Volume II Part 26 (1/2)

(Signed) PAGE.

This cablegram had a certain effect. The reply came from Was.h.i.+ngton that ”eventually” thirty-six destroyers would be sent.

Page's letters of this period are full of the same subject.

_To the President_

London, May 4, 1917.

Dear Mr. President:

The submarines have become a very grave danger. The loss of British and allied tonnage increases with the longer and brighter days--as I telegraphed you, 237,000 tons last week; and the worst of it is, the British are not destroying them. The Admiralty publishes a weekly report which, though true, is not the whole truth. It is known in official circles here that the Germans are turning out at least two a week--some say three; and the British are not destroying them as fast as new ones are turned out. If merely the present situation continue, the war will pretty soon become a contest of endurance under hunger, with an increasing proportion of starvation. Germany is yet much the worse off, but it will be easily possible for Great Britain to suffer to the danger point next winter or earlier unless some decided change be wrought in this situation.

The greatest help, I hope, can come from us--our destroyers and similar armed craft--provided we can send enough of them quickly.

The area to be watched is so big that many submarine hunters are needed. Early in the war the submarines worked near sh.o.r.e. There are very many more of them now and their range is one hundred miles, or even two hundred, at sea.

The public is becoming very restive with its half information, and it is more and more loudly demanding all the facts. There are already angry threats to change the personnel of the Admiralty; there is even talk of turning out the Government. ”We must have results, we must have results.” I hear confidentially that Jellicoe has threatened to resign unless the Salonica expedition is brought back: to feed and equip that force requires too many s.h.i.+ps.

And there are other troubles impending. Norway has lost so many of her s.h.i.+ps that she dare not send what are left to sea. Unarmed they'll all perish. If she arms them, Germany will declare war against her. There is a plan on foot for the British to charter these Norwegian s.h.i.+ps and to arm them, taking the risk of German war against Norway. If war comes (as it is expected) England must then defend Norway the best she can. And _then England may ask for our big s.h.i.+ps to help in these waters_. All this is yet in the future, but possibly not far in the future.

For the present the only anti-submarine help is the help we may be able to give to patrol the wide area off Ireland. If we had one hundred destroyers to send, the job there could, I am told, be quickly done. A third of that number will help mightily. At the present rate of destruction more than four million tons will be sunk before the summer is gone.

Such is this dire submarine danger. The English thought that they controlled the sea; the Germans, that they were invincible on land.

Each side is losing where it thought itself strongest.

Admiral Sims is of the greatest help imaginable. Of course, I gave him an office in one of our Emba.s.sy buildings, and the Admiralty has given him an office also with them. He spends much of his time there, and they have opened all doors and all desks and drawers to him. He strikes me (and the English so regard him) as a man of admirable judgment--unexcitable and indefatigable. I hope we'll soon send a general over, to whom the War Department will act similarly. Hoover, too, must have a good man here as, I dare say, he has already made known. These will cover the Navy, the Army, Food, and s.h.i.+pping. Perhaps a Censor and an Intelligence (Secret Service) group ought to come. I mean these for permanent--at least indefinite--service. Exchange visits by a Congressional Committee (such as the French and British make) and by high official persons such as members of your Cabinet (such also as the French and British make)--you will have got ideas about these from Mr.

Balfour.

W.H.P.

In the latter part of June Admiral Sims went to Queenstown. Admiral Bayly, who directed the operation of the anti-submarine forces there, had gone away for a brief rest, and Admiral Sims had taken over the command of both the British and American forces at that point. This experience gave Admiral Sims a first-hand picture of a really deplorable situation. The crisis was so desperate that he made another appeal to Page.

_From Admiral William S. Sims_

Admiralty House, Queenstown, June 25, 1917.

My Dear Mr. Page:

I enclose herewith a letter on the submarine situation[61].

I think I have made it plain therein that the Allies are losing the war; that it will be already lost when the loss of s.h.i.+pping reaches the point where fully adequate supplies cannot be maintained on the various battle fronts.

I cannot understand why our Government should hesitate to send the necessary anti-submarine craft to this side.

There are at least seventeen more destroyers employed on our Atlantic coast, _where there is no war_, not to mention numerous other very useful anti-submarine craft, including sea-going tugs, etc.

Can you not do something to bring our Government to an understanding of how very serious the situation is? Would it not be well to send another telegram to Mr. Lansing and the President, and also send them the enclosed correspondence?

I am sending this by mail because I may be somewhat delayed in returning to London.