Part 3 (2/2)
Bullock's letter to the Senate was accompanied by a memorial from a convention of colored men held at Macon in October. It said that there existed in Georgia a spirit of hatred toward the negroes and their friends, which resulted in the persecution, political repression, terrorizing, outrage and murder of the negroes, in the burning of their schools, and in the slander, ostracism and abuse of their teachers and political friends. Of this the act of the legislature was an instance and an evidence. The aid of the federal government was implored.[171]
Similar charges had been made, it will be remembered, in the debates of 1866 and 1867. Now, however, they began to be urged with an earnestness and persistence altogether new. So conspicuous is this fact in the debates in Congress that a southern writer ironically remarks: ”From this time forth the entire white race of the South devoted itself to the killing of negroes.”[172] The rest of this chapter will be devoted to considering how much truth there was in the reported abuse of negroes and ”loyal” persons.
We stated in Chapter II. that after the war a bitter jealousy and animosity toward the negroes arose among the lower cla.s.s of the white population, and in Chapter IV. that the restless conduct of the negroes under the influences of reconstruction filled the upper cla.s.s with such alarm that they formed secret organizations in self-defence. This practice, at first supported and led by good men of the higher cla.s.s, simply for defence, soon fell into the hands of the poor white cla.s.s, the criminal cla.s.s, and the turbulent and discontented young men of all cla.s.ses, and became an instrument of revenge, crime and oppression. The change, however, was not a complete transformation. A great deal of the whipping inflicted upon negroes was _bona fide_ chastis.e.m.e.nt for actual misdemeanors. This mode of punishment was the natural product of the transition from the old social conditions, when the negroes were disciplined by their masters, to the new conditions.[173] But besides these acts of correction many outrages were committed upon negroes, and also upon white men, simply from malice or vengeance, or other private motive.[174] These outrages included some homicides.[175] The testimony of credible contemporaries belonging to both political parties agrees that the Ku Klux Klan and similar organizations were used only to a very small extent for political purposes.[176]
How many of these corrective or purely vicious acts were perpetrated upon negroes? Democrats of that time commonly said that the number was insignificant, that the peace was as well kept in Georgia as in any northern state, and that statements to the contrary were invented for political purposes.[177] The number was, indeed, greatly exaggerated by Republicans, as some of the Republicans themselves admitted.[178] Making allowance for the warping of the truth in both directions, and considering the statements of the moderate Republicans,[179] and the admissions of some of the Democrats,[180] remembering also the recent disbandment of the army and the disturbed conditions of society, we must conclude that the attacks on negroes, made by disguised bands and otherwise, were very numerous.
The friends of the negroes also fared badly. Philanthropic women who came from the North to teach in the negro schools were almost invariably treated with contempt and avoided by the white people.[181] This was due partly to the lingering bitterness of the war and partly to the connection of the negro schools with the Freedmen's Bureau. This inst.i.tution, the office of which was to set up strangers, from a recently hostile country, to instruct the southern people in their private affairs, was in itself odious. It was rendered more odious by the want of intelligence and tact, and even of honesty, which is said to have frequently characterized its officers. That the hatred thus aroused should be visited upon true philanthropists who were connected with the Bureau was unfortunate, but inevitable. As for the political friends of the negroes, the ”loyal” men, or in other words the white men who supported reconstruction, they were habitually treated by the Conservative press and by Conservative speakers with violent invective. Conservative editors and orators neither engaged in nor recommended the slaughter or outrage of Radicals, but by continually voicing furious sentiments, they furnished encouragement to action of that sort by men of less intelligence and self-control.[182]
The accounts of lawlessness and persecution in Georgia, though exaggerated, undoubtedly had a substantial foundation. Whether this fact was a good argument for renewed interference in the state government by Congress is another question.
CHAPTER VII
CONGRESSIONAL ACTION REGARDING GEORGIA FROM DECEMBER, 1868, TO DECEMBER, 1869
On December 7, 1868, the credentials of Joshua Hill, one of the Senators elected by the Georgia legislature in the previous July, were presented in the United States Senate. Immediately the letter of Governor Bullock and the memorial of the negro convention were also presented. These doc.u.ments, seconded by a speech from a Senator dwelling on the fact that Georgia was under ”rebel control,” secured the reference of Hill's credentials to the committee on the judiciary.[183] This committee on January 25, 1869, recommended that Hill be not admitted to the Senate.[184]
The reason for this recommendation, said the committee's report, was that Georgia had failed to comply with the requirements of the Omnibus Act, and so was not yet ent.i.tled to representation in Congress. The failure here referred to was not that alleged by Bullock--that the members of the legislature had not taken the Test Oath--but the failure of the two houses to exclude persons disqualified by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Omnibus Act had provided that Georgia should be ent.i.tled to representation in Congress when her legislature had ”_duly_” ratified the Fourteenth Amendment. The word _duly_ meant _in a certain manner_--namely, the manner required by the rest of the act. The failure to exclude the disqualified members was a departure from this manner.
We saw in Chapter V. that each of the committees appointed by the Georgia legislature in July to investigate the eligibility of members was divided, that both houses voted that all were eligible in the face of detailed evidence to the contrary, that the decision of the lower house contradicted the majority of its committee, and that Meade accepted the decision rather for the sake of convenience and finality than because it was indisputably correct. On these facts and on some independent investigation the Senate judiciary committee based its belief that the legislature had failed to obey the Omnibus Act in this respect.
Trumbull, of this committee, submitted a minority report. He admitted that the decision of the legislature may have been incorrect. But he protested that if the United States government intended to regard the presence of half a dozen ineligible members in a body of two hundred and nineteen as entirely vitiating the action of the legislature, it should have taken this stand at first. If at first it had, through its representative, Meade, overlooked the irregularity as a trifle, it seemed only just to continue to overlook it, and not to make it now the occasion for augmenting the turmoil in the state by fresh interference.
But the majority rejoined that there were very good reasons for not overlooking the irregularity. It was not a mere trifling departure from the letter of the act of Congress, it was a violation of the spirit of that act. ”The obvious design” of the Omnibus Act ”was to prevent the new organization from falling under the control of enemies of the United States.” The expulsion of the negroes showed that that design had been frustrated and that the government was under ”rebel control;” it showed a ”common purpose to ... resist the authority of the United States.”
Moreover, the ”disorganized condition of society” in the state made it necessary for the federal government to intervene again in Georgia, not only to vindicate its law, but to preserve order.
The protest of Trumbull is significant as an early sign of the growth within the Republican party of an opposition to the prolongation of Congressional interference with the southern state governments.
The report of the judiciary committee was not acted upon, and thus the Senate avoided a categorical decision. But Hill was not admitted. A number of bills relating to Georgia were introduced; a bill ”to carry out the Reconstruction Acts in Georgia” by Sumner,[185] a bill to repeal the act of June 25, 1868, in so far as it admitted Georgia, and to provide for a provisional government in that state, by Edmunds,[186] and others. All of these soon lapsed.
Meanwhile, in the House of Representatives the committee on reconstruction had been instructed to examine the public affairs of Georgia and to inquire what measures ought to be taken regarding the representatives of Georgia in the House.[187] Many citizens of Georgia, black and white, testified before the committee.[188] Among them Governor Bullock was conspicuous, advocating the enforcement of the Test Oath qualification--a fact which aroused great indignation in the state.
The doubtful position in which Georgia now hung raised the question, what should be done with her electoral votes in February, 1869? Congress had pa.s.sed a joint resolution on July 20, 1868, to the effect that none of the states affected by the Omnibus Act should be ent.i.tled to vote in the Electoral College in 1869 unless at the time for choosing electors it had become ent.i.tled to representation in Congress.[189] As February 10, the day for counting the votes, approached, it was considered desirable, in order that the ceremony might pa.s.s off smoothly, that the Senate and the House should agree by a special rule what should be done with Georgia's votes. Now, the Senate could not agree to a rule declaring that the votes should be counted, for that would imply that the state had become ent.i.tled to representation in Congress, and the Senate had refused to admit Hill.
But the House could not concur in declaring that the votes should not be counted; for that would imply that the state had not become ent.i.tled to representation in Congress, and the House had admitted seven Representatives from the state. It was therefore agreed by a concurrent resolution pa.s.sed February 8, that at the count of the electoral votes, in case the Georgia votes should be found not to affect the result essentially (which it was well known would be the case), then the presiding officer should make the following announcement:
Were the votes presented as of the state of Georgia to be counted, the result would be for ---- for President of the United States, -- votes; if not counted, for ----, for President of the United States, -- votes; but in either case ---- is elected President of the United States;
and a similar announcement of the votes for Vice-President.[190]
Accordingly, on February 10, amid the wildest uproar, caused by the blunders of a perplexed chairman and the violent protest of a group of Representatives, led by Butler, against the execution of the special rule, which had been rushed through the House without their knowledge, it was announced that the electoral vote was as follows:
For Grant and Colfax Including Georgia's votes 214 Excluding Georgia's votes 214
For Seymour and Blair Including Georgia's votes 80 Excluding Georgia's votes 71
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