Part 8 (2/2)
From St. Kitts the July ”trade” was sent home with two s.h.i.+ps of the line. Three others, he wrote to the Admiralty, would accompany the September fleet, ”and the remainder of the s.h.i.+ps on this station, which are in want of great repair and are not copper-bottomed, shall proceed with them or with the convoy which their Lords.h.i.+ps have been pleased to order shall sail from hence in October next.” If these arrived before winter, he argued, they would be available by spring as a reinforcement for the Channel fleet, and would enable the Admiralty to send him an equivalent number for the winter work on his station.
As de Guichen had taken the whole French homeward merchant fleet from Martinique to Cap Francois and as the height of the hurricane season was near, Rodney reasoned that but a small French force would remain in Hati, and consequently that Jamaica would not require all the British fleet to save it from any possible attack. He therefore sent thither ten sail of the line, notifying Vice-Admiral Sir Peter Parker that they were not merely to defend the island, but to enable him to send home its great trade in reasonable security.
These things being done by July 31st, Rodney, reasoning that the allies had practically abandoned all enterprises in the West Indies for that year, and that a hurricane might at any moment overtake the fleet at its anchors, possibly making for it a lee sh.o.r.e, went to sea, to cruise with the fleet off Barbuda. His mind, however, was inclined already to go to the continent, whither he inferred, correctly but mistakenly, that the greater part of de Guichen's fleet would go, because it should. His purpose was confirmed by information from an American vessel that a French squadron of seven s.h.i.+ps of the line, convoying six thousand troops, had anch.o.r.ed in Narragansett Bay on the 12th of July. He started at once for the coast of South Carolina, where he communicated with the army in Charleston, and thence, ”sweeping the southern coast of America,” anch.o.r.ed with fourteen s.h.i.+ps of the line at Sandy Hook, on the 14th of September, unexpected and unwelcome to friends and foes alike.
Vice-Admiral Arbuthnot, being junior to Rodney, showed plainly and with insubordination his wrath at this intrusion into his command, which superseded his authority and divided the prize-money of a lucrative station. This, however, was a detail. To Was.h.i.+ngton, Rodney's coming was a deathblow to the hopes raised by the arrival of the French division at Newport, which he had expected to see reinforced by de Guichen. Actually, the departure of the latter made immaterial Rodney's appearance on the scene; but this Was.h.i.+ngton did not know then. As it was, Rodney's force joined to Arbuthnot's const.i.tuted a fleet of over twenty sail of the line, before which, vigorously used, there can be little doubt that the French squadron in Newport must have fallen. But Rodney, though he had shown great energy in the West Indies, and unusual resolution in quitting his own station for a more remote service, was sixty-two, and suffered from gout. ”The sudden change of climate makes it necessary for me to go on sh.o.r.e for some short time,” he wrote; and although he added that his illness was ”not of such a nature as shall cause one moment's delay in his Majesty's service,” he probably lost a chance at Rhode Island. He did not overlook the matter, it is true; but he decided upon the information of Arbuthnot and Sir Henry Clinton, and did not inspect the ground himself. Nothing of consequence came of his visit; and on the 16th of November he sailed again for the West Indies, taking with him only nine sail of the line.
The arrival of de Ternay's seven s.h.i.+ps at Newport was more than offset by a British reinforcement of six s.h.i.+ps of the line under Rear-Admiral Thomas Graves which entered New York on July 13th,--only one day later. Arbuthnot's force was thus raised to ten of the line, one of which was of 98 guns. After Rodney had come and gone, the French division was watched by cruisers, resting upon Gardiner's Bay,--a commodious anchorage at the east end of Long Island, between thirty and forty miles from Rhode Island. When a movement of the enemy was apprehended, the squadron a.s.sembled there, but nothing of consequence occurred during the remainder of the year.
The year 1780 had been one of great discouragement to the Americans, but the injury, except as the lapse of time taxed their staying power, was more superficial than real. The successes of the British in the southern States, though undeniable, and seemingly substantial, were involving them ever more deeply in a ruinously ex-centric movement.
They need here only to be summarised, as steps in the process leading to the catastrophe of Yorktown,--a disaster which, as Was.h.i.+ngton said, exemplified naval rather than military power.
The failure of d'Estaing's attack upon Savannah in the autumn of 1779[89] had left that place in the possession of the British as a base for further advances in South Carolina and Georgia; lasting success in which was expected from the numbers of royalists in those States. When the departure of the French fleet was ascertained, Sir Henry Clinton put to sea from New York in December, 1779, for the Savannah River, escorted by Vice-Admiral Arbuthnot. The details of the operations, which were leisurely and methodical, will not be given here; for, although the Navy took an active part in them, they scarcely can be considered of major importance. On the 12th of May, 1780, the city of Charleston capitulated, between six and seven thousand prisoners being taken. Clinton then returned to New York, leaving Lord Cornwallis in command in the south. The latter proposed to remain quiet during the hot months; but the activity of the American partisan troops prevented this, and in July the approach of a small, but relatively formidable force, under General Gates, compelled him to take the field. On the 16th of August the two little armies met at Camden, and the Americans, who were much the more numerous, but largely irregulars, were routed decisively. This news reached General Was.h.i.+ngton in the north nearly at the same moment that the treason of Benedict Arnold became known. Although the objects of his treachery were frustrated, the sorrowful words, ”Whom now can we trust?” show the deep gloom which for the moment shadowed the constant mind of the American Commander-in-Chief. It was just at this period, too, that Rodney arrived at New York.
Cornwallis, not content with his late success, decided to push on into North Carolina. Thus doing, he separated himself from his naval base in Charleston, communication with which by land he had not force to maintain, and could recover effective touch with the sea only in Chesapeake Bay. This conclusion was not apparent from the first.
In North Carolina, the British general did not receive from the inhabitants the substantial support which he had expected, and found himself instead in a very difficult and wild country, confronted by General Greene, the second in ability of all the American leaders.
Hara.s.sed and baffled, he was compelled to order supplies to be sent by sea to Wilmington, North Carolina, an out-of-the-way and inferior port, to which he turned aside, arriving exhausted on the 7th of April, 1781. The question as to his future course remained to be settled. To return to Charleston by sea was in his power, but to do so would be an open confession of failure,--that he could not return by land, through the country by which he had come--much the same dilemma as that of Howe and Clinton in Philadelphia. To support him in his distress by a diversion, Sir Henry Clinton had sent two successive detachments to ravage the valley of the James River in Virginia.
These were still there, under the command of General Phillips; and Cornwallis, in the circ.u.mstances, could see many reasons that thither was the very scene to carry the British operations. On the 25th of April, 1781, he left Wilmington, and a month later joined the division at Petersburg, Virginia, then commanded by Benedict Arnold; Phillips having died. There, in touch now with his fate, we must leave him for the moment.
To complete the naval transactions of 1780, it is necessary to mention briefly two incidents, trivial in themselves, but significant, not only as a.s.sociated with the greater movements of the campaign, but as indicative of the naval policy of the States which were at war. The two, though not otherwise connected, have a certain unity of interest, in that the same British officer commanded on both occasions.
It will be remembered that in Byron's action off Grenada, in July, 1779, the 64-gun s.h.i.+p _Lion_ received such injuries that her commander, Captain Cornwallis, had been compelled to run down before the trade-winds to Jamaica, in order to save her from capture.
Since that time she had remained there, as one of the squadron of Vice-Admiral Sir Peter Parker. In March, 1780, still commanded by Cornwallis, she was making an ordinary service cruise off the north side of Hati, having in company the _Bristol_, 50, and the _Ja.n.u.s_, 44. On the 20th of March, off Monte Christi, a number of sail were sighted to the eastward, which proved to be a French convoy, on its way from Martinique to Cap Francois, protected by La Motte-Picquet's squadron of two 74's, one 64, one 50, and a frigate. The French merchant s.h.i.+ps were ordered to crowd sail for their port, while the men-of-war chased to the north-west. La Motte-Picquet's flags.h.i.+p, the _Annibal_, 74, got within range at 5 P.M., when a distant cannonade began, which lasted till past midnight, and was resumed on the following morning. From it the _Ja.n.u.s_ was the chief sufferer, losing her mizzen topmast and foretopgallant mast. It falling nearly calm, the _Bristol_ and _Lion_ got out their boats and were towed by them to her support. The two other French s.h.i.+ps of the line got up during the forenoon of the 21st, so that the action that afternoon, though desultory, might be called general.
The two opposing commodores differ in their expressed opinions as to the power of the French to make the affair more decisive. Some of La Motte-Picquet's language seems to show that he felt the responsibility of his position. ”The _Ja.n.u.s_, being smaller and more easily worked, lay upon our quarter and under our stern, where she did considerable damage. A little breeze springing up enabled us (the _Annibal_) to stand towards our own s.h.i.+ps, which did everything possible to come up and cover us, without which we should have been _surrounded_.” It is easy to see in such an expression the reflection of the commands of the French Cabinet, to economise the s.h.i.+ps. This was still more evident in La Motte-Picquet's conduct next day. On the morning of the 22d, ”at daylight we were within one and a half cannon-shot, breeze fresh at the east-north-east, and I expected to overtake the British squadron in an hour, when we perceived four s.h.i.+ps in chase of us.
At 6.30 A.M. three were seen to be men-of-war. This superiority of force compelled me to desist, and to make signal to haul our wind for Cap Francois.” These three new-comers were the _Ruby_, 64, and two frigates, the _Pomona_, 28, and _Niger_, 32. The comparison of forces, therefore, would be: French, two 74's, one 64, one 50, and one frigate, opposed to, British, two 64's, one 50, and three frigates.
La Motte-Picquet evidently did not wait to ascertain the size of the approaching s.h.i.+ps. His courage was beyond all dispute, and, as Hyde Parker had said, he was among the most distinguished of French officers; but, like his comrades, he was dominated by the faulty theory of his government.
The captain of the _Ja.n.u.s_ died a natural death during the encounter.
It may be interesting to note that the s.h.i.+p was given to Nelson, who was recalled for that purpose from the expedition to San Juan, Nicaragua, one of the minor operations of the war. His health, however, prevented this command from being more than nominal, and not long afterward he returned to England with Cornwallis, in the _Lion_.
Three months later, Cornwallis was sent by Parker to accompany a body of merchant s.h.i.+ps for England as far as the neighborhood of Bermuda.
This duty being fulfilled, he was returning toward his station, having with him two 74's, two 64's, and one 50, when, on the morning of June 20, a number of sail were seen from north-east to east (a); the British squadron (aa) then steering east, with the wind at south-south-east. The strangers were a body of French transports, carrying the six thousand troops destined for Rhode Island, and convoyed by a division of seven s.h.i.+ps of the line--one 80, two 74's, and four 64's--under the command of Commodore de Ternay. Two of the s.h.i.+ps of war were with the convoy, the other five very properly to windward of it. The latter therefore stood on, across the bows of the British, to rejoin their consorts, and then all hauled their wind to the south-west, standing in column (bb) towards the enemy. Cornwallis on his part had kept on (b) to reconnoitre the force opposed to him; but one of his s.h.i.+ps, the _Ruby_, 64, was so far to leeward (b') that the French, by keeping near the wind, could pa.s.s between her and her squadron (b, b, b'). She therefore went about (t) and steered southwest, on the port tack (c'), close to the wind. The French, who were already heading the same way, were thus brought on her weather quarter in chase. Cornwallis then wore his division (w), formed line of battle on the same tack as the others (c), and edged down towards the _Ruby_. If the French now kept their wind, either the _Ruby_ (c') must be cut off, or Cornwallis, to save her, must fight the large odds against him. De Ternay, however, did not keep his wind but bore up,--yielded ground (cc). ”The enemy,” wrote Cornwallis, ”kept edging off and forming line, though within gunshot. At 5.30 P.M., seeing we had pushed the French s.h.i.+ps to leeward sufficiently to enable the _Ruby_, on our lee bow, to join us, I made the signal to tack.” As the British squadron went about to stand east again (d), the French, heading now west-south-west (cc), hoisted their colours and opened fire in pa.s.sing. The _Ruby_ kept on till she fetched the wake of the British column (d'), when she too tacked. The French then tacked also, in succession (d), and the two columns stood on for awhile in parallel lines, exchanging shots at long range, the British to windward.
Cornwallis very properly declined further engagement with so superior a force. He had already done much in saving a s.h.i.+p so greatly exposed.
[Ill.u.s.tration]
The account above followed is that of the British commander, but it does not differ in essentials from the French, whose captains were greatly incensed at the cautious action of their chief. A French _commissaire_ in the squadron, who afterwards published his journal, tells that de Ternay a few days later asked the captain of one of the s.h.i.+ps what English admiral he thought they had engaged, and received the reply, ”We have lost our opportunity of finding out.” He gives also many details of the talk that went on in the s.h.i.+ps, which need not be repeated. Chevalier points out correctly, however, that de Ternay had to consider that an equal or even a superior force might be encountered as Narragansett Bay was approached, and that he should not risk crippling his squadron for such a contingency. The charge of six thousand troops, under the then conditions, was no light responsibility, and at the least must silence off-hand criticism now.
Comment upon his action does not belong to British naval history, to which the firmness and seamans.h.i.+p of Captain Cornwallis added a lasting glory. It may be noted that fifteen years later, in the French Revolution, the same officer, then a Vice-Admiral, again distinguished himself by his bearing in face of great odds, bringing five s.h.i.+ps safe off, out of the jaws of a dozen. It ill.u.s.trates how luck seems in many cases to characterise a man's personality, much as temperament does.
Cornwallis, familiarly known as ”Billy Blue” to the seamen of his day, never won a victory, nor had a chance of winning one; but in command both of s.h.i.+ps and of divisions, he repeatedly distinguished himself by successfully facing odds which he could not overcome.
The year 1780 was uneventful also in European waters, after Rodney's relief of Gibraltar in January. The detachment of the Channel Fleet which accompanied him on that mission returned safely to England. The ”Grand Fleet,” as it still was styled occasionally, cruised at sea from June 8th to August 18th, an imposing force of thirty-one s.h.i.+ps of the line, eleven of them three-deckers of 90 guns and upwards. Admiral Francis Geary was then Commander-in-Chief, but, his health failing, and Barrington refusing to take the position, through professed distrust of himself and actual distrust of the Admiralty, Vice-Admiral George Darby succeeded to it, and held it during the year 1781.
The most notable maritime event in 1780 in Europe was the capture on August 9th of a large British convoy, two or three hundred miles west of Cape St. Vincent, by the allied fleets from Cadiz. As out of sixty-three sail only eight escaped, and as of those taken sixteen were carrying troops and supplies necessary for the West India garrisons, such a disaster claims mention among the greater operations of war, the success of which it could not fail to influence. Captain John Moutray, the officer commanding the convoy, was brought to trial and dismissed his s.h.i.+p; but there were not wanting those who charged the misadventure to the Admiralty, and saw in the captain a victim. It was the greatest single blow that British commerce had received in war during the memory of men then living, and ”a general inclination prevailed to lay the blame upon some individual, who might be punished according to the magnitude of the object, rather than in proportion to his demerit.”[90]
During the year 1780 was formed the League of the Baltic Powers, known historically as the Armed Neutrality, to exact from Great Britain the concession of certain points thought essential to neutral interests.
The accession of Holland to this combination, together with other motives of dissatisfaction, caused Great Britain to declare war against the United Provinces on the 20th of December. Orders were at once sent to the East and West Indies to seize Dutch possessions and s.h.i.+ps, but these did not issue in action until the following year.
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