Part 1 (2/2)
Variation; X. Genesis, Heredity and Variation; XI. Cla.s.sification; XII.
Distribution.
In the scheme of nature Mind is ever a.s.sociated with Life. The third division of this philosophical system will therefore be Psychology, or the Science of Mind. This great subject will be considered, not by the narrow methods usual with metaphysicians, but in its broadest aspects as a phase of nature's order--to be studied by observation and induction through the whole range of psychical manifestation in animated beings. The subject of mind will be regarded in the light of the great truths of Biology previously established; the connections of mind and life will be traced; the progress of mentality as exhibited in the animal grades, and the evolution of the intellectual faculties in man will be delineated and the cooperation of mind and nature in the production of ideas and intelligence unfolded. We have no work upon mind of this comprehensive and thoroughly scientific character: the materials are abundant, and the necessity of their organization is widely recognized. That Mr. Spencer is eminently the man to perform this great task is proved by the fact that he is already the author of the most profound and able contribution to the advancement of psychological science that has appeared for many years.
In the true philosophic order, Biology and Psychology prepare the way for the study of social science, and hence the fourth part of Mr. Spencer's system will treat of Sociology, or the natural laws of society. As a knowledge of individuals must precede an understanding of their mutual relations, so an exposition of the laws of life and mind, which const.i.tute the science of human nature, must precede the successful study of social phenomena. In this part will be considered the development of society, or that intellectual and moral progress which depends upon the growth of human ideas and feelings in their necessary order. The evolution of political, ecclesiastical, and industrial organizations will be traced, and a statement made of those principles underlying all social progress, without which there can be no successful regulation of the affairs of society. Mr.
Spencer's mind has long been occupied with these important questions, as the reader will find by referring to his able work upon ”Social Statics,”
published several years ago.
Lastly, in Part Fifth, Mr. Spencer proposes to consider the _Principles of Morality_, bringing to bear the truths furnished by Biology, Psychology, and Sociology, to determine the true theory of right living. He will show that the true moral ideal and limit of progress is the attainment of an equilibrium between const.i.tution and conditions of existence, and trace those principles of private conduct, physical, intellectual, moral, and religious that follow from the conditions to complete individual life.
Those rules of human action which all civilized nations have registered as essential laws--the inductions of morality--will be delineated, and also those mutual limitations of men's actions necessitated by their coexistence as units of society, which const.i.tute the foundation of justice.
It cannot be doubted that the order here indicated, as it corresponds to the method of nature, is the one which Philosophy must pursue in the future. It combines the precision of science with the harmony and unity of universal truth. The time is past when Biology can be considered with no reference to the laws of Physics; Mind with no reference to the science of Life, and Sociology, without having previously mastered the foregoing subjects. The progress of knowledge is now toward more definite, systematic, and comprehensive views, while it is the highest function of intellect to coordinate and bind together its isolated and fragmentary parts. In carrying out his great plan, therefore, Mr. Spencer is but embodying the large philosophical tendencies of the age.
If it is urged that his scheme is too vast for any one man to accomplish, it may be replied: 1st. That it is not intended to treat the various subjects exhaustively, but only to state general principles with just sufficient details for their clear ill.u.s.tration. 2d. A considerable portion of the work is already issued, and much more is ready for publication, while the author is still in the prime of life. 3d. It must be remembered that intellects occasionally appear, endowed with that comprehensive grasp and high organizing power which fits them for vast undertakings. The reader will find at the close of the volume Mr. Spencer's Prospectus of his system. That he who has so clearly mapped out his work is the proper one to execute it, we think will be fully apparent to all who peruse the present volume.
An impression prevails with many that Mr. Spencer belongs to the positive school of M. Auguste Comte. This is an entire misapprehension; but the position having been a.s.sumed by several of his reviewers, he repels the charge in the following letter, which appeared in the _New Englander_ for January, 1864.
_To the Editor of the New Englander_:
SIR:--While recognizing the appreciative tone and general candour of the article in your last number, ent.i.tled ”Herbert Spencer on Ultimate Religious Ideas,” allow me to point out one error which pervades it.
The writer correctly represents the leading positions of my argument, but he inadvertently conveys a wrong impression respecting my tendencies and sympathies. He says of me, ”the spirit of his philosophy is evidently that of the so-called positive method which has now many partial disciples, as well as many zealous adherents among the thinkers of England.” Further on I am tacitly cla.s.sed with ”the English admirers and disciples of the great Positivist;” and it is presently added that ”in Mr. Spencer we have an example of a positivist, who does not treat the subject of religion with supercilious neglect.” Here and throughout, the implication is that I am a follower of Comte. This is a mistake. That M. Comte has given a general exposition of the doctrine and method elaborated by science, and has applied to it a name which has obtained a certain currency, is true. But it is not true that the holders of this doctrine and followers of this method are disciples of M. Comte. Neither their modes of inquiry nor their views concerning human knowledge in its nature and limits are appreciably different from what they were before. If they are Positivists it is in the sense that all men of science have been more or less consistently Positivists; and the applicability of M. Comte's t.i.tle to them no more makes them his disciples than does its applicability to the men of science who lived and died before M. Comte wrote, make them his disciples.
My own att.i.tude toward M. Comte and his partial adherents has been all along that of antagonism. In an essay on the ”Genesis of Science,”
published in 1854, and republished with other essays in 1857, I have endeavoured to show that his theory of the logical dependence and historical development of the sciences is untrue. I have still among my papers the memoranda of a second review (for which I failed to obtain a place), the purpose of which was to show the untenableness of his theory of intellectual progress. The only doctrine of importance in which I agree with him--the relativity of all knowledge--is one common to him and sundry other thinkers of earlier date; and even this I hold in a different sense from that in which he held it. But on all points that are distinctive of his philosophy, I differ from him. I deny his Hierarchy of the Sciences. I regard his division of intellectual progress into the three phases, theological, metaphysical, and positive, as superficial. I reject utterly his Religion of Humanity.
And his ideal of society I hold in detestation. Some of his minor views I accept; some of his incidental remarks seem to me to be profound, but from everything which distinguishes Comteism as a system, I dissent entirely. The only influence on my own course of thought which I can trace to M. Comte's writings, is the influence that results from meeting with antagonistic opinions definitely expressed.
Such being my position, you will, I think, see that by cla.s.sing me as a Positivist, and tacitly including me among the English admirers and disciples of Comte, your reviewer unintentionally misrepresents me. I am quite ready to bear the odium attaching to opinions which I do hold; but I object to have added the odium attaching to opinions which I _do not_ hold. If, by publis.h.i.+ng this letter in your forthcoming number, you will allow me to set myself right with the American public on this matter, you will greatly oblige me. I am, Sir, your obedient servant,
HERBERT SPENCER.
We take the liberty of making an extract from a private letter of Mr.
Spencer, which contains some further observations in the same connection:
”There appears to have got abroad in the United States, a very erroneous impression respecting the influence of Comte's writings in England. I suppose that the currency obtained by the words 'Positivism'
and 'Positivist,' is to blame for this. Comte having designated by the term Positive Philosophy all that body of definitely-established knowledge which men of science have been gradually organizing into a coherent body of doctrine, and having habitually placed this in opposition to the incoherent body of doctrine defended by theologians, it has become the habit of the theological party to think of the antagonist scientific party under this t.i.tle of Positivists applied to them by Comte. And thus, from the habit of calling them Positivists there has grown up the a.s.sumption that they call themselves Positivists, and that they are the disciples of Comte. The truth is that Comte and his doctrines receive here scarcely any attention. I know something of the scientific world in England, and I cannot name a single man of science who acknowledges himself a follower of Comte, or accepts the t.i.tle of Positivist. Lest, however, there should be some such who were unknown to me, I have recently made inquiries into the matter. To Professor Tyndall I put the question whether Comte had exerted any appreciable influence on his own course of thought: and he replied, 'So far as I know, my own course of thought would have been exactly the same had Comte never existed.' I then asked, 'Do you know any men of science whose views have been affected by Comte's writings?'
and his answer was: 'His influence on scientific thought in England is absolutely _nil_.' To the same questions Prof. Huxley returned, in other words, the same answers. Professors Huxley and Tyndall, being leaders in their respective departments, and being also men of general culture and philosophic insight, I think that, joining their impressions with my own, I am justified in saying that the scientific world of England is wholly uninfluenced by Comte. Such small influence as he has had here has been on some literary men and historians--men who were attracted by the grand achievements of science, who were charmed by the plausible system of scientific generalizations put forth by Comte, with the usual French regard for symmetry and disregard for fact, and who were, from their want of scientific training, unable to detect the essential fallaciousness of his system. Of these the most notable example was the late Mr. Buckle. Besides him, I can name but seven men who have been in any appreciable degree influenced by Comte; and of these, four, if not five, are scarcely known to the public.”
Mr. Spencer's philosophical series is published by D. Appleton & Co., New York, in quarterly parts (80 to 100 pages each), by subscription, at two dollars a year. ”_First Principles_” is issued in one volume, and four parts of Biology have appeared. We subjoin some notices of his philosophy from American and English reviews.
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