Part 11 (1/2)

So it is with the German nation. The country is on the verge of a nervous breakdown. Men and women, business men and generals, long ago lost their patience. They are under-nourished. They are depressed, distressed, suffering and anxious for peace. It is as true of the Hamburg-American Line directors as it is true of the officers at the front.

There have been more cases of nervous breakdowns among the people during the last year than at any time in Germany's history. There have been so many suicides that the newspapers are forbidden to publish them. There have been so many losses on the battlefields that every family has been affected not once, but two, three and four times.

Dance halls have been closed. Cafes and hotels must stop serving meals by 11 o'clock. Theatres are presenting the most sullen plays. Rumours spread like prairie fires. One day Hindenburg is dead. Two days later he is alive again.

But the Kaiser has studied this war psychology. He and his ministers know that one thing keeps the German people fighting--their hope of ultimate victory; their belief that they have won already. The Kaiser knows, too, that if the public mind is stimulated from day to day by new victories, by reports of many prisoners, of new territory gained, of enemy s.h.i.+ps torpedoed, or by promises of reforms after the war, the public will continue fighting.

So the Kaiser gambles from day to day with his people's nerves. For two years he has done this, and for two years he has been supported by a 12,000,000-man-power army and a larger army of workers and women at home. The Kaiser believes he can gamble for a long time yet with his people.

Just as it is impossible for a physician to say how long his patient can be stimulated without breaking down, so is it impossible for an observer in Germany to say how long it will be before the break-up comes in Germany.

Many times during the war Germany has been on the verge of a collapse.

President Wilson's ultimatum after the sinking of the Suss.e.x in the English Channel brought about one crisis. Von Falkenhayn's defeat at Verdun caused another. The Somme battle brought on a third. General Brusiloff's offensive against the Austrians upset conditions throughout the Central Powers. Rumania's declaration of war made another crisis.

But Germany pa.s.sed all of these successfully.

The ability of the German Government to convince the people that Wilson was unneutral and wanted war caused them to accept Germany's note in the _Suss.e.x_ case. The defeat at Verdun was explained as a tactical success. The Somme battles, with their terrible losses, failed to bring a break-up because the Allies stopped attacking at the critical moment.

Von Hindenburg as chief of the General Staff of Central Europe remedied the mistakes of the Austrians during Brusiloff's attacks by reorganising the Dual Monarchy's army. The crisis which Rumania's entrance on the Allies' side brought in Germany and Hungary was forgotten after von Mackensen took Bucharest.

In each of these instances it will be noticed that the crisis was successfully pa.s.sed by ”stimulation.” The German mind was made to believe what the Kaiser willed.

But what about the future? Is there a bottomless well of stimulation in Germany?

Before these questions can be answered others must be asked: Why don't the German people think for themselves? Will they ever think for themselves?

An incident which occurred in Berlin last December ill.u.s.trates the fact that the people are beginning to think. After the Allies replied to President Wilson's peace note the Kaiser issued an appeal to the German people. One morning it was printed on the first pages of all newspapers in boldface type. When I arrived at my office the janitor handed me the morning papers and, pointing to the Kaiser's letter, said:

”I see the Kaiser has written US another letter. You know he never wrote to US in peace time.”

There are evidences, too, that others are beginning to think. The Russian revolution is going to cause many Socialists to discuss the future of Germany. They have discussed it before, but always behind closed doors and with lowered voices. I attended one night a secret meeting of three Socialist leaders of the Reichstag, an editor of a Berlin paper and several business men. What they said of the Kaiser that night would, if it were published, send every man to the military firing squad. But these men didn't dare speak that way in public at that time. Perhaps the Russian revolt will give them more courage.

But the Government is not asleep to these changes. The Kaiser believes he can continue juggling public opinion, but he knows that from now on it will be more difficult. But he will not stop. He will always hold forth the vision of victory as the reward for German faithfulness.

Today, for instance, in the United States we hear very little about the German submarine warfare. It is the policy of the Allies not to publish all losses immediately; first because the enemy must not be given any important information if possible, and, secondly, because, losses have a bad effect upon any people.

But the German people do not read what we do. Their newspapers are printing daily the s.h.i.+p losses of the Entente. Submarines are returning and making reports. These reports are published and in a way to give the people the impression that the submarine war is a success.

We get the opposite impression here, but we are not in a position better to judge than the Germans, because we don't hear everything.

The important question, however, is: What are the German people being told about submarine warfare?

Judging from past events, the Kaiser and his Navy are undoubtedly magnifying every sinking for the purpose of stimulating the people into believing that the victory they seek is getting nearer. The Government knows that the public favours ruthless torpedoing of all s.h.i.+ps bound for the enemy, so the Government is safe in concluding that the public can be stimulated for some months more by reports of submarine victory.

Military operations in the West are probably not arousing the discussion in Berlin that the plans against Russia are. The Government will see to it that the press points regularly to the possibilities of a separate peace with Russia, or to the possibility of a Hindenburg advance against England and France.

The people have childlike faith in von Hindenburg. If Paul von Hindenburg says a retreat is a victory the people will take his judgment. But all German leaders know that the time is coming when they will have to show the German people a victory or take the consequences themselves.

Hence it would not be surprising if, after present military operations are concluded, either by an offensive against Russia or by an attack on the Western line, the Chancellor again made peace proposals. The Socialists will force the Chancellor to do it sooner or later. They are the real power behind the throne, although they have not enough s.p.u.n.k to try to oust the Kaiser and tell the people to do their own thinking.

A big Allied military victory would, of course, change everything.