Part 39 (1/2)
Question. Do you know anything about the capture of Fort Pillow?
Answer. Only from hearsay.
Question. You are acquainted somewhat with the circ.u.mstances attending the surrender of Union City?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Will you tell us about that?
Answer. About 4 o'clock on the evening of the 23d of March we received a telegram that it was likely Union City would be attacked within two days. Shortly afterwards we received a telegram from Colonel Hawkins that he would be attacked within 24 hours. He said his men had not seen the enemy, but that his information was reliable. General Brayman instructed me to proceed by special boat to Columbus, and from thence, by special train, to Union City, to inquire into the matter, find out the truth of the case, and let him know; also, to find out whether re-enforcements were necessary. I left Cairo about 5 p. m. on the 23d, arrived at Columbus about half past seven o'clock, and immediately proceeded to the telegraph office and telegraphed to Colonel Hawkins, asking him if he had any further information. He answered that he had none. I then asked him if his information and his despatches could be relied upon, and whether he had seen the enemy. He answered that none of his men had seen the enemy; that he had not seen any one who had seen the enemy, but that his information was entirely reliable, and that he would be attacked, there was no doubt of it.
I then proceeded, by special train, to Union City, and had a consultation with Colonel Hawkins. He told me that the ferries on the Obion had been destroyed, and that scouts whom he had expected in the day before had not returned; that he supposed that they were captured, or that it was impossible for them to get across the Obion. He said that his men had not seen the enemy; that he could not get any of them across the Obion in consequence of the rebel forces having destroyed the private ferries, and guarding the other places.
About half past 3 o'clock on the morning of the 24th a messenger came in and stated that the pickets at the bridge on the Dresden and Hickman road had been attacked and driven in, and that they were probably cut off, which afterwards proved to be the fact. The messenger also reported that, when shots were exchanged, he thought the rebels had brought artillery to the front, but he could not be certain of that; that it sounded on the bridge like artillery. I immediately directed Colonel Hawkins to have his men saddle their horses ready for a fight. I instructed him, if he saw fit, and thought he could not hold the place, to abandon it and fall back on Columbus. He asked me how soon I would re-enforce him if he remained there. I told him I would re-enforce him just as quick as I could get the troops up there. He said he thought he could hold the place with his regiment if he had some artillery; but that he could not contend against artillery without he had some himself.
I told him I did not want him to retreat without having seen the enemy; that he must have a skirmish with them, and feel their strength, before falling back to Columbus; that I did not want the command disgraced by retreating without seeing the enemy, which it would be if the reports should prove false, or he found that he had fallen back before a small number of men.
I then told Colonel Hawkins I must leave, for my orders were not to endanger the train, but to save it. The train consisted of nine cars and a locomotive, and was loaded with stores from Union City belonging to the government and to the railroad company, and 150 contrabands, (railroad hands.) The last words I said to Colonel Hawkins were, that if he found he could not whip the enemy, he should immediately retreat to Columbus. He said that, if he did not fall back, he would hold the place until re-enforcements reached him. I told him I would immediately push forward re-enforcements; that the garrison at Columbus consisted of only 1,100 men in all, and that 900 and odd of them were negroes, who had never been in a fight, and that re-enforcements would have to come from Cairo. I wrote a telegraphic despatch at the time to General Brayman, giving all the facts. But while it was being sent, the wires were cut, and we did not get the half of it through.
I then started to return to Columbus with the train, with the distinct understanding with Colonel Hawkins that he should either hold Union City until re-enforcements should arrive, or fall back to Columbus. The State line bridge was burning as I crossed it with the train, the evident intention of the rebels being to capture the train. I succeeded, however, in getting it through to Columbus safe.
Colonel Lawrence, commanding at Columbus, had telegraphed General Brayman that communications with Union City were cut off; that I was on the opposite side of the bridge, and that Colonel Hawkins was probably attacked. General Brayman immediately forwarded re-enforcements to Columbus, taking 2,000 men belonging to General Veatch's command, then on their way up the Tennessee river. He had received telegraphic orders from General Sherman not to take any of those troops out of their proper course, but forward them as soon as possible up the Tennessee. As transports were not ready for them, and as General Brayman could go to Union City and back again before transportation would be ready, he concluded to use some of the troops for the purpose of re-enforcing Union City. The movement was made with as little delay as possible. He arrived at Columbus about ten or half past ten o'clock on the morning of the 24th, and immediately proceeded on a railroad train towards Union City. Upon arriving within about seven miles of Union City, we were informed, by citizens and some scouts, that Colonel Hawkins had surrendered at 11 o'clock of that day; that the rebels had destroyed all the works and the government property, and had retreated. General Brayman being fully convinced that Union City had been surrendered, everything there destroyed, and that the enemy had fled, returned to Columbus, and from thence to Cairo, with the troops ready to be forwarded up the Tennessee in obedience to the orders of General Sherman.
Question. Will you now state what you know in relation to the attack on Paducah?
Answer. About 8 o'clock on the night of the 25th of March we received a telegraphic despatch from the operator at Metropolis, stating that a big light was seen in the direction of Paducah; that it looked as if the town or some boats were burning. The despatch also stated that the telegraph repairer had come in and reported that he had been within two miles of Paducah, and had heard firing there. We had received, previous to this, no intimation from Colonel Hicks, commanding at Paducah, that the place was in danger of an attack. In obedience to instructions from General Brayman, I immediately got on a despatch boat, furnished by Captain Pennock, of the navy, and with Captain s.h.i.+rk, of the navy, proceeded to Paducah. We found, on our arrival there, that General Forrest, with his command of about 6,500 men, had attacked Paducah in the afternoon, about 3 o'clock, the troops under Colonel Hicks having only about fifteen minutes notice of their coming. Colonel Hicks's scouts had returned from the road over which the rebels had come in, and reported that they had heard nothing of the enemy. They were just about sending out new scouts when the rebels dashed into the town, driving our pickets in, and driving our troops into the fort. As the rear of the battalion of the 16th Kentucky cavalry were marching into the fort they were fired upon by the rebels.
After fighting a short time, the rebels sent in a demand, under flag of truce, for the unconditional surrender of all the forces under Colonel Hicks's command, and all the government property, stating that, if he should comply with the demand, his troops should be treated as prisoners of war; if not, then an overwhelming force would be thrown against him, and no quarter would be shown him. Colonel Hicks replied by stating that he had been placed there by his government to hold and defend the place and the public stores there, and that he should obey the command of his superior officer, and do so; that he was prepared for the enemy, and should not surrender.
Forrest then again attacked the fort, making three different charges.
Our troops, both black and white, behaved in the most gallant and meritorious manner, fighting most bravely. After fighting until half past seven or eight o'clock in the evening our ammunition began to run short, so much so that men and officers began to count their cartridges.
Colonel Hicks had only 3,000 rounds of small ammunition left when Forrest made the second demand for a surrender. But Colonel Hicks, as before, positively refused to comply with the demand. Firing then ceased until daylight the next morning.
During this cessation of firing I succeeded in getting into the fort with re-enforcements and a small supply of ammunition from the gunboats.
The supply of ammunition from Cairo did not arrive until the evening. As it was impossible to get any despatches through from Colonel Hicks, the line being cut, we knew nothing when I left Cairo of his being short of ammunition. The understanding we had with Colonel Hicks, before any attack was made, was that we had a large supply of ammunition on hand; that there were about 33,000 cartridges, calibre 58, on hand--that being the calibre used by the troops there--and a large supply of artillery ammunition in the fort.
The next morning, about six o'clock, the enemy again advanced in line of battle towards the fort. There was some firing on both sides, but it did not amount to much. Some of the rebel troops, while their main body was firing at the fort, were engaged in pillaging the town, stealing property from private citizens, horses, and government stores, burning houses, and committing all sorts of depredations.
While the flag of truce was at the fort the first, second, and third times, the rebel troops were taking new positions in line of battle, although they had made a distinct agreement and understanding with Colonel Hicks that while the flag of truce was in there should be no movements of troops on either side; that everything should remain as it was.
While the fight was going on, women, children, and other non-combatants came running down to the river towards the gunboats. The officers in the fort and on the gunboats called to them to run down to the river bank to the left of our fort. They did so, and under cover of the gunboats they got on a wharf boat or a little ferry-boat and were ferried across the river as fast as possible. While they were doing this the rebel sharpshooters got in among them, so that we could not fire upon them without killing the women and children, and fired on our troops in the fort and on the gunboats, wounding one officer on a gunboat and two men.
They also made women stand up in front of their sharpshooters, where it was impossible for us to return the fire without killing the women. They also fired into houses where there were women, and where there were none of our soldiers. They also went into a hospital, took the surgeon of the hospital prisoner, and took a lady that was there and carried her off and took her clothing from her, leaving her nothing but an old dress to cover herself with. This woman, as well as Dr. Hart, the surgeon of the hospital, were taken away by them as prisoners. All the prisoners taken there by Forrest, with the exception of three or four men, were sick men from the hospital, unable to move or walk from the hospital to the fort without injury to their health. All the men who were able to walk were brought from the hospital to the fort. They took the rest of the men from the hospital, and under the third flag of truce offered to exchange them. This Colonel Hicks and myself refused, because we thought it treachery on their part. We also refused for the reason that we did not think they had a right to take as prisoners of war men in the hospital who were unable to walk without danger to their lives. Yet the rebels took those men and marched them ten miles, and then camped them down in a swampy piece of ground at night, with their clothes nearly all taken from them. Some of them were left bareheaded and barefooted, with nothing on but their pants and s.h.i.+rts, compelled to stay in that swampy ravine all night long, with nothing to eat, and not permitted to have fires. The next morning they were marched off again. I have certain knowledge that for two days and one night those sick men were compelled to march with the rebel troops without anything to eat, with hardly any clothing, and a number of them without any boots or shoes.
Question. Do you know that the rebels placed women and other non-combatants in front of their lines as they advanced towards the fort?
Answer. They had women and children between us and their lines, and they stood behind them, the women and children forming a sort of breastwork for the rebels, as we were unable to return their fire for fear of killing the women and children. Colonel Hicks reported to me that they took several women and compelled them to stand in front of their lines during the fight; that there were women and children between our fire and theirs; that as the women moved the rebels moved along with them, keeping behind them.
Question. Have you any idea of the number of women and children they had thus placed in front of them?