Part 16 (1/2)
”When within a mile and a half of the enemy, two batteries moved out and took up positions to sh.e.l.l them in front; while the infantry deployed, the line on the left facing the enemy on the hills. The 2nd Punjab Cavalry were on the right of the guns, whose escort consisted of a squadron of 19th Bengal Lancers, and a company of Punjab Infantry.
”It was the general's intention to advance to the attack but, at nine o'clock, before his dispositions were completed, the whole crest of the hills held by the enemy seemed to be swarming with men. Scarcely had the guns opened fire, when the enemy swept down from the hills, in successive lines of swordsmen, stretching out far beyond either flank of our force. At the same time a large body of horse rode along the hills, threatening the left flank.
”As the swordsmen swept down on the infantry and guns, the Afghan horse came out of two ravines, and charged the Bengal Lancers before they could acquire sufficient speed to meet them fairly. The Lancers were forced back, disorganizing the 3rd Ghoorkhas, who composed the left battalion of the line. The colonel of the Ghoorkhas threw his men into company squares, and they stood their ground; but the Lancers could not be rallied until they had swept along almost the whole rear of the infantry.
”In the meantime the swordsmen on foot swept down with fanatical fury, and it became necessary to bring up the whole reserve into the fighting line. The two batteries of artillery on the right were now firing grape shot, at close range, into the ma.s.s of Afghans; but neither this, nor the fire of the infantry supporting them, could check the advance of the enemy. The batteries, having used up all their case shot, were compelled to retire two hundred yards; and the right of the infantry line was also forced back.
”The situation at this moment was horribly critical: both our flanks were turned, and the troops were a good deal shaken by the suddenness and fierceness of the attack. The enemy's hors.e.m.e.n, however, pus.h.i.+ng round to the left flank, were checked by the firmness of the 3rd Ghoorkhas--who stood their ground bravely--and by the fire of the batteries on that flank. On the right the 2nd Punjab Cavalry charged and drove back the enemy, thus giving time for the two batteries to take up their fresh position, and again come into action.
”The infantry on the right also recovered from the confusion into which they had been temporarily thrown, and poured a withering fire into the Afghans. In the centre the 2nd Sikhs maintained, through out the fight, a steady and unyielding front. The steady and well-directed fire of the whole line, aided by the batteries, was creating terrible havoc among the enemy and, after an hour's gallant and strenuous exertion on both our flanks, their efforts began to slacken and, before long, the whole of them were in flight, leaving a thousand dead and wounded on the ground.
”It was calculated that they had at least two thousand casualties, while our own loss amounted to only one hundred and forty-one. They were not pursued, as the cavalry were required to guard the baggage.”
”It was a grand fight, Major,” the colonel said; ”but you were at Maiwand also, were you not?”
”Yes; and it would be hard to find a greater contrast to the fight I have just described. The two British forces were attacked under almost precisely similar circ.u.mstances. One was splendidly commanded; and the other, it must be confessed, was badly led.
”There was a good deal against us. The day was in July, and terribly hot and, at every step the troops took, they found the power of the sun increasing, until the heat became intense. A solitary traveller, in such circ.u.mstances, would make but poor travelling; and of course it was vastly worse for troops, advancing heavily laden and formed in column. The 66th Foot had had tea, and a light breakfast before starting; but the native troops had had nothing to eat since the night before. One regiment, indeed, had no water; but the others had managed to fill their canteens during the halt at half-past nine.
”The brigade, at the end of the march, were again ordered to change front. The Grenadiers, which was a pivot regiment, did not slacken their pace and, consequently, the centre were greatly exhausted in trying to keep up with it, and were certainly in no condition to take part in the battle at midday.
”The whole thing was a hideous mistake. General Burrows had brought his line into such a position that behind him lay a great nullah and, during the course of the battle, the enemy were enabled to bring guns up to within five hundred yards on front and flank. It was a ghastly day. Both flanks were driven back, and the line became bent into the form of a horseshoe. The two cavalry regiments, whose support should have been invaluable, behaved badly and, early in the fight, left the field.
”After the first line gave way, everything went badly. Some of the troops stood and died on the ground they held, others soon became a mob of fugitives. The loss, as long as they held their positions, was comparatively slight; but the grand total mounted up, during the retreat.
”It was a hideous business, and one that I do not like to recall.
Men staggered along, overpowered by heat and thirst; falling, in many cases without resistance, under the sabre of the pursuing enemy. Had these fought properly, it is probable that not a single man, except the cowardly cavalry, would have reached Kandahar to tell the tale.”
”Thank you, Major. You were also, I believe, in two or three das.h.i.+ng affairs before Maiwand?”
”Yes, Colonel. Certainly one of the most successful was that which Cavagnari, who was afterwards murdered at Kabul, made. It was not much of an affair, but it shows what can be done with dash.
”In 1877 we were making a ca.n.a.l, to tap the Swat river at a point where it enters British territory. Naturally, the Swat villagers on the other side of the frontier considered that the operation was a deep-laid plot for injuring them; and it was at the village of Sappri that the chief went down, with a number of desperate men, and murdered all the coolies engaged in the work. Cavagnari issued orders that the chief must pay a heavy fine, in money and cattle; and that the actual murderers must be tried for their crime. The Khan, however, took no notice of the demand.
”Forty miles southeast of Sappri was the British cantonment of Murdan, where the corps of Guides is permanently quartered. The greater portion of these were, however, absent on another expedition; and there remained available a few squadrons of cavalry, and eleven companies of infantry.
”Cavagnari kept his plans a profound secret. He did not even give the slightest hint of his intentions to their commanding officer, Captain Wigram Battye. So well, indeed, was the secret kept, that the officers were playing a game at racket when they were called upon to start. The first intimation that the men had of the movement was the serving out of ball cartridge, when the gates of the fort were closed in the evening. The old soldiers were well aware that this meant that fighting was at hand; and they gave a great shout, which was the first intimation to the officers that something was on foot. We were as glad as the men.
”Mules had been got in readiness, and the small detachment set off on its long night march. The mules were picked animals and in good condition, and were able to keep up with the men. After covering thirty-two miles in seven hours, we halted at the frontier fort of Abazai, seven miles south of Sappri.
”Beyond this point the country was impracticable for cavalry; and the force, now consisting of two hundred and twelve men, dismounted and marched forward on foot. After seven miles of severe toil, they arrived in the vicinity of the hostile village; and Captain Battye placed his men on the surrounding high ground, so as to completely command the place, and cut off all retreat. His disposition had been completed without arousing the enemy and, in a short time, day broke.
”Cavagnari immediately sent in a demand, to the Khan, to surrender the outlaws and pay the fine. The Khan refused to comply with the terms. There was a short but desperate fight, in which the Guides were victorious, the Khan and many of his leading men were killed, and the village captured. The fine was then exacted, and the troops marched back to Fort Abazai.
”This was a fine example of a punitive expedition thoroughly well managed. The movements were made with secrecy and rapidity. Horses, men, and mules were all in readiness. The cavalry were, on an emergency, prepared to perform the role of infantry; while the little party of infantry were ready to ride thirty miles, on mules, with the cavalry. In this raid the Guides covered forty-eight miles, without a halt; but the perfect success that attended the expedition is not often attained, especially when, as in this case, the force is unprovided with guns. Two or three little mountain guns make all the difference in expeditions of this kind for, though the Afridis will stand musketry fire pluckily enough, they begin to flinch as soon as guns, however small, open upon them.
”There is no more awkward business than an attack upon hill forts that are well held, for some of them are really formidable. I was present at the storming of Nilt fort, and the fight near Chillas--both of them awkward affairs--and in the fight at Malandrai. There had, for some time, been a state of hostilities between Malandrai, two miles across the border, and Rustam on our side of it. Information was received that several of the most important of the enemy's raiders, and a considerable number of cattle would, on a certain night, be at Malandrai; and it was arranged that two companies of Guides should start in the afternoon for Rustam, twenty-five miles distant, which they would reach after dark. At this place they were to take a short rest, and were then to follow the difficult tracks through the hills, and appear on a commanding spur in the rear of the village, at dawn. The frontal attack was to be made by six companies, who were to arrive before the bridge in the small hours of the morning. A squadron of Bengal cavalry were to move independently, and to cut off any of the enemy who might escape from the frontal attack.
”The turning party arrived after a march of eighteen hours, through a terribly rough country. The main body, unfortunately, miscalculated their distance and, instead of halting in the gorge leading to the village, in which it was known that pickets had been placed, they came suddenly upon the enemy's outposts. These fired a volley, killing the colonel and some of the men. The surprise, therefore, as a surprise failed; but an attack was made in the morning, the village taken, and the turning party extricated from its dangerous position. That is a good example of the difficulty of attacking a hill fort.
”Another instance is the attack upon Nilt fort. The place was one of great natural strength; the fort, which was a large one, faced the junction of three precipitous cliffs, several hundred feet high, where a great ravine runs into the Hunza river. Owing to the nature of the ground, the fort could not be seen till the force was within three hundred yards of it; and fire could not be properly opened upon it until within two hundred and fifty yards.