Part 3 (2/2)

[1] _Hyp._ I. 30.

[2] _Hyp._ I. 30.

[3] _Hyp._ I. 30; Diog. IX. 11, 61.

[4] _Adv. Math._ XI. 146-160.

[5] _Hyp._ I. 27.

[6] _Hyp._ I. 28.

Ataraxia came to the Sceptic as success in painting the foam on a horse's mouth came to Apelles the painter. After many attempts to do this, and many failures, he gave up in despair, and threw the sponge at the picture that he had used to wipe the colors from the painting with. As soon as it touched the picture it produced a representation of the foam.[1] Thus the Sceptics were never able to attain to ataraxia by examining the anomaly between the phenomena and the things of thought, but it came to them of its own accord just when they despaired of finding it.

The intellectual preparation for producing ataraxia, consists in placing arguments in opposition to each other, both in regard to phenomena, and to things of the intellect. By placing the phenomenal in opposition to the phenomenal, the intellectual to the intellectual, and the phenomenal to the intellectual, and _vice versa_, the present to the present, past, and future, one will find that no argument exists that is incontrovertible. It is not necessary to accept any statement whatever as true, and consequently a state of [Greek: epoche] may always be maintained.[2] Although ataraxia concerns things of the opinion, and must be preceded by the intellectual process described above, it is not itself a function of the intellect, or any subtle kind of reasoning, but seems to be rather a unique form of moral perfection, leading to happiness, or is itself happiness.

[1] _Hyp._ I. 28, 29.

[2] _Hyp._ I. 32-35.

It was the aim of Scepticism to know nothing, and to a.s.sert nothing in regard to any subject, but at the same time not to affirm that knowledge on all subjects is impossible, and consequently to have the att.i.tude of still seeking. The standpoint of Pyrrhonism was materialistic. We find from the teachings of s.e.xtus that he affirmed the non-existence of the soul,[1] or the ego, and denied absolute existence altogether.[2] The introductory statements of Diogenes regarding Pyrrhonism would agree with this standpoint.[3]

There is no criterion of truth in Scepticism. We cannot prove that the phenomena represent objects, or find out what the relation of phenomena to objects is. There is no criterion to tell us which one is true of all the different representations of the same object, and of all the varieties of sensation that arise through the many phases of relativity of the conditions which control the character of the phenomena.

Every effort to find the truth can deal only with phenomena, and absolute reality can never be known.

[1] _Adv. Math._ VII. 55; _Hyp._ II. 32.

[2] _Adv. Math._ XI. 140.

[3] Diog. IX. 11, 61.

CHAPTER III.

_The Sceptical Tropes_.

The exposition of the Tropes of Pyrrhonism const.i.tutes historically and philosophically the most important part of the writings of s.e.xtus Empiricus. These Tropes represent the sum total of the wisdom of the older Sceptical School, and were held in high respect for centuries, not only by the Pyrrhoneans, but also by many outside the narrow limits of that School. In the first book of the _Hypotyposes_ s.e.xtus gives two cla.s.ses of Tropes, those of [Greek: epoche] and the eight Tropes of Aenesidemus against Aetiology.

The Tropes of [Greek: epoche] are arranged in groups of ten, five and two, according to the period of the Sceptical School to which they belong; the first of these groups is historically the most important, or the Ten Tropes of [Greek: epoche], as these are far more closely connected with the general development of Scepticism, than the later ones. By the name [Greek: tropos] or Trope, the Sceptic understood a manner of thought, or form of argument, or standpoint of judgement. It was a term common in Greek philosophy, used in this sense, from the time of Aristotle.[1] The Stoics, however, used the word with a different meaning from that attributed to it by the Sceptics.[2]

Stepha.n.u.s and Fabricius translate it by the Latin word _modus_[3] and [Greek: tropos] also is often used interchangeably with the word [Greek: logos] by s.e.xtus, Diogenes Laertius, and others; sometimes also as synonymous with [Greek: topos],[4] and [Greek: typos] is found in the oldest edition of s.e.xtus.[5] Diogenes defines the word as the standpoint, or manner of argument, by which the Sceptics arrived at the condition of doubt, in consequence of the equality of probabilities, and he calls the Tropes, the ten Tropes of doubt.[6] All writers on Pyrrhonism after the time of Aenesidemus give the Tropes the princ.i.p.al place in their treatment of the subject. s.e.xtus occupies two thirds of the first book of the _Hypotyposes_ in stating and discussing them; and about one fourth of his presentation of Scepticism is devoted to the Tropes by Diogenes. In addition to these two authors, Aristocles the Peripatetic refers to them in his attack on Scepticism.[7] Favorinus wrote a book ent.i.tled _Pyrrhonean Tropes_, and Plutarch one called _The Ten ([Greek: topoi]) Topes of Pyrrho_.[8] Both of these latter works are lost.

[1] Pappenheim _Erlauterung Pyrrh. Grundzugen_, p. 35.

[2] Diog I. 76; _Adv. Math._ VIII. 227.

[3] Fabricius, Cap. XIV. 7.

[4] _Hyp._ I. 36.

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