Volume II Part 26 (2/2)

Very sincerely yours,

Wm. S. Sims.

Page immediately acted on this suggestion.

_Most confidential for the Secretary of State and President only_

Sims sends me by special messenger from Queenstown the most alarming reports of the submarine situation which are confirmed by the Admiralty here. He says that the war will be won or lost in this submarine zone within a few months. Time is of the essence of the problem, and anti-submarine craft which cannot be a.s.sembled in the submarine zone almost immediately may come too late. There is, therefore, a possibility that this war may become a war between Germany and the United States alone. Help is far more urgently and quickly needed in this submarine zone than anywhere else in the whole war area.

Page.

The United States had now been in the war for three months and only twenty-eight of the sixty destroyers which were available had been sent into the field. Yet this latest message of Page produced no effect, and, when Admiral Sims returned from Queenstown, the two men, almost in despair, consulted as to the step which they should take next. What was the matter? Was it that Was.h.i.+ngton did not care to get into the naval war with its full strength, or was it that it simply refused to believe the representations of its Admiral and its Amba.s.sador? Admiral Sims and Page went over the whole situation and came to the conclusion that Was.h.i.+ngton regarded them both as so pro-British that their reports were subject to suspicion. Just as Page had found that the State Department, and its ”trade advisers,” had believed that the British were using the blockade as a means of destroying American trade for the benefit of Britain, so now he believed that Mr. Daniels and Admiral Benson, the Chief of Naval Operations, evidently thought that Great Britain was attempting to lure American wars.h.i.+ps into European waters, to undergo the risk of protecting British commerce, while British wars.h.i.+ps were kept safely in harbour. Page suggested that there was now only one thing left to do, and that was to request the British Government itself to make a statement to President Wilson that would substantiate his own messages.

”Whatever else they think of the British in Was.h.i.+ngton,” he said, ”they know one thing--and that is that a British statesman like Mr. Balfour will not lie.”

Mr. Balfour by this time had returned from America. The fact that he had established these splendid personal relations with Mr. Wilson, and that he had impressed the American public so deeply with his sincerity and fine purpose, made him especially valuable for this particular appeal.

Page and Admiral Sims therefore went to the Foreign Office and laid all the facts before him. Their own statements, Page informed the Foreign Secretary, were evidently regarded as hysterical and biased by an unreasoning friendliness to Great Britain. If Mr. Balfour would say the same things over his own signature, then they would not be disbelieved.

Mr. Balfour gladly consented. He called in Admiral Jellicoe and asked him to draft a despatch, so that all the technical facts would be completely accurate. He also consulted with Sir Edward Carson, the First Lord of the Admiralty. Then Mr. Balfour put the doc.u.ment in its final shape and signed it. It was as follows:

_Mr. Balfour to the President_

June 30, 1917.

The forces at present at the disposal of the British Admiralty are not adequate to protect s.h.i.+pping from submarine attack in the danger zone round the British Islands. Consequently s.h.i.+pping is being sunk at a greater rate than it can be replaced by new tonnage of British origin.

The time will come when, if the present rate of loss continues, the available s.h.i.+pping, apart from American contribution, will be insufficient to bring to this country sufficient foodstuffs and other essentials, including oil fuel. The situation in regard to our Allies, France, and Italy, is much the same.

Consequently, it is absolutely necessary to add to our forces as a first step, pending the adoption or completion of measures which will, it is hoped, eventually lead to the destruction of enemy submarines at a rate sufficient to ensure safety of our sea communications.

The United States is the only allied country in a position to help.

The pressing need is for armed small craft of every kind available in the area where commerce concentrates near the British and French coasts. Destroyers, submarines, gunboats, yachts, trawlers, and tugs would all give invaluable help, and if sent in sufficient numbers would undoubtedly save a situation which is manifestly critical. But they are required now and in as great numbers as possible. There is no time for delay. The present method of submarine attack is almost entirely by torpedo with the submarine submerged. The gun defense of merchant s.h.i.+ps keeps the submarine below the surface but does no more; offensively against a submerged submarine it is useless, and the large majority of the s.h.i.+ps torpedoed never see the attacking submarine until the torpedo has. .h.i.t the s.h.i.+p[62].

The present remedy is, therefore, to prevent the submarine from using its periscope for fear of attack by bomb or ram from small craft, and this method of defense for the s.h.i.+pping and offense against the submarine requires small craft in very large numbers.

The introduction of the convoy system, provided there are sufficient destroyers to form an adequate screen to the convoy, will, it is hoped, minimize losses when it is working, and the provision of new offensive measures is progressing; but for the next few months there is only one safeguard, viz., the immediate addition to patrols of every small vessel that can possibly be sent to European waters.

Page, moreover, kept up his own appeal:

_To the President_

July 5th.

_Strictly confidential to the President and the Secretary_

The British Cabinet is engaging in a threatening controversy about the att.i.tude which they should take toward the submarine peril.

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