Part 7 (1/2)
Part III. BIOLOGY.--_Organosophy_, _Phytogeny_, _Phyto-physiology_, _Phytology_, _Zoogeny_, _Physiology_, _Zoology_, _Psychology_.
A glance over this confused scheme shows that it is an attempt to cla.s.sify knowledge, not after the order in which it has been, or may be, built up in the human consciousness; but after an a.s.sumed order of creation. It is a pseudo-scientific cosmogony, akin to those which men have enunciated from the earliest times downwards; and only a little more respectable. As such it will not be thought worthy of much consideration by those who, like ourselves, hold that experience is the sole origin of knowledge. Otherwise, it might have been needful to dwell on the incongruities of the arrangements--to ask how motion can be treated of before s.p.a.ce? how there can be rotation without matter to rotate? how polarity can be dealt with without involving points and lines? But it will serve our present purpose just to point out a few of the extreme absurdities resulting from the doctrine which Oken seems to hold in common with Hegel, that ”to philosophize on Nature is to re-think the great thought of Creation.” Here is a sample:--
”Mathematics is the universal science; so also is Physio-philosophy, although it is only a part, or rather but a condition of the universe; both are one, or mutually congruent.
”Mathematics is, however, a science of mere forms without substance.
Physio-philosophy is, therefore, _mathematics endowed with substance_.”
From the English point of view it is sufficiently amusing to find such a dogma not only gravely stated, but stated as an unquestionable truth. Here we see the experiences of quant.i.tative relations which men have gathered from surrounding bodies and generalized (experiences which had been scarcely at all generalized at the beginning of the historic period)--we find these generalized experiences, these intellectual abstractions, elevated into concrete actualities, projected back into Nature, and considered as the internal frame-work of things--the skeleton by which matter is sustained. But this new form of the old realism, is by no means the most startling of the physio-philosophic principles. We presently read that,
”The highest mathematical idea, or the fundamental principle of all mathematics is the zero = 0.”...
”Zero is in itself nothing. Mathematics is based upon nothing, and, _consequently_, arises out of nothing.
”Out of nothing, _therefore_, it is possible for something to arise; for mathematics, consisting of propositions, is something, in relation to 0.”
By such ”consequentlys” and ”therefores” it is, that men philosophize when they ”re-think the great thought of creation.” By dogmas that pretend to be reasons, nothing is made to generate mathematics; and by clothing mathematics with matter, we have the universe! If now we deny, as we _do_ deny, that the highest mathematical idea is the zero;--if, on the other hand, we a.s.sert, as we _do_ a.s.sert, that the fundamental idea underlying all mathematics, is that of equality; the whole of Oken's cosmogony disappears. And here, indeed, we may see ill.u.s.trated, the distinctive peculiarity of the German method of procedure in these matters--the b.a.s.t.a.r.d _a priori_ method, as it may be termed. The legitimate _a priori_ method sets out with propositions of which the negation is inconceivable; the _a priori_ method as illegitimately applied, sets out either with propositions of which the negation is _not_ inconceivable, or with propositions like Oken's, of which the _affirmation_ is inconceivable.
It is needless to proceed further with the a.n.a.lysis; else might we detail the steps by which Oken arrives at the conclusions that ”the planets are coagulated colours, for they are coagulated light; that the sphere is the expanded nothing;” that gravity is ”a weighty nothing, a heavy essence, striving towards a centre;” that ”the earth is the identical, water the indifferent, air the different; or the first the centre, the second the radius, the last the periphery of the general globe or of fire.” To comment on them would be nearly as absurd as are the propositions themselves. Let us pa.s.s on to another of the German systems of knowledge--that of Hegel.
The simple fact that Hegel puts Jacob B[oe]hme on a par with Bacon, suffices alone to show that his stand-point is far remote from the one usually regarded as scientific: so far remote, indeed, that it is not easy to find any common basis on which to found a criticism. Those who hold that the mind is moulded into conformity with surrounding things by the agency of surrounding things, are necessarily at a loss how to deal with those, who, like Sch.e.l.ling and Hegel, a.s.sert that surrounding things are solidified mind--that Nature is ”petrified intelligence.” However, let us briefly glance at Hegel's cla.s.sification. He divides philosophy into three parts:--
1. _Logic_, or the science of the idea in itself, the pure idea.
2. _The Philosophy of Nature_, or the science of the idea considered under its other form--of the idea as Nature.
3. _The Philosophy of the Mind_, or the science of the idea in its return to itself.
Of these, the second is divided into the natural sciences, commonly so called; so that in its more detailed form the series runs thus:--Logic, Mechanics, Physics, Organic Physics, Psychology.
Now, if we believe with Hegel, first, that thought is the true essence of man; second, that thought is the essence of the world; and that, therefore, there is nothing but thought; his cla.s.sification, beginning with the science of pure thought, may be acceptable. But otherwise, it is an obvious objection to his arrangement, that thought implies things thought of--that there can be no logical forms without the substance of experience--that the science of ideas and the science of things must have a simultaneous origin.
Hegel, however, antic.i.p.ates this objection, and, in his obstinate idealism, replies, that the contrary is true; that all contained in the forms, to become something, requires to be thought: and that logical forms are the foundations of all things.
It is not surprising that, starting from such premises, and reasoning after this fas.h.i.+on, Hegel finds his way to strange conclusions. Out of _s.p.a.ce_ and _time_ he proceeds to build up _motion_, _matter_, _repulsion_, _attraction_, _weight_, and _inertia_. He then goes on to logically evolve the solar system. In doing this he widely diverges from the Newtonian theory; reaches by syllogism the conviction that the planets are the most perfect celestial bodies; and, not being able to bring the stars within his theory, says that they are mere formal existences and not living matter, and that as compared with the solar system they are as little admirable as a cutaneous eruption or a swarm of flies.[F]
[F] It is somewhat curious that the author of ”The Plurality of Worlds,” with quite other aims, should have persuaded himself into similar conclusions.
Results so outrageous might be left as self-disproved, were it not that speculators of this cla.s.s are not alarmed by any amount of incongruity with established beliefs. The only efficient mode of treating systems like this of Hegel, is to show that they are self-destructive--that by their first steps they ignore that authority on which all their subsequent steps depend. If Hegel professes, as he manifestly does, to develop his scheme by reasoning--if he presents successive inferences as _necessarily following_ from certain premises; he implies the postulate that a belief which necessarily follows after certain antecedents is a true belief: and, did an opponent reply to one of his inferences, that, though it was impossible to think the opposite, yet the opposite was true, he would consider the reply irrational. The procedure, however, which he would thus condemn as destructive of all thinking whatever, is just the procedure exhibited in the enunciation of his own first principles.
Mankind find themselves unable to conceive that there can be thought without things thought of. Hegel, however, a.s.serts that there _can_ be thought without things thought of. That ultimate test of a true proposition--the inability of the human mind to conceive the negation of it--which in all other cases he considers valid, he considers invalid where it suits his convenience to do so; and yet at the same time denies the right of an opponent to follow his example. If it is competent for him to posit dogmas, which are the direct negations of what human consciousness recognises; then is it also competent for his antagonists to stop him at every step in his argument by saying, that though the particular inference he is drawing seems to his mind, and to all minds, necessarily to follow from the premises, yet it is not true, but the contrary inference is true.
Or, to state the dilemma in another form:--If he sets out with inconceivable propositions, then may he with equal propriety make all his succeeding propositions inconceivable ones--may at every step throughout his reasoning draw exactly the opposite conclusion to that which seems involved.
Hegel's mode of procedure being thus essentially suicidal, the Hegelian cla.s.sification which depends upon it, falls to the ground. Let us consider next that of M. Comte.
As all his readers must admit, M. Comte presents us with a scheme of the sciences which, unlike the foregoing ones, demands respectful consideration. Widely as we differ from him, we cheerfully bear witness to the largeness of his views, the clearness of his reasoning, and the value of his speculations as contributing to intellectual progress. Did we believe a serial arrangement of the sciences to be possible, that of M.
Comte would certainly be the one we should adopt. His fundamental propositions are thoroughly intelligible; and if not true, have a great semblance of truth. His successive steps are logically co-ordinated; and he supports his conclusions by a considerable amount of evidence--evidence which, so long as it is not critically examined, or not met by counter evidence, seems to substantiate his positions. But it only needs to a.s.sume that antagonistic att.i.tude which _ought_ to be a.s.sumed towards new doctrines, in the belief that, if true, they will prosper by conquering objectors--it needs but to test his leading doctrines either by other facts than those he cites, or by his own facts differently applied, to at once show that they will not stand. We will proceed thus to deal with the general principle on which he bases his hierarchy of the sciences.
In the second chapter of his _Cours de Philosophie Positive_, M. Comte says:--”Our problem is, then, to find the one _rational_ order, amongst a host of possible systems.”... ”This order is determined by the degree of simplicity, or, what comes to the same thing, of generality of their phenomena.” And the arrangement he deduces runs thus: _Mathematics_, _Astronomy_, _Physics_, _Chemistry_, _Physiology_, _Social Physics_. This he a.s.serts to be ”the true _filiation_ of the sciences.” He a.s.serts further, that the principle of progression from a greater to a less degree of generality, ”which gives this order to the whole body of science, arranges the parts of each science.” And, finally, he a.s.serts that the gradations thus established _a priori_ among the sciences, and the parts of each science, ”is in essential conformity with the order which has spontaneously taken place among the branches of natural philosophy;” or, in other words--corresponds with the order of historic development.
Let us compare these a.s.sertions with the facts. That there may be perfect fairness, let us make no choice, but take as the field for our comparison, the succeeding section treating of the first science--Mathematics; and let us use none but M. Comte's own facts, and his own admissions. Confining ourselves to this one science, of course our comparisons must be between its several parts. M. Comte says, that the parts of each science must be arranged in the order of their decreasing generality; and that this order of decreasing generality agrees with the order of historic development. Our inquiry must be, then, whether the history of mathematics confirms this statement.
Carrying out his principle, M. Comte divides Mathematics into ”Abstract Mathematics, or the Calculus (taking the word in its most extended sense) and Concrete Mathematics, which is composed of General Geometry and of Rational Mechanics.” The subject-matter of the first of these is _number_; the subject-matter of the second includes _s.p.a.ce_, _time_, _motion_, _force_. The one possesses the highest possible degree of generality; for all things whatever admit of enumeration. The others are less general; seeing that there are endless phenomena that are not cognizable either by general geometry or rational mechanics. In conformity with the alleged law, therefore, the evolution of the calculus must throughout have preceded the evolution of the concrete sub-sciences. Now somewhat awkwardly for him, the first remark M. Comte makes bearing upon this point is, that ”from an historical point of view, mathematical a.n.a.lysis _appears to have risen out of_ the contemplation of geometrical and mechanical facts.” True, he goes on to say that, ”it is not the less independent of these sciences logically speaking;” for that ”a.n.a.lytical ideas are, above all others, universal, abstract, and simple, and geometrical conceptions are necessarily founded on them.”