under the government of a single person, had they not contrived a kind of const.i.tution that has all the internal advantages of a republican, together with the external force of a monarchical, government. I mean a confederate republic.
This form of government is a convention by which several petty states agree to become members of a larger one, which they intend to establish. It is a kind of a.s.semblage of societies, that const.i.tute a new one, capable of increasing by means of further a.s.sociations, till they arrive at such a degree of power as to be able to provide for the security of the whole body.
It was these a.s.sociations that so long contributed to the prosperity of Greece. By these the Romans attacked the whole globe, and by these alone the whole globe withstood them; for when Rome had arrived at her highest pitch of grandeur, it was the a.s.sociations beyond the Danube and the Rhine-a.s.sociations formed by the terror of her arms-that enabled the barbarians to resist her.
Hence it proceeds that Holland,1 Germany, and the Swiss cantons are considered in Europe as perpetual republics.
The a.s.sociations of cities were formerly more necessary than in our times. A weak, defenceless town was exposed to greater danger. By conquest it was deprived not only of the executive and legislative power, as at present, but, moreover, of all human property.2 A republic of this kind, able to withstand an external force, may support itself without any internal corruption; the form of this society prevents all manner of inconveniences.
If a single member should attempt to usurp the supreme power, he could not be supposed to have an equal authority and credit in all the confederate states. Were he to have too great an influence over one, this would alarm the rest; were he to subdue a part, that which would still remain free might oppose him with forces independent of those which he had usurped, and overpower him before he could be settled in his usurpation.
Should a popular insurrection happen in one of the confederate states, the others are able to quell it. Should abuses creep into one part, they are reformed by those that remain sound. The state may be destroyed on one side, and not on the other; the confederacy may be dissolved, and the confederates preserve their sovereignty.
As this government is composed of petty republics, it enjoys the internal happiness of each; and with regard to its external situation, by means of the a.s.sociation, it possesses all the advantages of large monarchies.
2.-That a confederate Government ought to be composed of States of the same Nature, especially of the republican Kind The Canaanites were destroyed by reason that they were petty monarchies that had no union or confederacy for their common defence; and, indeed, a confederacy is not agreeable to the nature of petty monarchies.
As the confederate republic of Germany consists of free cities, and of petty states subject to different princes, experience shows us that it is much more imperfect than that of Holland and Switzerland.
The spirit of monarchy is war and enlargement of dominion: peace and moderation are the spirit of a republic. These two kinds of government cannot naturally subsist in a confederate republic.
Thus we observe, in the Roman history, that when the Veientes had chosen a king, they were immediately abandoned by all the other petty republics of Tuscany. Greece was undone as soon as the kings of Macedon obtained a seat among the Amphictyons.
The confederate republic of Germany, composed of princes and free towns, subsists by means of a chief, who is, in some respects, the magistrate of the union, in others the monarch.
3.-Other Requisites in a confederate Republic In the republic of Holland one province cannot conclude an alliance without the consent of the others. This law, which is an excellent one, and even necessary in a confederate republic, is wanting in the Germanic const.i.tution, where it would prevent the misfortunes that may happen to the whole confederacy, through the imprudence, ambition, or avarice of a single member. A republic united by a political confederacy has given itself entirely up, and has nothing more to resign.
It is difficult for the united states to be all of equal power and extent. The Lycian3 republic was an a.s.sociation of twenty-three towns; the large ones had three votes in the common council, the middling ones two, and the small towns one. The Dutch republic consists of seven provinces of different extent of territory, which have each one voice.
The cities of Lycia4 contributed to the expenses of the state, according to the proportion of suffrages. The provinces of the United Netherlands cannot follow this proportion; they must be directed by that of their power.
In Lycia5 the judges and town magistrates were elected by the common council, and according to the proportion already mentioned. In the republic of Holland they are not chosen by the common council, but each town names its magistrates. Were I to give a model of an excellent confederate republic, I should pitch upon that of Lycia.
4.-In what Manner despotic Governments provide for their Security As republics provide for their security by uniting, despotic governments do it by separating, and by keeping themselves, as it were, single. They sacrifice a part of the country; and by ravaging and desolating the frontiers they render the heart of the empire inaccessible.
It is a received axiom in geometry that the greater the extent of bodies, the more their circ.u.mference is relatively small. This practice, therefore, of laying the frontiers waste is more tolerable in large than in middling states.
A despotic government does all the mischief to itself that could be committed by a cruel enemy, whose arms it were unable to resist.
It preserves itself likewise by another kind of separation, which is by putting the most distant provinces into the hands of a great va.s.sal. The Mogul, the King of Persia, and the emperors of China have their feudatories; and the Turks have found their account in putting the Tartars, the Moldavians, the Wallachians, and formerly the Transylvanians between themselves and their enemies.
5.-In what Manner a Monarchical Government provides for its Security A monarchy never destroys itself like a despotic government. But a kingdom of a moderate extent is liable to sudden invasions: it must, therefore, have fortresses to defend its frontiers; and troops to garrison those fortresses. The least spot of ground is disputed with military skill and resolution. Despotic states make incursions against one another; it is monarchies only that wage war.
Fortresses are proper for monarchies; despotic governments are afraid of them. They dare not intrust their officers with such a command, as none of them have any affection for the prince or his government.
6.-Of the defensive Force of States in general To preserve a state in its due force, it must have such an extent as to admit of a proportion between the celerity with which it may be invaded, and that with which it may defeat the invasion. As an invader may appear on every side, it is requisite that the state should be able to make on every side its defence; consequently it should be of a moderate extent, proportioned to the degree of velocity that nature has given to man, to enable him to move from one place to another.
France and Spain are exactly of a proper extent. They have so easy a communication for their forces as to be able to convey them immediately to what part they have a mind; the armies unite and pa.s.s with rapidity from one frontier to another, without any apprehension of such difficulties as require time to remove.
It is extremely happy for France that the capital stands near to the different frontiers in proportion to their weakness; and the prince has a better view of each part of his country according as it is more exposed.
But when a vast empire, like Persia, is attacked, it is several months before the troops are a.s.sembled in a body; and then they are not able to make such forced marches, for that s.p.a.ce of time, as they could for fifteen days. Should the army on the frontiers be defeated, it is soon dispersed, because there is no neighboring place of retreat. The victor, meeting with no resistance, advances with all expedition, sits down before the capital and lays siege to it, when there is scarcely time sufficient to summon the governors of the provinces to its relief. Those who foresee an approaching revolution hasten it by their disobedience. For men whose fidelity is entirely owing to the danger of punishment are easily corrupted as soon as it becomes distant; their aim is their own private interest. The empire is subverted, the capital taken, and the conqueror disputes the several provinces with the governors.