Part 20 (1/2)
There is one inst.i.tution which would become peculiarly liable to attack in such a House of Commons, to which I wish to draw the attention of the Right Reverend Bench, and that is, the Establishment of the Church of England in Ireland. This Church is the object of a fundamental Article of the Treaty of Union between the two countries, and is secured by Acts of both Parliaments; and the King is, besides, sworn to maintain its right and possessions: can any man believe that, when the representatives for Ireland come to be elected in the manner proposed by the bill, the Church of England in Ireland can be maintained?
I have already shown that these representatives must be elected under the influence of the Roman Catholic hierarchy. Who are those who now show the greatest hostility to the Church, its rights, and possessions?--the Members for populous places. The reason is, that the deprivation of the Church of their property is one of the popular objects of the day. The object of the bill is, and its effects will be, to increase the number of this description of Members in Parliament, and to render the influence of this party predominant and irresistible.
I believe that the n.o.ble Earl (Grey) has already found the Members returned by Ireland, under this influence, very inconvenient to himself, upon more than one occasion; and it appears, that the right honourable Gentleman who conducts the affairs of Ireland in the House of Commons, was under the necessity, very lately, of giving up a measure which he thought important for the benefit and peace of Ireland, because the Members from Ireland, of this party, were opposed to it. How can the n.o.ble Lord suppose, that the Church of England can be protected, or even the Union itself preserved in a Reformed Parliament? There is no man, who considers what the Government of King, Lords, and Commons is, and the details of the manner in which it is carried on, who must not see, that Government will become impracticable, when the three branches shall be separate--each independent of the other, and uncontrolled in its action by any of the existing influences.
_October 4, 1831._
_Danger of a Democratic House of Commons._
A n.o.ble earl (the Earl of Winchelsea) who has spoken on this side of the House, has made an observation to your Lords.h.i.+ps, which well deserves your attention. The n.o.ble earl has told you, that if you increase but a little the democratic power in the state, the step can never be withdrawn. Your Lords.h.i.+ps must continue in the same course till you have pa.s.sed through the miseries of a revolution, and thence to a military despotism, and the evils which attend that system of government. It is not denied, that this bill must increase beyond measure the democratic power of the state--that it must const.i.tute in the House of Commons a fierce democracy: what must be the consequences, your Lords.h.i.+ps will judge.
I will not detain your Lords.h.i.+ps by adverting to the merits of the system of government which has existed up to the present moment, upon which my opinion is by no means altered. No man denies that we have enjoyed great advantages; that we have enjoyed a larger share of happiness, comfort, and prosperity, for a long course of years, than were ever enjoyed by any nation; that we have more riches, the largest fortunes, personal as well as real, more manufactures and commerce, than all the nations of Europe taken together; the richest, most extensive, most peopled, and most prosperous foreign colonies and possessions, that any nation ever possessed. There is not an important position in the world, whether for the purpose of navigation, commerce, or military defence, that does not belong to us.
If this democratic a.s.sembly should once be established in England, does any one believe that we should continue to enjoy these vast advantages?
But a democracy has never been established in any part of the world, that it has not immediately declared war against property--against the payment of the public debt--and against all the principles of conservation, which are secured by, and are, in fact, the princ.i.p.al objects of the British const.i.tution, as it now exists. Property, and its possessors, will become the common enemy. I do not urge this argument as one in which your Lords.h.i.+ps are peculiarly interested: it is not you alone, nor even other proprietors, who are interested in the protection of property; the whole people, middling cla.s.ses as well as the lower orders, are interested in this subject. Look at the anxiety prevailing in every part of London, in respect to the great revolution to be made by this bill. My n.o.ble friend, the n.o.ble baron (Lord Wharncliffe) has been ridiculed for adverting to the opinions of tradesmen in Bond-street and St. James's-street. Those in Bond-street consist of more than 200 respectable persons, who are well able to form an opinion of the effect of this bill upon the resources of themselves, the middling cla.s.ses, and the poor, as they supply the luxuries of persons in easier circ.u.mstances, residing in that quarter of the town. Anything which can effect the resources of their customers, must be interesting to them, and they do feel that this bill must affect property, private expenditure, and the resources of themselves, and of those whom they employ. A n.o.ble lord on the other side, who adverted to this topic, greatly underrated the wealth of these tradesmen. I know of one, residing in Bond-street, who employs at all times from 2,000 to 4,000 workmen, whose trade depends, as well as the employment of this body of people, upon the expenditure of his customers: is he not interested in upholding the public faith, and the system of property now established in England? Are not the people, of all cla.s.ses and descriptions, down to the lowest, interested in the maintenance of our extensive manufactures and commerce, in the conservation of our enormous dominions abroad, and the continued respect of all nations?
If I am right in thinking that this fierce democracy will be established in the House of Commons, does any man believe that that harmony can continue between the king and his government and the House of Commons, so necessary to insure to both general respect, and to the king's government the strength which is necessary to enable his Majesty to protect and keep in order his foreign dominions, and to insure the obedience of their inhabitants? We shall lose these colonies and foreign possessions, and with them our authority and influence abroad.
There is no instance of any country having maintained its strength or its influence in its foreign possessions, or the respect of foreign nations, during the existence of internal troubles and disturbance; and there is no case of the existence, without such troubles, of a Government consisting of King, Lords, and Commons, independently of each other, and the members of the latter depending solely upon the popular choice, and being delegates of the people. We have had an example in England of a House of Commons which was independent of the influence of the Crown; and of this House, turning the Spiritual Lords out of it, murdering their Sovereign, and voting the House of Lords useless. I will read your Lords.h.i.+ps the account given by a man, who was knowing in his time (Oliver Cromwell), of what this House became.
”The parliament, which had so vigorously withstood the encroachments of the royal power, became themselves too desirous of absolute authority; and not only engrossed the legislative, but usurped the executive power.”
”All causes, civil and criminal, all questions of property, were determined by committees, who, being themselves the legislature, were accountable to no law, and for that reason their decrees were arbitrary, and their proceedings violent. Oppression was without redress, unjust sentence without appeal; there was no prospect of ease or intermission.
The parliament had determined never to dissolve themselves.”
”At length the army interfered. They soon perceived that, unless they made one regulation more, and crushed this many-headed monster, they had hitherto ventured their lives to little purpose, and had, instead of a.s.suring their own and their country's liberty, only changed one kind of slavery for another.”
This is the account of the state of a house of Commons acting independently of all influence; and of the state to which it brought the country.
_October 4, 1831._
_Contempt of intimidation by popular meetings._
I do not deny that I always felt strongly the attempts that were made to intimidate your Lords.h.i.+ps by public meetings. For all such meetings, I feel the greatest contempt; and I am perfectly satisfied that the house is superior to any intimidation founded on the proceedings of any such a.s.semblages. I feel no concern for all those threats, whether proceeding from Birmingham or elsewhere. I have always thought, and I think still, that the law is too strong to be overborne by such proceedings. I know further, that there does exist throughout this country a strong feeling of attachment to the government of the country, as by law established. I know that the people look up to the laws as the best means of protection, and those laws they will not violate in any manner to endanger the government of the country, or any of its established inst.i.tutions. I am afraid of none of these, but I will tell your Lords.h.i.+ps what I am afraid of, I am afraid of revolution, and of revolutionary measures, brought in and proposed by his Majesty's government. I a.s.sert, and I believe that history will bear me out in the a.s.sertion, that there has been no revolution in this country, or any great change, which has not been brought about by the parliament, and generally by the government introducing measures, and carrying them through by the influence of the Crown. I would therefore entreat your Lords.h.i.+ps to do all you can to defeat this measure--use every means of resistance which the just exercises of your privileges will warrant; and trust to the good sense of the country to submit to the legal and just decision you come to.
_October 5,1831._
_Comparison of the Finance Administration of the Wellington with that of the Grey government._
I believe we find ourselves in this singular situation: we have an increased expenditure, (increased within this year,) and have, at the same time, a reduction of taxation, and no overplus whatever (or one not amounting to more than 10,000 l.) of revenue. I say we are in that peculiar situation, because I put out of the question those occasions on which ministers of the crown have thought it their duty to propose and effect loans, to carry on the public service of the country. Even in these cases, those who have made such propositions have thought it their duty to provide a surplus over revenue, in order to meet the unforeseen casualties in the amount of revenue, which every man knows must occur in so large a revenue as this country has the happiness to boast of.
This principle of having a surplus revenue over the expenditure, has been considered advantageous with a view to the diminution of the national debt. I am aware that this is a part of the subject on which a difference of opinion exists. I am aware that many great authorities are of opinion that no surplus is necessary for the express purpose of reducing the national debt, and I perfectly agree with them that it is not desirable that a surplus should be created by borrowing, and thus creating new liabilities for the purpose of getting rid of the old. But I cannot look to what has taken place of late years, even in my own time, when I filled the situation of first Lord of his Majesty's Treasury,--cannot look to what took place then without seeing the advantage of having an overplus of income over expenditure, such as would tend to the gradual diminution of the public debt.