Part 14 (2/2)

Next morning, at daylight, the French were seen at anchor, seven or eight miles to leeward. At 6 A.M. they began to get under way. One of their sixty-fours, the _Ajax_, had lost her main and mizzen topmasts in a violent squall on the previous afternoon, and was not in the line. There were therefore eleven s.h.i.+ps on each side. The action, known as that of Negapatam, began shortly before 11, when both fleets were on the starboard tack, heading south-south-east, wind south-west.

The British being to windward, Hughes ordered his fleet to bear up together to the attack, exactly as Suffren had done on the 12th of April. As commonly happened, the rear got less close than the van (Position I). The fourth s.h.i.+p in the French order, the _Brillant_, 64 (a), losing her mainmast early, dropped to leeward of the line, (a'), and astern of her place (a”). At half-past noon the wind flew suddenly to south-south-east,--the sea-breeze,--taking the s.h.i.+ps a little on the port bow. Most of them, on both sides, paid off from the enemy, the British to starboard, the French to port; but between the main lines, which were in the momentary confusion consequent upon such an incident, were left six s.h.i.+ps--four British and two French--that had turned the other way (Positions II and III).[145] These were the _Burford_, _Sultan_ (s), _Worcester_, and _Eagle_, fourth, fifth, eighth and tenth, in the British order; and the _Severe_ (b), third in the French, with the dismasted _Brillant_, which was now towards the rear of the fight (a). Under these conditions, the _Severe_, 64, underwent a short but close action with the _Sultan_, 74; and with two other British s.h.i.+ps, according to the report of the _Severe's_ captain. The remainder of the incident shall be given in the latter's own words.

”Seeing the French squadron drawing off,--for all the s.h.i.+ps except the _Brillant_ had fallen off on the other tack,--Captain de Cillart thought it useless to prolong his defence, and had the flag hauled down. The s.h.i.+ps engaged with him immediately ceased their fire, and the one on the starboard side moved away. At this moment the _Severe_ fell off to starboard, and her sails filled. Captain de Cillart then ordered the fire to be resumed by his lower-deck guns, the only ones which remained manned, and he rejoined his squadron.”

When the _Severe's_ flag came down, Suffren was approaching with his flags.h.i.+p. The _Sultan_ wore to rejoin her fleet, and was raked by the _Severe_ in so doing. The _Brillant_, whose mainmast had been shot away in conflict with either the _Sultan_ or the _Burford_, both much heavier s.h.i.+ps, had at this later phase of the fight fallen under the guns of the _Worcester_ and the _Eagle_. Her captain, de Saint-Felix, was one of the most resolute of Suffren's officers. She was rescued by the flags.h.i.+p, but she had lost 47 killed and 136 wounded,--an almost incredible slaughter, being over a third of the usual complement of a sixty-four; and Suffren's s.h.i.+ps were undermanned.

These spirited episodes, and the fact that his four separated s.h.i.+ps were approaching the enemy, and being approached by them, caused Hughes to give the orders to wear, and for a general chase; the flag for the line being hauled down. These signals would bring all the main body to the support of the separated s.h.i.+ps, without regard to their order in battle, and therefore with the utmost expedition that their remaining sail power would admit. Two of the fleet, however, made signals of disability; so Hughes annulled the orders, and at 1.30 formed on the port tack, recalling the engaged vessels. Both squadrons now stood in sh.o.r.e, and anch.o.r.ed at about 6 P.M.; the British near Negapatam, the French some ten miles north. The loss in the action had been: British, 77 killed, 233 wounded; French, 178 killed, 601 wounded.

On the following day Suffren sailed for Cuddalore. There he received word that two s.h.i.+ps of the line--the _Ill.u.s.tre_, 74, and _St. Michel_, 60, with a convoy of supplies and 600 troops--were to be expected shortly at Pointe de Galle, then a Dutch port, on the south-west side of Ceylon. It was essential to cover these, and on the 18th he was ready for sea; but the necessity of an interview with Hyder Ali delayed him until the 1st of August, when he started for Batacalo.

On the 9th he arrived there, and on the 21st the reinforcement joined him. Within forty-eight hours the supply-s.h.i.+ps were cleared, and the squadron sailed again with the object of taking Trincomalee.

On the 25th he was off the port, and, the operation being pushed energetically, the place capitulated on the 31st of August.

It is difficult to resist the impression that greater energy on Hughes's part might have brought him up in time to prevent this mishap. He reached Madras only on July 20th, a fortnight after the late action; and he did not sail thence until the 20th of August, notwithstanding that he apprehended an attempt upon Trincomalee.

Hence, when he arrived there on the 2d of September, not only had it pa.s.sed into the hands of the enemy, but Suffren had reembarked already the men and the guns that had been landed from his fleet.

When Hughes's approach was signalled, all preparations for sea were hastened, and the following morning, at daybreak, the French came out.

Hughes had been joined since the last action by the _Sceptre_, 64, so that the respective forces in the action fought off Trincomalee on September 3d were twelve of the line to fourteen, viz.: British, three 74's, one 70, one 68, six 64's, one 50; French, four 74's, seven 64's, one 60, two 50's. Suffren had also put into the line a 36-gun s.h.i.+p, the _Consolante_.[146]

While the French were getting underway from Trincomalee, the British fleet was standing south-south-east towards the entrance, close-hauled on the starboard tack, a fresh south-west monsoon blowing. When Hughes made out the hostile flags on the works, he kept away four points,[147] and steered east-south-east, still in column, under short canvas (A). Suffren pursued, being to windward yet astern, with his fleet on a line of bearing; that is, the line on which the s.h.i.+ps were ranged was not the same as the course which they were steering. This formation, (A), wherein the advance is oblique to the front, is very difficult to maintain. Wis.h.i.+ng to make the action, whatever the immediate event, decisive in results, by drawing the French well to leeward of the port, Hughes, who was a thorough seaman and had good captains, played with his eager enemy. ”He kept avoiding me without taking flight,” wrote Suffren; ”or rather, he fled in good order, regulating his canvas by his worst sailers; and, keeping off by degrees, he steered from first to last ten or twelve different courses.” Hughes, on his part, while perfectly clear as to his own object, was somewhat perplexed by the seeming indecision of an adversary whose fighting purpose he knew by experience. ”Sometimes they edged down,” he wrote; ”sometimes they brought-to; in no regular order, as if undetermined what to do.” These apparent vacillations were due to the difficulty of maintaining the line of bearing, which was to be the line of battle; and this difficulty was the greater, because Hughes was continually altering his course and Suffren's s.h.i.+ps were of unequal speed.

At length, at 2 P.M., being then twenty-five miles south-east of the port, the French drew near enough to bear down. That this movement might be carried out with precision, and all the vessels come into action together, Suffren caused his fleet to haul to the wind, on the starboard tack, to rectify the order. This also being done poorly and slowly, he lost patience,--as Nelson afterwards said, ”A day is soon lost in manoeuvring,”--and at 2.30, to spur on the laggard s.h.i.+ps, the French admiral gave the signal to attack, (a), specifying pistol-range. Even this not sufficing to fetch the delinquents promptly into line with the flags.h.i.+p, the latter fired a gun to enforce obedience. Her own side being still turned towards the British, as she waited, the report was taken by the flags.h.i.+p's men below decks to be the signal for opening fire, and her whole broadside was discharged. This example was followed by the other s.h.i.+ps, so that the engagement, instead of being close, was begun at half cannon-shot.

[Ill.u.s.tration]

Owing to his measured and deliberate retreat, Hughes had his fleet now in thoroughly good shape, well aligned and closed-up. The French, starting from a poor formation to perform a difficult evolution, under fire, engaged in utter disorder (B). Seven s.h.i.+ps, prematurely rounding-to to bring their broadsides to the enemy, and fore-reaching, formed a confused group (v), much to windward and somewhat ahead of the British van. Imperfectly deployed, they interfered with one another and their fire consequently could not be adequately developed.

In the rear a somewhat similar condition existed. Suffren, expecting the bulk of his line to fight the British to windward, had directed the _Vengeur_, 64, and the _Consolante_, 36, to double to leeward on the extreme rear; but they, finding that the weather sides of the enemy were not occupied, feared to go to leeward, lest they should be cut off. They attacked the rear British s.h.i.+p, the _Worcester_, 64 (w), to windward; but the _Monmouth_, 64 (m), dropping down to her support, and the _Vengeur_ catching fire in the mizzen top, they were compelled to haul off. Only Suffren's own s.h.i.+p, the _Heros_, 74 (a), and her next astern, the _Ill.u.s.tre_, 74, (i), came at once to close action with the British centre; but subsequently the _Ajax_, 64, succeeding in clearing herself from the snarl in the rear, took station ahead (j) of the _Heros_. Upon these three fell the brunt of the fight. They not only received the broadsides of the s.h.i.+ps immediately opposed to them, but, the wind having now become light yet free, the British vessels ahead and astern, (h, s,) by luffing or keeping off, played also upon them. ”The enemy formed a semicircle around us,” wrote Suffren's chief of staff, ”and raked us ahead and astern, as the s.h.i.+p came up and fell off with the helm to leeward.” The two seventy-fours were crushed under this fire. Both lost their main and mizzen masts in the course of the day, and the foretopmast of the flags.h.i.+p also fell. The _Ajax_, arriving later, and probably drawing less attention, had only a topmast shot away.

The British total of killed and wounded was very evenly distributed throughout the fleet. Only the rear s.h.i.+p lost an important spar,--the main topmast. It was upon her, as already mentioned, and upon the two leading s.h.i.+ps, the _Exeter_ and _Isis_, that fell the heaviest fire, proportionately, of the French. From the position of the seven van s.h.i.+ps of the latter, such fire as they could make must needs be upon the extreme British van, and the _Exeter_ was forced to leave the line. The loss of the French that day was 82 killed and 255 wounded; of which 64 killed and 178 wounded belonged to the _Heros_, _Ill.u.s.tre_, and _Ajax_. The British had 51 killed and 283 wounded; the greatest number of casualties in one s.h.i.+p being 56. Singularly enough, in such a small list of deaths, three were commanding officers: Captains Watt of the _Sultan_, Wood of the _Worcester_, and Lumley of the _Isis_.

At 5.30 P.M. the wind s.h.i.+fted suddenly from south-west to east-south-east (C). The British wore together, formed on the other tack, and continued the fight. It was during this final act, and at 6 P.M., that the mainmast of the French flags.h.i.+p came down. The van s.h.i.+ps of the French had towed their heads round with boats before 4, in order to come to the support of the centre, in obedience to a signal from Suffren; but the light airs and calms had r.e.t.a.r.ded them.

With the s.h.i.+ft they approached, and pa.s.sed in column (c) between their crippled vessels and the enemy. This manoeuvre, and the failure of daylight, brought the battle to an end. According to Hughes's report, several of his fleet ”were making much water from shot-holes so very low down in the bottom as not to be come at to be effectually stopped; and the whole had suffered severely in their masts and rigging.”

Trincomalee being in the enemy's possession, and the east coast of Ceylon an unsafe anchorage now, at the change of the monsoon, he felt compelled to return to Madras, where he anch.o.r.ed on the 9th of September. Suffren regained Trincomalee on the 7th of the month, but the _Orient_, 74, running ash.o.r.e at the entrance and being lost, he remained outside until the 17th, saving material from the wreck.

The break-up of the south-west monsoon, then at hand, is apt to be accompanied by violent hurricanes, and is succeeded by the north-east monsoon, during which the east coasts of the peninsula and of Ceylon give a lee sh.o.r.e, with heavy surf. Naval operations, therefore, were suspended for the winter. During that season Trincomalee is the only secure port. Deprived of it, Hughes determined to go to Bombay, and for that purpose left Madras on the 17th of October. Four days later a reinforcement of five s.h.i.+ps of the line arrived from England, under Commodore Sir Richard Bickerton, who at once followed the Commander-in-Chief to the west coast. In the course of December the entire British force was united at Bombay.

In Trincomalee Suffren had a good anchorage; but the insufficiency of its resources, with other military considerations, decided him to winter at Acheen, at the west end of Sumatra. He arrived there on the 2d of November, having first paid a visit to Cuddalore, where the _Bizarre_, 64, was wrecked by carelessness. On the 20th of December he left Acheen for the Coromandel coast, having shortened his stay to the eastward for reasons of policy. On the 8th of January, 1783, he was off Ganjam, on the Orissa coast, and thence reached Trincomalee again on the 23d of February. There he was joined on the 10th of March by three s.h.i.+ps of the line from Europe: two 74's and one 64. Under their convoy came General de Bussy, with twenty-five hundred troops, which were at once despatched to Cuddalore.

On the 10th of April Vice-Admiral Hughes, returning from Bombay, pa.s.sed Trincomalee on the way to Madras, The various maritime occurrences, wrecks and reinforcements, since the battle of September 3d had reversed the naval odds, and Hughes now had eighteen s.h.i.+ps of the line, one of which was an eighty, opposed to fifteen under Suffren. Another important event in the affairs of India was the death of Hyder Ali, on the 7th of December, 1782. Although his policy was continued by his son, Tippoo Saib, the blow to the French was serious.

Under all the conditions, the British authorities were emboldened to attempt the reduction of Cuddalore. The army destined to this enterprise marched from Madras, pa.s.sed round Cuddalore, and encamped south of it by the sh.o.r.e. The supply-s.h.i.+ps and lighter cruisers anch.o.r.ed near, while the fleet cruised to the southward. Being there to windward, for the south-west monsoon had then set in, it covered the operations against disturbance from the sea.

Towards the beginning of June the investment of the place was complete by land and by water. Intelligence of this state of things was brought on the 10th of June to Suffren, who by Bussey's direction was keeping his inferior fleet in Trincomalee until its services should be absolutely indispensable. Immediately upon receiving the news he left port, and on the 13th sighted the British fleet, then at anchor off Porto Novo, a little south of Cuddalore. Upon his approach Hughes moved off, and anch.o.r.ed again five miles from the besieged place. For the next two days the French were baffled by the winds; but on the 17th the south-west monsoon resumed, and Suffren again drew near.

The British Vice-Admiral, not caring to accept action at anchor, got under way, and from that time till the 20th remained outside, trying to obtain the weather-gage, in which he was frustrated by the variableness of the winds. Meanwhile Suffren had anch.o.r.ed near the town, communicated with the general, and, being very short of men at the guns, had embarked twelve hundred troops for his expected battle; for it was evident that the issue of the siege would turn upon the control of the sea. On the 18th he weighed again, and the two fleets manoeuvred for the advantage, with light baffling airs, the British furthest from sh.o.r.e.

On the 20th of June, the wind holding at west with unexpected constancy, Hughes decided to accept the attack which Suffren evidently intended. The latter, being distinctly inferior in force,--fifteen to eighteen,--probably contemplated an action that should be decisive only as regarded the fate of Cuddalore; that is, one which, while not resulting in the capture or destruction of s.h.i.+ps, should compel his opponent to leave the neighbourhood to repair damages. The British formed line on the port tack, heading to the northward. Suffren ranged his fleet in the same manner, parallel to the enemy, and was careful to see the order exact before bearing down. When the signal to attack was given, the French kept away together, and brought-to again on the weather beam of the British, just within point-blank range. The action lasted from shortly after 4 P.M. to nearly 7, and was general throughout both lines; but, as always experienced, the rears were less engaged than the centres and vans. No s.h.i.+p was taken; no very important spars seem to have been shot away. The loss of the British was 99 killed, 434 wounded; of the French, 102 killed, 386 wounded.

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