Part 28 (2/2)

FOOTNOTES:

[75] See _Friend of China_, July 11, 1865.

[76] See the account from _Shanghae Recorder_, at the end of the preceding chapter.

[77] Referring to Colonel Gordon, Captain Osborn, R.N., and their subordinates.

[78] Meaning the n.o.ble occupation of buying and selling; and that, too, at the point of the bayonet.

[79] _Times_, January 12, 1865. _China Overland Trade Report_, 30th November, 1864.

[80] The _Times_, October 26, 1864, in its China intelligence (under date, ”Shanghae, September 4”), describing the evacuation of Hoo-chow, makes the following statement, which is a further proof of the total or partial escape of the Nankin garrison:--”The rebel force had been so greatly swollen by fugitives _from Nankin_ and other places, that it const.i.tuted quite a formidable army.”

[81] The writer of the letter has evidently made a confusion of the name, Le, and t.i.tle, s.h.i.+, of the chief, for the following proclamations prove him to be the s.h.i.+ or Shee w.a.n.g.

[82] This must mean Nankin.

CHAPTER XXVI.

Results of British Policy.--Its Effect on Trade.--The Inspectorate System.--The Tien-tsin Treaty.--Present State of China.--Rebellion in the Ascendant.--Proposed Remedy.--The Mandarin Policy.--The Extradition Treaty.--The Mo-w.a.n.g's Case.--Its Injustice.--Its Illegality.--Burgevine's Case.--Our Treatment by the Manchoos.--Russia's Policy in China.--Contrasted with that of England.--Russian Progress.--Statistics.--Acquisition of Territory by Russia.--Her Approach to British India.--Russia's Advantages.--Her Future Policy.--”Peking and the Pekingese.”--Its Author's Misstatements.--Misquotations.--Examples thereof.--”Chinese Miscellanies.”--Ti-ping Movements.--The Future of the Ti-pings Doubtful.--Latest Movements.--The Kan-w.a.n.g.--Nien-fie Victories.--Future Prospects.--Finis.

Since Whig Ministers took it into their heads to become Manchoo Mandarins, the result may soon be told.

The wars have all been undertaken for the purpose either of forcing trade--princ.i.p.ally, if not wholly, that in opium--upon the Chinese, or else to chastise that people for endeavouring to put their own laws against opium smuggling into force, from the time of the _fracas_ with Commissioner Lin to the lorcha _Arrow_ pretext for the last war.

The results of the late British policy in China are summed up generally in the following sectional review:--

1. As for the vaunted treaty of Tien-tsin, _forced_ from unwilling Manchoos by the results of the ”_Arrow_ war,” it has greatly restricted trade along the coast of China, closed ports (such as Wan-chew, Tai-chew, Lam-quan, Hoc-kau, Chin-chew, &c.), which were virtually open to foreign trade, and by confining commerce to a few Treaty Ports, played exactly into the hands of the anti-foreign Mandarins. Upon this subject a capital article appears, from an old resident of many years'

standing in China, in the _Overland Trade Report_, September 11, 1865, which, as the editor says, ”contains the most able exposition of the defects of the treaty of Tien-tsin, of the pernicious results of the foreign inspectorate, and of the crusade carried on against foreign s.h.i.+pping visiting non-treaty ports, that we ever read.” The article is long, but some of its salient points are to the following effect: Until the signing of the treaty of Tien-tsin, the whole coast-line, from Canton to Woo-sung, with all its intermediate ports, was virtually open to foreign trade! Foreign vessels of all nations were allowed and even encouraged by the local authorities to enter any port they chose, and were permitted to trade in any article, either native or foreign, without hindrance or molestation, provided they paid the lawful duties.

The disadvantages to which British (and all foreign) trade is subjected by the treaty of Tien-tsin, and the establishment of the foreign inspectorate of Chinese Customs, are these:--

1st. To pay nearly double as much duty on both imports and exports as native vessels or junks are charged.

2nd. Heavy tonnage dues are enforced, consisting of 4 mace or 410 of a tael (6s. 8d.) per ton, every four months, instead of every six months as previous to the war; junks paying no tonnage dues!

3rd. Interdicted from carrying or trading in _salt_, one of the princ.i.p.al articles of trade in all parts of China and Formosa. Likewise saltpetre, sulphur, alum, and some other articles of general commerce, on pain of confiscation of vessel. Junks allowed to carry or trade in any article either native or foreign!

4th. Interdicted from entering any port on the coast of China, except those specified ”open port” by the treaty, on pain of _confiscation_ of vessels and cargo. Junks free to enter any port or harbour either in China or foreign countries. What a contrast of advantages and disadvantages! Whereas, before the concoction of the Tien-tsin treaty, foreign vessels enjoyed equal privileges with native craft, they have since been placed at a discount by the execution of the retrogressive measures of that treaty so inimical to British interests. No doubt the astute Manchoo statesmen who acted for China during the negotiations gained many advantages over the representatives of England. They succeeded in obtaining terms which restricted trade, and limited foreign intercourse to a few ports; their latest act has been to follow this up (now that the dread of the Ti-ping is over and the Ta-ku forts in their hands again) by interdicting the employment of foreign vessels to carry goods on Chinese account even between treaty ports!

2. The foreign inspectorate of Chinese Maritime Customs was a scheme effected by officials of Lord Elgin's emba.s.sy to China; its aim was to make sure of the indemnity by placing Englishmen in charge of the Imperial revenue, and to enable the squeezed Government to suppress rebellion by handing it over the remainder. Beautifully has the Pekin Cabinet responded by taking advantage of every opportunity to limit the rights of Englishmen, and resuming step by step its habits of repellance and exclusiveness!

A very significant event has lately taken place, being the elevation of Tseng-kwo-fan, leader of the anti-foreign party, and sometime besieger of Nankin, to a position of unprecedented magnitude. This Mandarin has been appointed to the absolute civil and military control of all the officials and troops, whether Tartar or Chinese, in the three provinces of Chili, Shangtung, and Honan. Speaking of this appointment, the _China Overland Trade Report_, 12th August, 1865, states:--

”Lest it may be hoped by some that Tseng-kwo-fan is a man adapted to the times, and likely to carry into effect salutary reforms, it should be mentioned that he is the quintessence of a Mandarin in the full acceptation of the term--corrupt and venal to a degree, and perfectly indifferent to the welfare of the country or the people. His anti-foreign tendencies form the leading feature of his political creed, and there is good reason to suppose that Prince Kung fully agrees with him.... The influence he obtains in the empire will be irresistible, and must insure success in whatever line of policy he may feel inclined to pursue.”

Tseng-kwo-fan's rank is that of Commander-in-Chief and General Viceroy of the empire.

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