Part 12 (1/2)
”Unless you try to make peace at once the people will revolt and I shall lead the revolution!”
At the same time the industrial leaders of the Rhine Valley and the Army and Navy were serving notice on the Government that there could not possibly be a German victory unless every weapon in Germany's possession, which included of course the submarine, was used against Germany's so-called chief foe--England.
Confronted by graver troubles within Germany than those from the outside, the Chancellor went to Great Headquarters to report to the Kaiser and to discuss with von Hindenburg and Ludendorf what should be done to unite the German nation.
While the Army had been successful in Roumania and had given the people renewed confidence, this was not great enough to carry the people through another hard winter.
While Germany had made promises to the United States in May that no s.h.i.+ps would be sunk without warning, the submarines were not adhering very closely to the written instructions. The whole world was aroused over Germany's repeated disregard of the rules and practice of sea warfare. President Wilson through Amba.s.sador Gerard had sent nine inquiries to the Foreign Office asking for a report from Germany on the sinking of various s.h.i.+ps not only contrary to international law but contrary to Germany's pledges. In an attempt to ward off many of the neutral indictments of Germany's sea warfare the official North German Gazette published an explanation containing the following:
”The activity of our submarines in the Atlantic Ocean and White Sea has led the press of the entire world to producing articles as to the waging of cruiser warfare by means of submarines. In both cases it can be accurately stated that there is no question of submarine warfare here, but of cruiser warfare waged with the support of submarines and the details reported hitherto as to the activities of our submarines do not admit of any other explanation, in spite of the endeavours of the British press to twist and misrepresent facts. It is also strictly correct to state that the cruiser warfare which is being waged by means of submarines is in strict compliance with the German prize regulations which correspond to the International Rules laid down and agreed to in the Declaration of London which are not being any more complied with by England. The accusations and charges brought forward by the British press and propaganda campaign in connection with s.h.i.+ps sunk, can be shown as futile, as our position is both militarily and from the standpoint of international law irreproachable. We do not sink neutral s.h.i.+ps per se, as was recently declared in a proclamation, but the ammunition transports and other contraband wares conducive to the prolongation of the war, and the rights of defensive measures as regards this cannot be denied Germany any more than any other country.
”Based on this idea, it is clearly obvious that the real loss of the destruction of tonnage must be attributed to the supplies sent to England and not to the att.i.tude displayed by Germany which has but recourse to purely defensive measures. If the att.i.tude displayed by England towards neutrals during the course of this war be considered, the manner in which it forced compulsory supplies of contraband goods, etc., it can be further recognised that England is responsible for the losses in s.h.i.+ps; as it is owing to England's att.i.tude that the cause is to be found. . . .
”Although England has. .h.i.t and crippled legitimate trade to such an extent, Germany does not wish to act in the same manner, but simply to stop the s.h.i.+pments of contraband goods calculated to lengthen the war.
England evidently is being hard hit by our defensive submarine measures and is therefore doing all in her power to incite public opinion against the German methods of warfare and confuse opinion in neutral countries. . . .
”Therefore it must again be recalled that it is:
”England, which has crippled neutral trade!
”England, which has rendered the freedom of the seas impossible!
”England, which has extended the risk of contraband wares in excess of international agreements, and now raises a cry when the same weapons are used against herself.
”England, which has compelled the neutrals to supply these s.h.i.+pments of contraband goods calculated to lengthen the war!
”As the neutrals quietly acquiesced when there was a question of abandoning trade with the Central Powers they have remedies in hand for the losses of s.h.i.+ps which affect them so deeply. They need only consider the fact that the German submarines on the high seas are able to prevent war services to the enemy in the s.h.i.+pments of contraband goods, in a manner that is both militarily and from the standpoint of international law, irreproachable. If they agree to desist from the s.h.i.+pment of contraband goods and cease yielding to British pressure then they will not have to complain of losses in s.h.i.+ps and can retain the same for peaceful aims.”
This was aimed especially at America. Naval critics did not permit the opportunity to pa.s.s to call to the attention of the Government that Germany's promises in the _Suss.e.x_ case were only conditional and that, therefore, they could be broken at any time. The Chancellor was in a most difficult situation; so was von Hindenburg and the Kaiser. On December 10th it was announced that the Reichstag would be called to a special session on the twelfth and that the Chancellor would discuss the international situation as it was affected by the Roumanian campaign.
The meeting of December 12th was the best attended and most impressive one of the Reichstag since August 4th, 1914. Before the Chancellor left his palace he called the representatives of the neutral nations and handed them Germany's peace proposal. The same day Germany sent to every part of the globe through her wireless stations, Germany's note to the Allies and the Chancellor's address.
The world was astonished and surprised at the German move but no one knew whether it was to be taken seriously. Great Britain instructed her emba.s.sies and legations in neutral countries to attempt to find out whether the Chancellor really desired to make peace or whether his statements were to be interpreted as something to quiet internal troubles.
During the days of discussion which followed I was in close touch with the Foreign Office, the American Emba.s.sy and the General Staff. The first intimation I received that Germany did not expect the peace plan to succeed was on December 14th at a meeting of the neutral correspondents with Lieut. Col. von Haeften. When von Hindenburg became Chief of the General Staff he reorganised the press department in Berlin and sent von Haeften from his personal staff to Berlin to direct the press propaganda. As a student of public opinion abroad von Haeften was a genius and was extremely frank and honest with the correspondents.
”We have proposed peace to our enemies,” he said to the correspondents, ”because we feel that we have been victorious and because we believe that no matter how long the war continues the Allies will not be able to defeat us. It will be interesting to see what effect our proposal has upon Russia. Reports which we have received, coming from unquestionable sources, state that internal conditions in Russia are desperate; that food is scarce; that the transportation system is so demoralised and that it will be at least eight months before Russia can do anything in a military way. Russia wants peace and needs peace and we shall see now whether she has enough influence upon England to compel England to make peace. We are prepared to go on with the war if the Allies refuse our proposals. If we do we shall not give an inch without making the Allies pay such a dear cost that they will not be able to continue.”
The Foreign Office was not optimistic over the possibilities of success; officials realised that the new Lloyd-George Cabinet meant a stronger war policy by Great Britain, but they thought the peace proposals might shake the British confidence in the new government and cause the overthrow of Lloyd-George and the return of Asquith and Viscount Edward Grey.
From all appearances in Berlin it was evident to every neutral diplomat with whom I talked that while Germany was proclaiming to the whole world her desire for peace she had in mind only the most drastic peace terms as far as Belgium, certain sections of northern France, Poland and the Balkans were concerned. Neutrals observed that Germany was so exalted over the Roumanian victory and the possibilities of that campaign solving the food problem that she was not only ready to defy the Allies but the neutral world unless the world was ready to bow to a German victory. There were some people in Germany who realised that the sooner she made peace the better peace terms she could get but the Government was not of this opinion. The Allies, as was expected, defiantly refused the Prussian olive branch which had been extended like everything else from Germany with a string tied to it. For the purposes of the Kaiser and his Government the Allies' reply was exactly what they wanted.
The German Government was in this position: If the Allies accepted Germany's proposal it would enable the Government to unite all factions in Germany by making a peace which would satisfy the political parties as well as the people. If the Allies refused, the German Government calculated that the refusal would be so bitter that it would unite the German people political organisations and enable the Government to continue the war in any way it saw fit.
Nothing which had happened during the year so solidified the German nation as the Allies' replies to Berlin and to President Wilson. It proved to the German people that their Government was waging a defensive war because the Allies demanded annexation, compensation and guarantees, all of which meant a change in the map of Europe from what it was at the beginning of the war. The interests which had been demanding a submarine warfare saw their opportunity had come. They knew that as a result of the Allies' notes the public would sanction an unrestricted sea warfare against the whole world if that was necessary.
From December 12th until after Christmas, discussions of peace filled the German newspapers. By January 1st all possibilities of peace had disappeared. The Government and the public realised that the war would go on and that preparations would have to be made at once for the biggest campaign in the history of the world in 1917.
Throughout the peace discussions one thing was evident to all Americans. Opposition to American intervention in any peace discussion was so great that the United States would not be able to take any leading part without being faced by the animosity of a great section of Germany. When it was stated in the press that Joseph O. Grew, the American Charge d'Affaires, had received the German note and transmitted it to his Government, public indignation was so great that the Government had to inform all of the German newspapers to explain that Germany had not asked the United States to make peace; that Germany had in fact not asked any neutrals to make peace but had only handed these neutrals the German note in order to get it officially before the Allies. At this time the defiant att.i.tude of the whole nation was well expressed in an editorial in the _Morgen Post_ saying: ”If Germany's hand is refused her fist will soon be felt with increased force.”
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