Part 6 (1/2)
Yet it cannot be conceived as a potentiality _in_ anything actual: except indeed in the actually existing essence which is the composite result of its union with the existential act. It is not a real, subjective potentiality antecedently to the existential act, and on which the latter is, as it were, superimposed:(126) in itself, it is, in fact, nothing real except as actualized by the latter; but, as we have already observed, the process of actualization, whether by direct creation or by the action of created causes, must be conceived as having for its total term or effect a composite reality resulting from what we can at best imperfectly describe as the union of two correlative, con-created, or co-produced principles of being, a potential and an actual, really distinct from each other: that whereby the thing _can_ exist, the potentiality of existence, the essence; and that whereby the thing _does_ exist, the actuality of essence, the existence. The description is imperfect because these principles are not con-created or co-produced separately; but, rather, the creation or production of an existing essence, the efficiency by which it is ”placed outside its causes,” has one single, though composite, term: the actually existing thing.
This view, thus advocating a real distinction between essence and existence, may obviously be regarded as an emphatic expression of the objective validity of intellectual knowledge. It might be regarded as an application of the more general view that the objective concepts between which the intellect distinguishes in its interpretation of reality should be regarded as representing _distinct realities_, except when the distinction is seen to arise not from the nature of the object but from the nature of the subject, from the limitations and imperfections of our own modes of thought. But in the case of any particular (disputed) distinction, the _onus probandi_ should lie rather on the side of those who contend that such distinction is logical, and not real. On the other hand, many philosophers who are no less firmly convinced of the objective validity of intellectual knowledge observe that it is possible to push this principle too far, or rather to err by excess in its application.
Instead of placing the burden of proof solely on the side of the logical distinction, they would place it rather more on the side of the real distinction-in conformity with the maxim of method, _Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem_. And they think that it is an error by excess to hold the distinction between essence and existence to be real.
This brings us to the second alternative opinion: that the distinction in question is not real, but only virtual.(127)
According to this view, the essence and the existence of any existing contingent being are one and the same reality. There is, however, in this reality a basis for the two distinct objective concepts-of essence and of existence-whereby we apprehend it. For the contingent being does not exist necessarily: we see such beings coming into existence and ceasing to exist: we can therefore think of _what they are_ without thinking of them as _actually existent_: in other words, we can think of them as possible, and of their existence as that by which they become actual. This is a sufficient reason for distinguis.h.i.+ng mentally, in the existing being, the essence which exists and the existence by which it exists.(128) But when we think of the essence of an actually existing being as objectively possible, or as potential in its causes, we are no longer thinking of it as anything real in itself, but only of its ideal being as an object of thought in our minds, or of the ideal being it has in the Divine Mind, or of the potential being it has in created causes, or of the virtual being it has in the Divine Omnipotence, or of the ultimate basis of its possibility in the Divine Essence. But all these modes of ”being” we know to be really distinct from the real, contingent essence itself which begins to exist actually in time, and may cease once more to exist in time when and if its own nature demands, and G.o.d wills, such cessation. But that the real, contingent essence itself which so exists, is something really distinct from the existence whereby it exists; that it forms with the latter a really composite being; that it is in itself a real, subjective potentiality, receptive of existence as another and actualizing reality, really distinct from it, so that the creation or production of any single actually existing contingent being would have for its term two really distinct principles of being, a potential and an actual, essence and existence, created or produced _per modum unius_, so to speak: for a.s.serting all this it is contended by supporters of the virtual distinction that we have no sufficient justifying reason.(129) Hence they conclude that a real distinction must be denied: _Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem_.
Though each of these opinions has been defended with a great deal of ability, and an exhaustive array of arguments, a mere rehearsal of these latter would not give much material a.s.sistance towards a solution of the question. We therefore abstain from repeating them here. There are only a few points in connexion with them to which attention may be directed.
In the first place, some defenders of the real distinction urge that were the distinction not real, things would exist essentially, _i.e._ necessarily; and thus the most fundamental ground of distinction between G.o.d and creatures, between the Necessary Being and contingent beings, would be destroyed: creatures would be no longer in their very const.i.tution composite, mixtures of potentiality and actuality, but would be purely actual, absolutely simple and, in a word, identical with the Infinite Being Himself. Supporters of the virtual distinction deny that those very serious consequences follow from their view. They point out that though the existence of the creature is really identical with its essence, the essence does not exist necessarily or _a se_; the whole existing essence is _ab alio_, is caused, contingent; and the fundamental distinction between such a being and the Self-Existing Being is in this view perfectly clear. Nor is the creature, they contend, purely actual and absolutely simple; it need not have existed, and it may cease to exist; it has, therefore, a potentiality of non-existence, which is inconceivable in the case of the Necessary and purely Actual Being; it is, therefore, mutable as regards existence; besides which the essences even of the most simple created beings, namely pure spirits are composite in the sense that they have faculties and operations really distinct from their substance.
Secondly, it is alleged by some defenders of the real distinction that this latter view of the nature of existing contingent reality is a cardinal doctrine in the whole philosophical system of St.
Thomas, and of scholastics generally: so fundamental, in fact, that many important doctrines, unanimously held to be true by all scholastics, cannot be successfully vindicated apart from it.(130) To which it is replied that there are no important truths of scholastic philosophy which cannot be defended quite adequately apart altogether from the view one may hold on the present question; and that, this being the case, it is unwise to endeavour to base admittedly true doctrines, which can be better defended otherwise, upon an opinion which can at best claim only the amount of probability it can derive from the intrinsic merits of the arguments by which it is itself supported.(131)
Before pa.s.sing from this whole question we must note the existence of a third school of thought, identified mainly with the followers of Duns Scotus.(132) These authors contend that the distinction between essence and existence is not a real distinction, nor yet, on the other hand, is it merely a virtual distinction, but one which they call _formalis, actualis ex natura rei_, that between a reality and its intrinsic modes. It is better known as the ”Scotistic” distinction. We shall see the nature of it when dealing _ex professo_ with the general doctrine of distinctions.
The multiplicity of these views, and the unavoidable difficulty experienced in grasping and setting forth their meaning with any tolerable degree of clearness, would suggest the reflection that in those controversies the medieval scholastics were perhaps endeavouring to think and to express what reality is, apart from thought and ”independently of the consideration of the mind”-a task which, conceived in these terms, must appear fruitless; and one which, anyhow, involves in its very nature the closest scrutiny of the epistemological problem of the power of the human mind to get at least a true and valid, if not adequate and comprehensive, insight into the nature of reality.
CHAPTER IV. REALITY AS ONE AND MANIFOLD.
25. THE TRANSCENDENTAL ATTRIBUTES OR PROPERTIES OF BEING: UNITY, TRUTH, AND GOODNESS.-So far, we have a.n.a.lysed the notions of Real Being, of Becoming or Change, of Being as Possible and as Actual, of Essence and Existence. Before approaching a study of the Categories or _Suprema Genera Entis_, the highest and widest modes in which reality manifests itself, we have next to consider certain attributes or properties of being which reveal themselves as co-extensive with reality itself. Taking human experience in its widest sense, as embracing all modes that are cognitive or allied with consciousness, as including intellect, memory, imagination, sense perception, will and appet.i.te, as speculative, ethical or moral, and esthetic or artistic,-we find that the reality which makes up this complex human experience of ours is universally and necessarily characterized by certain features which we call the _transcendental attributes or properties of being_, inasmuch as they transcend all specific and generic modes of being, pervade all its categories equally, and are inseparable from any datum of experience. We shall see that they are not really distinct from the reality which they characterize, but only logically distinct from it, being aspects under which we apprehend it, negations or other logical relations which we necessarily annex to it by the mental processes whereby we seek to render it actually intelligible to our minds.
The first in order of these ontological attributes is _unity_: the concept of that whereby reality considered in itself becomes a definite object of thought. The second in order is _truth_: which is the conception of reality considered in its relation to cognitive experience, to intellect.
The third is _goodness_: the aspect under which reality is related as an object to appet.i.tive experience, to will.
Now when we predicate of any reality under our consideration that it is ”one,” or ”good,” or ”true”-in the ontological sense to be explained,-that which we predicate is not a mere _ens rationis_, but something real, something which is really identical with the subject, and which is distinguished from the latter in our judgment only by a logical distinction. The attribution of any of these properties to the subject does not, however, add anything real to the latter: it adds merely some logical aspect involved in, or supposed by, the attribution. At the same time, this logical aspect gives us real information by making explicit some real feature of being not explicitly revealed in the concept of being itself, although involved in, and following as a property from, the latter.
There do not seem to be any other transcendental properties of being besides the three enumerated. The terms ”reality,” ”thing,” ”something,”
are synonymous expressions of the concept of being itself, rather than of properties of being. ”Existence” is not a transcendental attribute of being, for it is not co-extensive with reality or real being. And although reality _must_ be ”_either_ possible _or_ actual,” ”_either_ necessary _or_ contingent,” ”_either_ infinite _or_ finite,” etc., this necessity of verifying in itself one or other member of any such alternatives is not a property of being, but rather something essentially rooted in the very concept of reality itself. Some would regard as a distinct transcendental attribute of being the conception of the latter as an object of esthetic contemplation, as manifesting order and harmony, as _beautiful_. This conception of being will be found, however, to flow from the more fundamental aspects of reality considered as _true_ and as _good_, rather than directly from the concept of being itself.
26. TRANSCENDENTAL UNITY.-When we think of anything as one we think of it as undivided in itself. The unity or oneness of being is the undividedness of being: _Unum est id quod est indivisum in se: Universaliter quaecunque non habent divisionem, inquantum non habent, sic unum dic.u.n.tur_.(133) When, therefore, we conceive being as undivided into const.i.tutive parts, and unmultiplied into repet.i.tions of itself, we conceive it as _a_ being, as _one_. For the concept of being, formally as one, it does not seem necessary that we conceive being as _divided or distinct from all other being_. This second negation, of ident.i.ty with other being, rather follows the conception of being as one: being is distinct from other being because it is already itself one: it is a prior negation that formally const.i.tutes its unity, namely, _the negation of internal division or multiplication of itself_: G.o.d was truly _one_ from all eternity, before there was any _other_ being, any created being, distinct from Him. The division or distinction of an object of thought from whatever is not itself is what const.i.tutes the notion of _otherness_.(134)
It is manifest that being and unity are really identical, that when we think of being we think of what is really undivided in itself, that once we introduce dividedness into the object of our concept we are no longer thinking of being but of _beings_, _i.e._ of a mult.i.tude or plurality each member of which is a _being_ and _one_. For being, as an object of thought, is either simple or composite. If simple, it is not only undivided but indivisible. If composite, we cannot think of it as _a_ being, capable of existing, so long as we think its parts as separate or divided: only when we think of them as actually united and undivided have we the concept of _a_ being: and _eo ipso_ we have the concept of being as one, as a unity.(135)
Hence the scholastic formulae: _Ens et unum convertuntur_, and _Omne ens est unum_. The truth embodied in these is so self-evident that the expression of it may seem superfluous; but they are not mere tautologies, and in the interests of clear and consistent thinking our attention may be profitably directed to them. The same remark applies to much in the present and subsequent chapters on the transcendental attributes of being.
27. KINDS OF UNITY.-(_a_) The unity we have been describing has been called _transcendental_, to distinguish it from _predicamental_ unity-the unity which is proper to a special category of being, namely, _quant.i.ty_, and which, accordingly, is also called _quant.i.tative_ or _mathematical_ unity. While the former is common to all being, with which it is really identical, and to which it adds nothing real, the latter belongs and is applicable, properly speaking, only to the mode of being which is corporeal, which exists only as affected by quant.i.ty, as occupying s.p.a.ce, as capable of measurement; and therefore, also, this latter unity adds something real to the being which it affects, namely, the attribute of quant.i.ty, of which unity is the measure and the generating principle.(136) For quant.i.ty, as we shall see, is a mode of being really distinct from the corporeal substance which it affects. The quant.i.ty has its own transcendental unity; so has the substance which it quantifies; so has the composite whole, the quantified body, but this latter transcendental unity, like the composite being with which it is identical, is not a _unum per se_ but only a _unum per accidens_ (_cf._ _b_, _infra_).
We derive our notion of quant.i.tative or mathematical unity, which is the principle of counting and the standard of measuring, from dividing mentally the continuous quant.i.ty or magnitude which is one of the immediate data of sense experience. Now the distinction between this unit and transcendental unity supposes not merely that quant.i.ty is really distinct from the corporeal substance, but also that the human mind is capable of conceiving as real certain modes of being other than the corporeal, modes to which quant.i.tative concepts and processes, such as counting and measuring, are not _properly_ applicable, as they are to corporeal reality, but only in an _a.n.a.logical_ or _transferred_ sense (2).
The notion of transcendental unity, therefore, bears the same relation to that of quant.i.tative unity, as the notion of being in general bears to that of quantified or corporeal being.
(_b_) Transcendental unity may be either _essential_ (or _substantial_, ”unum _per se_,” ”unum _simpliciter_”), or _accidental_ (”unum _per accidens_,” ”unum _secundum quid_”). The former characterizes a being which has nothing in it beyond what is essential to it as such, _e.g._ the unity of any substance: and this unity is twofold-(1) _unity of simplicity_ and (2) _unity of composition_-according as the substance is essentially simple (such as the human soul or a pure spirit) or essentially composite (such as man, or any corporeal substance: since every such substance is composed essentially of a formative and an indeterminate principle).(137)
Accidental unity is the unity of a being whose const.i.tuent factors or contents are not really united in such a way as to form one essence, whether simple or composite. It is threefold: (1) _collective_ unity, or unity _of aggregation_, as of a _heap_ of stones or a _crowd_ of men; (2) _artificial_ unity, as of a house or a picture; and (3) _natural_ or _physical_ unity, as of any existing substance with its connatural accidents, _e.g._ a living organism with its size, shape, qualities, etc., or the human soul with its faculties.(138)