Part 83 (1/2)

”Yeah. You'll like them,” Pick said.

”If you're happy,” Babs said, ”I'm happy.”

Afterword.

I was an X Corps sergeant/combat correspondent in Korea shortly after the events fictionally chronicled in this book took place. As such, I was able to read the official version of what happened in the X Corps and 1st Marine Division After Action Reports.

What follows are the facts as we now know them, from our own sources and from those of the Communist Chinese, more than half a century after the conflict.

On 3 November 1950, Major General Charles Willoughby announced to the press that there ”possibly” were from 16,500 to a maximum of 34,000 Red Chinese soldiers in Korea.

There were, in fact, 180,000 Chinese soldiers facing the Eighth United States Army on the west of Korea, and about 120,000 facing the X United States Corps in the east. They had begun crossing the Yalu River and entering North Korea in October 1950, each carrying a personal weapon, eighty rounds of ammunition, sometimes three or four ”stick” hand grenades, and a week's supply of rations, dried fish, rice, and tea. There were some machine guns and some mortars, all hand-carried.

They moved in at night, halting two hours before day-break to prepare camouflaged positions. They then slept through the day. Anyone seen moving was shot on the spot, and his body hastily concealed from American aerial observation.

Red Chinese and American historians are generally agreed that the first battle of the Chinese intervention was the attack by the Communists' 124th Division on the 3d ROK Division, which was then advancing near the Chosin Reservoir. The 3d ROK retreated thirty miles south. The 7th Marines counterattacked, killing more than 1,500 Chinese and virtually destroying the 124th Division in a three-day battle.

The Chinese pulled back to plan, and it was decided then that the primary mission of their Ninth Army Group would be the destruction of the U.S. 1st Marine Division.

Misinterpreting this inactivity of the Chinese-and still grossly underestimating the size of the enemy forces- General of the Army Douglas MacArthur ordered X Corps and Eighth Army to stage attacks designed to, as MacArthur said, ”end the war by Christmas.”

The attacks didn't.

On Friday, 25 November 1950, preceded by a heavy and lengthy artillery barrage, General Walton Walker's Eighth Army began its march to the Yalu.

Initially, there was very little resistance. But on the night of 25-26 November 1950, the Chinese struck with overwhelming force. By morning, they had broken through Walker's lines, and the Eighth Army's right flank was exposed. The Turkish Brigade was sent to plug the hole, and was virtually destroyed.

By nightfall, Walker had ordered the beginning of what has been called the longest retreat in the history of the U.S. Army: 275 miles in six weeks, during which the Eighth Army suffered 10,000 casualties.

In the east, on 27 November 1950, Major General Edward M. Almond's X Corps-about 100,000 men, including the 1st Marine Division-began to strike for the Yalu.

The 1st Marine Division commander, Major General O.P. Smith-who openly disliked his orders from Almond and MacArthur but had nevertheless begun to comply with them-positioned about 7,000 Marines to lead the fight.

They were unaware that three Red Chinese divisions, about 30,000 men, were in the mountains on either side of the Yudam-ni Valley, ready to attack, and that the rest of the Chinese Ninth Army Group was moving to cut the main supply route in many places once that attack began.

Nor had they heard about the beating the Eighth Army had taken the day before, and was taking as their attack began.

General Smith's 5th and 7th Marines had some initial success, destroying one Red Chinese division and mauling another. But by the end of the second day, the Chinese plan to chop up the main supply route was also meeting success.

And on the Chosin Reservoir's east sh.o.r.e, the Chinese, in division strength, for all practical purposes wiped out the hopelessly outnumbered 7th Infantry Division's 31st Regimental Combat Team, including a reinforcement by just over a thousand men of the 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry (Task Force Faith, so named for its commander, Lieutenant Colonel Don Carlos Faith).

On 30 November, General Almond ordered General Smith to withdraw, and thus began the thirteen-day retreat in sub-zero temperatures from Yudam-ni to Hungnam, which deservedly has become Marine legend: To move down the one-lane road, it was first necessary for the Marines to clear the Chinese from the ridges on each side of the valley.

The Marines did so, one ridgeline after another.

Marine Aviation flew close ground support missions whenever the weather permitted.

Marine Artillery provided what support it could.

For nine days, over the thirty miles from Yudam-ni to Chinghung-ni, where the 3d U.S. Army Infantry Division had established a line, the Marines were in constant combat with ten Chinese Communist divisions.

It was during this period that General O. P. Smith was quoted as saying, ”Retreat, h.e.l.l! We're just attacking in another direction!”-although there is some doubt about the attribution.

The first ”Retreat, h.e.l.l!” comment came in France during World War I, when orders were issued for the Marines to retreat. ”Retreat, h.e.l.l! We just got here!” one said. The line was already part of Marine legend by 1950, and somebody certainly must have said it at the Chosin Reservoir.

During this period, too, the legendary Marine Colonel Lewis B. ”Chesty” Puller, who was then commanding the 1st Marines, did say something near the Chosin Reservoir about which there is no question: ”Don't you forget that you're 1st Marines! Not all the Communists in h.e.l.l can overrun you!”

The Marines came out, bringing with them their weapons, their vehicles, their wounded, most of their dead, and a substantial number of Army soldiers they had rescued from certain capture or death.

The 1st Marine Division had suffered 718 Killed in Action, 3,508 Wounded in Action, and 7,313 ”noncombat” casualties due to frostbite. There were 192 Marines Missing in Action.

Fourteen Marines were named Medal of Honor recipients.

The Marine Corps estimates 25,000 Chinese were killed and another 12,500 were wounded. The U.S. Army estimates there were 30,000 Chinese KIA and another 30,000 Chinese were frostbitten.

On Christmas Eve, 1950, the 1st Marine Division, with the rest of the X United States Corps, was evacuated by sea from Hamhung. X Corps took with it more than 100,000 Korean refugees. The only thing they left for the enemy were some engineering bridge timbers.

On Christmas Eve, 1950, Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker was killed in a jeep accident. Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway was named to replace him.

On 11 April 1951, President Truman sent, through ordinary Army channels, a message to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, which read: ”I deeply regret that it becomes my duty as President and Commander-in-Chief of the United States Military Forces to replace you as Supreme Commander.”

General Ridgway was named to replace him.

After he came home, was promoted, and retired, I had the unique privilege of coming to know Lieutenant General Edward M. Almond and of having him talk to me-usually in his bas.e.m.e.nt office in his home-at length about his role in the Korean campaign, and his relations.h.i.+ps with General of the Army Douglas MacArthur and other members of the Supreme Commander's staff.

One day, when I-and if memory serves, my twelve-year -old Boy Scout son Bill-arrived for lunch at General Almond's gracious hillside home in Anniston, Alabama, he met me at the door and handed me a letter he said he had just received.

General Almond was then well into his seventies, but his eyes were still a brilliant blue, and when I looked at him, I thought I saw the beginnings of tears.

The letter was on Marine Corps General Officer's stationery. There were three red stars at the top.