Part 23 (1/2)

More recently, the organization representing the world's organ transplantation surgeons has adopted a moratorium on the transplantation of vascularized animal organs into humans. This was done out of fear of the spread of long-dormant HIV-type xenoviruses from animals such as pigs or baboons into the human population. Unfortunately, such a moratorium can also slow down the availability of lifesaving xenografts (genetically modified animal organs that are accepted by the human immune system) to the millions of people who die each year from heart, kidney, and liver disease. Geoethicist Martine Rothblatt has proposed replacing this moratorium with a new set of ethical guidelines and regulations.44 In the case of nanotechnology, the ethics debate has started a couple of decades prior to the availability of the particularly dangerous applications. The most important provisions of the Foresight Inst.i.tute guidelines include:

”Artificial replicators must not be capable of replication in a natural, uncontrolled environment.” ”Artificial replicators must not be capable of replication in a natural, uncontrolled environment.” ”Evolution within the context of a self-replicating manufacturing system is discouraged.” ”Evolution within the context of a self-replicating manufacturing system is discouraged.” ”MNT device designs should specifically limit proliferation and provide traceability of any replicating systems.” ”MNT device designs should specifically limit proliferation and provide traceability of any replicating systems.” ”Distribution of molecular manufacturing ”Distribution of molecular manufacturing development development capability should be restricted whenever possible, to responsible actors that have agreed to use the Guidelines. No such restriction need apply to end products of the development process.” capability should be restricted whenever possible, to responsible actors that have agreed to use the Guidelines. No such restriction need apply to end products of the development process.”

Other strategies that the Foresight Inst.i.tute has proposed include: Replication should require materials not found in the natural environment. Replication should require materials not found in the natural environment. Manufacturing (replication) should be separated from the functionality of end products. Manufacturing devices can create end products but cannot replicate themselves, and end products should have no replication capabilities. Manufacturing (replication) should be separated from the functionality of end products. Manufacturing devices can create end products but cannot replicate themselves, and end products should have no replication capabilities. Replication should require replication codes that are encrypted and time limited. The broadcast architecture mentioned earlier is an example of this recommendation. Replication should require replication codes that are encrypted and time limited. The broadcast architecture mentioned earlier is an example of this recommendation.

These guidelines and strategies are likely to be effective for preventing accidental release of dangerous self-replicating nanotechnology ent.i.ties. But dealing with the intentional design and release of such ent.i.ties is a more complex and challenging problem. A sufficiently determined and destructive opponent could possibly defeat each of these layers of protections. Take, for example, the broadcast architecture. When properly designed, each ent.i.ty is unable to replicate without first obtaining replication codes, which are not repeated from one replication generation to the next. However, a modification to such a design could bypa.s.s the destruction of the replication codes and thereby pa.s.s them on to the next generation. To counteract that possibility it has been recommended that the memory for the replication codes be limited to only a subset of the full code. However, this guideline could be defeated by expanding the size of the memory.

Another protection that has been suggested is to encrypt the codes and build in protections in the decryption systems, such as time-expiration limitations. However, we can see how easy it has been to defeat protections against unauthorized replications of intellectual property such as music files. Once replication codes and protective layers are stripped away, the information can be replicated without these restrictions.

This doesn't mean that protection is impossible. Rather, each level of protection will work only to a certain level of sophistication. The meta-lesson here is that we will need to place twenty-first-century society's highest priority on the continuing advance of defensive technologies, keeping them one or more steps ahead of the destructive technologies (or at least no more than a quick step behind).

Protection from ”Unfriendly” Strong AI. Even as effective a mechanism as the broadcast architecture, however, won't serve as protection against abuses of strong AI. The barriers provided by the broadcast architecture rely on the lack of intelligence in nanoengineered ent.i.ties. By definition, however, intelligent ent.i.ties have the cleverness to easily overcome such barriers. Even as effective a mechanism as the broadcast architecture, however, won't serve as protection against abuses of strong AI. The barriers provided by the broadcast architecture rely on the lack of intelligence in nanoengineered ent.i.ties. By definition, however, intelligent ent.i.ties have the cleverness to easily overcome such barriers.

Eliezer Yudkowsky has extensively a.n.a.lyzed paradigms, architectures, and ethical rules that may help a.s.sure that once strong AI has the means of accessing and modifying its own design it remains friendly to biological humanity and supportive of its values. Given that self-improving strong AI cannot be recalled, Yudkowsky points out that we need to ”get it right the first time,” and that its initial design must have ”zero nonrecoverable errors.”45 Inherently there will be no absolute protection against strong AI. Although the argument is subtle I believe that maintaining an open free-market system for incremental scientific and technological progress, in which each step is subject to market acceptance, will provide the most constructive environment for technology to embody widespread human values. As I have pointed out, strong AI is emerging from many diverse efforts and will be deeply integrated into our civilization's infrastructure. Indeed, it will be intimately embedded in our bodies and brains. As such, it will reflect our values because it will be us. Attempts to control these technologies via secretive government programs, along with inevitable underground development, would only foster an unstable environment in which the dangerous applications would be likely to become dominant.

DecentraIization. One profound trend already well under way that will provide greater stability is the movement from centralized technologies to distributed ones and from the real world to the virtual world discussed above. Centralized technologies involve an aggregation of resources such as people (for example, cities, buildings), energy (such as nuclear-power plants, liquid-natural-gas and oil tankers, energy pipelines), transportation (airplanes, trains), and other items. Centralized technologies are subject to disruption and disaster. They also tend to be inefficient, wasteful, and harmful to the environment. One profound trend already well under way that will provide greater stability is the movement from centralized technologies to distributed ones and from the real world to the virtual world discussed above. Centralized technologies involve an aggregation of resources such as people (for example, cities, buildings), energy (such as nuclear-power plants, liquid-natural-gas and oil tankers, energy pipelines), transportation (airplanes, trains), and other items. Centralized technologies are subject to disruption and disaster. They also tend to be inefficient, wasteful, and harmful to the environment.

Distributed technologies, on the other hand, tend to be flexible, efficient, and relatively benign in their environmental effects. The quintessential distributed technology is the Internet. The Internet has not been substantially disrupted to date, and as it continues to grow, its robustness and resilience continue to strengthen. If any hub or channel does go down, information simply routes around it.

Distributed Energy. In energy, we need to move away from the extremely concentrated and centralized installations on which we now depend. For example, one company is pioneering fuel cells that are microscopic, using MEMS technology. In energy, we need to move away from the extremely concentrated and centralized installations on which we now depend. For example, one company is pioneering fuel cells that are microscopic, using MEMS technology.46 They are manufactured like electronic chips but are actually energy-storage devices with an energy-to-size ratio significantly exceeding that of conventional technology. As I discussed earlier, nanoengineered solar panels will be able to meet our energy needs in a distributed, renewable, and clean fas.h.i.+on. Ultimately technology along these lines could power everything from our cell phones to our cars and homes. These types of decentralized energy technologies would not be subject to disaster or disruption. They are manufactured like electronic chips but are actually energy-storage devices with an energy-to-size ratio significantly exceeding that of conventional technology. As I discussed earlier, nanoengineered solar panels will be able to meet our energy needs in a distributed, renewable, and clean fas.h.i.+on. Ultimately technology along these lines could power everything from our cell phones to our cars and homes. These types of decentralized energy technologies would not be subject to disaster or disruption.

As these technologies develop, our need for aggregating people in large buildings and cities will diminish, and people will spread out, living where they want and gathering together in virtual reality.

Civil Liberties in an Age of Asymmetric Warfare. The nature of terrorist attacks and the philosophies of the organizations behind them highlight how civil liberties can be at odds with legitimate state interests in surveillance and control. Our law-enforcement system-and indeed, much of our thinking about security-is based on the a.s.sumption that people are motivated to preserve their own lives and well-being. That logic underlies all our strategies, from protection at the local level to mutual a.s.sured destruction on the world stage. But a foe that values the destruction of both its enemy and itself is not amenable to this line of reasoning. The nature of terrorist attacks and the philosophies of the organizations behind them highlight how civil liberties can be at odds with legitimate state interests in surveillance and control. Our law-enforcement system-and indeed, much of our thinking about security-is based on the a.s.sumption that people are motivated to preserve their own lives and well-being. That logic underlies all our strategies, from protection at the local level to mutual a.s.sured destruction on the world stage. But a foe that values the destruction of both its enemy and itself is not amenable to this line of reasoning.

The implications of dealing with an enemy that does not value its own survival are deeply troublesome and have led to controversy that will only intensify as the stakes continue to escalate. For example, when the FBI identifies a likely terrorist cell, it will arrest the partic.i.p.ants, even though there may be insufficient evidence to convict them of a crime and they may not yet even have committed a crime. Under the rules of engagement in our war on terrorism, the government continues to hold these individuals.

In a lead editorial, the New York Times New York Times objected to this policy, which it described as a ”troubling provision.” objected to this policy, which it described as a ”troubling provision.”47 The paper argued that the government should release these detainees because they have not yet committed a crime and should rearrest them only after they have done so. Of course by that time suspected terrorists might well be dead along with a large number of their victims. How can the authorities possibly break up a vast network of decentralized cells of suicide terrorists if they have to wait for each one to commit a crime? The paper argued that the government should release these detainees because they have not yet committed a crime and should rearrest them only after they have done so. Of course by that time suspected terrorists might well be dead along with a large number of their victims. How can the authorities possibly break up a vast network of decentralized cells of suicide terrorists if they have to wait for each one to commit a crime?

On the other hand this very logic has been routinely used by tyrannical regimes to justify the waiving of the judicial protections we have come to cherish. It is likewise fair to argue that curtailing civil liberties in this way is exactly the aim of the terrorists, who despise our notions of freedoms and pluralism. However, I do not see the prospect of any technology ”magic bullet” that would essentially change this dilemma.

The encryption trapdoor may be considered a technical innovation that the government has been proposing in an attempt to balance legitimate individual needs for privacy with the government's need for surveillance. Along with this type of technology we also need the requisite political innovation to provide for effective oversight, by both the judicial and legislative branches, of the executive branch's use of these trapdoors, to avoid the potential for abuse of power. The secretive nature of our opponents and their lack of respect for human life including their own will deeply test the foundations of our democratic traditions.

A Program for GNR Defense

We come from goldfish, essentially, but that [doesn't] mean we turned around and killed all the goldfish. Maybe [the AIs] will feed us once a week....If you had a machine with a 10 to the 18th power IQ over humans, wouldn't you want it to govern, or at least control your economy?-SETH SHOSTAK

How can we secure the profound benefits of GNR while ameliorating its perils? Here's a review of a suggested program for containing the GNR risks: The most urgent recommendation is to greatly increase our investment in defensive technologies. greatly increase our investment in defensive technologies. Since we are already in the G era, Since we are already in the G era, the bulk of this investment today should be in (biological) antiviral medications and treatments. the bulk of this investment today should be in (biological) antiviral medications and treatments. We have new tools that are well suited to this task. RNA interference, for example, can be used to block gene expression. Virtually all infections (as well as cancer) rely on gene expression at some point during their life cycles. We have new tools that are well suited to this task. RNA interference, for example, can be used to block gene expression. Virtually all infections (as well as cancer) rely on gene expression at some point during their life cycles.

Efforts to antic.i.p.ate the defensive technologies needed to safely guide N and R should also be supported, and these should be substantially increased as we get closer to the feasibility of molecular manufacturing and strong AI, respectively. A significant side benefit would be to accelerate effective treatments for infectious disease and cancer. I've testified before Congress on this issue, advocating the investment of tens of billions of dollars per year (less than 1 percent of the GDP) to address this new and under-recognized existential threat to humanity.”

We need to streamline the regulatory process for genetic and medical technologies. The regulations do not impede the malevolent use of technology but significantly delay the needed defenses. As mentioned, we need to better balance the risks of new technology (for example, new medications) against the known harm of delay.A global program of confidential, random serum monitoring for unknown or evolving biological pathogens should be funded. Diagnostic tools exist to rapidly identify the existence of unknown protein or nucleic acid sequences. Intelligence is key to defense, and such a program could provide invaluable early warning of an impending epidemic. Such a ”pathogen sentinel” program has been proposed for many years by public health authorities but has never received adequate funding.Well-defined and targeted temporary moratoriums, such as the one that occurred in the genetics field in 1975, may be needed from time to time. But such moratoriums are unlikely to be necessary with nanotechnology. Broad efforts at relinquis.h.i.+ng major areas of technology serve only to continue vast human suffering by delaying the beneficial aspects of new technologies, and actually make the dangers worse.Efforts to define safety and ethical guidelines for nanotechnology should continue. Such guidelines will inevitably become more detailed and refined as we get closer to molecular manufacturing.To create the political support to fund the efforts suggested above, it is necessary to raise public awareness of these dangers raise public awareness of these dangers. Because, of course, there exists the downside of raising alarm and generating uninformed backing for broad ant.i.technology mandates, we also need to create a public understanding of the profound benefits of continuing advances in technology.These risks cut across international boundaries-which is, of course, nothing new; biological viruses, software viruses, and missiles already cross such boundaries with impunity. International cooperation International cooperation was vital to containing the SARS virus and will become increasingly vital in confronting future challenges. Worldwide organizations such as the World Health Organization, which helped coordinate the SARS response, need to be strengthened. was vital to containing the SARS virus and will become increasingly vital in confronting future challenges. Worldwide organizations such as the World Health Organization, which helped coordinate the SARS response, need to be strengthened.A contentious contemporary political issue is the need for preemptive action to combat threats, such as terrorists with access to weapons of ma.s.s destruction or rogue nations that support such terrorists. Such measures will always be controversial, but the potential need for them is clear. A nuclear explosion can destroy a city in seconds. A self-replicating pathogen, whether biological or nanotechnology based, could destroy our civilization in a matter of days or weeks. We cannot always afford to wait for the ma.s.sing of armies or other overt indications of ill intent before taking protective action .Intelligence agencies and policing authorities will have a vital role in forestalling the vast majority of potentially dangerous incidents. Their efforts need to involve the most powerful technologies available. For example, before this decade is over, devices the size of dust particles will be able to carry out reconnaissance missions. When we reach the 2020s and have software running in our bodies and brains, government authorities will have a legitimate need on occasion to monitor these software streams. The potential for abuse of such powers is obvious. We will need to achieve a middle road of preventing catastrophic events while preserving our privacy and liberty.The above approaches will be inadequate to deal with the danger from pathological R (strong AI). Our primary strategy in this area should be to optimize the likelihood that future nonbiological intelligence will reflect our values of liberty, tolerance, and respect for knowledge and diversity. The best way to accomplish this is to foster those values in our society today and going forward. If this sounds vague, it is. But there is no purely technical strategy that is workable in this area, because greater intelligence will always find a way to circ.u.mvent measures that are the product of a lesser intelligence. The nonbiological intelligence we are creating is and will be embedded in our societies and will reflect our values. The transbiological phase will involve nonbiological intelligence deeply integrated with biological intelligence. This will amplify our abilities, and our application of these greater intellectual powers will be governed by the values of its creators. The transbiological era will ultimately give way to the postbiological era, but it is to be hoped that our values will remain influential. This strategy is certainly not foolproof, but it is the primary means we have today to influence the future course of strong AI.

Technology will remain a double-edged sword. It represents vast power to be used for all humankind's purposes. GNR will provide the means to overcome age-old problems such as illness and poverty, but it will also empower destructive ideologies. We have no choice but to strengthen our defenses while we apply these quickening technologies to advance our human values, despite an apparent lack of consensus on what those values should be.

MOLLY 2004: Okay, now run that stealthy scenario by me again-you know, the one where the bad nan.o.bots spread quietly through the bioma.s.s to get themselves into position but don't actually expand to noticeably destroy anything until they're spread around the globe. Okay, now run that stealthy scenario by me again-you know, the one where the bad nan.o.bots spread quietly through the bioma.s.s to get themselves into position but don't actually expand to noticeably destroy anything until they're spread around the globe.

RAY: Well, the nan.o.bots would spread at very low concentrations, say one carbon atom per 10 Well, the nan.o.bots would spread at very low concentrations, say one carbon atom per 1015 in the bioma.s.s, so they would be seeded throughout the bioma.s.s. Thus, the speed of physical spread of the destructive nan.o.bots would not be a limiting factor when they subsequently replicate in place. If they skipped the stealth phase and expanded instead from a single point, the spreading nanodisease would be noticed, and the spread around the world would be relatively slow. in the bioma.s.s, so they would be seeded throughout the bioma.s.s. Thus, the speed of physical spread of the destructive nan.o.bots would not be a limiting factor when they subsequently replicate in place. If they skipped the stealth phase and expanded instead from a single point, the spreading nanodisease would be noticed, and the spread around the world would be relatively slow.

MOLLY 2004: So how are we going to protect ourselves from that? By the time they start phase two, we've got only about ninety minutes, or much less if you want to avoid enormous damage. So how are we going to protect ourselves from that? By the time they start phase two, we've got only about ninety minutes, or much less if you want to avoid enormous damage.

RAY: Because of the nature of exponential growth, the bulk of the damage gets done in the last few minutes, but your point is well taken. Under any scenario, we won't have a chance without a nanotechnology immune system. Obviously, we can't wait until the beginning of a ninety-minute cycle of destruction to begin thinking about creating one. Such a system would be very comparable to our human immune system. How long would a biological human circa 2004 last without one? Because of the nature of exponential growth, the bulk of the damage gets done in the last few minutes, but your point is well taken. Under any scenario, we won't have a chance without a nanotechnology immune system. Obviously, we can't wait until the beginning of a ninety-minute cycle of destruction to begin thinking about creating one. Such a system would be very comparable to our human immune system. How long would a biological human circa 2004 last without one?

MOLLY 2004: Not long, I suppose. How does this nano-immune system pick up these bad nan.o.bots if they're only one in a thousand trillion? Not long, I suppose. How does this nano-immune system pick up these bad nan.o.bots if they're only one in a thousand trillion?

RAY: We have the same issue with our biological immune system. Detection of even a single foreign protein triggers rapid action by biological antibody factories, so the immune system is there in force by the time a pathogen achieves a near critical level. We'll need a similar capability for the nanoimmune system. We have the same issue with our biological immune system. Detection of even a single foreign protein triggers rapid action by biological antibody factories, so the immune system is there in force by the time a pathogen achieves a near critical level. We'll need a similar capability for the nanoimmune system.

CHARLES DARWIN: Now tell me, do the immune-system nan.o.bots have the ability to replicate? Now tell me, do the immune-system nan.o.bots have the ability to replicate?

RAY: They would need to be able to do this; otherwise they would not be able to keep pace with the replicating pathogenic nan.o.bots. There have been proposals to seed the bioma.s.s with protective immune-system nan.o.bots at a particular concentration, but as soon as the bad nan.o.bots significantly exceeded this fixed concentration the immune system would lose. Robert Freitas proposes nonreplicating nanofactories able to turn out additional protective nanorobots when needed. I think this is likely to deal with threats for a while, but ultimately the defensive system will need the ability to replicate its immune capabilities in place to keep pace with emerging threats. They would need to be able to do this; otherwise they would not be able to keep pace with the replicating pathogenic nan.o.bots. There have been proposals to seed the bioma.s.s with protective immune-system nan.o.bots at a particular concentration, but as soon as the bad nan.o.bots significantly exceeded this fixed concentration the immune system would lose. Robert Freitas proposes nonreplicating nanofactories able to turn out additional protective nanorobots when needed. I think this is likely to deal with threats for a while, but ultimately the defensive system will need the ability to replicate its immune capabilities in place to keep pace with emerging threats.

CHARLES: So aren't the immune-system nan.o.bots entirely equivalent to the phase one malevolent nan.o.bots? I mean seeding the bioma.s.s is the first phase of the stealth scenario. So aren't the immune-system nan.o.bots entirely equivalent to the phase one malevolent nan.o.bots? I mean seeding the bioma.s.s is the first phase of the stealth scenario.

RAY: But the immune-system nan.o.bots are programmed to protect us, not destroy us. But the immune-system nan.o.bots are programmed to protect us, not destroy us.

CHARLES: I understand that software can be modified. I understand that software can be modified.

RAY: Hacked, you mean? Hacked, you mean?