Part 19 (1/2)

7 The Romanian lands taken by Stalin were invaded by the Romanian army, not the German. They were followed by Einsatzgruppe D; see Angrick, The Romanian lands taken by Stalin were invaded by the Romanian army, not the German. They were followed by Einsatzgruppe D; see Angrick, Besatzungspolitik. Besatzungspolitik.

8 See Snyder, See Snyder, Reconstruction. Reconstruction.

9 The deportation figures are in Angrick, The deportation figures are in Angrick, Riga Riga, 46. If conscription is included, the total rises to 34,000.

10 MacQueen, ”White Terror,” 97; Angrick, MacQueen, ”White Terror,” 97; Angrick, Riga Riga, 59. Among the two hundred thousand I include Jews in Vilnius and surrounding areas annexed to Lithuania.

11 Arad, Arad, Soviet Union Soviet Union, 144, 147; MacQueen, ”White Terror,” 99-100; Angrick, Riga Riga, 60.

12 Tomkiewicz, Tomkiewicz, Ponary Ponary, 191-197.

13 Ibid., 203. Ibid., 203.

14 Angrick, Angrick, Riga Riga, 66-76. See also Arad, Soviet Union Soviet Union, 148.

15 Weiss-Wendt, Weiss-Wendt, Estonians Estonians, 39, 40, 45, 90, 94-105.

16 The 9,817 count in The 9,817 count in Verbrechen Verbrechen is at 93. See also Wnuk, is at 93. See also Wnuk, Za pierwszego Sowieta Za pierwszego Sowieta, 371 (11,000-12,000); and Hryciuk, ”Victims,” 183 (9,400).

17 On interwar anti-Jewish politics, see, generally, Polonsky, On interwar anti-Jewish politics, see, generally, Polonsky, Politics Politics; and Mendelsohn, Jews. Jews.

18 On Biaystok, see Matthaus, ”Controlled Escalation,” 223; and On Biaystok, see Matthaus, ”Controlled Escalation,” 223; and Verbrechen der Wehrmacht Verbrechen der Wehrmacht, 593. Spektor (in ”dzi woyscy,” 575) counts thirty-eight pogroms in Volhynia; and the authors and editors of Woko Jedwabnego Woko Jedwabnego, about thirty in the Biaystok region.

19 On the total number of Jews killed (19,655), see Brandon, ”First Wave.” For the ”Hundreds of Jews . . . running down the street,” see On the total number of Jews killed (19,655), see Brandon, ”First Wave.” For the ”Hundreds of Jews . . . running down the street,” see Verbrechen der Wehrmacht Verbrechen der Wehrmacht, 99. On the nationality of the prisoners, see Himka, ”Ethnicity,” 8.

20 The idea of double collaboration as biographical self-cleansing is advanced in Gross, The idea of double collaboration as biographical self-cleansing is advanced in Gross, Neighbors. Neighbors. For examples from Estonia, Ukraine, and Belarus of double collaboration, see Weiss-Wendt, For examples from Estonia, Ukraine, and Belarus of double collaboration, see Weiss-Wendt, Estonians Estonians, 115-119; Dubno: sefer zikaron Dubno: sefer zikaron, 698-701; Rein, ”Local Collaborators,” 394; Brakel, Unter Rotem Stern Unter Rotem Stern, 304; Musial, Mythos Mythos, 266; and Mironowicz, Biaoru Biaoru, 160. See also Snyder, ”West Volhynian Jews.” A systematic study of double collaboration would be worthwhile.

21 This is the closest that I would come to an Arendtian argument about alienation. Arendt's follower Jan Gross makes a similar argument about the privatization of violence in his study of the first Soviet occupation, This is the closest that I would come to an Arendtian argument about alienation. Arendt's follower Jan Gross makes a similar argument about the privatization of violence in his study of the first Soviet occupation, Revolution from Abroad. Revolution from Abroad. But then in his studies of the consequences of two occupations, But then in his studies of the consequences of two occupations, Neighbors Neighbors and and Fear Fear, he s.h.i.+fts away from sociology and toward ethics, as if Poles should have remembered themselves when German occupation was added to Soviet, or Soviet to German. In my view the logical move would have been to press forward with the Arendtian argument, but claiming that the overlap of both ”totalitarian” powers plays the historical role that Arendt a.s.signed to modernity. This is not quite what Gross claims (although he makes gestures in this direction in Upiorna dekada Upiorna dekada and in a few pa.s.sages in both and in a few pa.s.sages in both Neighbors Neighbors and and Fear Fear). But I do think it follows from his occupation studies as a whole, if they are read as studies of human behavior (rather than of Polish ethics). This line of argument is pursued in the Conclusion.

22 Westermann, ”Ideological Soldiers,” 46 (30% and 66%). Westermann, ”Ideological Soldiers,” 46 (30% and 66%).

23 Compare Gerlach, ”n.a.z.i Decision,” 476. Compare Gerlach, ”n.a.z.i Decision,” 476.

24 Longerich, Longerich, Himmler Himmler, 551; Kay, Exploitation Exploitation, 106. On Uman, see USHMM-SBU 4/1747/19-20.

25 Matthaus, ”Controlled Escalation,” 225; Gerlach, Matthaus, ”Controlled Escalation,” 225; Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde Kalkulierte Morde, 555; Kershaw, Fateful Choices Fateful Choices, 456, 458. Cuppers, in Wegbereiter Wegbereiter, develops the argument about the crucial early role of the Waffen-SS.

26 Kay, Kay, Exploitation Exploitation, 107; Browning, ”n.a.z.i Decision,” 474. Pohl notes that the reinforcements came first to Ukraine; see Herrschaft Herrschaft, 152. He specifies early August as the time when Einsatzgruppe C understood that women and children were to be killed; see ”Schauplatz,” 140.

27 Mallmann, Mallmann, Einsatzgruppen Einsatzgruppen, 97.

28 Pohl, ”Schauplatz,” 142; Kruglov, ”Jewish Losses,” 274-275; Pohl, ”Schauplatz,” 142; Kruglov, ”Jewish Losses,” 274-275; Verbrechen der Wehrmacht Verbrechen der Wehrmacht, 135.

29 Kruglov, ”Jewish Losses,” 275. Kruglov, ”Jewish Losses,” 275.

30 Ru, ”Ma.s.saker,” 494, 503, 505; Berkhoff, ”Records,” 294; Pohl, ”Schauplatz,” 147. Ru, ”Ma.s.saker,” 494, 503, 505; Berkhoff, ”Records,” 294; Pohl, ”Schauplatz,” 147.

31 Berkhoff, Berkhoff, Harvest Harvest, 65-67, at 65; FVA 3267.

32 Darmstadt testimony, 29 April 1968, IfZ(M), Gd 01.54/78/1762. Darmstadt testimony, 29 April 1968, IfZ(M), Gd 01.54/78/1762.

33 Ru, ”Ma.s.saker,” 486; Berkhoff, Ru, ”Ma.s.saker,” 486; Berkhoff, Harvest Harvest, 68. On Sara, see Ehrenburg, Black Book Black Book, Borodyansky-Knysh testimony. On the valuables, see Dean, ”Jewish Property,” 86. On the people ”already b.l.o.o.d.y,” see ”Stenogramma,” 24 April 1946, TsDAVO, 166/3/245/118. On the bones and ash and sand, see Klee, Gott mit uns Gott mit uns, 136.

34 Darmstadt testimony, 29 April 1968, IfZ(M), Gd 01.54/78/1764-1765; Berkhoff, ”Records,” 304. Darmstadt testimony, 29 April 1968, IfZ(M), Gd 01.54/78/1764-1765; Berkhoff, ”Records,” 304.

35 Prusin, ”SiPo/SD,” 7-9; Rubenstein, Prusin, ”SiPo/SD,” 7-9; Rubenstein, Unknown Unknown, 57. Romanowsky makes the point about the rotation of official enemies in ”n.a.z.i Occupation,” 240.

36 Rubenstein, Rubenstein, Unknown Unknown, 54, 57, 61; Prusin, ”SiPo/SD,” 7-9.

37 On Kharkiv, see Pohl, ”Schauplatz,” 148; and On Kharkiv, see Pohl, ”Schauplatz,” 148; and Verbrechen der Wehrmacht Verbrechen der Wehrmacht, 179. On Kiev, see Prusin, ”SiPo/SD,” 10.

38 Gerlach, Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde Kalkulierte Morde, 544, 567. Nebe was a member of the resistance to Hitler in 1944.

39 Megargee, Megargee, Annihilation Annihilation, 99.

40 Quotation and figures are from Gerlach, Quotation and figures are from Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde Kalkulierte Morde, 588, 585; see also Ingrao, ”Violence,” 231.

41 For the ”sea of blood,” see Gerlach, For the ”sea of blood,” see Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde Kalkulierte Morde, 182. For ”thus must be destroyed,” see Verbrechen Verbrechen, 138.

42 This was an argument of the previous chapter. This was an argument of the previous chapter.

43 The Soviet rationale was a cla.s.sic one. First, the NKVD ”established” that Germany had hundreds of spies among the Volga Germans. Then, the NKVD argued that the entire population was guilty, since none of the Volga Germans had reported all of this espionage to the proper authorities. In a particularly refined move, the NKVD used the presence of swastikas in German households as evidence of n.a.z.i collaboration. In fact, the Soviets had themselves distributed those swastikas, in 1939, when Moscow and Berlin were allies, and a friendly visit from Hitler was expected. By the end of 1942, the Soviets had resettled some nine hundred thousand Germans, the vast majority of the German population in the Soviet Union. The Soviets deported some eighty-nine thousand Finns, most of them to Siberia. On Stalin, see Polian, The Soviet rationale was a cla.s.sic one. First, the NKVD ”established” that Germany had hundreds of spies among the Volga Germans. Then, the NKVD argued that the entire population was guilty, since none of the Volga Germans had reported all of this espionage to the proper authorities. In a particularly refined move, the NKVD used the presence of swastikas in German households as evidence of n.a.z.i collaboration. In fact, the Soviets had themselves distributed those swastikas, in 1939, when Moscow and Berlin were allies, and a friendly visit from Hitler was expected. By the end of 1942, the Soviets had resettled some nine hundred thousand Germans, the vast majority of the German population in the Soviet Union. The Soviets deported some eighty-nine thousand Finns, most of them to Siberia. On Stalin, see Polian, Against Their Will Against Their Will, 134. On Hitler, see Longerich, Unwritten Order Unwritten Order, 75; Gerlach, Krieg Krieg, 96; Gerlach, ”Wannsee,” 763; Pinkus, ”Deportation,” 456-458; Mazower, Hitler's Empire Hitler's Empire, 370; and Friedlander, Extermination Extermination, 239, 263-264.

44 Quotation: Lukacs, Quotation: Lukacs, Last European War Last European War, 154; see also Friedlander, Extermination Extermination , 268. , 268.

45 Angrick, Angrick, Riga Riga, 133-150.

46 Chemno is discussed in Chapter 8. The connection is made by Kershaw, Chemno is discussed in Chapter 8. The connection is made by Kershaw, Fateful Choices Fateful Choices, 462; see also Kershaw, Hitler Hitler, 66. Mazower emphasizes the centrality of the Wartheland in Hitler's Empire Hitler's Empire, for example at 191. I am excluding in this judgment Jews killed in the ”euthanasia” program.

47 Himmler and Globocnik will be discussed at greater length in Chapter 8. Himmler and Globocnik will be discussed at greater length in Chapter 8.

48 Megargee, Megargee, Annihilation Annihilation, 115.

49 Arguing from the periphery, from Belarus and Ukraine to Berlin, Gerlach and Pohl each make a case for the importance of food supplies in the extermination of the Jews. Aly and Heim, arguing forward from the logic of prewar planning, present a kind of negative explanation for the Holocaust: the Jews were already regarded as harmful in future designs and as useless consumers of present necessities. Hitler certainly undertook the war against the Soviet Union on the understanding that food supplies could thereby be secured during the war and for future wars. It is certainly true that the Hunger Plan, real supply difficulties for the Wehrmacht, and the perceived need to satisfy German civilians mattered a great deal on the eastern front generally. The concern for food made it easier for officers to endorse killing Jews. As the war continued, the economic argument about Jewish labor would be countered by the economic argument about the food Jews would eat. I agree that food played a much greater role in the process than it might appear from English-language literature on the Holocaust. But I do not believe that food (or any other economic consideration) can explain the timing or the precise content of Hitler's policy as conveyed in December 1941. It was an ideological expression and political resolution of pressing problems arising from a failed colonial war. It was also a choice. Arguing from the periphery, from Belarus and Ukraine to Berlin, Gerlach and Pohl each make a case for the importance of food supplies in the extermination of the Jews. Aly and Heim, arguing forward from the logic of prewar planning, present a kind of negative explanation for the Holocaust: the Jews were already regarded as harmful in future designs and as useless consumers of present necessities. Hitler certainly undertook the war against the Soviet Union on the understanding that food supplies could thereby be secured during the war and for future wars. It is certainly true that the Hunger Plan, real supply difficulties for the Wehrmacht, and the perceived need to satisfy German civilians mattered a great deal on the eastern front generally. The concern for food made it easier for officers to endorse killing Jews. As the war continued, the economic argument about Jewish labor would be countered by the economic argument about the food Jews would eat. I agree that food played a much greater role in the process than it might appear from English-language literature on the Holocaust. But I do not believe that food (or any other economic consideration) can explain the timing or the precise content of Hitler's policy as conveyed in December 1941. It was an ideological expression and political resolution of pressing problems arising from a failed colonial war. It was also a choice.

50 Quotation: Edele, ”States,” 374. Quotation: Edele, ”States,” 374.

51 On the 3 January meeting of Hitler with the j.a.panese amba.s.sador, see Hauner, On the 3 January meeting of Hitler with the j.a.panese amba.s.sador, see Hauner, Axis Strategy Axis Strategy, 384. See also Lukacs, Last European War Last European War, 143.

52 Krebs, ”j.a.pan,” 547-554. Krebs, ”j.a.pan,” 547-554.

53 German propaganda was making the case explicitly; see Herf, German propaganda was making the case explicitly; see Herf, Jewish Enemy Jewish Enemy, 100, 128. Compare Gerlach, ”Wannsee.” The recent scholarly emphasis upon Himmler and December has much to do with Gerlach's work and with the publication of Witte, Dienstkalendar Dienstkalendar, and Longerich, Himmler. Himmler. Himmler was the crucial executor of a policy for which Hitler was responsible. Himmler was the crucial executor of a policy for which Hitler was responsible.

54 Quoted and discussed, for example, in Longerich, Quoted and discussed, for example, in Longerich, Unwritten Order Unwritten Order, 95; Gerlach, Krieg Krieg, 123; Gerlach, ”Wannsee,” 783, 790; Kershaw, Fateful Choices Fateful Choices, 466; Tooze, Wages of Destruction Wages of Destruction, 504; and Mazower, Hitler's Empire Hitler's Empire, 376 (for the Frank quotation as well). As Friedlander points out in a persuasive pa.s.sage, this was one of a cl.u.s.ter of such statements; see Extermination Extermination, 281.

55 On Hitler (”common front”), see Herf, On Hitler (”common front”), see Herf, Jewish Enemy Jewish Enemy, 132. On Goebbels, see Pohl, Verfolgung Verfolgung, 82.