Part 2 (1/2)
”L'ordre moral,” such was the political catchword of the new administration. Just what it meant was not very clear. In general, however, it was obviously intended to imply resistance to radicalism (republicanism) and the maintenance of a strictly conservative policy, strongly tinged with clericalism.[5] The victors over M. Thiers had revived their desire of a monarchical restoration and many of them hoped that the marechal de Mac-Mahon would shortly make way for the comte de Chambord. But though an anti-republican he was never willing to lend himself to any really illegal or dishonest manoeuvres, and his sense of honor was of great help to him in his want of political competence.
So he did not prove the pliant tool of his creators, and his term of office saw the definite establishment of the Republic.
The first Cabinet was led by the duc de Broglie who took the portfolio of Foreign Affairs. The new Government was viewed askance by the conquerors at Berlin, who disliked such an orderly transmission of powers as an indication of national recovery and stability. Bismarck even exacted new credentials from the French Amba.s.sador. Meanwhile, the Minister of the Interior, Beule, proceeded to consolidate the authority of the new Cabinet by numerous changes in the prefects of the departments, turning out the ”rascals” of Thiers's administration to make room for appointees more amenable to new orders.
The time now seemed ripe for another effort to establish the monarchy under the comte de Chambord. It culminated in the ”monarchical campaign”
of October, 1873. The monarchical sympathizers were hand-in-glove with the Clericals and for the most part coincided with them. The Royalists were inevitably clerical if for no other reason than that monarchy and religion both seemed to involve continuity, and the legitimacy of the monarchy had always been blessed by the Church. The revolutionary Rights of Man were held to be inconsistent with the traditional Rights of G.o.d and the monarchy. Moreover, the founders of the third republic had, with noteworthy exceptions like the devout Trochu, been mildly anti-clerical. They were for the most part religious liberals and deists, rarely atheists, but that was enough to array the bishops, like monseigneur Pie of Poitiers, against them. Indeed, a quick religious revival swept over the land, as was shown by numerous pilgrimages, including one to Paray-le-Monial, home of the cult of the Sacred Heart.
France herself should be consecrated to the Sacred Heart, and the idea was evolved, afterwards carried out, of the erection of the great votive basilica of the Sacre Coeur on the heights of Montmartre.
The first step toward the restoration of ”Henry V” was to persuade the comte de Paris to make new efforts for a fusion of the two branches.
Swallowing his pride, the comte de Paris generously went to the home of the comte de Chambord at Frohsdorf, in Austria, in August, and paid his respects to him as head of the family. As the comte de Chambord had no children, it was expected that the comte de Paris would be his successor. But the old difficulty about the white flag cropped up, and the comte de Chambord stubbornly refused to rule over a country above which waved the revolutionary tricolor.
Matters dragged on through the summer, during the parliamentary recess, and the conservative leaders were outspoken as to their plans to overthrow the Republic. It was hoped that some compromise might be reached by which could be reconciled, as to the flag, the desires of the a.s.sembly which was expected to recall the pretender and those of the comte de Chambord who considered his divinely inspired will superior to that of the representatives of the people. It was suggested that the question of the flag might be settled _after_ his accession to the throne. The emba.s.sy to Salzburg, in October, of M. Chesnelong, an emissary of a committee of nine of the Royalist leaders, achieved only a half-success, but left matters sufficiently indeterminate to encourage them in continuing their plans. Matters seemed progressing swimmingly when, on October 27, an unexpected letter from the pretender to M.
Chesnelong categorically declared that _nothing_ would induce him to sacrifice the white banner.
The effect of this letter was to make all hopes of a restoration impossible. Everybody knew that the majority of Frenchmen would never give up their flag for the white one, whether this were dignified by the name of ”standard of Arques and Ivry,” or whether one called it irreverently a ”towel,” as did Pope Pius IX, impatient at the obstinacy of the comte de Chambord. In the midst of the general confusion only one thing seemed feasible if governmental anarchy were to be avoided, namely, the prorogation of Mac-Mahon's authority, as a rampart against rising democracy and a permanent republic. This condition the Orleanist Right Centre turned to their advantage. By a vote of November 20, the executive power was conferred for a definite period of seven years on the marechal de Mac-Mahon. Thus a head of the nation was provided who might perhaps outlast the a.s.sembly. The vote might be interpreted either as the beginning of a permanent republican regime, as it proved to be, or as the establishment of a definite interlude in antic.i.p.ation of a new attempt to set up a monarchy, this time to the advantage of the younger branch. Many hoped that the comte de Chambord would soon be dead, his white flag forgotten, and the way open to the comte de Paris. The Orleanists were pleased by this latter idea, the Republicans were glad to have the republican regime recognized for, at any rate, seven years to come, accompanied by the promise of a const.i.tutional commission of thirty members. The Legitimists alone were disappointed, and, oblivious of the fact that the comte de Chambord had lost through his folly, they were before long ready to vent their wrath on Mac-Mahon and his adviser, the duc de Broglie, who was responsible for the presidential prorogation.
The pretender had been completely taken aback at the impression produced by his letter. Convinced of his divinely inspired omniscience, and certain that he was the foreordained ruler of France, he had thought that the a.s.sembly would give way on the question of the flag, or that the army would follow him, or that Mac-Mahon would yield. His state coach had been made ready and a military uniform awaited him at a tailor's. He hastened in secret to Versailles, where he remained for a while in retirement to watch events, and where Mac-Mahon refused to see him. Then, after the vote on the presidency, he sadly returned into exile forever.
Never was a greater service done to France than when the comte de Chambord refused to give up his flag. Completely out of touch with the country through a life spent in exile, inspired with the feeling of his divine rights and their superiority to the will of democracy, he would scarcely have ascended the throne before some conflict would have broken out and the history of France would have registered one revolution more.
The duc de Broglie had considered it good form to resign after the vote of November 20, but Mac-Mahon immediately entrusted to him the selection of a second Cabinet. In this Cabinet the portfolio of Foreign Affairs was given to the duc Decazes, a skilled diplomat, but the Legitimists were offended by some of the cabinet changes and their dislike of the duc de Broglie gradually became more acute. Finally, after several months of parliamentary skirmis.h.i.+ng the second Broglie Cabinet fell before a coalition vote of Republicans and extreme Royalists with a few Bonapartists, on May 16, 1874. The Right Centre and Left Centre had unsuccessfully joined in support of the Cabinet. The nation was taking another step toward republican control and the overthrow of the conservatives.
From now on, Mac-Mahon's task became increasingly difficult. After the split in the conservative majority it was necessary to rely on combination ministries, representing different sets and harder to reconcile or to propitiate. The result of Mac-Mahon's first efforts was a Cabinet led by a soldier, General de Cissey, and having no p.r.o.nounced political tendencies.
Party differences were becoming accentuated. The downfall of the Broglie Cabinet had been largely due to the extreme Royalists and the Orleanists could not forgive them. The situation was made worse by differences in interpretation of the law of November 20, establis.h.i.+ng the ”septennat”
of the marechal de Mac-Mahon. Some of the Monarchists maintained the ”septennat personnel,” namely, the election of one specific person to hold office for seven years, with the idea that he could withdraw at any time in favor of a king. Others interpreted the law as establis.h.i.+ng a ”septennat impersonnel,” a definite truce of seven years, which should still hold even if Mac-Mahon had to be replaced before the expiration of the time by another President. Then, they hoped, their enemy Thiers would be dead. The Republicans were, of course, desirous of making the impersonal ”septennat” lead to a permanent republic, and declared that Mac-Mahon was not the President of a seven years' republic, but President, for seven years, of the Republic.
In this state of affairs the Bonapartists now became somewhat active again. Strangely enough, the disasters of 1870 were already growing sufficiently remote for some of the anti-Republicans to turn again to the prospect of empire. This menace frightened the moderate Royalists into what they had kept hesitating to do; that is to say, into spurring to activity the purposely inactive and dilatory const.i.tutional commission.
The stumbling-block was the recognition of the Republic itself and the admission that the form of government existing in France was to be permanent. There was much parliamentary skirmis.h.i.+ng over various plans, rejected one after the other, inclining in turn toward the Republic and a monarchy. Finally, some of the Monarchists, discouraged by the rising tide of ”radicalism,” and frightened lest unwillingness to accept a conservative republic now might result still worse for them in the future, rallied in support of the motion of M. Wallon, known as the ”amendement Wallon,” which was adopted by a vote of 353 to 352 (January, 1875): ”The President of the Republic is elected by absolute majority of votes by the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies united as a National a.s.sembly. He is chosen for seven years and is re-eligible.”
In this vote the fateful statement was made concerning the election of a President other than Mac-Mahon and the transmission of power in a republic. The third Republic received its definite consecration by a majority of _one vote_.
The vote on the Wallon amendment dealt with only one article of a project not yet voted as a whole, but it was the crossing of the Rubicon. The other articles were adopted by increased majorities.
The Ministry of General de Cissey had already resigned upon a minor question, but had held over at the President's request. Mac-Mahon now asked the Monarchist M. Buffet to form a conservative conciliation Cabinet, which was made up almost entirely from the Right Centre (Orleanists) and the Left Centre (moderate Republicans) and accepted at first by the Republican Left. By this Cabinet still one more step was taken toward Republican preponderance.
During the Buffet Ministry three important matters occupied public attention. One was the completion of the new const.i.tution. A second was the creation of ”free” universities, not under control of the State.
This step was advocated in the name of intellectual freedom, but the whole scheme was backed by the Catholics and merely resulted in the creation of Catholic faculties in several great cities. A third matter was the intense anxiety over the prospect of a rupture with Germany.
Bismarck was renewing his policy of pin-p.r.i.c.ks. The French army had been strengthened by a battalion to every regiment, and so Bismarck complained of the strictures of French and Belgian bishops on his anti-papal policy. Whether he only meant to humiliate France still more, or whether he actually desired a new rupture so as to crush the country finally, is not clear. At any rate, with the aid of England and especially of Russia, France showed that she was not helpless, and Bismarck protested that he was absolutely friendly.
By the close of 1875, the measures const.i.tuting the new Government had been voted and, on December 31, the a.s.sembly, which had governed France since the Franco-Prussian War, was dissolved to make way for the new legislature. During the succeeding elections M. Buffet's Cabinet, antagonized by the Republicans and rent by internal dissensions, went to pieces, M. Buffet personally suffered disastrously at the polls. The slate was clear for a totally new organization. The a.s.sembly had done many a good service, but its dilatoriness in establis.h.i.+ng a permanent government, its ingrat.i.tude to M. Thiers, its clericalism, and its stubbornness in trying to foist a king on the people made it pa.s.s away unregretted by a country which had far outstripped it in republicanism.
The ”Const.i.tution of 1875,” under which, with some modifications, France is still governed, is not a single doc.u.ment constructed _a priori_, like the Const.i.tution of the United States. It was partly the result of the evolution of the National a.s.sembly itself, partly the result of compromises and d.i.c.kerings between hostile groups. Particularly, it expressed the jealousy of a monarchical a.s.sembly for a President of a republic, and the desire, therefore, to keep power in the hands of its own legislative successor. The a.s.sembly took it for granted that the Chamber of Deputies would have the same opinions as itself. As a matter of fact, the political complexion of the legislature has been consistently toward radicalism, and the result has hindered a strong executive and promoted legislative demagogy.
The Const.i.tution of 1875 may be considered as consisting of the Const.i.tutional Law of February 25, relating to the organization of the public powers (President, Senate, Chamber of Deputies, Ministers, etc.); the Const.i.tutional Law of the previous day, February 24, relating to the organization of the Senate; the Const.i.tutional Law of July 16, on the relations of the public powers. Subsidiary ”organic laws” voted later determined the procedure for the election of Senators and Deputies. The vote of February 25 was the crucial one in the definite establishment of the Republican regime. The Const.i.tution has undergone certain slight modifications since its adoption.
By the Const.i.tution of 1875 the government of the French Republic was vested in a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies. The Senate consisted of 300 members, of whom 75 were chosen for life by the expiring a.s.sembly, their successors to be elected by co-optation in the Senate itself. The other 225, chosen for nine years and renewable by thirds, were to be elected by a method of indirect selection. In 1884, the choice of life Senators ceased and the seats, as they fell vacant, have been distributed among the Departments of the country. The Deputies were elected by universal suffrage for a period of four years. Unless a candidate obtained an absolute majority of the votes cast, the election was void, and a new one was necessary. Except during the period from 1885 to 1889, the Deputies have represented districts determined, unless for densely populated ones, by the administrative _arrondiss.e.m.e.nts_.
From 1885 to 1889, the _scrutin de liste_ was in operation: the _whole_ Department voted on a ticket containing as many names as there were _arrondiss.e.m.e.nts_. The prerogatives of the two houses were identical except that financial measures were to originate in the Chamber of Deputies. As a matter of fact, the Senate has fallen into the background, and the habit of considering the vote of the Chamber rather than that of the Senate as important in a change of Ministry has made it the true source of government in France. The two houses met at Versailles until 1879; since then Paris has been the capital, except for the election of a President. After separate decision by each house to do so, or the request of the President, they could meet in joint a.s.sembly as a Const.i.tutional Convention to revise the const.i.tution.
The Senate and Chamber, united in joint session as a National a.s.sembly, were to choose a President for a definite term of seven years, not to fill out an incomplete term vacated by another President. The President could be re-elected. With the consent of the Senate he could dissolve the Chamber, but this restriction made the privilege almost inoperative in practice. He was irresponsible, the nominal executive and figurehead of the State, but all his acts had to be countersigned by a responsible Minister, by which his initiative was greatly reduced. In fact the President had really less power than a const.i.tutional king.