Part 22 (1/2)

Negotiations were commenced in October, but were delayed by the death of Mary of England in November, and the refusal of Queen Elizabeth to acknowledge the surrender of Calais. Philip, hoping perhaps thereby to gain her hand, offered to stand by the English Queen and break off the negotiations, but only on condition that she would support him with all her power as long as the war should last. This did not suit the cautious and parsimonious Queen, and she finally consented to leave Calais for eight years in the hands of France. France was also allowed, by the Emperor Ferdinand, to retain the three Lotharingian Bishoprics, Metz, Toul, and Verdun, but had to surrender all her other conquests to Philip and his allies, except Turin, Saluzzo, Pignerol, and a few other places of importance in Piedmont. These she was to hold until Henry's claim to that princ.i.p.ality through his grandmother, Louise of Savoy, should be decided--a claim which he could hardly believe to be serious. Thus Philip regained the towns which France had taken in Luxembourg; Montferrat was restored to the Duke of Mantua; Genoa regained Corsica. On his side, Philip surrendered the few places he held in Picardy. The two Kings further bound themselves to do their best to procure the meeting of a General Council, which was necessary both for reformation of abuses, and for the restoration of union and concord to the Church. The treaty was to be ratified by a double marriage; Philip was to marry Elizabeth, the eldest daughter of Henry II., then a girl of thirteen, who had at first been suggested as the bride of his son Don Carlos; Margaret, the sister of the French king, was to espouse Emanuel Philibert, Duke of Savoy. In the tournament which was held to celebrate the marriage of Philip with the French princess, Henry II. received a wound from which he died, and was succeeded by his son Francis II., a youth of sixteen, who in 1558 had married Mary Queen of Scots.

The peace of Cateau Cambresis, by which France 'lost as many provinces as she regained cities,' was far more disadvantageous than the military position, in spite of the defeats of St. Quentin and Gravelines, justified. It is therefore not unnaturally looked upon as a dishonourable one by most French writers. It reminds us once more of the taunt of Machiavelli that the French are not masters of diplomacy, and is perhaps not an unfitting close to that long struggle between the Houses of Valois and of Hapsburg, which commenced with the foolish expedition of Charles VIII., and in which France had continually been the aggressor. Her only permanent gains were those of Calais, and the three Lotharingian bishoprics; and these, balanced as they were by the loss of Spanish Navarre, were won at the price of an exhausted treasury and an impoverished people. She had no doubt taken a leading part in resisting the dangerous supremacy of the Austro-Spanish House, and in foiling the attempt of Charles to establish a universal monarchy in Europe. Yet it may be questioned whether she could not have done this more effectively if she had kept her hands off Italy, and had strengthened and extended her frontiers by winning Rousillon and Franche-Comte, and by pressing towards the Rhine. While playing the rival to the House of Hapsburg, she had not only contributed to the success of the Reformers in Germany, and to the advance of the Turk in Hungary, but had allowed Protestantism to gain a firm hold at home, and had fostered a military spirit among the smaller n.o.bility, which was to give to the religious struggle in France some of its worst characteristics.

Throughout the long struggle nothing had been done to strengthen the government of France, or to develop const.i.tutional life. The monarchy came out of the war bankrupt, and the government the prey of rival factions--factions which, if they did not cause the religious wars, most certainly prolonged them and France, torn by civil and religious strife, had to wait till the reign of Henry IV. before she could take that part in European affairs to which her central position, the ability of her people, and her magnificent natural resources ent.i.tled her.

Nor was Spain in much better plight. To outward appearances, indeed, the power of Philip seemed overwhelming. He was King of the whole Spanish Peninsula with the exception of Portugal;[56] King of Naples and of Sicily, and Duke of Milan, a position which enabled him to control the politics of the Peninsula;[57] Master of Franche-Comte and of the Netherlands. In Africa, he held Tunis and Oran, with places on the Barbary coast, and the islands of Cape de Verd, and the Canaries; while in the Pacific Ocean, the Philippines were under his sway. In America, Spain held a large part of the eastern coast, except Brazil, which belonged to Portugal, all the islands in the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea, and the kingdoms of Mexico and Peru, which had been conquered during the reign of Charles. The Spanish infantry was considered the most formidable in Europe, and the treasures of the Indies were believed to be inexhaustible. Yet Spain had suffered seriously from the long-protracted struggle. Her resources were nearly as much crippled as those of France; her government, if better organised, was fully as despotic, and all religious liberty had been crushed out; and she was shortly to give evidence of her weakness in the failure to put down the revolt of the United Provinces, and in the defeat of the Armada by the puny s.h.i.+ps of England.

The peace of Cateau Cambresis, therefore, closes one epoch and begins another. New actors came upon the scene.[58] The struggle for supremacy is stayed a while. Germany and Spain are for ever divided; the Turkish Empire soon ceases to be aggressive, and begins to suffer from internal decay. The remaining thirty-nine years we have to cover is chiefly taken up with the Counter-Reformation and the struggles to which that movement gave birth, with the religious wars in France, and with the revolt of the Netherlands against the religious and political tyranny of Spain.

FOOTNOTES:

[54] It had already been summoned in 1542, but had been postponed.

[55] The question whether Charles had used the words, 'nicht einiges' (any), or 'nicht ewiges (perpetual) Gefangniss,' appears to be an afterthought. Cf. Armstrong, ii. 156.

[56] For the character of the Spanish rule in Italy, cf.

Armstrong, _Charles V._, II. p. 291 ff.

[57] As we shall have to speak but little hereafter of Italy, it may be well to give concisely the names of the chief dependent or independent states:

1. Piedmont, in the hands of Emanuel Philibert of Savoy.

2. Genoa and Venice, independent republics.

3. Parma and Piacenza, under the rule of Ottavio Farnese; of these Parma had been restored to him by Paul III., and Piacenza by Philip II. in 1556.

4. Mantua, in the hands of Frederick, first Duke of Mantua, who also gained Montferrat from Charles V. in 1536, having married the heiress of William VII. (Paleologus), Marquis of Montferrat.

5. Florence, under Duke Cosimo dei Medici, who had just secured Siena, and a.s.sumed the t.i.tle of Grand Duke of Tuscany in 1569.

6. The Duchy of Urbino, a papal fief, in the hands of Guidobaldo della Rovere.

7. The duchies of Ferrara, Modena, and Reggio, in the hands of Ercole II. of Este. On the extinction of the direct line in 1597, Ferrara was seized by the Pope, Clement VIII. Modena and Reggio went to Charles of Este, a collateral.

[58] Charles, and Mary Queen of England died in 1558, Paul IV.

and Henry II. in 1559.

CHAPTER VI

THE COUNTER-REFORMATION AND CALVINISM

The Counter-Reformation in Spain and Italy--The Theatines--The Jesuits--Last Session of Council of Trent--The Inquisition--John Calvin and Geneva--Characteristics of Calvinism.

-- 1. _The Counter-Reformation._

| Spain, the home of the Counter-Reformation.

With the abdication and the death of Charles V., the history of Europe loses that unity which it received from the comprehensiveness of his policy, and from his striking personality. None the less, a central point of interest is afforded us by the movement of the Counter-Reformation, which affects all Europe and focuses the political movements for the next thirty years, or more. The Counter-Reformation found its impulse in that profound sense of dissatisfaction with the condition of the Church to which Protestantism itself owed its origin. Like the two orders of the Dominicans and Franciscans of the thirteenth century, this movement took its rise in Spain and in Italy. In the days of Alexander VI., when the Papacy was immersed in secular interests, and was rapidly forfeiting the respect of Europe, a thorough reform of the Church in Spain had been inaugurated by Ferdinand and Isabella and carried through by the energy and devotion of Cardinal Ximenes. Under these influences a school of theologians had been formed, who revived the doctrine of the great Dominican of the thirteenth century, Thomas Aquinas, and united learning with a life of purity and zeal. The movement had at first met with little support from the Papacy. The kings of Spain were determined to maintain their independence in matters ecclesiastical, and had acted independently and often even against the papal will. Yet the spirit of reform soon spread to Italy. Adrian VI. had, while Regent in Spain, been influenced by the movement, and, as Pope (1522-1523), had vainly attempted to extend the reform to the Church at large. Under the leaders.h.i.+p of Caraffa (1555-1559), who had before he became Pope spent some years in Spain, and still more of Loyola, Lainez, and Xavier, the Spanish founders of the Jesuits, the Counter-Reformation was to become the great support of papal authority.