Part 12 (2/2)

It was determined that our fleet in the Mediterranean should be reinforced by three or four line-of-battle s.h.i.+ps, on the principle that wherever any Power had a large force, we should have one--not a very wise principle, it seems to me, if we are never to use force. I interceded for a few powerful steamers, with 68 pound carronades, and I think Lord Melville seemed inclined to acquiesce.

Questions are to be put to Polignac to ascertain what he would do in certain events. I said he never would open himself to Lord Stuart. It was then suggested by the Duke that Aberdeen could write a private letter. This will, I believe, be done. I said to Fitzgerald, who was next to me, 'Neither letter nor Stuart will get anything out of Polignac. One of ourselves should go to Paris as an individual, see Polignac, and return before the Conference.'

I suggested Rosslyn, as he had nothing to do. Fitzgerald said he could go and return in a week, and seemed to wish to do so. However, nothing was said openly; and with all the means of success in our hands, for, I think, Polignac _might_ be brought into our views, we shall lose all by not using proper instruments; just as we have lost the Greek question by persisting in keeping Stratford Canning.

We had a good deal of conversation as to the limits of Greece. The Duke was for adhering to the Morea. It was _really_ the best line. It was what we had guaranteed. We had told the Turks we did not mean to go beyond it.

Aberdeen has always had a little private hankering after Athens, though he ridicules it. He had no scruple about annexing Athens, although not yet taken. I said I thought Polignac would be disposed to hold our language to Russia, if we would make some concession on the subject of Greece, and enable him to settle that question with _eclat_. He would then be supported by France in any strong language he might hold, and would establish himself by the experiment of his first fortnight of office.

However, the Cabinet seems disposed to look at accessories, not at principles, at the minor objects rather than at _the one great object_, which is inducing France to act with us to prevent the occupation of Constantinople or to force its evacuation. Instead of yielding upon points of minor importance, in order to carry the question, we are to insist now on the minor points-the evacuation of the Morea by the French, and then, I fear we shall weaken Polignac's Government, and lose our object.

Our foreign policy has certainly been, most unsuccessful. We have succeeded in nothing.

The communication to be made to Polignac is to be made to him confidentially, and he is to know it is not to be made to Austria. It is considered that in any case Austria would support France and England if they acted together, and any indication Austria might give of moving alone would bring down Prussia upon her. This line, I think, well considered and prudent.

It seemed to be thought that, if the Turkish Empire should be _dissolved_, Austria might be inclined to share the spoils and be quiet; but if it were only _weakened_, she would feel she suffered.

It seemed to be admitted by all that we ought to have taken a decided step long ago. That we were too late, and that we were inexcusable.

I said a year ago Aberdeen would ruin us--he would gradually let us down, not by any flagrant error, but by being always under the mark. The Duke, occupied as he is as Prime Minister, wanted an efficient secretary for Foreign Affairs, and he could not have had a worse.

Peel seems to think Ireland stands much better since the proclamation respecting the attack made by the Ribbonmen upon the Orangemen in Fermanagh. He seems to think the Irish Government ready enough when things are brought to their notice, but that they do not read or attend to the reports made to them.

_August 19._

I am inclined to think from what Colonel Hodgson says that leather might be made in India as well as here. They have the hide of the buffalo. They want the _tanning_, and some one must be sent from this country to teach them.

He told me of a Mr. Cotton who was long at Tanjore, where the iron is, and I have written to him.

_August 22._

The Russians have taken Erzeroum, and have quite dispersed the Turkish army in Asia. Every success of theirs in that quarter makes my heart bleed. I consider it a victory gained over me, as Asia is _mine_.

_August 28._

The 'Courier' of last night throws doubts on the reported victory of Kirkhilissa. The Sultan is said to be now ready to treat. The plague is in the Russian army, and in the country before them. Had a long conversation with Hardinge on Indian affairs.

_August 29._

Read a letter from Mr. Cartwright, the Consul at Constantinople, dated the 9th. The loss of Erzeroum is to be attributed to the Janizaries. In all Asia they seem to be rising. The Russians are not expected to advance till they are joined by 15,000 men, coming by sea. Thus our fleet would have saved Constantinople.

Cabinet at half-past three. Before the Cabinet read Lord Heytesbury's and Mr. Gordon's despatches. Lord Heytesbury seems to be a mere Russian.

_August 31._

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