Part 3 (1/2)

CHAPTER V

THE ADMINISTRATION OF JULES GReVY

January, 1879, to December, 1887

The resignation of the marechal de Mac-Mahon was followed by the immediate gathering, in accordance with the const.i.tution, of the National a.s.sembly, which chose as President for seven years Jules Grevy.

The new chief magistrate, elected without a compet.i.tor, was already seventy-two, and had in his long career won the reputation of a dignified and sound statesman, in whose hands public affairs might be entrusted with absolute safety. He represented a step beyond the military and aristocratic regime which had preceded him. The embodiment of the old _bourgeoisie_, he had, along with its qualities, some of its defects. Eminently cautious, his statesmans.h.i.+p had been at times a non-committal reserve more than constructive genius. His parsimony soon caused people to accuse him of unduly saving his salary and state allowances, while his personal dislikes led him to err grievously in his choice of advisers, or rather in his elimination of Gambetta, to whom circ.u.mstances now pointed.

Jules Grevy hated Gambetta, undeniably the leading figure in the Republican party since the death of Thiers, and neglected to entrust to him the formation of a Cabinet. Thiers himself had shown greater wisdom.

He, too, had disliked the raging and apparently futile volubility of the young tribune during the Franco-Prussian War, but Thiers got over calling Gambetta a ”fou furieux.” On the contrary, just after the Seize-Mai and before his own death, when Thiers was expecting to return to the Presidency as successor to a discredited Mac-Mahon, he had intended to make Gambetta the head of his Cabinet. For Gambetta with maturity had become more moderate. Instead of drastic political remedies he was gradually evolving, as already stated, the policy of ”Opportunism” so closely linked with his name, the method of gradual advance by concessions and compromises, by taking advantage of occasions and making one's general policy conform with opportunity.

If Gambetta, as leader of the majority group in the Republican party, which had evicted Mac-Mahon, had become Prime Minister, it is conceded that the precedent would have been set by the new administration for parliamentary government with a true party leaders.h.i.+p, as in Great Britain. Instead, Grevy entrusted the task of forming a Ministry to an upright but colorless leader named Waddington, at the head of a composite Cabinet, more moderate in policy than Gambetta, who became presiding officer of the Chamber of Deputies. The consequence was that, after lasting less than a year, it gave way to another Cabinet led by the great political trimmer Freycinet,[9] until in due time it was in turn succeeded by the Ministry of Jules Ferry in September, 1880.

It must not be inferred that nothing was accomplished by the Waddington and Freycinet Ministries. Indeed, Jules Ferry, the chief Republican next to Gambetta, was himself a member of these two Cabinets before leading his own.

The lining-up of Republican groups, as opposed to the Monarchists, under the new administration was: the Left Centre, composed as in the past of ultra-conservative Republicans, constantly diminis.h.i.+ng numerically; the Republican Left, which followed Jules Ferry; the Republican Union of Gambetta; and, finally, the radical Extreme Left, which had taken for itself many of the advanced measures advocated by Gambetta when he had been a radical. One of its leaders was Georges Clemenceau. Between the two large groups of Ferry and Gambetta there was little difference in ideals, but Gambetta was now the Opportunist and Ferry made his own Gambetta's old battle-cry against clericalism.

[Ill.u.s.tration: JULES FERRY]

The Chamber elected after the Seize-Mai was by reaction markedly anti-Clerical, and the Waddington Cabinet, to begin with, contained three Protestants and a freethinker. Obviously steps would soon be taken to defeat the ”enemy.” In this movement Jules Ferry was from the beginning a leader, by direct action as well as by the educational reforms which he carried out as Minister of Public Instruction. Jules Ferry became, more than Gambetta, the great bugbear of the Clericals and the author of the ”lois scelerates.”

During the Waddington Ministry Jules Ferry began his efforts for the reorganization of superior instruction, and among his measures carried through the Chamber of Deputies the notorious ”Article 7” indirectly aimed at Jesuit influence in _secondary_ teaching as well: ”No person can direct any public or private establishment whatsoever or teach therein if he belongs to an unauthorized order.” The Jesuits had at that time no legal footing in France, but were openly tolerated. The Senate rejected this article under the Freycinet Ministry and the law was finally adopted thus apparently weakened. But Jules Ferry, nothing daunted, immediately put into operation the no less notorious decrees of March, 1880, reviving older laws going back even to 1762, which had long since fallen into disuse. By these decrees the Jesuit establishments were to be closed and the members dispersed within three months.

Moreover, every unauthorized order was, under penalty of expulsion, to apply for authorization within a like limit of time. The expulsion of the Jesuits was carried out with a certain spectacular display of pa.s.sive resistance on the part of those evicted. Later in the year similar steps were taken against many other organizations.

It is evident from the above that the promotion of educational reform under Republican control was definitely connected with measures directed against clerical domination. The French Catholic Church, on its part, treated every attempt toward laicization as a form of persecution. But Jules Ferry unhesitatingly extended his policy when he became Prime Minister. His measures were genuinely neutral, but his reputation as a Voltairian freethinker and a freemason inevitably afforded his opponents an excuse for their charges.

Jules Ferry's reforms in education, extending over several Cabinet periods as late as 1882, included secondary education for girls, and free, obligatory, lay, primary instruction. To Americans accustomed to such methods of education it is difficult to conceive the struggles of Jules Ferry and his a.s.sistant on the floor of the House, Paul Bert, in carrying through these measures for the training of the democracy.

In foreign affairs Jules Ferry inaugurated a more active policy symptomatic of the return of France to partic.i.p.ation in international matters. At the Congress of Berlin, France had avoided entanglements, but, even at that early period, Lord Salisbury had hinted to M.

Waddington, present as French delegate, that no interference would be made by England, were France to advance claims in Tunis. This suggestion came, perhaps, originally from Bismarck, who was not averse to embroiling France with Italy. That country longed for Tunis so conveniently situated near Sicily. England, moreover, was probably not desirous of seeing the Italians thus strategically ensconced in the Mediterranean.

In 1881, financial manoeuvres and the plundering expeditions into Algeria of border tribes called Kroumirs afforded a pretext for intervention, to the indignation of Italy, which was thus more than ever inclined to seek alliances against France, even with Germany. Here, indeed, was the germ of the Triple Alliance. An easy advance to Tunis forced the Bey to accept a French protectorate by the Treaty of the Bardo on May 12, 1881. Later in the year the situation became rather serious, and new and rather costly military operations became necessary, including the occupation of Sfax, Gabes, and Kairouan.

Thus France came into possession of valuable territories, but at the cost of Italian indignation. Moreover, Jules Ferry, who was always one of the most hated of party leaders in his own country, reaped no advantage to himself. His enemies affected to believe that the whole Tunisian war was a game of capitalists, or was planned for effect upon elections to the new Chamber. The boulevards refused to take the Kroumirs seriously and joked about ”Cherchez le Kroumir.” Finally, on November 9, 1881, the personal intervention of Gambetta before the newly elected Chamber of Deputies saved the Cabinet on a vote of confidence.

Jules Ferry none the less determined to resign, and Gambetta, in spite of Grevy's aversion, was the inevitable man for the formation of a new Cabinet.

Gambetta's great opportunity had come too late to be effective. The undoubted leader of the Republic, he had grown in statesmans.h.i.+p since his early days, but was still hated by men like Grevy who could not get over their old prejudices. Then the advanced radicals, or _intransigeants_, thought him a traitor to his old platforms or _programmes_.[10] They blamed his Opportunism and said that he wanted power without responsibility. Gambetta's enemies, whether the duc de Broglie or Clemenceau, talked of his secret influence (_pouvoir occulte_), and accused him of aspiring to a dictators.h.i.+p, in fact if not in name. Their suspicions were somewhat deepened by Gambetta's ardent advocacy of the _scrutin de liste_ instead of the existing _scrutin d'arrondiss.e.m.e.nt_.[11]

It was a.s.serted that Gambetta wanted to diminish the independence of local representation and marshal behind himself a subservient majority.

To Gambetta the _scrutin de liste_ was the truly republican form of representation, the one existing under the National a.s.sembly and abolished by the reactionaries under the new const.i.tution.

Thus, Gambetta had against him, during the campaign for renewal of the Chamber of Deputies in the summer of 1881, not only the anti-Republicans but also timid liberals like Jules Simon, the influence of President Grevy, and the _intransigeants_. The Senate was averse to the _scrutin de liste_ and rejected, in the spring of 1881, the measure which Gambetta carried through the Chamber. Gambetta, formerly the idol of the working cla.s.ses of Paris, met with opposition, was hooted in one of his own political rallies, and was re-elected on the first ballot in one only of the two districts in which he was a candidate.

The elections of the Chamber of 1881 resulted in a strongly Republican body, in which, however, the majority subdivided into groups. Gambetta's ”Union republicaine” was the most numerous, followed by Ferry's ”Gauche republicaine,” and the extremists. A certain fraction of Gambetta's group, including Henri Brisson and Charles Floquet, also tended to stick together. They were the germ of what became in time the great Radical party.

It had been hoped that Gambetta would bring into his Cabinet all the other leaders of his party, and at last form a great governing ministry.