Part 18 (1/2)

64 See, above all, bikowski, ”ydowscy przesiedlecy,” 224-228; also Grynberg, See, above all, bikowski, ”ydowscy przesiedlecy,” 224-228; also Grynberg, Relacje Relacje, 244; Browning, Origins Origins, 124; and Ka.s.sow, Archive Archive, 107, 273. These movements were senseless, even from a German perspective: Jews were cleared from the Warsaw district from January to March 1941 to make room for Poles who were to be expelled from the Warthegau, who were removed to make room for Germans, who were coming west from the Soviet Union: but Germany would invade the Soviet Union in June 1941, so that Germans could move east and colonize its lands.

65 On Sborow and Lederman, see Sakowska, On Sborow and Lederman, see Sakowska, Dzieci Dzieci, 51, 50. Quotation: bikowski, ”ydowscy przesiedlecy,” 260.

66 ”Sprawozdania wietliczanek,” 65, quotations at 70, 69. ”Sprawozdania wietliczanek,” 65, quotations at 70, 69.

67 On the two different approaches to elites, see Friedlander, On the two different approaches to elites, see Friedlander, Extermination Extermination, 40. See also Tooze, Wages of Destruction Wages of Destruction, 364-365; and Makowski, ”Ausserordentliche,” 9-11, quotation at 11. Compare Cienciala, Crime Crime, 114-115; and Jolluck, Exile Exile, 15.

68 Wieliczko, ”Akcja,” 34-35; Pankowicz, ”Akcja,” 43-45; Wieliczko, ”Akcja,” 34-35; Pankowicz, ”Akcja,” 43-45; Zagada polskich elit Zagada polskich elit, 62, 67.

69 Bartoszewski, Bartoszewski, Warszawski piercie Warszawski piercie, 64-65; Dunin-Wsowicz, ”Akcja,” 24.

70 Pietrzykowski, ”Akcja,” 113-115; Jankowski, ”Akcja,” 65-66. On the brothel for Germans, see Pietrzykowski, Pietrzykowski, ”Akcja,” 113-115; Jankowski, ”Akcja,” 65-66. On the brothel for Germans, see Pietrzykowski, Akcja AB Akcja AB, 77-78.

71 Pietrzykowski, ”Akcja,” 114-115. Pietrzykowski, ”Akcja,” 114-115.

72 See, for example, Pankowicz, ”Akcja,” 44. On ”We can't tell . . . ,” see Cienciala, See, for example, Pankowicz, ”Akcja,” 44. On ”We can't tell . . . ,” see Cienciala, Crime Crime, 182.

73 On all three men, see Pietrzykowski, ”Akcja,” 117-118. On all three men, see Pietrzykowski, ”Akcja,” 117-118.

74 Dunin-Wsowicz, ”Akcja,” 22-25; Bauer, Dunin-Wsowicz, ”Akcja,” 22-25; Bauer, Dowbor Dowbor, 217, 241; Crime of Katy Crime of Katy, 33; Zagada polskich elit Zagada polskich elit, 73.

75 Zagada polskich elit Zagada polskich elit, 77.

76 On Himmler and the transports, see Bartoszewski, On Himmler and the transports, see Bartoszewski, Warszawski piercie Warszawski piercie, 59, 60, 123-125. For further details on the transports, see Zagada polskich elit Zagada polskich elit, 69; Seidel, Besatzungspolitik in Polen. Besatzungspolitik in Polen. On Bach-Zelewski and the execution site, see Dwork, On Bach-Zelewski and the execution site, see Dwork, Auschwitz Auschwitz, 166, 177. On IG Farben, see Tooze, Wages of Destruction Wages of Destruction, 443.

77 On collectivization, see Report of 25 November 1941, SPP 3/1/1/1/1; also Shumuk, On collectivization, see Report of 25 November 1941, SPP 3/1/1/1/1; also Shumuk, Perezhyte Perezhyte, 17.

78 On the Ukrainians targeted, see HI 210/14/7912. These operations were part of a series of June 1941 deportation actions that were then organized throughout the newly annexed regions of the Soviet Union, from the Baltics to Romania. On the 11,328 and 22,353 Polish citizens, see Hryciuk, ”Victims,” 191, 193. See also Olaru-Cemirtan, ”Zuge.” On the Ukrainians targeted, see HI 210/14/7912. These operations were part of a series of June 1941 deportation actions that were then organized throughout the newly annexed regions of the Soviet Union, from the Baltics to Romania. On the 11,328 and 22,353 Polish citizens, see Hryciuk, ”Victims,” 191, 193. See also Olaru-Cemirtan, ”Zuge.”

79 On the bombing, see Jolluck, On the bombing, see Jolluck, Exile Exile, 16. Quotation: Gross, Children's Eyes Children's Eyes, 52.

80 Some 292,513 Polish citizens were deported in four waves, along with thousands more individually or in smaller actions. See Some 292,513 Polish citizens were deported in four waves, along with thousands more individually or in smaller actions. See Deportacje obywateli Deportacje obywateli, 29; and Hryciuk, ”Victims,” 175. Of the deportees, some 57.5 percent were counted by the Soviets as Poles, 21.9 percent as Jews, 10.4 percent as Ukrainians, and 7.6 percent as Belarusians; see Hryciuk, ”Victims,” 195. For overall counts I rely on Hryciuk, ”Victims,” 175; and Autuchiewicz, ”Stan,” 23. See also Gurianov, ”Obzor,” 205.

81 Czapski, Czapski, Na nieludzkiej ziemi Na nieludzkiej ziemi, 68.

82 King James Bible, Matthew 5:37; Koestler, King James Bible, Matthew 5:37; Koestler, Darkness at Noon Darkness at Noon, 249. Czapski's meeting with Reikhman took place on 3 February 1942; see Crimes of Katy Crimes of Katy, 90.

83 Czapski, Czapski, Na nieludzkiej ziemi Na nieludzkiej ziemi, 120, 141-143, 148.

84 Czapski, Czapski, Na nieludzkiej ziemi Na nieludzkiej ziemi, 149.

85 On Frank, see Longerich, On Frank, see Longerich, Unwritten Order Unwritten Order, 47. On the NKVD, see Koakowski, NKWD NKWD, 74. On Hitler, see Makowski, ”Ausserordentliche,” 7. Compare Aly, Architects Architects , 151. , 151.

CHAPTER 5: THE ECONOMICS OF APOCALYPSE.

1 This is not an intellectual history, and I can permit myself only the briefest of remarks about these complex issues. As individuals, Hitler and Stalin embodied different forms of the early-nineteenth-century German response to the Enlightenment: Hitler the tragic romantic hero who must bear the burden of leading a flawed nation, Stalin the Hegelian world spirit that reveals reason in history and dictates it to others. A more complete comparison, as Christopher Clark has suggested, would account for different views of time. The n.a.z.i and Soviet regimes both rejected the basic Enlightened a.s.sumption that time was moving forward on its own, bringing knowledge and thus progress. Each was instead racing ahead to a point that was supposed to be in the past. Marxism was indeed a scheme of progress, but Lenin had leapt ahead of Marx's predictions to make a revolution in a backward country, while the more industrial countries defied Marx's predictions by not having socialist revolutions at all. The Soviets under Stalin were thus hastening, in the 1930s, so that the homeland of socialism could defend itself from the imperialist world. The n.a.z.is were in an even greater hurry toward an even more fantastic vision. They imagined a cataclysm that would destroy the Soviet Union, remake eastern Europe, and restore German greatness and purity. Hitler was anxious to make the Germany of his dreams in his own lifetime, one that he feared would be short. An introduction to attempts to bind discussions of n.a.z.i Germany and the Soviet Union within intellectual history is Bracher, This is not an intellectual history, and I can permit myself only the briefest of remarks about these complex issues. As individuals, Hitler and Stalin embodied different forms of the early-nineteenth-century German response to the Enlightenment: Hitler the tragic romantic hero who must bear the burden of leading a flawed nation, Stalin the Hegelian world spirit that reveals reason in history and dictates it to others. A more complete comparison, as Christopher Clark has suggested, would account for different views of time. The n.a.z.i and Soviet regimes both rejected the basic Enlightened a.s.sumption that time was moving forward on its own, bringing knowledge and thus progress. Each was instead racing ahead to a point that was supposed to be in the past. Marxism was indeed a scheme of progress, but Lenin had leapt ahead of Marx's predictions to make a revolution in a backward country, while the more industrial countries defied Marx's predictions by not having socialist revolutions at all. The Soviets under Stalin were thus hastening, in the 1930s, so that the homeland of socialism could defend itself from the imperialist world. The n.a.z.is were in an even greater hurry toward an even more fantastic vision. They imagined a cataclysm that would destroy the Soviet Union, remake eastern Europe, and restore German greatness and purity. Hitler was anxious to make the Germany of his dreams in his own lifetime, one that he feared would be short. An introduction to attempts to bind discussions of n.a.z.i Germany and the Soviet Union within intellectual history is Bracher, Zeit der Ideologien. Zeit der Ideologien.

2 This is a recasting of the argument developed in Chapters 1-3. For ”Garden of Eden” (16 July 1941), see Mulligan, This is a recasting of the argument developed in Chapters 1-3. For ”Garden of Eden” (16 July 1941), see Mulligan, Illusion Illusion, 8.

3 Compare Goulder, ”Internal Colonialism”; and Viola, ”Selbstkolonisierung.” Compare Goulder, ”Internal Colonialism”; and Viola, ”Selbstkolonisierung.”

4 Britain is more an external factor in this study than a subject of inquiry; but there is a case to be made for the importance of individuals in history here as well. See Lukacs, Britain is more an external factor in this study than a subject of inquiry; but there is a case to be made for the importance of individuals in history here as well. See Lukacs, Hitler and Stalin Hitler and Stalin; and Lukacs, Five Days in London. Five Days in London. See also Isaiah Berlin's essay ”Winston Churchill in 1940” in See also Isaiah Berlin's essay ”Winston Churchill in 1940” in Personal Impressions Personal Impressions, 1-23.

5 See the Preface; also Streit, See the Preface; also Streit, Keine Kameraden Keine Kameraden, 26-27. Oil was necessary for both industry and agriculture. Here, too, Germany was dependent upon imports, and true autarky seemed to require the conquest of the Soviet Caucasus and its oil fields.

6 Consult Tooze, Consult Tooze, Wages of Destruction Wages of Destruction, 409, 424, 429, 452. For the ”most autarkic state in the world,” see Kennedy, Aufstieg Aufstieg, 341. On the oil reserves, see Eichholtz, Krieg um ol Krieg um ol, 8, 15, pa.s.sim. Compare Hildebrand, Weltreich Weltreich, 657-658. The German military was convinced that Soviet resources were needed to fight the war; see Kay, Exploitation Exploitation, 27, 37, 40, and ”immense riches” at 212.

7 On Germany's naval capacity, see Weinberg, On Germany's naval capacity, see Weinberg, World at Arms World at Arms, 118; also Tooze, Wages of Destruction Wages of Destruction, 397-399; and Evans, Third Reich at War Third Reich at War, 143-146. Quotation: Mazower, Hitler's Empire Hitler's Empire, 133. Alan Milward long ago drew attention to the significance of the a.s.sumption of a rapid victory; see German Economy German Economy, 40-41.

8 On Generalplan Ost, see Madajczyk, ”Generalplan,” 12-13, also 64-66; Aly, On Generalplan Ost, see Madajczyk, ”Generalplan,” 12-13, also 64-66; Aly, Architects Architects , 258; Kay, , 258; Kay, Exploitation Exploitation, 100-101, 216; Wa.s.ser, Himmlers Raumplannung Himmlers Raumplannung, 51-52; Aly, Architects Architects, 258; Tooze, Wages of Destruction Wages of Destruction, 466-467; Rutherford, Prelude Prelude, 217; Mazower, Hitler's Empire Hitler's Empire, 206, 210; and Longerich, Himmler Himmler, 597-599.

9 On Himmler, see Longerich, On Himmler, see Longerich, Himmler Himmler, 599. On Hitler, see Kershaw, Hitler Hitler, 651. See also Tooze, Wages of Destruction Wages of Destruction, 469.

10 Hitler's proclamation of 31 January 1941 is cited after Tooze, Hitler's proclamation of 31 January 1941 is cited after Tooze, Wages of Destruction Wages of Destruction , 465. The final form of the Final Solution is the subject of the next chapter. Evans argues that Hitler needed to begin the war against the Soviet Union before the war against Britain was over because German citizens would have opposed a new war; see , 465. The final form of the Final Solution is the subject of the next chapter. Evans argues that Hitler needed to begin the war against the Soviet Union before the war against Britain was over because German citizens would have opposed a new war; see Third Reich at War Third Reich at War, 162.

11 Deutschosterreichische Tageszeitung Deutschosterreichische Tageszeitung, 3 March 1933; Kershaw, Fateful Choices Fateful Choices, 267. On the percentage cited, see Kay, Exploitation Exploitation, 56, 143.

12 Quotations: Kay, Quotations: Kay, Exploitation Exploitation, 211, 50, 40. See also Tooze, Wages of Destruction Wages of Destruction, 469; and Kershaw, Hitler Hitler, 650.

13 Quotation: Gerlach, Quotation: Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde Kalkulierte Morde, 342. The inst.i.tutional apparati are clarified in Kay, Exploitation Exploitation, 17-18, 148.

14 Kay, Kay, Exploitation Exploitation, 138, 162-163.

15 On the ”extinction of . . . a great part of the population,” see On the ”extinction of . . . a great part of the population,” see Verbrechen der Wehrmacht Verbrechen der Wehrmacht, 65. The long quotation is in Kay, Exploitation Exploitation, 133; see also Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde Kalkulierte Morde, 52-56. Given the settlement patterns of Soviet Jews, these ”superfluous people” included not only Russians, Belarusians, Ukrainians, and Balts but at least three quarters of the Soviet Jewish population as well.

16 Kay, Kay, Exploitation Exploitation, 164. In June, Hitler confirmed Goring's overall responsibility for economic planning.

17 Hauner, Hauner, Axis Strategy Axis Strategy, 378-383.

18 Hitler's capacity for improvisation makes it difficult to speak of strategy in the conventional sense. In my view the dispute between those who argue for a continental and a world strategy is most easily resolved thus: Hitler and his commanders agreed that a conquered Soviet Union was needed to pursue the war, whatever form it took. Hitler had in mind a war of continents and believed that it would come. Winning that world war required an earlier victory in the continental war. Hitler's capacity for improvisation makes it difficult to speak of strategy in the conventional sense. In my view the dispute between those who argue for a continental and a world strategy is most easily resolved thus: Hitler and his commanders agreed that a conquered Soviet Union was needed to pursue the war, whatever form it took. Hitler had in mind a war of continents and believed that it would come. Winning that world war required an earlier victory in the continental war.

19 On the neutrality pact, see Weinberg, On the neutrality pact, see Weinberg, World at Arms World at Arms, 167-169; and Hasegawa, Racing Racing, 13-14.

20 Burleigh, Burleigh, Third Reich Third Reich, 484, 487.

21 On the j.a.panese wavering, see Weinberg, On the j.a.panese wavering, see Weinberg, World at Arms World at Arms, 253. On ”for the time being,” see Hasegawa, Racing Racing, 13. On the reaffirmation, see Krebs, ”j.a.pan,” 554. On the oft-forgotten Italian role, see Schlemmer, Italianer. Italianer.

22 Quotations: Romer, Quotations: Romer, Kommissarbefehl Kommissarbefehl, 204. Regarding Hitler's quotation, see Kershaw, Hitler Hitler, 566. See also Pohl, Herrschaft Herrschaft, 64; and Bartov, Hitler's Army Hitler's Army, 16.

23 On the use of civilians as human s.h.i.+elds, see the order of 13 May 1941, text in On the use of civilians as human s.h.i.+elds, see the order of 13 May 1941, text in Verbrechen der Wehrmacht Verbrechen der Wehrmacht, 46. See also Bartov, Hitler's Army Hitler's Army, 71; Pohl, Herrschaft Herrschaft, 71, and discussion of women in uniform at 205; Romer, Kommissarbefehl Kommissarbefehl, 228, also 551; and Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde Kalkulierte Morde, 774.

24 Gerlach, Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde Kalkulierte Morde, 244, 266; Bartov, Eastern Front Eastern Front, 132.

25 Verbrechen der Wehrmacht Verbrechen der Wehrmacht, 344; Pohl, Herrschaft Herrschaft, 185; Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde Kalkulierte Morde, 266.