Part 5 (1/2)

Some days afterwards came the only reverse which French ever received at the hands of the Boers There has been endless argument as to as directly responsible for the disaster to the Suffolks It seeiven by French as the result of pressure brought to bear on him by the enthusiastic colonel of the Suffolks The key to the Boer stronghold lay in the kopje of Grassy Hill Lieutenant-Colonel AJ Watson had frequently reconnoitred the Boer position in company with General French As a result, he was confident that his battalion could rush the position

On January 5 he begged for per day French authorised him to make the attack should he see a favourable opportunity, on condition that he first informed the General of his plans and probable tiht, without further warning, Watson and hiseither in canvas shoes or in stocking-soles in order to deaden the noise of their footsteps

The fore breathlessly towards the su lines It was clear that they were not only discovered but expected Watson ordered a withdrawal But withdrawal from that stark boulder-strewn hill-side was almost an i and so, under a fierce fire froether the rear coallantry, to lead it to the su the first to fall, riddled with bullets, and although his officers perished with him almost to a man, the men beat a hasty retreat, in face of the enemy's destructive fire The affair accounted in all for eleven officers and 150 ely to blame But the facts seemed to show that the eneainst such a chance as this, strategy and generalshi+p are helpless Certainly French would be the last man in the world to deny any responsibility, had he been to blan

One fact was now clear beyond dispute The enely reinforced and was too alert to allow ofdaunted, French therefore directed his energies to the left A few days later (January 11) he accon In the plain to the west of Colesberg there arose an isolated kopje, soht, called Coles Kop This hill, which rises almost sheer from the plain, taxes the wind of the unencuher than the surrounding kopjes, it coer The Boers had left it ungarrisoned, thinking it useless either to thereatis i: PREPARING A SURPRISE]

One day Schoe hi from a 15-pounder which Major EEA

Butcher, RFA, had coaxed up to the top of Coles Kop in three and a half hours by dint of e and more sinew The Boers themselves never equalled this extraordinary feat

To hoist the guns on to the hilltop was the least part of the undertaking Guns without aet shells on to the kopje without disaster was an infinitelya hill lift The veldt is not a very pro shop; but Butcher was not easily beaten

Using steel rails for standards and anything worthy the nahts were fixed snatchblocks over which he passed his carrying wires On this hts up to 30 lbs, thanks to an ingenious systeether rustic, for a dru, so that as one load went up another was automatically let down It is only fair to say that the Boers theed to get their guns to the top of kopjes re a ht hiselse quite so dra this proceeding French had been distracting the ene Consequently the shells fro breakfast (January 12) with devastating results The laager was instantly abandoned, and a second, two thousand yards farther off, suffered the saet a second 15-pounder up the hill, the Boers were compelled to shi+ft every camp they possessed into sheltered positions

Most of these exploits show the resource and the daring which mark French's tactics But his caution is no less remarkable One instance of it will suffice Shortly after the Coles Kop incident, it was discovered that the Boers had left open a portion of the road froh a narrow pass known as Plessis Poort

Immediately French planned its capture One detachment was sent to occupy bastard's Nek, another defile to the west of Plessis Poort

Covered by a cross-fire from the artillery, the infantry were to move forward and seize the road In order to divert the Boers' attention fro the whole British line Advancing carefully the infantry met with little opposition, a fact which made French suspicious As the silence continued he abruptly ordered the ”Retire” The moment that his men obeyed, a fierce fire broke out from the enemy, ere present in force French's caution was justified

[Page Heading: MASTERS OF TACTICS]

During all this ti out, in the constant effort to parry outflanking th of fifty eneral could throwthe last days of French's co had beco else The Boer generals, who now included De Wet and Delarey, were entirely taken up with the effort to out-manoeuvre the irrepressible French

It was here that French first mastered the new problem of enerals gradually gave the can the resemblance of a Mukden or a Mons in miniature That the British force was not entirely out-manoeuvred by suchfor French's extraordinarylike six weeks' tih he knows all the methods of all the school his own tactics brand new on the spot” To that fact one may attribute his consistent superiority to the Boer Where even Kitchener and Roberts doubted, French invariably did the right thing

During the following fortnight he hadhis unique abilities

FOOTNOTES:

[11] To those interested enough to pursue the subject further, I commend _With French and his Cavalry in South Africa_, by CS

Goldman (Macmillan & Co)

CHAPTER VII

THE DASH TO KIMBERLEY

French's Pledge--The Task--The First Shell--”Hee--In and Out of Kimberley--The Surrender of Cronje

By the end of the year French had saved the situation in Cape Colony

Realizing this, Roberts summoned him to Cape Town on more important business Into French's hands he placed the task which Methuen had failed to accoh adverse circumstances--the Relief of Kimberley When Lord Roberts, with customary precision, had stated exactly what he wanted, he was surprised to receive a drae from his General ”I promise faithfully,” said French, ”to relieve Ki of the 15th, if I am alive”