Part 6 (2/2)

(_c_) Transcendental unity may be either individual (singular, numerical, concrete, real) or universal (specific, generic, abstract, logical). The former is that which characterizes being or reality considered as actually existing or as proximately capable of existing: the unity of an _individual_ nature or essence: the unity whereby a being is not merely undivided in itself but incapable of repet.i.tion or multiplication of itself. It is only the individual as such that can actually exist: the abstract and universal is incapable of actually existing as such. We shall examine presently what it is that _individuates_ reality, and what it is that renders it capable of existing actually in the form of ”things” or of ”persons”-the forms in which it actually presents itself in our experience.

Abstract or universal unity is the unity which characterizes a reality conceived as an abstract, universal object by the human intellect. The object of a specific or generic concept, ”man” or ”animal,” for example, is one in this sense, undivided in itself, but capable of indefinite multiplication or repet.i.tion in the only mode in which it can actually exist-the individual mode. The universal is _unum aptum inesse pluribus_.

Finally, we can conceive any nature or essence without considering it in either of its alternative states-either as individual or as universal.

Thus conceived it is characterized by a unity which has been commonly designated as _abstract_, or (by Scotists) as _formal_ unity.

28. MULt.i.tUDE AND NUMBER.-The _one_ has for its correlative the _manifold_. Units, one of which is not the other, const.i.tute mult.i.tude or plurality. If unity is the negation of actual division in being, mult.i.tude results from a second negation, that, namely, by which the undivided being or unit is marked off or divided from other units.(139) We have defined unity by the negation of actual _intrinsic_ dividedness; and we have seen it to be compatible with _extrinsic_ dividedness, or otherness. Thus the vague notion of dividedness is anterior to that of unity. Now mult.i.tude involves dividedness; but it also involves and presupposes the intrinsic undividedness or _unity_ of each const.i.tuent of the manifold. In the real order of things the _one_ is prior to all _dividedness_; but on account of the sensuous origin of our concepts we can define the former only by exclusion of the latter. The order in which we obtain these ideas seems, therefore, to be as follows: ”first _being_, then _dividedness_, next _unity_ which excludes dividedness, and finally _mult.i.tude_ which consists of units”.(140)

The relation of the _one_ to the _manifold_ is that of undivided being to divided being. The same reality cannot be one and manifold under the same aspect; though obviously a being may be actually one and potentially manifold or _vice versa_, or one under a certain aspect and manifold under another aspect.

From the transcendental plurality or mult.i.tude which we have just described we can distinguish _predicamental_ or _quant.i.tative_ plurality: a distinction which is to be understood in the same way as when applied to unity. Quant.i.tative mult.i.tude is the actually separated or divided condition of quantified being. _Number_ is a mult.i.tude measured or counted by unity: it is a _counted_, and, therefore, necessarily a _definite_ and _finite_ mult.i.tude. Now it is _mathematical_ unity that is, properly, the principle of number and the standard or measure of all counting; and therefore it is only to realities which fall within the category of quant.i.ty-in other words, to material being-that the concept of number is properly applicable. No doubt we can and do conceive transcendental unity after the a.n.a.logy of the quant.i.tative unity which is the principle of counting and measuring; and no doubt we can use the transcendental concept of ”actually undivided being” as a principle of enumeration, and so ”count” or ”enumerate” spiritual beings; but this counting is only a.n.a.logical; and many philosophers, following Aristotle and St. Thomas, hold that the concepts of _numerical_ multiplicity and _numerical_ distinction are not properly applicable to immaterial beings, that these latter differ individually from one another _not numerically_, but each by its whole nature or essence, that is, _formally_.(141)

29. THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE UNIVERSAL.-We have distinguished transcendental unity into individual and universal (27, _c_). Reality as endowed with universal unity is reality as apprehended by abstract thought to be capable of indefinite repet.i.tion or multiplication of itself in actual existence. Reality as endowed with individual unity is reality apprehended as actually existing, or as proximately capable of actually existing, and as therefore incapable of any repet.i.tion or multiplication of itself, of any division of itself into other ”selves” or communication of itself to other ”selves”. While, therefore, the universal has its reality only in the individuals to which it communicates itself, and which thus embody it, the individual has its reality in itself and of its own right, so to speak: when it actually exists it is ”_sui juris_,” and as such incommunicable, ”_incommunicabilis_”. The actually existing individual is called in Latin a ”_suppositum_”-a term which we shall render by the English ”thing” or ”individual thing”. It was called by Aristotle the ??s?a p??t?, _substantia prima_, ”first substance,” or ”first essence,” to distinguish it from the substance or essence conceived by abstract thought as universal; the latter being designated as ??s?a d??te?a, _substantia secunda_, ”second substance” or ”second essence”.

Now it is a fundamental a.s.sumption in Aristotelian and scholastic philosophy that whatever actually exists, or whatever is real in the sense that as such it is proximately capable of actual existence, is and must be individual: that the universal as such is not real, _i.e._ as such cannot actually exist. And the manifest reason for this a.s.sumption is that whatever actually exists must be, with entire definiteness and determinateness, its own self and nothing else: it cannot be capable of division or repet.i.tion of itself, of that which it really is, into ”other”

realities which would still be ”that individual thing”. But reality considered as universal _is_ capable of such repet.i.tion of itself indefinitely. Therefore reality cannot actually exist as universal, but only as individual.

This is merely plain common sense; nor does the idealistic monism which appears to attribute reality to the universal as such, and which interprets reality exclusively according to the forms in which it presents itself to abstract thought, really run counter to this consideration; for what it really holds is not that universals as such are real, but that they are phases of the all-one reality which is itself _one individual being_.

But many modern philosophers hold that individuality, no less than universality, is a form of thought. No doubt ”individuality” _in the abstract_ is, no less than universality, an object abstracted from the data of experience by the mind's a.n.a.lysis of the latter.

But this is not what those philosophers mean. They mean that the individual as such is not a real datum of experience. From the Kantian view that individuality is a purely mental form with which the mind invests the datum, they draw the subjectivist conclusion that the world, thus interpreted as consisting of ”individuals,”

is a phenomenal or mental product for the objective validity of which there can be to man's speculative reason no sufficient guarantee.

To this theory we oppose that of Aristotle and the scholastics, not merely that the individual alone is actually existent, but that as actually existent and as individual it is actually given to us and apprehended by us in internal and external sense experience; and that although in the inorganic world, and to some extent in the lower forms of life, we may not be able to determine for certain what portions of this experience are distinct individuals, still in the world of living things generally, and especially of the animal kingdom, there can be no difficulty in determining this, for the simple reason that here reality is given to us in sense experience as consisting of distinct individuals.

At the same time it is true that we can understand these individual realities, interpret them, read the meaning of them, only by the intellectual function of judgment, _i.e._ by the a.n.a.lytic and synthetic activity whereby we abstract and universalize certain aspects of them, and use these aspects as predicates of the individuals. Now, seeing that intellectual thought, as distinct from sense experience, apprehends its objects only as abstract and potentially universal, only as static, self-identical, possible essences, and nevertheless predicates these of the concrete, individual, contingent, actually existing ”things” of sense experience, identifying them with the latter in affirmative judgments; seeing moreover, that-since the intellectual knowledge we thus acquire about the data of sense experience is genuine and not chimerical-those ”objects” of abstract thought must be likewise real, and must be really in those individual sense data (according to the theory of knowledge which finds its expression in Moderate Realism),-there arises immediately the problem, or rather the group of problems, regarding the relations between reality as revealed to intellect, _i.e._ as abstract and universal, and reality as revealed to sense, _i.e._ as concrete and individual. In other words, we have to inquire how we are to interpret intellectually the fact that reality, which as a possible essence is _universal_ for abstract thought, is nevertheless, as actually existing, _individualized_ for sense-and consequently for intellect reflecting on the data of sense.(142)

30. THE ”METAPHYSICAL GRADES OF BEING” IN THE INDIVIDUAL.-What, then is the relation between all that intellect can apprehend in the individual, _viz._ its lowest cla.s.s essence or specific nature, and its whole nature as an individual, its _essentia atoma_ or individual nature? We can best approach this problem by considering first these various abstract thought-objects which intellect can apprehend in the individual.

What are called the metaphysical grades of being, those positive moments of perfection or reality which the mind detects in the individual, as, for instance, substantiality, materiality, organic life, animality, rationality, individuality, in the individual man-whether we describe them as ”phases” or ”aspects” or ”formalities” of being-are undoubtedly distinct objects for abstract thought. Why does it thus distinguish between them, and express them by distinct concepts, even when it finds them embodied in a single individual? Because, reflecting on the manner in which reality presents itself, through sense experience, as actually existing, it finds resemblances and differences between individually distinct data. It finds in some of them grades of reality which it does not find in others, individual, specific, and generic grades; and some-transcendental-grades common to all. Now between these various grades of being as found in one and the same individual it cannot be denied that there exists a logical distinction with a foundation or ground for it in the individual reality; because the latter, _being more or less similar_ to other individual realities, causes the mind to apprehend it by a number of distinct concepts: the individuality whereby it differs really from all other individuals of the same species; the specific, differential and generic grades of being whereby it is conceptually identified with wider and wider cla.s.ses of things; and the transcendental grades whereby it is conceptually identified with all others. The _similarity_ of really distinct individuals, which is the _conceptual ident.i.ty_ of their _qualities_, is the ground on which we conceptually identify their _essences_. Now is there any reason for thinking that these grounds of similarity, as found in the individual, are _really distinct_ from one another in the latter? They are certainly conceptually distinct expressions-each less inadequate than the wider ones-of what is really one individual essence. But we must take them to be all really identical in and with this individual essence, unless we are prepared to hold conceptual plurality as such to be real plurality; in which case we should also hold conceptual unity as such to be real unity. But this latter view is precisely the error of extreme realism, of reifying abstract concepts and holding the ”_universale a parte rei_”: a theory which leads logically to monism.(143)

31. INDIVIDUALITY.-The distinction, therefore, between these grades of being in the individual, is a virtual distinction, _i.e._ a logical distinction with a ground for it in the reality. This is the sort of distinction which exists between the specific nature of the individual, _i.e._ what is contained in the definition of the lowest cla.s.s to which it belongs, and its _individuality_, _i.e._ what const.i.tutes its _nature or essence as an individual_. No doubt the concrete existing individual contains, besides its individual nature or essence, a variety of accidental characteristics which serve as marks or signs whereby its individuality _is revealed to us_. These are called ”individualizing characteristics,” ”_notae individuantes_,” the familiar scholastic list of them being ”_forma_, _figura_, _locus_, _tempus_, _stirps_, _patria_, _nomen_,” with manifest reference to the individual ”man”. But though these characteristics enable us to mark off the individual in s.p.a.ce and time from other individuals of the same cla.s.s, thus _revealing_ individuality to us in the concrete, it cannot be held that they const.i.tute the individuality of the nature or substance in each case. If the human substance, essence, or nature, as found in Socrates, were held to differ from the human substance, essence, or nature, as found in Plato, only by the fact that in each it is affected by a different set of accidents, _i.e._ of modes accidental to the substance as found in each, then it would follow that this substance is not merely _conceptually_ identical in both, but that it is _really_ identical in both; which is the error of extreme realism. As a matter of fact it is the converse that is true: the sets of accidents are distinct because they affect individual substances already really and individually distinct.

It is manifest that the accidents which are _separable_ from the individual substance, _e.g._ name, shape, size, appearance, location, etc., cannot const.i.tute its individuality. There are, however, other characteristics which are _inseparable_ from the individual substance, or which are _properties_ of the latter, _e.g._ the fact that an individual man was born of certain parents. Perhaps it is such characteristics that give its individuality to the individual substance?(144) To think so would be to misunderstand the question under discussion. We are not now inquiring into the _extrinsic_ causes whereby actually existing reality is individuated, into the _efficient_ principles of its individuation, but into the _formal_ and _intrinsic_ principle of the latter. There must obviously be something intrinsic to the individual reality itself whereby it is individuated. And it is about this intrinsic something we are inquiring. The individual man is this individual, human nature is thus individuated in him, by something that is essential to human nature as found in him. This something has been called-after the a.n.a.logy of the _differentia specifica_ which differentiates species within a genus-the _differentia individua_ of the individual. It has also been called by some the _differentia numerica_, and by Scotists the _haecceitas_. However we are to conceive this something, it is certain at all events that, considered as it is really found in the individual, it cannot be anything _really distinct_ from the specific nature of the latter. No doubt, the _differentia specifica_, considered in the abstract, it is not essential and intrinsic to the _natura generica_ considered in the abstract: it is extrinsic and accidental to the abstract content of the latter notion; but this is because we are conceiving these grades of being in the abstract.

The same is true of the _differentia individua_ as compared with the _natura specifica_ in the abstract. But we are now considering these grades of reality as they are actually in the concrete individual being: and as they are found here, we have seen that a real distinction between them is inadmissible.

32. THE ”PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUATION”.-How, then, are we to conceive this something which individuates reality? It may be well to point out that for the erroneous doctrine of extreme realism, which issues in monism, the problem of individuation, as here understood, does not arise. For the monist all plurality in being is merely apparent, not real: there can be no question of a real distinction between individual and individual.(145) Similarly, the nominalist and the conceptualist evade the problem. For these the individual alone is not merely formally real: it alone is fundamentally real: the universal is not even fundamentally real, has no foundation in reality, and thus all scientific knowledge of reality as revealed in sense experience is rendered impossible. But for the moderate realist, while the individual alone is formally real, the universal is fundamentally real, and hence the problem arises. It may be forcibly stated in the form of a paradox: That whereby Socrates and Plato are really distinct from each other as individuals is really identical with the human nature which is really in both. But what individuates human nature in Socrates, or in Plato, is logically distinct from the human nature that is really in Socrates, and really in Plato. We have only to inquire, therefore, whether the intrinsic principle of individuation is to be conceived merely as a negation, as something negative added by the mind to the concept of the specific nature, whereby the latter is apprehended as incapable of multiplication into ”others” each of which would be formally that same nature, or, in other words, as incommunicable; or is the intrinsic ground of this incommunicability to be conceived as something positive, not indeed as something really distinct from, and superadded to, the specific nature, but as a positive aspect of the latter, an aspect, moreover, not involved in the concept of the specific nature considered in the abstract.

Of the many views that have been put forward on this question two or three call for some attention. In the opinion of Thomists generally, the principle which individuates _material_ things, thus multiplying numerically the same specific nature, is to be conceived as a positive mode affecting the latter and revealing it in a new aspect, whereas the specific nature of the _spiritual_ individual is itself formally an individual. The principle of the latter's individuation is already involved in the very concept of its specific nature, and therefore is not to be conceived as a distinct positive aspect of the latter but simply as the absence of plurality and communicability in the latter. In material things, moreover, the positive mode or aspect whereby the specific nature is found numerically multiplied, and incommunicable as it exists in each, consists in the fact that such a specific nature involves in its very const.i.tution a _material_ principle which is actually allied with certain _quant.i.tative dimensions_. Hence the principle which individuates material substances is not to be conceived-after the manner in which Scotists conceive it-as an ultimate _differentia_ affecting the _formal_ factor of the nature, determining the specific nature just as the _differentia specifica_ determines the generic nature, but as a _material_ differentiating principle. What individuates the material individual, what marks it off as one in itself, distinct or divided from other individuals of the same specific nature, and incommunicable in that condition, is the material factor of that individual's nature-not, indeed, the material factor, _materia prima_, considered in the abstract, but the material factor as proximately capable of actual existence by being allied to certain more or less definite spatial or quant.i.tative dimensions: ”matter affected with quant.i.ty”: ”_materia quant.i.tate signata_”.(146)

In regard to material substances this doctrine embraces two separate contentions: (_a_) that the principle which individuates such a substance must be conceived as something positive, not really distinct from, but yet not contained in, the specific nature considered in the abstract; (_b_) that this positive aspect is to be found not in the formal but in the material principle of the composite corporeal substance.

To the former contention it might be objected that what individuates the specific nature cannot be conceived as anything _positive_, superadded to this nature: it cannot be anything _accidental_ to the latter, for if it were, the individual would be only an accidental unity, a ”_unum per accidens_” and would be const.i.tuted by an accident, which we have seen to be inadmissible; nor, on the other hand, can it be anything _essential_ to the specific nature, for if it were, then individuals should be capable of adequate essential definition, and furthermore the definition of the specific nature would not really give the whole essence or _quidditas_ of the individuals-two consequences which are commonly rejected by all scholastics. To this, however, it is replied that the principle of individuation is something essential to the specific nature in the sense that it _is_ something intrinsic to, and really identical with, the whole real substance or ent.i.ty of this nature, though not involved in the abstract concept by the a.n.a.lysis of which we reach the definition or _quidditas_ of this nature. What individuates Socrates is certainly essential to Socrates, and is therefore really identical with his human nature; it is intrinsic to the human nature in him, a mode or aspect of his human substance; yet it does not enter into the definition of his nature-”_animal rationale_”-for such definition abstracts from individuality. When, therefore, we say that definition of the specific nature gives the whole _essence_ of an individual, we mean that it gives explicitly the abstract (specific) essence, not the individuality which is really identical with this, nor, therefore, the whole substantial reality of the individual. We give different answers to the questions, ”What is Socrates?” and ”Who is Socrates?” The answer to the former question-a ”man,” or a ”rational animal”-gives the ”essence,” but not explicitly the whole substantial reality of the individual, this remaining incapable of adequate conceptual a.n.a.lysis. The latter question we answer by giving the notes that _reveal_ individuality. These, of course, are ”accidental” in the strict sense. But even the principles which const.i.tute the individuality of separate individuals of the same species, and which differentiate these individuals numerically from one another, we do not describe as _essential_ differences, whereas we do describe specific and generic differences as _essential_. The reason of this is that the latter are abstract, universal, conceptual, amenable to intellectual a.n.a.lysis, scientifically important, while the former are just the reverse; the universal differences alone are principles about which we can have scientific knowledge, for ”all science is of the abstract and universal”;(147) and this is what we have in mind when we describe them as ”essential” or ”formal,” and individual differences as ”ent.i.tative” or ”material”.

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