Part 3 (2/2)
Without all Doubt it was Mr. _Moor_'s Intention to batter the western Face of the Bastion, and to beat down its Defences, which was evident, not only from the Construction, but from the Effect of the Battery. I must own I cannot but admire at the Author's Conclusion, that the Success was owing to Chance, because, if the Enemy had cleared more Ground round the Castle, the Undertaking would have been more difficult.
I readily join with him, that it would have been so; tho' in the Beginning of this Note, the Engineers are condemn'd for making the best Advantage of the Wood, which the Enemy had so imprudently left standing.
”The Engineers could by no Means out-do themselves; the Battery was constructed in a Wood.”]
[Footnote 14: In the Note, Letter (_o_), it is alledged, that the Admiral sent in these s.h.i.+ps to oblige the General; The Truth of the Fact is this; The Ground over which the Troops were to march to attack the Breach, being flank'd both from Fort St. _Joseph_, and from the Fascine Battery, it was, _March_ the 22d, resolved in a Council of War, composed of Land Officers, to represent that Circ.u.mstance to the Admiral, and that they deem'd the Breach could not be attempted, without great Loss, from the Fire of Fort St. _Joseph_, and the Fascine Battery, if some Means could not be used by the Fleet to divert their Fire. The Day following, the Admiral signify'd to the General by Letter, ”_That he had formed a Plan for bringing in the Men of War to make a general Attack on the Enemy's Forts and Batteries_”; to which he adds, ”_that nothing but the Necessity of the Case can justify us in these Resolutions, as it is against our Judgment, as Seamen_.” After the Opening of the great Gun Battery, the Castle Guns, which bore upon the Camp, were soon silenced; but it was apparent, even to Land-Men, that our Men of War could do little or no Damage to those of the Enemy's s.h.i.+pping, which, at that time, began to be made very uneasy by the red-hot b.a.l.l.s from the great Gun Battery.]
[Footnote 15: It may be remark'd (_Vide n. q._) though perhaps not as a Thing very extraordinary, that either the Author of the Pamphlet was, at that time on board, securely asleep in his Bed, or that he knowingly avers what is absolutely false; for that Night the Battery was, by particular Order, fired, both with Grape and round Shot, alternatively, and without any other Intermission, than was necessary to cool the Guns; for, it having been observed, that the Enemy was raising a Fascine Work behind the Breach, all possible Care was taken to r.e.t.a.r.d its Progress during the Night.]
[Footnote 16: The Author's being mistaken as to some Circ.u.mstances relating to the Attack, (_Vide_ his Note _r_) is easily to be excused; for, if he saw it at all, it must probably have been at a great Distance through a Spying Gla.s.s; but, as he is pleased in the latter Part of his Note to rea.s.sume his favourite Topick, the throwing out scurrilous Reflections upon the Land Forces, I cannot pa.s.s them over un.o.bserved.
This Success was undoubtedly, neither disagreeable to the Army, nor to the Navy; the former having undergone Hards.h.i.+ps, such as no modern Soldiers, or Sailors, had been accustomed to, nor perhaps many in former Times; nor did the Army propose any Advantage in being possessed of an Island (as the Author insinuates) but imbarked on board their Transports with all possible Expedition, in order to proceed to the Attack of the City.
That so formidable a Fleet was employ'd to little other Purpose, but to attend upon the Army, and to convoy their Transports, was with Regret observed, both by the Officers of the Army, and of the Navy; but surely so ridiculous a Thought could never enter into any Man's Imagination, as that the Soldiers should march along the Sh.o.r.e, the Fleet within Call, crying out to them for Help, or that they could not find their Way into the Castle without a Sea Pilot to conduct them: A Story, which has not the least Foundation; Lieutenant _Bennett_, the Gentleman, who led the Forlorn-Hope, and Mr. _Watson_, the Engineer, who accompanied him, are still living, and can testify, that no Sea Pilot, no _Spaniard_, no Prisoner, was upon that Attack; and I am well a.s.sured, that no such Person was ever thought of by the General to be employ'd on that Occasion.]
[Footnote 17: This Scheme (_Vide_ Note _s_) if there was any, seems to have been contrived chiefly for a Pretext to give the Sailors the Credit of whatsoever should be performed by the Land Forces; the Troops were certainly moving to the Attack, if not in Possession of the Castle, at the time, when Capt. _Knowles_'s Detachment could be first discovered by the Enemy; when it is not very probable, that they should lessen their Force by sending away large Boats full of Men (which I do not find were perceived by any body excepting the Author) to Fort St. _Joseph_; or give any Attention, but to the most pressing Danger: It is really true, that both the s.h.i.+ps and Fort St. _Joseph_ fired, but at the Troops, not at the Boats from the Fleet, which, when they came to Land, were both out of the Enemy's Sight, and out of the Reach of their Guns.]
[Footnote 18: The _Pa.s.sa-Cavallos_ is the only Creek, thro' which Provisions can be conveyed into the _Lagoon_, and from thence to the City, with which all Communication was effectually cut off, as soon as the Fleet was in Possession of the Harbour.]
[Footnote 19: Capt. _Knowles_ was appointed Governor of _Castillo Grande_; and to do him the more Honour (there could be no other End proposed, as there was no Possibility of the Enemies retaking of it) near 100 very useful Men of Lord _James Cavendish_'s, and Colonel _Bland_'s Regiments, were left in Garrison, and there continued till after the Troops reimbark'd, tho' of the Number required by the General to be landed (_Vide_ Notes in the Pamphlet _v_, and _w_).]
[Footnote 20: The most apparent Reason for the Enemy's burning the _French_ s.h.i.+p, was their concluding, that she must otherwise fall into our Hands, when our Men of War advanced to the Head of the Harbour; for they could apprehend little Danger to her from the Fire of _Castillo Grande_, as it lies only within a large random Shot from the Place, where she lay at Anchor.]
[Footnote 21: The Author of the Pamphlet in his Note (_y_) is pleased to affirm, ”_That things were on this Occasion (as they had been throughout the whole) done without Order or Method; for notwithstanding the Army had been apprized of the Enemy's having made Lodgments along the Road; yet they landed without a Grenado Sh.e.l.l, or Field-Piece; and were likewise told the Road was even able to sustain the Weight of the heaviest Cannon_.” Here the Author, as has been his Method thro' his whole Pamphlet, boldly a.s.serts, without the least Foundation; for, it is evident, both from the Resolutions of Councils of War, and from publick Orders, that no Step was taken here, nor indeed upon any other Occasion, without a Plan first laid down; and (where Time would admit of it) well consider'd, and approved by a Council of War.
It is very certain, that when Mr. _Macpherson_, the Guide, was conducting the Troops thro' the Defillee, he expressed no little Uneasiness on the Account of Lodgments, which he apprehended we should find upon our Route; but nothing of that Sort appeared, excepting, that a few Bushes were placed, in Order, in an Opening upon our right Flank, possibly with a Design to cover some small Party, who had retired into the Wood. But had our Landing been postponed, till the Arrival of Ordnance s.h.i.+ps from the Mouth of the Harbour, the Field-Pieces, Granado-Sh.e.l.ls, _&c._ which were then on board them, might indeed have been wanting to force such Works, as the Enemy would probably have finished during that Delay; which was prevented by boldly pus.h.i.+ng thro'
the Defillees to _La Quinta_; the Post of which, the Army was to possess themselves, ”_for cutting off the Communication of the City with the Country, and for covering the Landing of the Artillery_”. As Loss of Time might, on this Occasion, have been attended with the worst Consequences, the General found it necessary to advance without the _American_ Soldiers, Negroes, _&c._ which Disappointment cannot in any wise be attributed to the Officers of the Army, as the providing Boats for Landing the Forces was intirely under the Direction of the Navy.
Both our Motions, and those of the Enemy, might probably be seen from the s.h.i.+ps, their Masts being at that time crouded with Spectators; but what the Author alledges of the Execution they did upon the Enemy is not Fact. Whilst the Troops were moving along the Strand, some random Shots were made by the _Weymouth_, which killed one single _Spanish_ Negro, and were very near taking Place amongst our most advanced People; but were so far from obliging the Enemy to disperse, that they did not make the least Movement, till after being push'd by our Grenadiers.
That it was the general Opinion, that the City would have fallen into our Hands the first Day we landed, had the Troops push'd forward, is so far from being true, that had they been suffer'd to advance further, not an Officer but must, and would have condemn'd the General for exposing them without the least Probability of Success.
The Object proposed on our first Landing was the taking Post at _La Quinta_; ”there to cut off the City's Communication with the Country, to cover the Landing of the rest of the Forces, and of the Artillery; and to clear Ground for the Encampment,” which was mark'd out that very Day; but the Tents could not be pitched without first cutting down a thick Copse Wood; which, as soon as the Negroes and Tools were landed, was done with all possible Expedition. To have advanced further, in our Circ.u.mstances, would have been not only acting inconsistently with the Rules of War, but of common Sense, for we were entirely Strangers to the Road leading to _Carthagena_; the Guide, Mr. _Macpherson_, having, as soon as the Enemy appeared, gone on board a s.h.i.+p to view their Posture from the Main-top-mast-Head and did not return till the Affair was ended; we had neither Tools to throw up a Lodgment, nor Negroes to reconnoitre the Woods on our Flanks; besides, the Day advancing, the Heat was become so violent, that great Numbers must have fainted under the Fatigue.
From the Author's own Description of the Fort St. _Lazar_ (Page 53.) it is far from appearing to be so despicable a Redoubt, as with any Prospect of Success, to be attempted in the open Day, without Scaling-Ladders, _&c._ nor can I conceive how a Body of 1400 Men, with only their Firelocks in their hands, could (supposing the Fort to be taken) afterwards force their Way cross a Draw-bridge, commanded by Cannon, into a City fortify'd with double Walls, and two broad Ditches filled with Water, flanked by regular Bastions, and defended by a Garrison more than double the Number of the a.s.sailants; for the Body, which was drawn up on the Strand, was scarcely a fifth Part of the Garrison, and they fled thro' the Woods, where they could not be pursued, directly towards the City.]
[Footnote 22: The Stores and Ammunition which were landed at _La Quinta_, were carefully lodged in an House out of the Line of Fire, and a Guard put over them, (_vide_ Note in the Pamphlet (_a_) page 34.) The brave Officer, there so unjustly reflected upon, wants no Advocate, and will be easily able to clear himself of the Aspersions cast upon him, whenever the Author of them shall be pleased to declare himself.]
[Footnote 23: It is certain (Note _b_.) that the Enemy were very diligent in preparing for their Defence, nor was it in the power of the Army to interrupt them one Instant sooner than the Attack was made, from the want of Scaling Ladders, _&c._ being landed: What Time they employed in compleating their Works, or whether they did ever compleat them, it is not possible for the Author of the Pamphlet to judge, tho' 'tis well known they were begun upon, from the Time of our being possessed of _Boca-Chica_, if not before; but if he had been pleased candidly to have informed himself, he would have observed that our Mortar Battery at the Advanced Guard (_vide_ page 35.) play'd in 48 Hours after it was first begun upon; and that the Intrenchment there was finished in 18 Hours. I cannot but observe, that what the Author of the Pamphlet here affirms (_vide_ Note _b_, page 36) seems quite contradictory to what he advances (page 54) in the Appendix; in the one Place, _'tis declared that the Enemy had thrown up Intrenchments round about the Foot of the Castle, stronger and of more Importance than the Castle it self_: In the other, _that the Castle on the Side of the Town was quite defenseless_.]
[Footnote 24: The Communication of the city (_vide_ Note 6 page 36) with the Country on that Side, where the Army was incamp'd, was effectually cut off the very Day they landed; nor did the General (as the Author alledges) want to be prevail'd upon to do the same on the Side next to the Sea, but found it impracticable without the a.s.sistance of the Fleet, which was promised, and comply'd with, when it was too late.
The Author seems very careful to celebrate the great Attention given, to the preventing Supplies from entering the Town to Sea-ward; which was to be done without the least Difficulty or Hazard, particularly after the Fleet had got Admittance into the _Lagoon_: But pa.s.ses over in Silence, that no less Attention was given to prevent Refreshments being conveyed to the Army; it was even refused to the General to admit of sending out two or three small Vessels, to catch Turtle for the use of the Sick and Wounded: If the Army complain'd heavily, it was not without Reason; for during our Stay before _Carthagena_, the Fleet was supplied with Turtle, fresh Beef, _&c._ which the Land Forces on Sh.o.r.e laboured under the greatest Difficulties, even from the want of their Salt Provisions, which were not regularly conveyed to them.
The Author, with his usual Regard to Truth, affirms that a drove of Cattle was thro' neglect suffered to pa.s.s into the City. The Instant, the General was apprised from the Officer at the Convent, that a drove of Cattle was seen moving towards the City, he ordered out a Party to intercept them, who march'd with all the Expedition which was possible in that hot Climate, but were not so fortunate as to come up with them; of which some Part had probably dispersed in the Woods, and others, (as we were afterwards informed,) got into the Town. 'Tis not to be imagined that Men so distressed from the want of fresh Provisions, (even by the Author's own Account,) would have omitted any thing in their Power, to get such a Prey into their Hands; nor was due Encouragement wanting, a Reward of a Pistole for each Beeve, being promis'd to the Captors. Two or three small Islands lie in the Lake at about 500 Paces from the Sh.o.r.e, upon the right of the Ground where we encamped; which being observed to be sometimes frequented by the Spaniards, Application was made for a Boat, to know for what End these People came there, and to search for Goods, Provisions, _&c._ which might be lodged there; this I presume gave occasion for the pretty Story form'd by the Author. What idle Tales might be propagated in the Camp (perhaps by the Author himself) relating to raising Batteries, I cannot say; but I am well a.s.sur'd no Man in his Senses believ'd them.]
[Footnote 25: As many of the _American_ Soldiers were suspected to be _Irish_ Papists (_vide_ Note in the Pamphlet Letter (_d_) page 39) it was though adviseable both by the General and the Admiral, to employ them princ.i.p.ally on Board the Fleet; but the Regiments which came from Europe, being now reduced low in their Numbers, made it absolutely necessary, that the _Americans_ should be included in the Corps design'd for the Attempt on _Carthagena_.
This Reinforcement (as the Author stiles it) was only some Part of those Soldiers, which the General had required to be landed from the Fleet, and did not in Fact compleat the Troops on Sh.o.r.e, to numbers sufficient for proper Reliefs for the ordinary and extraordinary Duty; notwithstanding, had it been practicable to have victualled and sustained them, a Detachment had without doubt been made, even from the Numbers which were landed, to cut off the Communication on the _Eastern_ Side of the City; the General having great Reason to expect a further Supply from the Admiral.
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