Part 20 (1/2)

What has been called the _Principle of Sufficient Reason_ a.s.serts, when applied to reality, that every existing reality must have a sufficient reason for existing and for being what it is.(439) Unlike the _Principle of Causality_ which is an axiomatic or self-evident truth, this principle is rather a necessary postulate of all knowledge, an a.s.sumption that _reality is intelligible_. It does not mean that all reality, or even any single finite reality, is adequately intelligible to our finite minds. In the words of Bossuet, we do not know everything about anything: ”nous ne savons le tout de rien”.

In regard to contingent _essences_, if these be composite we can find a sufficient reason why they are such in their const.i.tutive principles; but in regard to simple essences, or to the simple const.i.tutive principles of composite essences, we can find no sufficient reason why they are such in anything even logically distinct from themselves: they are what they are because they are what they are, and to demand why they are what they are, is, as Aristotle remarked, to ask an idle question. At the same time, when we have convinced ourselves that their actual existence involves the existence of a Supreme, Self-Existent, Intelligent Being, we can see that the essence of this Being is the ultimate ground of the intrinsic possibility of all finite essences (20).

In regard to contingent _existences_ the Principle of Sufficient Reason is coincident with the Principle of Causality, inasmuch as the sufficient reason of the actual existence of any contingent thing consists in the extrinsic real principles which are its causes. The existence of contingent things involves the existence of a Necessary Being. We may say that the sufficient reason for the existence of the Necessary Being is the Divine Essence Itself; but this is merely denying that there is outside this Being any sufficient reason, _i.e._ any cause of the latter's existence; it is the recognition that the Principle of Causality is inapplicable to the Necessary Being. The Principle of Sufficient Reason, in this application of it, is logically posterior to the Principle of Causality.(440)

95. CLa.s.sIFICATION OF CAUSES: ARISTOTLE'S FOURFOLD DIVISION.-In modern times many scientists and philosophers have thought it possible to explain the order and course of nature, the whole cosmic process and the entire universe of our experience, by an appeal to the operation of _efficient causes_. Espousing a mechanical, as opposed to a teleological, conception of the universe, they have denied or ignored all influence of _purpose_, and eschewed all study of _final causes_. Furthermore, misconceiving or neglecting the category of substance, and the doctrine of substantial change, they find no place in their speculations for any consideration of _formal_ and _material_ causes. Yet without final, formal and material causes, so fully a.n.a.lysed by Aristotle(441) and the scholastics, no satisfactory explanation of the world of our experience can possibly be found. Let us therefore commence by outlining the traditional fourfold division of causes.

We have seen already that change involves composition or compositeness in the thing that is subject to change. Hence two _intrinsic_ principles contribute to the const.i.tution of such a thing, the one a pa.s.sive, determinable principle, its _material cause_, the other an active, determining principle, its _formal cause_. Some changes in material things are superficial, not reaching to the substance itself of the thing; these are _accidental_, involving the union of some _accidental_ ”form” with the concrete pre-existing substance as material (_materia_ ”_secunda_”).

Others are more profound, changes of the substance itself; these are _substantial_, involving the union of a new _substantial_ ”form” with the primal material princ.i.p.al (_materia_ ”_prima_”) of the substance undergoing the change. But whether the change be substantial or accidental we can always distinguish in the resulting composite thing two intrinsic const.i.tutive principles, its _formal cause_ and its _material cause_. The agencies in nature which, by their activity, bring about change, are _efficient causes_. Finally, since it is an undeniable fact that there is _order_ in the universe, that its processes give evidence of _regularity_, of operation according to _law_, that the cosmos reveals a _harmonious co-ordination of manifold_ agencies and a _subordination of means to ends_, it follows that there must be working in and through all nature a directive principle, a principle of plan or design, a principle according to which those manifold agencies work together in fulfilment of a purpose, _for the attainment of ends_. Hence the reality of a fourth cla.s.s of causes, _final causes_.

The separate influence of each of those four kinds of cause can be clearly ill.u.s.trated by reference to the production of any work of art. When, for instance, a sculptor chisels a statue from a block of marble, the latter is the material cause (_materia secunda_) of the statue, the form which he induces on it by his labour is the formal cause (_forma accidentalis_), the sculptor himself as agent is the efficient cause, and the motive from which he works-money fame, esthetic pleasure, etc.-is the final cause.

The formal and material causes are _intrinsic_ to the effect; they const.i.tute the effect _in facto esse_, the distinction of each from the latter being an inadequate real distinction. It is not so usual nowadays to call these intrinsic const.i.tutive principles of things _causes_ of the latter; but they verify the general definition of cause. The other two causes, the efficient and the final, are _extrinsic_ to the effect, and really and adequately distinct from it,(442) extrinsic principles of its production, its _fieri_.

This cla.s.sification of causes is adequate;(443) it answers all the questions that can be asked in explanation of the production of any effect: _a quo?_ _ex quo?_ _per quid?_ _propter quid?_ Nor is there any sort of cause which cannot be brought under some one or other of those four heads. What is called an ”exemplar cause,” _causa exemplaris_, _i.e._ the ideal or model or plan in the mind of an intelligent agent, according to which he aims and strives to execute his work, may be regarded as an extrinsic formal cause; or again, in so far as it aids and equips the agent for his task, an efficient cause; or, again, in so far as it represents a good to be realized, a final cause.(444)

The objects of our knowledge are in a true sense causes of our knowledge: any such object may be regarded as an efficient cause, both physical and moral, of this knowledge, in so far as by its action on our minds it determines the activity of our cognitive faculties; or, again, as a final cause, inasmuch as it is the end and aim of the knowledge.

The essence of the soul is, as we have seen (69), not exactly an efficient cause of the faculties which are its properties; but it is their final cause, inasmuch as their _raison d'etre_ is to perfect it; and their subjective or material cause, inasmuch as it is the seat and support of these faculties.

The fourfold division is a.n.a.logical, not univocal: though the matter, the form, the agent, and the end or purpose, all contribute positively to the production of the effect, it is clear that the character of the causal influence is widely different in each case.

Again, its members do not demand distinct subjects: all four cla.s.ses of cause may be verified in the same subject. For instance, the human soul is a formal cause in regard to the composite human individual, a material cause in regard to its habits, an efficient cause in regard to its acts, and a final cause in regard to its faculties.

Furthermore, the fourfold division is not an immediate division, for it follows the division of cause in general into _intrinsic_ and _extrinsic_ causes. Finally, it is a division of the causes which we find to be operative _in_ the universe. But the philosophical study of the universe will lead us gradually to the conviction that itself and all the causes in it are themselves _contingent_, themselves caused by and dependent on, a Cause _outside_ or extrinsic to the universe, a _First_, _Uncaused_, _Uncreated_, _Self-Existent_, _Necessary Cause_ (_Causa Prima_, _Increata_), at once the _efficient_ and _final_ cause of all things. In contrast with this _Uncreated_, _First Cause_, all the other causes we have now to investigate are called _created_ or _second_ causes (_causae secundae_, _creatae_).

A cause may be either _total_, _adequate_, or _partial_, _inadequate_, according as the effect is due to its influence solely, or to its influence in conjunction with, or dependence on, the influence of some other cause or causes _of the same order_. A created cause, therefore, is a total cause if the effect is due to its influence independently of other created causes; though of course all created causes are dependent, both as to their existence and as to their causality, on the influence of the First Cause. Without the activity of created efficient and final causes the First Cause can accomplish directly whatever these can accomplish-except their very causality itself, which cannot be actualized without them, but for which He can supply _eminenter_. Similarly, while it is incompatible with His Infinite Perfection that He discharge the function of material or formal cause of finite composite things, He can immediately create these latter by the simultaneous production (_ex nihilo_) and union of their material and formal principles.

A cause is said to be _in actu secundo_ when it is actually exercising its causal influence. Antecedently to such exercise, at least _prioritate naturae_, it is said to be _in actu primo_: when it has the expedite power to discharge its function as cause it is _in actu primo proximo_, while if its power is in any way incomplete, hampered or unready, it is _in actu primo remoto_.

Many other divisions of cause, subordinate to the Aristotelian division, will be explained in connexion with the members of this latter.

96. MATERIAL AND FORMAL CAUSES.-These are properly subject-matter for _Cosmology_. We will therefore very briefly supplement what has been said already concerning them in connexion with the doctrine of _Change_ (ch.

ii.). By a material cause we mean _that out of which anything is made_: _id ex quo aliquid fit_. Matter is correlative with form: from the union of these there results a composite reality endowed with either essential or accidental unity-with the former if the material principle be absolutely indeterminate and the correlative form substantial, with the latter if the material principle be some actually existing individual reality and the form some supervening accident. Properly speaking only corporeal substances have material causes,(445) but the term ”material cause” is used in an extended sense to signify any potential, pa.s.sive, receptive subject of formative or actuating principles: thus the soul is the subjective or material cause of its faculties and habits; essence of existence; _genus of differentia_, etc.

In what does the positive causal influence of a material cause consist?

How does it contribute positively to the actualization of the composite reality of which it is the material cause? It _receives_ and _unites with_ the form which is educed from its potentiality by the action of efficient causes, and thus contributes to the generation of the concrete, composite individual reality.(446)

It is by reason of the causality of the _formal cause_ that we speak of a thing being _formally_ such or such. As correlative of material cause it finds its proper application in reference to the const.i.tution of corporeal things. The formative principle, called _forma substantialis_, which actuates, determines, specifies the material principle, and by union with the latter const.i.tutes an individual corporeal substance of a definite kind, is the (substantial) formal cause of this composite substance.(447) The material principle of corporeal things is of itself indifferent to any species of body; it is the form that removes this indefiniteness and determines the matter, by its union with the latter, to const.i.tute a definite type of corporeal substance.(448) The existence of different species of living organisms and different types of inorganic matter in the universe implies in the const.i.tution of these things a common material principle, _materia prima_, and a multiplicity of differentiating, specifying, formative principles, _formae substantiales_. That the distinction between these two principles in the const.i.tution of any individual corporeal substance, whether living or inorganic, is not merely a virtual distinction between metaphysical (generic and specific) grades of being in the individual, but a real distinction between separable ent.i.ties, is a scholastic thesis established in the Special Metaphysics of the organic and inorganic domains of the universe.(449)

Since the _form_ is a perfecting, actuating principle, the term is often used synonymously with _actus_, _actuality_. And since besides the essential perfection which a being has by virtue of its substantial form it may have accidental perfections by reason of supervening accidental forms, these, too, are formal causes.

In what does the causal influence of the formal cause consist? In communicating itself intrinsically to the material principle or pa.s.sive subject from whose potentiality it is evoked by the action of efficient causes; in actuating that potentiality by intrinsic union therewith, and thus determining the individual subject to be actually or formally an individual of such or such a kind.

The material and formal causes are _intrinsic_ principles of the const.i.tution of things. We next pa.s.s to an a.n.a.lysis of the two _extrinsic_ causes, and firstly of the efficient cause and its causality.

97. EFFICIENT CAUSE; TRADITIONAL CONCEPT EXPLAINED.-By efficient cause we understand that _by which_ anything takes place, happens, occurs: _id a quo aliquid fit_. The world of our external and internal experience is the scene of incessant _changes_: men and things not only are, but are constantly _becoming_. Now every such change is originated by some active principle, and this we call the efficient cause of the change. Aristotle called it t? ????t???? or ? ???? ????t???, the _kinetic_ or _moving_ principle; or again, ???? ????s??? ? eta???? ?? ?t???, _principium motus vel mutationis in alio_, ”the principle of motion or change in some other thing”. The result achieved by this change, the actualized potentiality, is called the _effect_; the causality itself of the efficient cause is called _action_ (p???s??), _motion_, _change_-and, from the point of view of the effect, _pa.s.sio_ (pa??s??). The perfection or endowment whereby an efficient cause acts, _i.e._ its efficiency (?????e?a), is called _active power_ (_potentia seu virtus activa_); it is also called _force_ or _potential energy_ in reference to inanimate agents, _faculty_ in reference to animate agents, especially men and animals. This active power of an efficient cause or agent is to be carefully distinguished from the _pa.s.sive potentiality_ acted upon and undergoing change. The former connotes a perfection, the latter an imperfection: _unumquodque agit inquantum est in actu, pat.i.tur vero inquantum, est in potentia_. The scope of the active power of a cause is the measure of its actuality, of its perfection in the scale of reality; while the extent of the pa.s.sive potentiality of _patiens_ is a measure of its relative imperfection. The actuation of the former is _actio_, that of the latter _pa.s.sio_. The point of ontological connexion of the two _potentiae_ is the _change_ (_motus_, ????s??), this being at once the formal perfecting of the pa.s.sive potentiality in the _patiens_ or effect, and the immediate term of the efficiency or active power of the _agens_ or cause. _Actio_ and _pa.s.sio_, therefore, are not expressions of one and the same concept; they express two distinct concepts of one and the same reality, _viz._ the change: _actio et pa.s.sio sunt idem numero motus_. This change takes place _formally_ in the subject upon which the efficient cause acts, for it is an actuation of the potentiality of the former under the influence of the latter: ? ????s?? ?? t? ????t?; ??te???e?a ??? ?st? t??t??. Considered in the potentiality of this subject-”t? t??d? ?? t?de: _hujus in hococ_”-it is called _pa.s.sio_. Considered as a term of the active power of the cause-”t??de ?p? t??de: _hujus per hoc_”-it is called _actio_.

The fact that _actio_ and _pa.s.sio_ are really and objectively one and the same _motus_ does not militate against their being regarded as two separate supreme categories, for they are objects of distinct concepts,(450) and this is sufficient to const.i.tute them distinct categories (60).

Doubts are sometimes raised, as St. Thomas remarks,(451) about the a.s.sertion that the action of an agent is not formally in the latter but in the _patiens_: _actio fit in pa.s.so_. It is clear, however, he continues, that the action is formally in the _patiens_ for it is the actuation not of any potentiality of the agent, but of the pa.s.sive potentiality of the _patiens_: it is in the latter that the _motus_ or change, which is both _actio_ and _pa.s.sio_, takes place, dependently of course on the influence of the agent, or efficient cause of the change. The active power of an efficient cause is an index of the latter's actuality; the exercise of this power (_i.e._ _action_) does not formally perfect the agent, for it is not an actuation of any pa.s.sive potentiality of the latter; it formally perfects the _patiens_. Only _immanent_ action perfects the agent, and then not as agent but as _patiens_ or receiver of the actuality effected by the action (_cf._ 103 _infra_).