Part 12 (1/2)

_August 10._

The Russians appear to have pa.s.sed the defiles on the northern side of the Balkans, and almost without loss. There is, I conclude, a force near Bourgas, but all that is to be hoped is that the Turks will be wise enough not to fight. It was an unlucky appointment, that of the Grand Vizier. Old Hussein never would have committed his fault.

R. Gordon has been magnificently received at Constantinople.

Polignac has been made Prime Minister of France. De Rigny is made Minister of Marine. The Government is Tory, and I should think very favourable to English alliance, not Greek, and certainly not Russian. If it should be able to stand, it must be good for us. Received letters from Colonel Macdonald from Tabriz. He says the Russians at Tiflis talk as if they were going to war with us.

_August 11._

Received Persian despatches. The Persians will pay no more. They wanted to go to war. No one would go as Envoy to Petersburg but an _attache_. They all thought they should be beheaded. Macdonald seems to have kept them quiet.

Cabinet room. Met Lord Melville. Read Gordon's letters from Constantinople.

The Turks have not above 20,000 men there. They are not disposed to yield at all. Gordon thinks if we declared we would fix in any manner the limits of Greece, and maintain them, the Porte would not quarrel with us, and would rather do anything than yield the point of honour by acknowledging the independence of the Greeks.

The Russians mean to pa.s.s the Balkans with 60,000 men and march on Adrianople. They send a large force by sea to Sizeboli to turn Bourgas.

Lord Francis Leveson holds out the apprehension of a long religious contest in Ireland. [Footnote: Unhappily, like other pessimists, he seems to have judged Ireland correctly.] I believe he looks only at the surface and judges from first appearances.

_August 12._

A victory gained by Paskewitz over the Seraskier, whom he has taken prisoner, with thirty-one pieces of cannon, &c., near Erzeroum--that is, three days after the battle, Paskewitz, still in pursuit, was within forty miles of Erzeroum.

Wrote two letters to the Duke--one on the subject of Sir J. P. Grant, who has closed the Courts at Bombay because the Government would not execute an unlawful process, and the other respecting Persian affairs, giving the substance of the despatches which I enclosed.

We have a Cabinet to-morrow at 12 on Turkish affairs. I would not allow the Russians to advance any further. I would send one from our own body, _incognito,_ to Paris to talk to Polignac and endeavour to get him to join us in an act of vigorous intervention which would give character to his Government and save Constantinople. I would pa.s.s the English and French fleets through the Dardanelles, and give Russia a leaf out of the Greek Treaty. But I do not expect that this will be Aberdeen's course.

Drummond, whom I saw, said the Duke was delighted with the account of the Jaghirdars of the Kistna. Granville is gone to Ireland.

The Duke was gone to Windsor. It is the King's birthday.

_August 13._

When the Cabinet was a.s.sembled the Duke said we were not to consider the state of things at Constantinople, and what we should do. He thought the Russians would get to Constantinople, and into it. If they did he thought there was an end of the Ottoman Empire. He was doubtful whether, after the innovations introduced, the Turks would cordially support Mahmoud, [Footnote: Sultan Mahmoud, as is well known, remodelled the whole internal organisation of the Turkish Empire. He was denounced as the Giaour Sultan by old-fas.h.i.+oned Turks.] and already there were insurrections of the Greeks. It was just what he predicted in his letter to La Ferronays, and what Lord Dudley afterwards said in a letter to Lieven; the success of the Russians was the dissolution of an Empire which could not be reconst.i.tuted.

It was too late to interfere by force, even if we had been disposed to do so alone.

He thought France, if we did nothing, would be quiet--if we did anything, she would take the other line. Polignac was a more able man than people supposed, and he would adhere to the course he adopted. We might endeavour, at any rate, to ascertain his feelings and intentions.

As to the Greek question we must have a conference, and consider the suggestions of the Amba.s.sadors, namely, that whatever we chose to make Greece, should be declared independent, and guaranteed. Both the Duke and Aberdeen thought France and Russia would both take the proposition into consideration. The former as to _limits_, the latter for delay. France had already told us that, provided we could agree upon the limits, she was inclined to adopt the suggestion of the Amba.s.sadors.

We asked whether the permanent occupation of Constantinople by Russia was to be submitted to? The answer was, _No_, to be opposed by war. It seemed to me and to Fitzgerald we had better endeavour to prevent, at a small expense, even if alone, a measure we could only retrieve if it took place at an enormous expense, if at all, and which would in all probability effect the ruin of the Turkish Empire. I did not think affairs quite so desperate. I thought the Russians might get to Adrianople, but not to Constantinople, and that they could not maintain themselves at Adrianople without the command of the sea. We had six s.h.i.+ps at the mouth of the Dardanelles, and these with the Turkish Fleet would open the Black Sea.

I was for pa.s.sing our s.h.i.+ps up to Constantinople and placing them at the disposal of the Amba.s.sador, for from hence we cannot give orders adapted to circ.u.mstances. It was replied _that_ would be war. If war were to be declared we should do as much mischief as possible, and go to Cronstadt, not to the Black Sea. We should have our s.h.i.+ps beyond the Bosphorus when Russia occupied the Dardanelles, and shut us in. This would make us ridiculous.

As the object is not to do mischief to Russia, but to save the Turkish Empire, I should say that measure was to be effected at the Bosphorus, for Constantinople, once taken, and the Ottoman Power annihilated, it would be of no use to distress Russia.

Fitzgerald seemed to be of my opinion that, however desperate the chance, we should do all we could to save Constantinople, and at any risk.