Part 19 (2/2)
In the first place there is no need to suppose the reality of such a relative ent.i.ty. _Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem._ It is an abuse of realism to suppose that the _formal_ element of a relation, its ”_esse ad_,” is a distinct and separate reality. The reality of the praedicamental relation is safeguarded without any such postulate. Since the predicamental relation, considered _adequately_, _i.e._ not merely formally but fundamentally, not merely _secundum esse ad_ but _secundum esse in_, involves as its foundation an absolute accident which is real independently of our thought, the predicamental relation is not a _mere ens rationis_. It has a foundation in reality. It is an _ens rationis c.u.m fundamento in re_. This is a sufficient counter-a.s.sertion to Idealism, and a sufficient reason for treating relation as a distinct category of real being.
That there is no need for such a relative ent.i.ty will be manifest if we consider the simple case of two bars of iron each a yard long. The length of each is an absolute accident of each. The length of either, considered absolutely and in itself, is not formally the _equality_ of this with the other. Nor are both lengths considered separately the formal relation of equality. But both considered together are the adequate foundation of this formal relation; both considered together are this relation _potentially_, _fundamentally_, so that all that is needed for the _actual_, _formal_ relation of _equality_ is the mental apprehension of the two lengths together. The mental process of comparison is the only thing required to make the potential relation actual; and the product of this mental process is the _formality_ or ”_esse ad_” of the relation, the actual reference of the extremes to each other. Besides the absolute accidents which const.i.tute the foundation of the relation something more is required for the const.i.tution of the adequate predicamental relation. This ”something more,” however, is a mind capable of comparing the extremes, and not any real ent.i.ty distinct from extremes and foundation. Antecedently to the act of comparison the formally relative element of the relation, its ”_esse ad_,” was not anything actual; it was the mere _comparability_ of the extremes in virtue of the foundation. If the ”_esse ad_” were a separate real ent.i.ty, a relative ent.i.ty, really distinct from extremes and foundation, what sort of ent.i.ty could it be? Being an accident, it should inhere in, or be a mode of its subject. But if it did it would lose its formally relative character by becoming an inherent mode of an absolute reality. While to conceive it as an ent.i.ty astride on both extremes, and bridging or connecting these together, would be to subst.i.tute the crude imagery of the imagination for intellectual thought.
In the second place, if a subject can acquire a relation, or lose a relation, _without undergoing any real change_, then the relation considered formally as such, or _secundum_ ”_esse ad_,” cannot be a reality. But a subject can acquire or lose a relation without undergoing any real change. Therefore the relation considered formally, as distinct from its foundation and extremes, is not a reality.
The minor of this argument may be proved by the consideration of a few simple examples. A child already born is neither larger nor smaller than its brother that will be born two years hence.(421) But after the birth of the latter child the former can acquire those relations successively _without any real change in itself_, and merely by the growth of the younger child. Again, one white ball _A_ is similar in colour to another white ball _B_. Paint the latter black, and _eo ipso_ the former loses its relation of resemblance _without any real change in itself_.
And this appears to be the view of St. Thomas. If, he writes, another man becomes equal in size to me by growing while I remain unchanged in size, then although _eo ipso_ I become equal in size to him, thus acquiring a new relation, _nevertheless I gain or acquire nothing new_: ”nihil advenit mihi de novo, per hoc quod incipio esse alteri aequalis per ejus mutationem”. Relation, he says, is an extramental reality _by reason of its foundation or cause_, whereby one reality is referred to another.(422) Relation itself, considered formally as distinct from its foundation, is not a reality; it is real only inasmuch as its foundation is real.(423) Again, relation is something inherent, but not formally as a relation, and hence it can disappear without any real change in its subject.(424) A real relation may be destroyed in one or other of two ways: either by the destruction or change of the foundation in the subject, or by the destruction of the term, entailing the cessation of the reference, _without any change in the subject_.(425) Hence, too, the reason alleged by St. Thomas why relation, unlike the other categories of real being, can be itself divided into logical ent.i.ty and real ent.i.ty, _ens rationis_ and _ens reale_: because formally it is an _ens rationis_, and only fundamentally, or in virtue of its foundation, is it an _ens reale_.(426) And hence, finally, the reason why St. Thomas, following Aristotle, describes relation as having a ”lesser reality,” an ”esse debilius,”(427) than the other or absolute categories of real being: not as if it were a sort of diminutive ent.i.ty, intermediate between nothingness and the absolute modes of reality, but because being dependent for its formal actuality not merely on a foundation in its subject, but also on a term to which the latter is referred, it can perish not merely by the destruction of its subject like other accidents, but also by the destruction of its term while subject and foundation remain unchanged.
If, then, the real relation, considered formally or ”secundum _esse ad_”
is not a reality, the relation under this aspect is a _logical_, not a _real_, accident.
To const.i.tute a mutual real relation there is needed a foundation in _both_ of the extremes. As long as the term of the relation does not actually exist, not only does the relation not exist formally and actually, but it is not even _adequately potential_: the foundation in the subject alone is not an adequate foundation.
To this view, which denies any distinct reality to the predicamental relation considered formally, it has been objected that the predicamental relation is thus confounded with the transcendental relation. But this is not so; for the transcendental relation is always essential to its subject, whatever this subject may be, while the predicamental relation, considered formally, is a logical accident separable from its subject, and considered fundamentally it is some absolute accident really distinct from the substance of the related extremes. For instance, the _action_ which mediates between cause and effect is itself transcendentally related to both; while it is at the same time the adequate foundation whereby cause and effect are predicamentally related to each other.(428)
If what we have called the formal element of a relation be nothing really distinct from the extremes and foundation, it follows that some real relations between creatures are really identical with their substances;(429) and to this it has been objected that no relation _in creatures_ can be, _quoad rem_, substantial: ”Nulla relatio,” says St.
Thomas,(430) ”est substantia secundum rem in creaturis”. To this it may be replied that even in these cases the relation itself, considered adequately, is not wholly identical with the substance of either extreme.
It superadds a separable logical accident to these.(431)
Finally it is objected that the view which denies a distinct reality to the formal element of a real relation, to its ”_esse ad_,” equivalently denies all reality to relations, and is therefore in substance identical with the idealist doctrine already rejected (90). But this is a misconception. According to idealists, relations grounded on quality, quant.i.ty, causality, etc., are exclusively in the intellect, in our mental activity and its mental products, in our concepts alone, and are in no true sense characteristic of reality. This is very different from saying that our concepts of such relations are grounded in the realities compared, and that these realities are really endowed with everything that const.i.tutes such relations, the comparative act of the intellect being required merely to apprehend these characteristics and so to give the relation its formal completeness.(432) There is all the difference that exists between a theory which so exaggerates the const.i.tutive function of thought as to reduce all intellectual knowledge to a knowledge of mere subjective mental appearances, and a theory which, while recognizing this function and its products, will not allow that these cast any cloud or veil between the intellect and a genuine insight into objective reality.
These mental processes are guided by reality; the _entia rationis_ which are their products are grounded in reality; moreover we can quite well distinguish between these _mental_ modes and products of our intellectual activity and the _real_ contents revealed to the mind in these modes and processes. So long, therefore, as we avoid the mistake of ascribing to the objective reality itself any of these mental modes (as, for instance, extreme realists do when they a.s.sert the extramental reality of the _formal_ universal), our recognition of them can in no way jeopardize the objective validity of intellectual knowledge. Perhaps an excessive timidity in this direction is in some degree accountable for the ”abuse of realism” which ascribes to the formal element of a relation a distinct extramental,(433) objective reality.
CHAPTER XIII. CAUSALITY; CLa.s.sIFICATION OF CAUSES.
94. TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF CAUSE.-The modes of real being which we have been so far examining-substance, quality, quant.i.ty, relation-are modes of reality considered as _static_. But it was pointed out in an early chapter (ch. ii.) that the universe of our experience is subject to change, that it is ever _becoming_, that it is the scene of a continuous world-process which is apparently regulated by more or less stable principles or laws, these laws and processes const.i.tuting the _universal order_ which it is the duty of the philosopher to study and explain. We must now return to this _kinetic_ and _dynamic_ aspect of reality, and investigate the principles of change in things by a study of _Causes_.
As with the names of the other ultimate categories, so too here, the general sense of the term ”cause” (_causa_, a?t???) is familiar to all, while a.n.a.lysis reveals a great variety of modalities of this common signification. We understand by a cause _anything which has a positive influence of any sort on the being or happening of something else_. In philosophy this is the meaning which has been attached traditionally to the term since the days of Aristotle; though in its present-day scientific use the term has almost lost this meaning, mainly through the influence of modern phenomenism.(434) The traditional notion of cause is usually expounded by comparing it with certain kindred notions: _principle_, _condition_, _occasion_, _reason_.
A _principle_ is _that from which anything proceeds in any way whatsoever_.(435) Any sort of intrinsic connexion between two objects of thought is sufficient to const.i.tute the one a ”principle” of the other; but a mere extrinsic or time sequence is not sufficient. A _logical_ principle is some _truth_ from which further truths are or may be derived.
A _real_ principle is some _reality_ from which the _being_ or _happening_ of something originates and proceeds.(436) If this procession involves a real and positive influence of the principle on that which proceeds from it, such a real principle is a cause. But there may be a real and intrinsic connexion without any such influence. For instance, in the substantial changes which occur in physical nature the generation of the new substantial formative principle necessarily presupposes the _privation_ of the one which antecedently ”informed” the material principle; but this ”_privatio formae_” has no positive influence on the generation of the new ”form”; it is, however, the necessary and natural antecedent to the generation of the latter; hence although this ”_privatio formae_” is a real principle of substantial change (the process or _fieri_) it is not a _cause_ of the latter. The notion of principle, even of real principle, is therefore wider than the notion of cause.(437)
A _condition_, in the proper sense of a necessary condition or _conditio sine qua non_, is something which must be realized or fulfilled before the event or effect in question can happen or be produced. On the side of the latter there is real dependence, but from the side of the former there is no real and positive influence on the happening of the event. The influence of the condition is negative; or, if positive, it is only indirect, consisting in the removal of some obstacle-”_removens probibens_”-to the positive influence of the cause. In this precisely a condition differs from a cause: windows, for instance, are a condition for the lighting of a room in the daylight, but the sun is the cause. The distinction is clear and intelligible, nor may it be ignored in a philosophical a.n.a.lysis of causality. At the same time it is easy to understand that where, as in the inductive sciences, there is question of discovering _all_ the antecedents, positive and negative, of any given kind of phenomenon, in order to bring to light and formulate the law or laws according to which such phenomenon occurs, the distinction between cause and condition is of minor importance.(438)
An _occasion_ is _any circ.u.mstance or combination of circ.u.mstances favourable to the action of a free cause_. For instance, a forced sale is an occasion for buying cheaply; night is an occasion of theft; bad companions.h.i.+p is an occasion of sin. An occasion has no intrinsic connexion with the effect as in the case of a principle, nor is it necessary for the production of the effect as in the case of a condition.
It is spoken of only in connexion with the action of a free cause; and it differs from a cause in having no positive and direct influence on the production of the effect. It has, however, a real though indirect influence on the production of the effect by soliciting and aiding the determination of the free efficient cause to act. In so far as it does exert such an influence it may be regarded as a partial efficient cause, not a physical but a moral cause, of the effect.
To ask for the _reason_ of any event or phenomenon, or of the nature or existence of any reality, is to demand an _explanation_ of the latter; it is to seek what _accounts_ for the latter, what makes this _intelligible_ to our minds. Whatever is a cause is therefore also a reason, but the latter notion is wider than the former. Whatever explains a _truth_ is a _logical_ reason of the latter. But since all truths are concerned with realities they must have ultimately _real_ reasons, _i.e._ explanatory principles inherent in the realities themselves. The knowledge of these real or ontological principles of things is the logical reason of our understanding of the things themselves. But the ontological principles, which are the real reasons of the things, are wider in extent than the causes of these things, for they include principles that are not causes.
Furthermore, the grades of reality which we discover in things by the activity of abstract thought, and whereby we compare, cla.s.sify and define those things, we apprehend as explanatory principles of the latter; and these principles, though really in the things, and therefore real ”reasons,” are not ”causes”.
Thus, life is a real reason, though not a cause, of sensibility in the animal organism; the soul's independence of matter in its mode of existence is a real reason, though not a cause, of its spiritual activities. Hence, between a reason and that which it accounts for there may be only a logical distinction, while between a cause and that which it causes there must be a real distinction (38).
To understand all the intrinsic principles which const.i.tute the _essence_ of anything is to know the _sufficient reason_ of its _reality_. To understand all the extrinsic principles which account for its actual _existence_ is to know the sufficient reason of its _existence_; and to understand this latter adequately is to realize that the thing depends ultimately for its actual existence on a Reality or Being which necessarily exists by virtue of its own essence.
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