Part 3 (1/2)

[3] _Hyp._ I. 7; Diog. IX. 11, 70.

[4] _Hyp._ I. 8.

[5] _Hyp._ I. 10.

[6] _Hyp._ I. 12.

[7] _Hyp._ I. 14.

[8] _Hyp._ I. 14.

s.e.xtus replies to the charge that the Sceptics deny phenomena by refuting it.[1] The Sceptic does not deny phenomena, because they are the only criteria by which he can regulate his actions.

”We call the criterion of the Sceptical School the phenomenon, meaning by this name the idea of it.”[2] Phenomena are the only things which the Sceptic does not deny, and he guides his life by them. They are, however, subjective. s.e.xtus distinctly affirms that sensations are the phenomena,[3] and that they lie in susceptibility and voluntary feeling, and that they const.i.tute the appearances of objects.[4] We see from this that s.e.xtus makes the only reality to consist in subjective experience, but he does not follow this to its logical conclusion, and doubt the existence of anything outside of mind.

He rather takes for granted that there is a something unknown outside, about which the Sceptic can make no a.s.sertions.

Phenomena are the criteria according to which the Sceptic orders his daily life, as he cannot be entirely inactive, and they affect life in four different ways. They const.i.tute the guidance of nature, the impulse of feeling; they give rise to the traditions of customs and laws, and make the teaching of the arts important.[5] According to the tradition of laws and customs, piety is a good in daily life, but it is not in itself an abstract good. The Sceptic of s.e.xtus' time also inculcated the teaching of the arts, as indeed must be the case with professing physicians, as most of the leading Sceptics were.

s.e.xtus says, ”We are not without energy in the arts which we undertake.”[6] This was a positive tendency which no philosophy, however negative, could escape, and the Sceptic tried to avoid inconsistency in this respect, by separating his philosophy from his theory of life. His philosophy controlled his opinions, and his life was governed by phenomena.

[1] _Hyp._ I. 19.

[2] _Hyp._ I. 19.

[3] _Hyp._ I. 22; Diog. IX. 11, 105.

[4] _Hyp._ I. 22.

[5] _Hyp._ I. 23.

[6] _Hyp._ I. 24.

The aim of Pyrrhonism was ataraxia in those things which pertain to opinion, and moderation in the things which life imposes.[1]

In other words, we find here the same natural desire of the human being to rise above and beyond the limitations which pain and pa.s.sion impose, which is expressed in other forms, and under other names, in other schools of philosophy. The method, however, by which ataraxia or peace of mind could be reached, was peculiar to the Sceptic. It is a state of psychological equilibrium, which results from the equality of the weight of different arguments that are opposed to each other, and the consequent impossibility of affirming in regard to either one, that it is correct.[2] The discovery of ataraxia was, in the first instance, apparently accidental, for while the Sceptic withheld his opinion, unable to decide what things were true, and what things were false, ataraxia fortunately followed.[3]

After he had begun to philosophize, with a desire to discriminate in regard to ideas, and to separate the true from the false[4] during the time of [Greek: epoche], or suspension of judgement, ataraxia followed as if by chance, as the shadow follows the body.[5]

[1] _Hyp._ I. 25.

[2] _Hyp._ I. 26.

[3] _Hyp._ I. 26.

[4] Diog. IX. 11, 107.

[5] _Hyp._ I. 29.

The Sceptic in seeking ataraxia in the things of opinion, does not entirely escape from suffering from his sensations. He is not wholly undisturbed, for he is sometimes cold and hungry, and so on.[1] He claims, nevertheless, that he suffers less than the dogmatist, who is beset with two kinds of suffering, one from the feelings themselves, and also from the conviction that they are by nature an evil.[2] To the Sceptic nothing is in itself either an evil or a good, and so he thinks that ”he escapes from difficulties easier.”[3] For instance, he who considers riches a good in themselves, is unhappy in the loss of them, and in possession of them is in fear of losing them, while the Sceptic, remembering the Sceptical saying ”No more,” is untroubled in whatever condition he may be found, as the loss of riches is no more an evil than the possession of them is a good.[4] For he who considers anything good or bad by nature is always troubled, and when that which seemed good is not present with him, he thinks that he is tortured by that which is by nature bad, and follows after what he thinks to be good. Having acquired it, however, he is not at rest, for his reason tells him that a sudden change may deprive him of this thing that he considers a good.[5] The Sceptic, however, endeavours neither to avoid nor seek anything eagerly.[6]