Part 1 (1/2)

RETREAT, h.e.l.l!

by W.E.B. Griffin.

Prologue.

Until August 1945, when General Order Number One, the protocol for the surrender-and occupation-of j.a.pan was being somewhat hastily drafted in Was.h.i.+ngton, the 38th Parallel, which runs across the Korean Peninsula, had been just one line on a map of the globe.

At the time, World War II was just about over. Nagasaki and Hiros.h.i.+ma had been obliterated by atomic bombs, and j.a.pan was willing to surrender. The Soviet Union had just- somewhat belatedly-declared war on the j.a.panese Empire, and had already started to move troops into the j.a.panese ”Protectorates” of Manchuria and Korea.

President Truman, who had already learned not to trust the Soviet Union, realized that to keep the Red Army from occupying all of Korea, a border-”a demarcation line”-between the northern part of the Korean Peninsula and the southern, where the United States planned to station troops, was needed.

If Korea was divided-about equally-at the 38th Parallel, the United States would control Seoul, the capital, and the major ports of Inchon-near Seoul-and Pusan- at the southern tip of the peninsula.

The division at the 38th Parallel was proposed to the Soviets as the demarcation line, and they raised no objections. The seeds for what became the People's Democratic Republic of North Korea and the Republic of South Korea were sown.

Four years and eleven months later, the Inmun Gun- the Soviet-trained North Korean Army-invaded South Korea across the 38th Parallel with the announced intention of ”unifying” Korea. the Inmun Gun- the Soviet-trained North Korean Army-invaded South Korea across the 38th Parallel with the announced intention of ”unifying” Korea.

The attack officially-and in fact-came as a ”complete surprise” to the United States. United States intelligence agencies at all levels had failed to perform their basic duty to warn of an impending attack on the United States or its allies.

It was hard then-and still is, more than half a century later-to understand why we didn't see the attack coming.

Immediately after World War II, Stalin had managed to establish surrogate governments in East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia-and North Korea. On 5 March 1946, in a speech at Fulton, Missouri, British Wartime Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill said, ”From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent.”

President Harry S Truman had become very suspicious of Soviet intentions even before he ordered the use of atomic weapons against j.a.pan, and he had acted to foil them.

For example, Truman had courageously dispatched American advisers-actually the first special forces/operations soldiers, long before anyone even thought of wearing a green beret-to Greece, where they successfully thwarted Soviet intentions to take over the birthplace of democracy.

And when the Soviets tried to force the Americans, French, and English from Berlin, Truman had ordered the Air Lift, which saw U.S. Air Force transports landing round the clock at sixty-second intervals to keep Berlin fed, and the Western Allies in the former German capital. the clock at sixty-second intervals to keep Berlin fed, and the Western Allies in the former German capital.

Many historians now believe that the reason Stalin authorized his surrogate North Korean Army to invade South Korea is that the United States had actually led him to believe we would raise no objections.

On 12 January 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson outlined President Truman's Asian policy in a speech at the National Press Club in Was.h.i.+ngton, D.C. Acheson ”drew a line” of countries the United States considered ”essential to its national interests,” a euphemism everyone understood to mean the United States would go to war to defend.

Acheson placed j.a.pan, Okinawa, and the Philippines within the ”American defense perimeter.” Taiwan and Korea were not mentioned.

The United States was then ”completely surprised” five months later when, in the early morning of 25 June 1950, the North Koreans invaded across the 38th Parallel.

Not that twenty-four hours'-or ten days' or six months'-advance warning of the attack would have been of much real use: The Inmun Gun was well trained, well disciplined, and well armed. The South Korean armed forces were not.

The South Koreans had been denied, for example, heavy artillery because some of Truman's advisers believed they might use it to invade North Korea. South Korea had also been denied modern aircraft, tanks, and other military hardware by the same reasoning. And, of course, for reasons of economy.

There were only several hundred American troops in South Korea on that Sunday morning, a.s.signed to the Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG), and they were armed only with their individual weapons.

The Eighth United States Army was scattered among the islands of j.a.pan, but it was not prepared to fight a war.

Blame can fairly be laid for this: The President of the United States, under the Const.i.tution, is Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The authors of the Const.i.tution wanted to make absolutely sure that the armed forces were firmly under civilian control, and gave that control to the President.

With that authority, of course, came responsibility. It is the responsibility-the duty-of the President to ensure that the armed forces are prepared to wage war when called upon to do so. In practical terms, this means the President ensures that the uniformed officers in command of the armed forces meet their responsibilities to keep their forces in readiness. In turn, that means that the armed forces are trained and equipped to go to war.

There is little question now that the senior American officer in the Pacific, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, failed in his duty to make sure that the Eighth Army under his command was both trained and equipped to go to war. On 25 June 1950, it was neither.

That it was not adequately trained trained is entirely MacArthur's fault, but to place blame for the literally disgraceful lack of equipment in the Eighth United States Army, it is necessary to go all the way to the top of the chain of command. is entirely MacArthur's fault, but to place blame for the literally disgraceful lack of equipment in the Eighth United States Army, it is necessary to go all the way to the top of the chain of command.

United States Forces, Far East, were under the command of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. MacArthur repeatedly advised them of the sorry state of his equipment, and requested to be supplied with what he believed he needed.

The Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs-there were several during this period-repeatedly requested of their superior, the Secretary of Defense, that the U.S. Armed Forces worldwide (not only MacArthur's forces in j.a.pan) be adequately supplied with the necessary equipment.

Truman's Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, openly boasted at the time that he had first cut military spending to the bone, and then cut some more.

He had. At Johnson's orders, there were two battalions (instead of the three considered necessary) in most of the U.S. Army's regiments. And there were two regiments (instead of three) in all but one of the divisions.

The Secretary of Defense is, with the advice and consent of the Senate, appointed by the President. Once Louis Johnson had been confirmed, President Truman was responsible for his actions, good or bad.

The blame for the inadequate equipment in the Eighth U.S. Army-and just about everywhere else-has to be laid on the desk of President Harry S Truman, right beside the small sign reading ”The Buck Stops Here” that he kept there.

There were, of course, extenuating circ.u.mstances.

Congress, for one, was not in the mood to appropriate the billions of dollars it would have cost to bring the armed forces back to the state of preparedness they had been in five years before, when, on 2 September 1945, MacArthur had accepted the unconditional surrender of the j.a.panese Empire on the battles.h.i.+p USS Missouri Missouri in Tokyo Harbor. in Tokyo Harbor.

And Korea was almost at the bottom of the list of problems with which President Truman had to deal on a daily basis. Most of these problems had to do with thwarting Soviet mischief in Europe, the Near East, and even Africa.

The Soviets hadn't done nearly so well in the Far East, and the credit for that unquestionably belongs to Douglas MacArthur, who had flatly refused to permit the Soviets to partic.i.p.ate in the occupation of j.a.pan.

MacArthur had also successfully sown the seed of democratic government in the mind of the j.a.panese people, and taken wide and generally successful steps to get the war-ravaged j.a.panese economy moving.

As far as the disgraceful condition of the Eighth United States Army in j.a.pan was concerned, one has to remember that all armies are rank conscious.

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur was not only the senior officer on active duty, but he had been Army Chief of Staff when the general officers in the 1950 Pentagon had been captains and majors. In World War II, MacArthur had been a theater commander, commanding more men of all services than there were now in 1950 in all the armed forces of the United States.

There are annual inspections of every organization in the Army, ending with a conference during which the inspectors point out to the commander where he is doing what he should not be doing, or not doing what he should be doing.

It is very difficult to imagine any officer, even one with a galaxy of stars on his epaulets, pointing out to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, and Commanding General, United States Far East Command (FECOM), where he was doing something wrong, or where he had failed to do something he should have been doing.

And none did.

Because of the International Date Line, when it is Sunday in Korea it is Sat.u.r.day in New York City and Was.h.i.+ngton. The first word of the attack reached the Pentagon about eight o'clock Sat.u.r.day night, and at about the same time, the United Nations Commission in Korea managed to get UN Secretary General Trygve Lie on the telephone at his estate on Long Island.

Lie blurted, ”This is war against the United Nations.”

President Truman learned of the attack at his home in Independence, Missouri, early Sunday morning and immediately boarded his airplane, the Independence, Independence, to fly back to Was.h.i.+ngton. to fly back to Was.h.i.+ngton.

Lie convened an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council at two o'clock Sunday afternoon. The Soviet Union, trying to force the UN into seating Red China-and expelling Chiang Kai-shek's Chinese Nationalists-was refusing to attend Security Council meetings and did not partic.i.p.ate.

This was a blunder on their part. Had they attended, the Soviet Union could have vetoed the resolution the UN pa.s.sed. The resolution stated that the attack const.i.tuted a breach of the peace, ordered an immediate cessation of hostilities and the immediate withdrawal of North Korean forces from South Korea, and called upon all UN members to ”render every a.s.sistance to the UN in the execution of this resolution.” to ”render every a.s.sistance to the UN in the execution of this resolution.”

At about six o'clock that evening, in Was.h.i.+ngton, in Blair House-across Pennsylvania Avenue from the White House, which was being repaired-President Truman met with the more important members of his staff.