Part 3 (1/2)
That many of the Bomb-Sh.e.l.ls broke in the Air, from some Defect in their Fusees, or never broke at all, is undoubtedly Fact; which probably was occasioned by Damage they had received at Sea, and which could not be repaired, as we had neither Time nor Convenience for it, before their being wanted for Service. The Grenado-Sh.e.l.ls were of the same Sort, of the very same Dimensions with those usually issued out from the Office of Ordnance; nor was there ever before the least mention made of their having been deficient. The Reason given for their not breaking is no great Proof of the Author's Skill, as an Engineer; for it is well known, that one single Ounce of Gunpowder is sufficient (if properly confined) to rend in Pieces a Stone weighting several Tuns.
The eight twenty-four Pounders, put on board for the Use of the Expedition, were all landed at _Boca-Chica_ fit for Service, and were there actually made use of upon the Battery, where two of them were rendered unserviceable.
One hundred Baulks, and three hundred Battery Planks, were by an Order from the Board of Ordnance, bearing date, _May_ 1740, issued out of the Stores, and imbark'd for the Use of the Expedition; but Lord _Cathcart_, having after the Imbarkation of the Troops, been informed that no further Supply could be had in the _West-Indies_, tho' the contrary had been represented to the Board of Ordnance; He applied for an Addition of one hundred Baulks, and 300 Planks, which were put on board before the Fleet sailed; as were likewise 4050 Hand-bills, his Lords.h.i.+p deeming the 1000 already provided not to be sufficient.
Upon the whole, nothing could more demonstrate the Goodness of this Army, than the Service they performed, not only amidst the almost insuperable Difficulties, which arose from the Climate, but labouring under the utmost Distresses and Discouragements from a Quarter, whence the Reverse ought justly to have been expected. Were the Instruments imploy'd on the late Expedition such as the Author of the Pamphlet is pleased to describe, there would be no great Difficulty in accounting for its Miscarriage; the which, Lord _Cathcart_ (had he lived) could probably not have prevented: but as it does, I think, evidently appear, that what the Author has advanced to the Prejudice of the Land Forces, is false and groundless, and that they performed whatever was possible for them to do in their Situation, our Misfortunes are to be ascribed to some other Cause; they were, without Doubt, princ.i.p.ally occasioned by the Climate. What further may have contributed, nothing would set in a more clear Light, than an exact and faithful Account of every Transaction, not only during the Time of the Troops lying before _Carthagena_, but to that of their being recalled. Such an Account cannot but be very acceptable to all those who had a Share in that unfortunate Expedition, and had no other End in View but the publick Service. And, I am well a.s.sured, to none more than to the Gentleman, on whom the Command devolved by the Death of Lord _Cathcart_, who has all possible Reason to desire, that his whole Conduct may undergo the strictest Scrutiny.
I cannot conclude without remarking, as something extraordinary, the Justice done by the Author in his last Paragraph to the common Soldiers; but which is surely no less due to the Officers, who led them on, and by following whose brave Example, they gave evident Proofs, that they wanted not for Courage and Resolution becoming _Englishmen_.
_FINIS._
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 1: The princ.i.p.al Council of War, consisted of the two eldest Officers of the Army, of the two eldest Officers of the Navy, and of the Governor of _Jamaica_, whenever he could be present. It was the Province of this Council to determine what Enterprizes should be undertaken.]
[Footnote 2: _Vide_ Note (_a_) in the late Pamphlet, ent.i.tuled, _An Account of the Expedition to_ Carthagena.]
[Footnote 3: Upon its being first debated, whether an Attempt should be made on _Carthagena_, the General declared, that, as he was a Stranger in those Seas, he had no Knowledge of the then present State of that City; and that he should join with the Admiral in his Opinion; not doubting of his being well inform'd of every Circ.u.mstance relating to the Entry into the Harbour, the Strength of the Garrison, _&c._]
[Footnote 4: In relating this Transaction (_vide_ P. 7. note Letter _c_) the very candid Author of the Account of the Siege of _Carthagena_, is pleas'd to affirm, that _the General landed with a Body of 800 Grenadiers, but not thinking them sufficient, reimbark'd, and sent for more_: There was not the least Step taken, which could give Colour for such an a.s.sertion; excepting that Capt. _Dennet_, who commanded General _Harrison_'s Grenadiers, being apprehensive, that the General would give those of his own Regiment the Honour of landing first, push'd forward without Orders, and leaped on Sh.o.r.e with five or six Men: which the General perceiving, and that the rest of the Boats began to move in Confusion towards the Beach; he order'd those who had landed, (who were only _Dennet_, and the few Men abovementioned) to reimbark, and with the rest of the Boats to lay along-side of the _Norfolk_ and _Russel_, there to wait for the Arrival of the Companies, which were still wanting: Nor, had all the Companies of Grenadiers, been compleat to a Man, could they have exceeded 648 Officers included: but that was far from being the Case; for not only _Robinson_'s Grenadiers were then absent, having been separated from the Fleet, but the rest were at that Time so far reduced by Sickness, as not to amount to 400 Men, as it will appear from the Adjutant's Books.]
[Footnote 5: Had the Author of the Account, (_vide_ Note _d_,) been present on Sh.o.r.e, where probably he was not, he might have observed that all possible Diligence was used, to put the Men under Cover; and if he is in any wise capable of judging of military Operations at Land, he must have known that the Camp could not have been so properly formed in any other Place, for carrying on the Attack on the Castle of _Boca-Chica_; nor, if advanced higher into the Woods, could it have been supplied with Water, or the Tents pitch'd on that rocky Soil, which will not admit of the driving down a Tent Pin; but setting aside that Difficulty, how the Tents could have been pitch'd without cutting down the Trees, from whose Shade, as the Author alledges, the Soldiers would have been so much benefited, I really do not comprehend; nor would they have been less exposed to the Enemy's Shot, excepting they had incamped out of the Reach of it, which could not have answered the End proposed by their Landing.]
[Footnote 6: Mr. _Moor_ was of Opinion, that if an Opening should be made through the Wood from the Camp to the _Lagoon_, where the Enemy's s.h.i.+ps of War lay at Anchor, it might be a means of directing their fire: That the Admiral sollicited the General to continue this Coupure, is, I believe, true; but that it would have answer'd the Purposes mention'd in the latter part of the Note (_f_) in the Pamphlet, is not so evident. As the Enemy was in Possession of the _Lagoon_, they would not surely send Succours cross the _Boca-Grande_, (where s.h.i.+ps were posted to observe their Motions) thence with Hazard to pa.s.s the _Tierra Bomba_; which Succours could be conveyed by the way of the Harbour, without Danger or Interruption: nor could that Coupure be of the least Use to enable us to observe what pa.s.sed in the Harbour, of which we daily received Accounts from the abovementioned s.h.i.+ps, or from our small Parties; nor, if there was Danger to be apprehended from the Enemy's Incursions, (which there was not) could this Coupure have prevented them, as it was not much less than 1000 Paces from the Castle of _Boca-Chica_.]
[Footnote 7: The Communication between the Mortar-Battery and the Camp (_vide_ Letter _g_ in the Pamphlet) was covered from the Shot of the Castle by a rising Ground, nor was one Man killed during the whole Time in pa.s.sing between that and the Camp, nor did one single Shot take Place in it from the Fascine Battery, from which it was in great Measure secured by its natural Situation, which was help'd by a Parapet. Several of the Bombs most certainly broke in the Air, without any Effect; which was possibly occasioned by the splitting of the Fuzees, in driving them into the Sh.e.l.ls. Nor (notwithstanding what the Author is pleased to advance) did we suffer much from those thrown by the Enemy; one of which fell near the Mortar-Battery, and killed 6 or 7 Men; a few took Place in the Artillery-Park, (whither they were chiefly directed) damaged some Casks of working Tools, and two or three Carriages; but the greatest Part of them were either extinguished by falling into the Water, or buried themselves so deep in the Sand, as to break without any ill Effect whatsoever.]
[Footnote 8: Fascines and Pickets (_vide_ the beginning of the Note _f_) had not only been cut during the Fleet's watering at _Hispaniola_, but after our landing on _Tierra Bomba_, all possible Diligence was daily used, to compleat the Number required for erecting the Batteries.
Nothing can be more absurd than to imagine that so skilful an Engineer, as was Mr. _Moor_, could be so widely mistaken as to the Quant.i.ty. As soon as the Ground was cleared, and proper Works thrown up to cover the Workmen, he began with such Materials as were ready, and had from the Fleet no other a.s.sistance than 18 Carpenters for laying the Platforms; the Seamen were employed, (and that was properly their Province) in landing the Stores and Cannon; in getting the latter up to the Battery, and they afterwards a.s.sisted in firing of it; (most of the Gunners being at that time either Dead, or disabled by Sickness) besides 150 of them were for one or two Days employed to cut Fascines, but were so ungovernable as to be of little Service.
How far the Author may be qualified to judge of the Knowledge of the Sub-Engineers, Time may discover; was Mr. _Moor_ still living, he could well answer for the Construction of his Battery. He rais'd it not exactly parallel to the Face where the Breach was made, for a very powerful Reason: to prevent its being flank'd from the _Barradera_ Battery, and by that means preserved the Lives of a great many Men, who must otherwise have been lost. It is not improbable, that the Author believ'd the Line of Communication, between the great Gun-Battery and the Camp, to have been expos'd to the Enemy's Shot, and therefore never came near it; or he must have known that it was neither enfiladed from the Castle, nor the s.h.i.+pping, and that the few Men who were killed there, fell by Shot which glanced from the Trees, and did not exceed 7 or 8 during the whole Time the Troops lay before the Castle. (_vide_ Note _b_)]
[Footnote 9: The Troops were certainly annoyed in their Camp by the Enemy's Cannon, and particularly by the Fascine Battery: an Inconvenience which, in their Circ.u.mstances, was absolutely necessary to be supported, as by their removing to so great a Distance, as to be out of the reach of their Shot, the great Gun-Battery must have been expos'd to be insulted, which would at least have for some Time r.e.t.a.r.ded the taking of the Castle, if not oblig'd us to retire.
The base Insinuation relating to the Troops being moved without regular Orders, is absolutely groundless: The Independants from _Jamaica_, not arriving till after the Camp was formed, they were ordered to clear the Ground upon the Left, and there to pitch their Tents; where 200 _Americans_, and part of Lord _James Cavendish_'s and of Col. _Bland_'s Regiments, joined them from the Fleet. To make the more Room for the Artillery-Park, _Harrison_'s Regiment was, by Order, removed to the same Ground; as afterwards were those Regiments, which were the most exposed to the Fire from the Fascine Battery, and had suffered greatly in their Tents, Arms, _&c._ Nor, till then, did any of the General Officers remove to the new Encampment; which was indeed in some Measure covered by a Rock from the Fire of the Fascine Battery, but was not the less exposed to that from the s.h.i.+pping and the Castle, by which Lieutenant Col. _Sandford_ and several others there lost their Lives.]
[Footnote 10: Nothing can be more false than what the Author of the Pamphlet a.s.serts in his Note (_e_) of no Application having been made, nor any particular Scheme form'd for landing the Cannon and Stores.
_March_ the 10th, the Day after the Grenadiers had taken Possession of the two Forts, the General went in Person on board the Admiral to concert Measures with him for putting on Sh.o.r.e the Cannon, Ammunition, _&c._ and was by him, the Admiral, informed, that a Captain of a Man of War appointed for that Service, was gone on board the Ordnance s.h.i.+ps to give the proper Directions; the General, without Delay, order'd his Barge to row thither, and signify'd to the said Captain (who is since dead) both the Quant.i.ty and Species of Stores proper to be landed; and at the same time particularly mentioned to him the Inconvenience which would attend the putting on Sh.o.r.e more than were necessary for present Service. Notwithstanding (probably from the Want of Time and Means for sorting the Stores, _&c._) whatever first came to hand, was thrown into the Boats, sent to Sh.o.r.e, and confusedly cast upon the Beach. Whence they were removed by Matrosses and Soldiers appointed for that Service, and secured in the best Manner our Circ.u.mstances would admit of; but (excepting that some of the Powder received Damage from its having been placed by the Sailors upon the Sh.o.r.e within the Reach of the Surf of the Sea) none of the Stores were wash'd away, which indeed might possibly have happen'd, if timely Care had not been taken to prevent it.]
[Footnote 11: This bold and surprising Enterprize (as the Author of the Pamphlet is pleased to stile it in his Note _i_) seems to be celebrated with all the Rhetorick he is Master of: It is observable, that he makes no mention of the two hundred Soldiers, who were detached on the same Occasion, which possibly he may have forgot; as likewise, that, tho' by the Admiral's Disposition, the Soldiers were posted in the Rear; when landed, they were called for to advance, and a Lane made for their pa.s.sing towards the Front, which probably might be occasioned by their being armed more properly than the Sailors, for returning the Fire of the Enemy's small Arms. I cannot, without doing Injustice to Capt.
_Was.h.i.+ngton_, the Honourable Mr. _Murray_, and to the rest of the Land Officers, who were detach'd on this Occasion, join with the Author in pa.s.sing over their gallant Behaviour in Silence; nor would I be wanting in the Praises due to Capt. _Boscawen_, Capt. _Watson_, Capt. _Coates_, &c. who commanded the Sailors, who, as they have ever done, performed their Duty with great Bravery and Resolution, and particularly Lieutenant, now Captain _Forrest_, who, with the foremost, enter'd the Battery Sword in Hand; the Enemy having fled with Precipitation into the Woods, and the Soldiers being posted upon the Avenues, the Seamen set about spiking the Guns, destroying the Carriages, and tearing up the Platforms; but one of them having imprudently put Fire to the Guard House, they were discovered by the Enemy, and consequently exposed to the Fire from the Castle, _&c._ the Commandant therefore thought it advisable to retire, before the Battery could be effectually demolish'd.]
[Footnote 12: Two or three Boats were observed to pa.s.s between the Castle and the _Barradera_ Battery (not hundreds of Men as the Author alledges in Note _l_) who carry'd People sufficient so far to repair the Damage, which had been done, as in a short time to renew the Fire; an evident Proof both to the Army, and to the Navy, that the Battery had not been effectually demolish'd.
That the Army had work'd to some purpose (tho' the Author insinuates the contrary) plainly appears from their having made two Coupures thro' the Woods, cut the Fascines and Pickets, raised the Battery, and conveyed thither the Stores and Ammunition; in which last they had some a.s.sistance from the Sailors, and not a great deal from the Negroes. Had the Army the least Room for Resentment before, the sixty Gun s.h.i.+p was sent in to interrupt the Enemy's repairing the Fascine Battery, any Thing she perform'd, could by no Means cool it; for the fired at so great a Distance, as to give the Enemy very little Disturbance.]
[Footnote 13: The Author of the Pamphlet, in his extraordinary Note, Letter (_m_) mentions, _five hundred Sailors to have been employed in erecting the Battery_, tho' in Fact the Navy contributed to it, only 18 Carpenters. He adds, that, ”_as more Time and Men were employed in it than were necessary, much Execution may be expected therefrom_.” What more could be expected from it, than forcing the Enemy to abandon the Castle? ”_but the Engineers could not out-do themselves; they erected the Battery in a Wood_.” They might not out-do themselves, but they certainly did perfectly well; for by erecting their Battery under the Cover of the Wood, many Mens Lives were saved, and the Work was carried on without the Enemy's being able to interrupt their Progress.
He is likewise pleased to condemn them _for not clearing more Ground than was necessary_; a Circ.u.mstance, which, I should think, rather deserves his Approbation, as they avoided, improperly, to fatigue the Workmen, but this Caution, it seems was used, that the Enemy might not see the Army; if such a Sight would have given the Enemy any Satisfaction, I much doubt; or whether it would have answer'd to have obliged them at the Expence of cutting down 600 or 700 Paces of thick Wood, which intercepted their View of the Camp; but that the Army did not decline either then, or on any other Occasion, to look the Enemy in the Face, there have been too evident Proofs. No Man, who saw the Position of the Battery, could have the least Room to doubt of its bearing upon the Castle, as soon as a narrow Screen of Wood, which cover'd it, should be cut away. What is alledged, that no Guns could be brought to bear upon the Enemies s.h.i.+pping, is absolutely false; there were no less than seven, of which two were thought sufficient for that Purpose, which fir'd red hot b.a.l.l.s, and did good Execution. It is most certain, that if no Epaulment had been thrown up, the Battery might have been rak'd, which was easily foreseen, and timely prevented. The Sailors behaved well, and would have done better, had they been more under Direction; but they did no more than their Duty, either in a.s.sisting to erect the Battery, in which they had but a very small Share, or in firing of it, as they were expressly order'd so to do by his Majesty.