Part 7 (1/2)
Early in the spring of B.C. 219 he proceeded to lay siege to Saguntum, a city of Greek origin, founded by the Zacynthians. Though situated to the south of the Iberus, and therefore not included under the protection of the treaty between Hasdrubal and the Romans, Sagantum had concluded an alliance with the latter people. There could be little doubt, therefore, that an attack upon this city would inevitably bring on a war with Rome; but for this Hannibal was prepared, or, rather, it was unquestionably his real object. The immediate pretext of his invasion was the same of which the Romans so often availed themselves--some injury inflicted by the Saguntines upon one of the neighboring tribes, who invoked the a.s.sistance of Hannibal. But the resistance of the city was long and desperate, and it was not till after a siege of nearly eight months that he made himself master of the place. During all this period the Romans sent no a.s.sistance to their allies. They had, indeed, as soon as they heard of the siege, dispatched emba.s.sadors to Hannibal, but he referred them for an answer to the government at home, and they could obtain no satisfaction from the Carthaginians, in whose councils the war-party had now a decided predominance. A second emba.s.sy was sent, after the fall of Saguntum, to demand the surrender of Hannibal, in atonement for the breach of the treaty. After much discussion, Q. Fabius, one of the Roman emba.s.sadors, holding up a fold of his toga, said, ”I carry here peace and war; choose ye which ye will.” ”Give us which you will,” was the reply. ”Then take war,” said Fabius, letting fall his toga. ”We accept the gift,” cried the Senators of Carthage. Thus commenced the Second Punic War.
[Ill.u.s.tration: Coin of Hiero.]
[Footnote 30: Gallicus ager.]
[Ill.u.s.tration: Lake Trasimenus.]
CHAPTER XII.
THE SECOND PUNIC WAR: FIRST PERIOD, DOWN TO THE BATTLE OF CANNae. B.C.
218-216.
The Second Punic War was not so much a contest between the powers of two great nations--between Carthage and Rome--as between the individual genius of Hannibal on one hand, and the combined energies of the Roman people on the other. The position of Hannibal was indeed very peculiar.
His command in Spain, and the powerful army there, which was entirely at his own disposal, rendered him in great measure independent of the government at Carthage, and the latter seemed disposed to devolve all responsibility upon him. Even now they did little themselves to prepare for the impending contest. All was left to Hannibal, who, after the conquest of Saguntum, had returned once more to New Carthage for the winter, and was there actively engaged in preparations for transporting the scene of war in the ensuing campaign from Spain into Italy. At the same time he did not neglect to provide for the defense of Spain and Africa during his absence. In the former country he placed his brother Hasdrubal, with a considerable army, great part of which was composed of Africans, while he sent over a large body of Spanish troops to contribute to the defense of Africa, and even of Carthage itself.
All his preparations being now completed, Hannibal quitted his winter quarters at New Carthage in the spring of B.C. 218, and crossed the Iberus with an army of 90,000 foot and 12,000 horse. The tribes between that river and the Pyrenees offered at first a vigorous resistance, and, though they were quickly subdued, Hannibal thought it necessary to leave behind him a force of 11,000 men under Hanno to maintain this newly-acquired province. His forces were farther thinned by desertion during the pa.s.sage of the Pyrenees, which obliged him to send home a large body of his Spanish troops. With a greatly diminished army, but one on which he could securely rely, he now continued his march from the foot of the Pyrenees to the Rhone without meeting with any opposition; for the Gaulish tribes through which he pa.s.sed were favorably disposed to him, or had been previously gained over by his enemies.
The Consul P. Cornelius Scipio had been ordered to proceed to Spain, but various causes had detained him in Italy, and upon landing at Ma.s.silia (Ma.r.s.eilles) he found that Hannibal was already advancing toward the Rhone. Meantime the Carthaginian general effected his pa.s.sage across the river, notwithstanding the opposition of the Gauls; and when Scipio marched up the left bank of the river he found that Hannibal had advanced into the interior of Gaul, and was already three days in advance of him. Despairing, therefore, of overtaking Hannibal, he determined to sail back to Italy and await him in Cisalpine Gaul; but as the Republic had already an army in that province, he sent the greater part of his own forces into Spain under the command of his brother Cn.
Scipio. This prudent step probably saved Rome; for if the Carthaginians had maintained the undisputed mastery of Spain, they might have concentrated all their efforts to support Hannibal in Italy, and have sent him such strong re-enforcements after the battle of Cannae as would have compelled Rome to submit.
Hannibal, after crossing the Rhone, continued his march up the left bank of the river as far as its confluence with the Isere. Here he interposed in a dispute between two rival chiefs of the Allobroges, and, by lending his aid to establish one of them firmly on the throne, secured the co-operation of an efficient ally, who greatly facilitated his farther progress. But in his pa.s.sage across the Alps he was attacked by the barbarians, and as he struggled through the narrow and dangerous defiles the enemy destroyed numbers of his men. It was some days before he reached the summit of the pa.s.s. Thenceforth he suffered but little from hostile attacks, but the descent was difficult and dangerous. The natural difficulties of the road, enhanced by the lateness of the season (the beginning of October, at which time the snows had already commenced in the high Alps), caused him almost as much loss as the opposition of the barbarians on the other side of the mountains. So heavy were his losses from these combined causes, that, when he at length emerged from the valley of Aosta into the plains of the Po and encamped in the friendly country of the Insubres, he had with him no more than 20,000 foot and 6000 horse.[31] Such were the forces with which he descended into Italy to attempt the overthrow of a power that a few years before was able to muster a disposable force of above 700,000 fighting men.
Five months had been employed in the march from New Carthage to the plains of Italy, of which the actual pa.s.sage of the Alps had occupied fifteen days. Hannibal's first care was now to recruit the strength of his troops, exhausted by the hards.h.i.+ps and fatigues they had undergone.
After a short interval of repose, he turned his arms against the Taurinians (a tribe bordering on, and hostile to, the Insubrians), whom he quickly reduced, and took their princ.i.p.al city (Turin). The news of the approach of P. Scipio next obliged him to turn his attention toward a more formidable enemy. In the first action, which took place in the plains westward of the Ticinus, the cavalry and light-armed troops of the two armies were alone engaged, and the superiority of Hannibal's Numidian horse at once decided the combat in his favor. The Romans were completely routed, and Scipio himself severely wounded; in consequence of which he hastened to retreat beyond the Ticinus and the Po, under the walls of Placentia. Hannibal crossed the Po higher up, and, advancing to Placentia, offered battle to Scipio; but the latter declined the combat, and withdrew to the hills on the left bank of the Trebia. Here he was soon after joined by the other Consul, Ti. Semp.r.o.nius Longus, who had hastened from Ariminum to his support. Their combined armies were greatly superior to that of the Carthaginians, and Semp.r.o.nius was eager to bring on a general battle, of which Hannibal, on his side, was not less desirous, notwithstanding the great inferiority of his force. The result was decisive; the Romans were completely defeated, with heavy loss; and the remains of their shattered army, together with the two Consuls, took refuge within the walls of Placentia. The battles of the Ticinus and Trebia had been fought in December, and the winter had already begun with unusual severity, so that Hannibal's troops suffered severely from cold, and all his elephants perished except one. But his victory had caused all the wavering tribes of the Gauls to declare in his favor, and he was now able to take up his winter quarters in security, and to levy fresh troops among the Gauls while he awaited the approach of spring.
[Ill.u.s.tration: Coasts of the Mediterranean, ill.u.s.trating the History of the Punic.]
As soon as the season permitted the renewal of military operations (B.C.
217), Hannibal entered the country of the Ligurian tribes, who had lately declared in his favor, and descended by the valley of the Macra into the marshes on the banks of the Arno. He had apparently chosen this route in order to avoid the Roman armies, which guarded the more obvious pa.s.ses of the Apennines; but the hards.h.i.+ps and difficulties which he encountered in struggling through the marshes were immense; great numbers of his horses and beasts of burden perished, and he himself lost the sight of one eye by a violent attack of ophthalmia. At length, however, he reached Faesulae in safety, and was able to allow his troops a short interval of repose.
The Consuls for this year were Cn. Servilius and C. Flaminius. The latter was the author of the celebrated Agrarian Law which occasioned the Gallic War, and in his first consuls.h.i.+p he had gained a great victory over the Insubrian Gauls (see p. 79)(Sixth paragraph of Chapter XI.--Transcriber). He had been raised to his second consuls.h.i.+p by popular favor, in spite of the opposition of the Senate; and he hurried from Rome before the Ides of March,[32] lest the Senate might throw any obstacle in the way of his entering upon his consuls.h.i.+p. He was a man of great energy, but headstrong and reckless. When Hannibal arrived at Faesulae, Flaminius was with his army at Arretium. It was always the object of Hannibal to bring the Roman commanders to a battle, and therefore, in moving from Faesulae, he pa.s.sed by the Roman general, and advanced toward Perugia, laying waste the fertile country on his line of march. Flaminius immediately broke up his camp, and, following the traces of Hannibal, fell into the snare which was prepared for him. His army was attacked under the most disadvantageous circ.u.mstances, where it was hemmed in between rocky heights, previously occupied by the enemy, and the Lake of Trasimenus. Its destruction was almost complete.
Thousands fell by the sword, among whom was the Consul himself; thousands more perished in the lake, and no less than 15,000 prisoners fell into the hands of Hannibal, who on his side is said to have lost only 1500 men. Hannibal's treatment of the captives on this occasion, as well as after the battle of the Trebia, was marked by the same policy on which he afterward uniformly acted; the Roman citizens alone were retained as prisoners, while their Italian allies were dismissed without ransom to their respective homes. By this means he hoped to excite the nations of Italy against their Roman masters, and to place himself in the position of the leader of a national movement rather than that of a foreign invader. It was probably in order to give time for this feeling to display itself that he did not, after so decisive a victory, push on toward Rome itself; but, after an unsuccessful attempt upon the Roman colony of Spoletium, he turned aside through the Apennines into Picenum, and thence into the northern part of Apulia. Here he spent a great part of the summer, and was able effectually to refresh his troops, who had suffered much from the hards.h.i.+ps of their previous marches; but no symptoms appeared of the insurrections he had looked for among the Italians.
Meantime the Romans had collected a fresh army, which they placed under the command of Q. Fabius Maximus, who had been elected Dictator by the Comitia of the Centuries. Fabius formed a different plan for the campaign. He determined to keep the heights, and not to risk a battle, but at the same time to watch the Carthaginian army, cut off its supplies, and hara.s.s and annoy it in every possible way. From pursuing this policy he received the surname of _Cunctator_, or the _Lingerer_.
Hannibal now recrossed the Apennines, descended into the rich plains of Campania, and laid waste, without opposition, that fertile territory.
But he was unable either to make himself master of any of the towns, or to draw the wary Fabius to a battle. The Roman general contented himself with occupying the mountain pa.s.ses leading from Samnium into Campania, by which Hannibal must of necessity retreat, and believed that he had caught him, as it were, in a trap; but Hannibal eluded his vigilance by an ingenious stratagem, pa.s.sed the defiles of the Apennines without loss, and established himself in the plains of Apulia, where he collected supplies from all sides, in order to prepare for the winter.
Meantime the Romans, having become impatient at the inactivity of Fabius, raised Minucius, the Master of the Horse, to an equality in command with Fabius. His rashness very nearly gave Hannibal the opportunity, for which he was ever on the watch, to crush the Roman army by a decisive blow; but Fabius was able to save his colleague from destruction; and Hannibal, after obtaining only a partial advantage, took up his winter quarters at the small town of Geronium. Minucius acknowledged his error, and resumed his post of Master of the Horse.
During the winter the Romans made preparations for bringing an unusually large force into the field. The people thought that it needed only a man of energy and decision at the head of an overwhelming force to bring the war to a close. They therefore raised to the consuls.h.i.+p C.
Terentius Varro, said to have been the son of a butcher, who had been for some time regarded as the champion of the popular party. The Senate regarded this election with dismay, as Varro possessed no military experience; and they therefore persuaded the people to appoint as his colleague L. aemilius Paullus, who had distinguished himself by the way in which he had conducted the Illyrian war during his consuls.h.i.+p.