Part 15 (1/2)
Considered in their _ensemble_, the several groups of evidences a.s.signed amount almost to proof. We have seen that, when critically examined, the speculations of late years current respecting the nature of the nebulae, commit their promulgators to sundry absurdities; while, on the other hand, we see that the various appearances these nebulae present, are explicable as different stages in the precipitation and aggregation of diffused matter.
We find that comets, alike by their physical const.i.tution, their immensely-elongated and variously-directed orbits, the distribution of those orbits, and their manifest structural relation to the Solar System, bear testimony to the past existence of that system in a nebulous form. Not only do those obvious peculiarities in the motions of the planets which first suggested the Nebular Hypothesis, supply proofs of it, but on closer examination we discover, in the slightly-diverging inclinations of their orbits, in their various rates of rotation, and their differently-directed axes of rotation, that the planets yield us yet further testimony; while the satellites, by sundry traits, and especially by their occurrence in greater or less abundance where the hypothesis implies greater or less abundance, confirm this testimony. By tracing out the process of planetary condensation, we are led to conclusions respecting the internal structure of planets which at once explain their anomalous specific gravities, and at the same time reconcile various seemingly contradictory facts. Once more, it turns out that what is _a priori_ inferable from the Nebular Hypothesis respecting the temperatures of the resulting bodies, is just what observation establishes; and that both the absolute and the relative temperatures of the Sun and planets are thus accounted for. When we contemplate these various evidences in their totality--when we observe that, by the Nebular Hypothesis, the leading phenomena of the Solar System, and the heavens in general, are explicable; and when, on the other hand, we consider that the current cosmogony is not only without a single fact to stand on, but is at variance with all our positive knowledge of Nature; we see that the proof becomes overwhelming.
It remains only to point out that while the genesis of the Solar System, and of countless other systems like it, is thus rendered comprehensible, the ultimate mystery continues as great as ever. The problem of existence is not solved: it is simply removed further back. The Nebular Hypothesis throws no light on the origin of diffused matter; and diffused matter as much needs accounting for as concrete matter. The genesis of an atom is not easier to conceive than the genesis of a planet. Nay, indeed, so far from making the Universe a less mystery than before, it makes it a greater mystery. Creation by manufacture is a much lower thing than creation by evolution. A man can put together a machine; but he cannot make a machine develop itself. The ingenious artizan, able as some have been, so far to imitate vitality as to produce a mechanical pianoforte-player, may in some sort conceive how, by greater skill, a complete man might be artificially produced; but he is unable to conceive how such a complex organism gradually arises out of a minute structureless germ. That our harmonious universe once existed potentially as formless diffused matter, and has slowly grown into its present organized state, is a far more astonis.h.i.+ng fact than would have been its formation after the artificial method vulgarly supposed. Those who hold it legitimate to argue from phenomena to noumena, may rightly contend that the Nebular Hypothesis implies a First Cause as much transcending ”the mechanical G.o.d of Paley,” as this does the fetish of the savage.
VII. BAIN ON THE EMOTIONS AND THE WILL.
After the controversy between the Neptunists and the Vulcanists had been long carried on without definite results, there came a reaction against all speculative geology. Reasoning without adequate data having led to nothing, inquirers went into the opposite extreme, and confining themselves wholly to collecting data, relinquished reasoning. The Geological Society of London was formed with the express object of acc.u.mulating evidence; for many years hypotheses were forbidden at its meetings; and only of late have attempts to organize the ma.s.s of observations into consistent theory been tolerated.
This reaction and subsequent re-reaction, well ill.u.s.trate the recent history of English thought in general. The time was when our countrymen speculated, certainly to as great an extent as any other people, on all those high questions which present themselves to the human intellect; and, indeed, a glance at the systems of philosophy that are or have been current on the Continent, suffices to show how much other nations owe to the discoveries of our ancestors. For a generation or two, however, these more abstract subjects have fallen into neglect; and, among those who plume themselves on being ”practical,” even into contempt. Partly, perhaps, a natural accompaniment of our rapid material growth, this intellectual phase has been in great measure due to the exhaustion of argument, and the necessity for better data. Not so much with a conscious recognition of the end to be subserved, as from an unconscious subordination to that rhythm traceable in social changes as in other things, an era of theorizing without observing, has been followed by an era of observing without theorizing. During the long-continued devotion to concrete science, an immense quant.i.ty of raw material for abstract science has been acc.u.mulated; and now there is obviously commencing a period in which this acc.u.mulated raw material will be organized into consistent theory. On all sides--equally in the inorganic sciences, in the science of life, and in the science of society--may we note the tendency to pa.s.s from the superficial and empirical to the more profound and rational.
In Psychology this change is conspicuous. The facts brought to light by anatomists and physiologists during the last fifty years, are at length being used towards the interpretation of this highest cla.s.s of biological phenomena; and already there is promise of a great advance. The work of Mr.
Alexander Bain, of which the second volume has been recently issued, may be regarded as especially characteristic of the transition. It gives us in orderly arrangement, the great ma.s.s of evidence supplied by modern science towards the building-up of a coherent system of mental philosophy. It is not in itself a system of mental philosophy, properly so called; but a cla.s.sified collection of materials for such a system, presented with that method and insight which scientific discipline generates, and accompanied with occasional pa.s.sages of an a.n.a.lytical character. It is indeed that which it in the main professes to be--a natural history of the mind.
Were we to say that the researches of the naturalist who collects and dissects and describes species, bear the same relation to the researches of the comparative anatomist tracing out the laws of organization, which Mr.
Bain's labours bear to the labours of the abstract psychologist, we should be going somewhat too far; for Mr. Bain's work is not wholly descriptive.
Still, however, such an a.n.a.logy conveys the best general conception of what he has done; and serves most clearly to indicate its needfulness. For as, before there can be made anything like true generalizations respecting the cla.s.sification of organisms and the laws of organization, there must be an extensive acc.u.mulation of the facts presented in numerous organic bodies; so, without a tolerably-complete delineation of mental phenomena of all orders, there can scarcely arise any adequate theory of the mind. Until recently, mental science has been pursued much as physical science was pursued by the ancients: not by drawing conclusions from observations and experiments, but by drawing them from arbitrary a priori a.s.sumptions. This course, long since abandoned in the one case with immense advantage, is gradually being abandoned in the other; and the treatment of Psychology as a division of natural history, shows that the abandonment will soon be complete.
Estimated as a means to higher results, Mr. Bain's work is of great value.
Of its kind it is the most scientific in conception, the most catholic in spirit, and the most complete in execution. Besides delineating the various cla.s.ses of mental phenomena as seen under that stronger light thrown on them by modern science, it includes in the picture much which previous writers had omitted--partly from prejudice, partly from ignorance. We refer more especially to the partic.i.p.ation of bodily organs in mental changes; and the addition to the primary mental changes, of those many secondary ones which the actions of the bodily organs generate. Mr. Bain has, we believe, been the first to appreciate the importance of this element in our states of consciousness; and it is one of his merits that he shows how constant and large an element it is. Further, the relations of voluntary and involuntary movements are elucidated in a way that was not possible to writers unacquainted with the modern doctrine of reflex action. And beyond this, some of the a.n.a.lytical pa.s.sages that here and there occur, contain important ideas.
Valuable, however, as is Mr. Bain's work, we regard it as essentially transitional. It presents in a digested form the results of a period of observation; adds to these results many well-delineated facts collected by himself; arranges new and old materials with that more scientific method which the discipline of our times has fostered; and so prepare the way for better generalizations. But almost of necessity its cla.s.sifications and conclusions are provisional. In the growth of each science, not only is correct observation needful for the formation of true theory; but true theory is needful as a preliminary to correct observation. Of course we do not intend this a.s.sertion to be taken literally; but as a strong expression of the fact that the two must advance hand in hand. The first crude theory or rough cla.s.sification, based on very slight knowledge of the phenomena, is requisite as a means of reducing the phenomena to some kind of order; and as supplying a conception with which fresh phenomena may be compared, and their agreement or disagreement noted. Incongruities being by and by made manifest by wider examination of cases, there comes such modification of the theory as brings it into a nearer correspondence with the evidence.
This reacts to the further advance of observation. More extensive and complete observation brings additional corrections of theory. And so on till the truth is reached. In mental science, the systematic collection of facts having but recently commenced, it is not to be expected that the results can be at once rightly formulated. All that may be looked for are approximate generalizations which will presently serve for the better directing of inquiry. Hence, even were it not now possible to say in what way it does so, we might be tolerably certain that Mr. Bain's work bears the stamp of the inchoate state of Psychology.
We think, however, that it will not be difficult to find in what respects its organization is provisional; and at the same time to show what must be the nature of a more complete organization. We propose here to attempt this: ill.u.s.trating our positions from his recently-issued second volume.
Is it possible to make a true cla.s.sification without the aid of a.n.a.lysis?
or must there not be an a.n.a.lytical basis to every true cla.s.sification? Can the real relations of things be determined by the obvious characteristics of the things? or does it not commonly happen that certain hidden characteristics, on which the obvious ones depend, are the truly significant ones? This is the preliminary question which a glance at Mr.
Bain's scheme of the emotions suggests.
Though not avowedly, yet by implication, Mr. Bain a.s.sumes that a right conception of the nature, the order, and the relations of the emotions, may be arrived at by contemplating their conspicuous objective and subjective characters, as displayed in the adult. After pointing out that we lack those means of cla.s.sification which serve in the case of the sensations, he says--
”In these circ.u.mstances we must turn our attention to _the manner of diffusion_ of the different pa.s.sions and emotions, in order to obtain a basis of cla.s.sification a.n.a.logous to the arrangement of the sensations. If what we have already advanced on that subject be at all well founded, this is the genuine turning point of the method to be chosen, for the same mode of diffusion will always be accompanied by the same mental experience, and each of the two aspects would identify, and would be evidence of, the other. There is, therefore, nothing so thoroughly characteristic of any state of feeling as the nature of the diffusive wave that embodies it, or the various organs specially roused into action by it, together with the manner of the action. The only drawback is our comparative ignorance, and our inability to discern the precise character of the diffusive currents in every case; a radical imperfection in the science of mind as const.i.tuted at present.
”Our own consciousness, formerly reckoned the only medium of knowledge to the mental philosopher, must therefore be still referred to as a princ.i.p.al means of discriminating the varieties of human feeling. We have the power of noting agreement and difference among our conscious states, and on this we can raise a structure of cla.s.sification. We recognise such generalities as pleasure, pain, love, anger, through the property of mental or intellectual discrimination that accompanies in our mind the fact of an emotion. A certain degree of precision is attainable by this mode of mental comparison and a.n.a.lysis; the farther we can carry such precision the better; but that is no reason why it should stand alone to the neglect of the corporeal embodiments through which one mind reveals itself to others. The companions.h.i.+p of inward feeling with bodily manifestation is a fact of the human const.i.tution, and deserves to be studied as such; and it would be difficult to find a place more appropriate than a treatise on the mind for setting forth the conjunctions and sequences traceable in this department of nature. I shall make no scruple in conjoining with the description of the mental phenomena the physical appearances, in so far as I am able to ascertain them.
”There is still one other quarter to be referred to in settling a complete arrangement of the emotions, namely, the varieties of human conduct, and the machinery created in subservience to our common susceptibilities. For example, the vast superstructure of fine art has its foundations in human feeling, and in rendering an account of this we are led to recognise the interesting group of artistic or aesthetic emotions. The same outward reference to conduct and creations brings to light the so-called moral sense in man, whose foundations in the mental system have accordingly to be examined.
”Combining together these various indications, or sources of discrimination,--outward objects, diffusive mode or expression, inward consciousness, resulting conduct and inst.i.tutions--I adopt the following arrangement of the families or natural orders of emotion.”
Here, then, are confessedly adopted, as bases of cla.s.sification, the most manifest characters of the emotions; as discerned subjectively, and objectively. The mode of diffusion of an emotion is one of its outside aspects; the inst.i.tutions it generates form another of its outside aspects; and though the peculiarities of the emotion as a state of consciousness, seem to express its intrinsic and ultimate nature, yet such peculiarities as are perceptible by simple introspection, must also be cla.s.sed as superficial peculiarities. It is a familiar fact that various intellectual states of consciousness turn out, when a.n.a.lyzed, to have natures widely unlike those which at first appear; and we believe the like will prove true of emotional states of consciousness. Just as our concept of s.p.a.ce, which is apt to be thought a simple, undecomposable concept, is yet resolvable into experiences quite different from that state of consciousness which we call s.p.a.ce; so, probably, the sentiment of affection or reverence is compounded of elements that are severally distinct from the whole which they make up. And much as a cla.s.sification of our ideas which dealt with the idea of s.p.a.ce as though it were ultimate, would be a cla.s.sification of ideas by their externals; so, a cla.s.sification of our emotions, which, regarding them as simple, describes their aspects in ordinary consciousness, is a cla.s.sification of emotions by their externals.
Thus, then, Mr. Bain's grouping is throughout determined by the most manifest attributes--those objectively displayed in the natural language of the emotions, and in the social phenomena that result from them, and those subjectively displayed in the aspects the emotions a.s.sume in an a.n.a.lytical consciousness. And the question is--Can they be correctly grouped after this method?
We think not; and had Mr. Bain carried farther an idea with which he has set out, he would probably have seen that they cannot. As already said, he avowedly adopts ”the natural-history-method:” not only referring to it in his preface, but in his first chapter giving examples of botanical and zoological cla.s.sifications, as ill.u.s.trating the mode in which he proposes to deal with the emotions. This we conceive to be a philosophical conception; and we have only to regret that Mr. Bain has overlooked some of its most important implications. For in what has essentially consisted the progress of natural-history-cla.s.sification? In the abandonment of grouping by external, conspicuous characters; and in the making of certain internal, but all-essential characters, the bases of groups. Whales are not now ranged along with fish, because in their general forms and habits of life they resemble fish; but they are ranged with mammals, because the type of their organization, as ascertained by dissection, corresponds with that of the mammals. No longer considered as sea-weeds in virtue of their forms and modes of growth, zoophytes are now shown, by examination of their economy, to belong to the animal kingdom.