Part 3 (2/2)
Meanwhile d'Estaing was in communication with Was.h.i.+ngton, one of whose aides-de-camp visited his flags.h.i.+p. A number of New York pilots also were sent. When these learned the draught of the heavier French s.h.i.+ps, they declared that it was impossible to take them in; that there was on the bar only twenty-three feet at high water. Had that been really the case, Howe would not have needed to make the preparations for defence that were visible to thousands of eyes on sea and on sh.o.r.e; but d'Estaing, though personally brave as a lion, was timid in his profession, which he had entered at the age of thirty, without serving in the lower grades. The a.s.surances of the pilots were accepted after an examination by a lieutenant of the flags.h.i.+p, who could find nothing deeper than twenty-two feet. Fortune's favors are thrown away, as though in mockery, on the incompetent or the irresolute. On the 22d of July a fresh north-east wind concurred with a spring tide to give the highest possible water on the bar.[26]
”At eight o'clock,” wrote an eye-witness in the British fleet, ”d'Estaing with all his squadron appeared under way. He kept working to windward, as if to gain a proper position for crossing the bar by the time the tide should serve. The wind could not be more favourable for such a design; it blew from the exact point from which he could attack us to the greatest advantage. The spring tides were at the highest, and that afternoon thirty feet on the bar. We consequently expected the hottest day that had ever been fought between the two nations. On our side all was at stake. Had the men-of-war been defeated, the fleet of transports and victuallers must have been destroyed, and the army, of course, have fallen with us.
D'Estaing, however, had not spirit equal to the risk; at three o'clock we saw him bear off to the southward, and in a few hours he was out of sight.”
Four days later, Howe, reporting these occurrences, wrote: ”The weather having been favourable the last three days for forcing entrance to this port, I conclude the French commander has desisted.”
It is clear that the experienced British admiral did not recognise the impossibility of success for the enemy.
After the demonstration of the 22d, d'Estaing stood to the southward, with the wind at east. The British advice-boats brought back word that they had kept company with him as far south as the Capes of the Delaware, and there had left him ninety miles from land. When their leaving freed him from observation, he turned, and made for Narragansett Bay, an attack on which, in support of an American land force, had been concerted between him and Was.h.i.+ngton. On the 29th he anch.o.r.ed three miles south of Rhode Island, and there awaited a suitable moment for forcing the entrance.
Narragansett Bay contains several islands. The two largest, near the sea, are Rhode Island and Conanicut, the latter being the more westerly. Their general direction, as that of the Bay itself, is north and south; and by them the entrance is divided into three pa.s.sages.
Of these, the eastern, called Seakonnet, is not navigable above Rhode Island. The central, which is the main channel, is joined by the western above Conanicut, and thus the two lead to the upper Bay. The town of Newport is on the west side of Rhode Island, four miles from the main entrance.
On the 30th of July, the day after the French fleet had arrived, two of its s.h.i.+ps of the line, under command of the afterwards celebrated Suffren, went up the western channel, anchoring within it near the south end of Conanicut. One of them, as she pa.s.sed, was hulled twice by the British batteries. At the same time, two frigates and a corvette entered Seakonnet; whereupon the British abandoned and burned a sloop of war, the _Kingfisher_, 16, and some galleys there stationed. The British general, Sir Robert Pigot, now withdrew his detachments from Conanicut, after disabling the guns, and concentrated the bulk of his force in the southern part of Rhode Island and about Newport. Goat Island, which covers the inner harbour of the town, was still occupied, the main channel being commanded by its batteries, as well as by those to the north and south of it upon Rhode Island. On the 5th of August, Suffren's two s.h.i.+ps again got under way, sailed through the western pa.s.sage, and anch.o.r.ed in the main channel, north of Conanicut; their former positions being taken by two other s.h.i.+ps of the line.[27] The senior British naval officer, seeing retreat cut off both north and south, now destroyed those s.h.i.+ps of war[28] which could not enter the inner harbour, sinking two between Goat and Rhode Islands, to prevent any enemy pa.s.sing there. Five transports also were sunk north of Goat Island, between it and Coaster's Harbour, to protect the inside anchorage in that direction. These preliminary operations cost the British five frigates and two sloops, besides some galleys. Guns and ammunition taken from them went to increase the defences; and their officers and crews, over a thousand in number, served in the fortifications.
[Ill.u.s.tration]
On the 8th of August the eight remaining French s.h.i.+ps of the line ran the batteries on Rhode and Goat Islands, anchoring above the latter, between it and Conanicut, and were rejoined there by the four previously detached to the western pa.s.sage. Ten thousand American troops having by this time crossed from the mainland to the northern part of Rhode Island, d'Estaing immediately landed four thousand soldiers and seamen from the fleet upon Conanicut, for a preliminary organisation; after which they also were to pa.s.s to Rhode Island and join in the operations. For the moment, therefore, the British garrison, numbering probably six thousand men,[29] was hemmed in by vastly superior forces, by land and by water. Its embarra.s.sment, however, did not last long. On the following morning Lord Howe appeared and anch.o.r.ed off Point Judith, seven miles from the entrance to the Bay, and twelve from the position then occupied by the French fleet. He brought a stronger force than he had been able to gather for the defence of New York, having now one 74, seven 64's, and five 50's, in all thirteen of the line, besides several smaller vessels; but he still was greatly inferior to opponent, by any rational mode of naval reckoning.
Howe's energies in New York had not been confined to preparations for resisting the entrance of the enemy, nor did they cease with the latter's departure. When he first arrived there from Philadelphia, he had hastened to get his s.h.i.+ps ready for sea, a pre-occupation which somewhat, but not unduly, delayed their taking their positions at Sandy Hook. Two, for instance, had been at the watering-place when the approach of the French was signalled. Owing to this diligence, no time was lost by his fault when the new destination of the enemy was made known to him, on the 28th or 29th of July, by the arrival of the _Raisonnable_, 64,[30] from Halifax. This s.h.i.+p narrowly escaped the French fleet, having pa.s.sed it on the evening of the 27th, steering for Rhode Island. The _Renown_, 50, which on the 26th had reached New York from the West Indies, had a similar close shave, having sailed unnoticed through the rear of the enemy the night before. Besides these two, Howe was joined also by the _Centurion_, 50, from Halifax, and by the _Cornwall_, 74; the latter, which crossed the bar on the 30th, being the first of Byron's fleet to reach New York. The three others belonged to Howe's own squadron. For the two Halifax s.h.i.+ps which helped to make this most welcome reinforcement, the Admiral was indebted to the diligence of the officer there commanding, who hurried them away as soon as he learned of d'Estaing's appearance on the coast. The opportuneness of their arrival attracted notice. ”Had they appeared a few days sooner,” says a contemporary narrative, ”either they must have been prevented from forming a junction with our squadron, and forced again to sea, or we should have had the mortification to see them increase the triumph of our enemy.”
On the 1st of August, forty-eight hours after the _Cornwall_ had come in from a stormy pa.s.sage of fifty-two days, the squadron was ready for sea, and Howe attempted to sail; but the wind hauled foul immediately after the signal to weigh had been made. It did not become fair at the hour of high water, when alone heavy s.h.i.+ps could cross the bar, until the morning of the 6th. ”Rhode Island was of such importance,” says the narrator already quoted, ”_and the fate of so large a portion of the British army as formed the garrison was of such infinite consequence to the general cause_, that it was imagined the Admiral would not lose a moment in making some attempt for their relief.”
He had learned of the detachments made from the French fleet, and hoped that some advantage might be taken of this division. In short, he went, as was proper and inc.u.mbent on him in such critical circ.u.mstances, to take a great risk, in hope of a favourable chance offering. On the 9th, as before stated, he anch.o.r.ed off Point Judith, and opened communications with the garrison, from which he learned the events that had so far occurred, and also that the enemy was well provided with craft of all kinds to make a descent upon any part of the Island.
As deGra.s.se at Yorktown, when rumour announced the approach of a British fleet, was deterred only by the most urgent appeals of Was.h.i.+ngton from abandoning his control of the Chesapeake, essential to the capture of Cornwallis, so now d'Estaing, in Narragansett Bay, was unwilling to keep his place, in face of Howe's greatly inferior squadron.[31] The influence exerted upon these two admirals by the mere approach of a hostile fleet, when decisive advantages depended upon their holding their ground, may be cited plausibly in support of the most extreme view of the effect of a ”fleet in being;” but the instances also, when the conditions are a.n.a.lysed, will suggest the question: Is such effect always legitimate, inherent in the existence of the fleet itself, or does it not depend often upon the characteristics of the man affected? The contemporary British narrative of these events in Narragansett Bay, after reciting the various obstacles and the inferiority of the British squadron, says: ”The most skilful officers were therefore of opinion that the Vice-Admiral could not risk an attack; and it appears by his Lords.h.i.+p's public letter that this was also his own opinion: under such circ.u.mstances, he judged it was impracticable to afford the General any essential relief.” In both these instances, the admirals concerned were impelled to sacrifice the almost certain capture, not of a mere position, but of a decisive part of the enemy's organised forces, by the mere possibility of action; by the moral effect produced by a fleet greatly inferior to their own, which in neither case would have attacked, as things stood. What does this prove?
Immediately upon Howe's appearance, the French seamen who had landed the day before on Conanicut were recalled to their s.h.i.+ps. The next morning, August 10, at 7 A.M., the wind came out strong at north-east, which is exceptional at that season. D'Estaing at once put to sea, cutting the cables in his haste. In two hours he was outside, steering for the enemy. Howe, of course, retired at once; his inferiority[32]
did not permit an engagement except on his own terms. To insure these, he needed the weather-gage, the offensive position of that day, which by keeping south he expected to gain, when the usual wind from that quarter should set in. The French Admiral had the same object, hoping to crush his agile opponent; and, as the sea breeze from south-west did not make that day, he succeeded in keeping the advantage with which he had started, despite Howe's skill. At nightfall both fleets were still steering to the southward, on the port tack, the French five or six miles in the rear of the British, with the wind variable at east. The same course was maintained throughout the night, the French gradually overhauling the British, and becoming visible at 3 A.M. of the 11th. By Howe's dispatch, they bore in the morning, at an hour not specified, east-north-east, which would be nearly abeam, but somewhat more distant than the night before, having apparently kept closer to the wind, which by this had steadied at east-north-east.
In the course of the day Howe s.h.i.+fted his flag from the _Eagle_, 64, to the _Apollo_, 32, and placed himself between the two fleets, the better to decide the movements of his own. Finding it impossible to gain the weather-gage, and unwilling, probably, to be drawn too far from Rhode Island, he now made a wide circle with the fleet by a succession of changes of course: at 8 A.M. to south, then to south-west and west, until finally, at 1.30 P.M., the s.h.i.+ps were steering north-west; always in line of battle. The French Admiral seems to have followed this movement cautiously, on an outer circle but with a higher speed, so that from east-north-east in the morning, which, as the fleets were then heading, would be on the starboard side of the British, abreast and to windward, at 4 P.M. the French bore south-south-east, which would be somewhat on the port quarter, or nearly astern but to leeward. At this time their van was estimated by Howe to be two or three miles from the British rear, and, according to his reading of their manoeuvres, d'Estaing was forming his line for the same tack as the British, with a view of ”engaging the British squadron to leeward,” whereby he would obtain over it the advantage of using the lower-deck guns, the wind and sea having become much heavier. As the French Admiral, in this new disposition, had put his heaviest s.h.i.+ps in the van, and his line was nearly in the wake of the British, Howe inferred an attack upon his rear. He therefore ordered his heaviest s.h.i.+p, the _Cornwall_, 74, to go there from the centre, exchanging places with the _Centurion_, 50, and at the same time signalled the fleet to close _to the centre_,--a detail worth remembering in view of Rodney's frustrated manoeuvre of April 17th, 1780. It now remained simply to await firmly the moment when the French should have covered the intervening ground, and brought to action so much of his rear as d'Estaing saw fit to engage; the conditions of the sea favoring the speed of the bulkier s.h.i.+ps that composed the hostile fleet. The latter, however, soon abandoned the attempt, and ”bore away to the southward, apparently from the state of the weather, which, by the wind freshening much, with frequent rain, was now rendered very unfavorable for engaging.” It may be added that the hour was very late for beginning an action. At sundown the British were under close-reefed topsails, and the sea such that Howe was unable to return to the _Eagle_.[33]
The wind now increased to great violence, and a severe storm raged on the coast until the evening of the 13th, throwing the two fleets into confusion, scattering the s.h.i.+ps, and causing numerous disasters. The _Apollo_ lost her foremast, and sprung the mainmast, on the night of the 12th. The next day only two British s.h.i.+ps of the line and three smaller vessels were in sight of their Admiral. When the weather moderated, Howe went on board the _Phoenix_, 44, and thence to the _Centurion_, 50, with which he ”proceeded to the southward, and on the 15th discovered ten sail of the French squadron, some at anchor in the sea, about twenty-five leagues east from Cape May.”[34] Leaving there the _Centurion_, to direct to New York any of Byron's s.h.i.+ps that might come on the coast, he departed thither himself also, and on the evening of the 17th rejoined the squadron off Sandy Hook, the appointed rendezvous. Many injuries had been received by the various s.h.i.+ps, but they were mostly of a minor character; and on the 22d the fleet again put to sea in search of the enemy.
The French had suffered much more severely. The flags.h.i.+p _Languedoc_, 90, had carried away her bowsprit, all her lower masts followed it overboard, and her tiller also was broken, rendering the rudder unserviceable. The _Ma.r.s.eillais_, 74, lost her foremast and bowsprit.
In the dispersal of the two fleets that followed the gale, each of these crippled vessels, on the evening of the 13th, encountered singly a British 50-gun s.h.i.+p; the _Languedoc_ being attacked by the _Renown_, and the _Ma.r.s.eillais_ by the _Preston_. The conditions in each instance were distinctly favourable to the smaller combatant; but both unfortunately withdrew at nightfall, making the mistake of postponing to to-morrow a chance which they had no certainty would exist after to-day. When morning dawned, other French s.h.i.+ps appeared, and the opportunity pa.s.sed away. The British _Isis_, 50, also was chased and overtaken by the _Cesar_, 74. In the action which ensued, the French s.h.i.+p's wheel was shot away, and she retired;--two other British vessels, one of the line, being in sight. The latter are not mentioned in the British accounts, and both sides claimed the advantage in this drawn action. The French captain lost an arm.
After making temporary repairs, at the anchorage where Howe saw them on the 15th of August, the French fleet had proceeded again towards Newport. It was in the course of this pa.s.sage that they were seen by Byron's flags.h.i.+p[35] on the 18th, to the southward of Long Island. The _Experiment_, 50, which Howe had sent to reconnoitre Narragansett Bay, was chased by them into Long Island Sound, and only reached New York by the East River; being the first s.h.i.+p of the line or 50-gun s.h.i.+p that ever pa.s.sed through h.e.l.l Gate. On the 20th d'Estaing communicated with General Sullivan, the commander of the American land forces on Rhode Island; but it was only to tell him that in his own opinion, and in that of a council of war, the condition of the squadron necessitated going to Boston to refit. Whatever may be thought of the propriety of this decision, its seriousness can be best understood from the report sent by Pigot to Howe. ”The rebels had advanced their batteries within fifteen hundred yards of the British works. He was under no apprehensions from any of their attempts in front; but, should the French fleet come in, it would make an alarming change.
Troops might be landed and advanced in his rear; and in that case he could not answer for the consequences.” Disregarding Sullivan's entreaties that he would remain, d'Estaing sailed next day for Boston, which he reached on August 28th. On the 31st the indefatigable Howe came in sight; but the French had worked actively in the three days.
Forty-nine guns, 18 and 24-pounders, with six mortars, were already in position covering the anchorage; and ”the French squadron, far from fearing an attack, desired it eagerly.”[36] The withdrawal of the French fleet from Rhode Island was followed by that of the American troops from before Newport.
Howe had quitted New York the instant he heard of d'Estaing's reappearance off Rhode Island. He took with him the same number of vessels as before,--thirteen of the line,--the _Monmouth_, 64, of Byron's squadron, having arrived and taken the place of the _Isis_, crippled in her late action. Before reaching Newport, he learned that the French had started for Boston. He hoped that they would find it necessary to go outside George's Bank, and that he might intercept them by following the shorter road inside. In this he was disappointed, as has been seen, and the enemy's position was now too strong for attack. The French retreat to Boston closed the naval campaign of 1778 in North American waters.
[Ill.u.s.tration]
The inability or unwillingness of d'Estaing to renew the enterprise against Rhode Island accords the indisputable triumph in this campaign to Howe,--an honour he must share, and doubtless would have shared gladly, with his supporters in general. That his fleet, for the most part two years from home, in a country without dockyards, should have been able to take the sea within ten days after the gale, while their opponents, just from France, yet with three months' sea practice, were so damaged that they had to abandon the field and all the splendid prospects of Rhode Island,--as they already had allowed to slip the chance at New York,--shows a decisive superiority in the British officers and crews. The incontestable merits of the rank and file, however, must not be permitted to divert attention from the great qualities of the leader, but for which the best material would have been unavailing. The conditions were such as to elicit to the utmost Howe's strongest qualities,--firmness, endurance, uninterrupted persistence rather than celerity, great professional skill, ripened by constant reflection and ready at an instant's call. Not brilliant in intellect, perhaps, but absolutely clear, and replete with expedients to meet every probable contingency, Howe exhibited an equable, unflagging energy, which was his greatest characteristic, and which eminently fitted him for the task of checkmating an enemy's every move--for a purely defensive campaign. He was always on hand and always ready; for he never wearied, and he knew his business. To great combinations he was perhaps unequal. At all events, such are not a.s.sociated with his name. The distant scene he did not see; but step by step he saw his way with absolute precision, and followed it with unhesitating resolution. With a force inferior throughout, to have saved, in one campaign, the British fleet, New York, and Rhode Island, with the entire British army, which was divided between those two stations and dependent upon the sea, is an achievement unsurpa.s.sed in the annals of naval defensive warfare. It may be added that his accomplishment is the measure of his adversary's deficiencies.
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