Part 15 (2/2)
Between married persons, the ce, as to abolish all division of possessions, and has often, in reality, the force assigned to it[45] And it is observable that, during the ardour of new enthusiasance, the co but experience of its inconveniences, frouised selfishness of men, could make the imprudent fanatics adopt anew the ideas of justice and separate property So true is it that this virtue derives its existence entirely from its necessary _use_ to the intercourse and social state of mankind”--(IV p 256)
”Were the human species so framed by nature as that each individual possessed within himself every faculty requisite both for his own preservation and for the propagation of his kind: Were all society and intercourse cut off between man and man by the primary intention of the Supre would be as much incapable of justice as of social discourse and conversation Where ard and forbearance serve to no manner of purpose, they would never direct the conduct of any reasonablecourse of the passions would be checked by no reflection on future consequences And as each man is here supposed to love himself alone, and to depend only on himself and his own activity for safety and happiness, he would, on every occasion, to the ute the preference above every other being, to none of which he is bound by any ties, either of nature or of interest
”But suppose the conjunction of the sexes to be established in nature, a fa found requisite for its subsistence, these are i the rest of mankind within their prescriptions Suppose that several faether in one society, which is totally disjoined froe the then entirely useless, lose their force when carried one step further But again, suppose that several distinct societies maintain a kind of intercourse for e, the boundaries of justice still grow larger, in proportion to the largeness of men's views and the force of their mutual connexion History, experience, reason, sufficiently instruct us in this natural progress of huard to justice in proportion as we become acquainted with the extensive utility of that virtue”--(IV pp 262-4)
The hts of property are by no means diminished by this exposure of the purely utilitarian basis on which they rest:--
”For what stronger foundation can be desired or conceived for any duty, than to observe that human society, or even human nature, could not subsist without the establishrees of happiness and perfection, the ard is which is paid to that duty?
”The dilemma seems obvious: As justice evidently tends to promote public utility, and to support civil society, the senti on that tendency, or, like hunger, thirst, and other appetites, resent, and other passions, arises froinal instinct in the human heart, which nature has implanted for like salutary purposes If the latter be the case, it follows that property, which is the object of justice, is also distinguished by a siument or reflection But who is there that ever heard of such an instinct? Or is this a subject in which new discoveries can be made? We may as well expect to discover in the body new senses which had before escaped the observation of all mankind”--(IV pp
273, 4)
The restriction of the object of justice to property, in this passage, is singular Pleasure and pain can hardly be included under the terely with the withholding of the former, or the infliction of the latter, by men on one another If a man bars another from a pleasure which he would otherwise enjoy, or actively hurts hiood reason, the latter is said to be injured as much as if his property had been interfered with Here, indeed, it may be readily shown, that it is as much the interest of society that men should not interfere with one another's freedoative pain, as that they should not ation of justice in such matters may be deduced But, if a man merely thinks ill of another, or feels maliciously towards him without due cause, he is properly said to be unjust In this case it would be hard to prove that any injury is done to society by the evil thought; but there is no question that it will be stigmatised as an injustice; and the offender hih to adhbour However, it ht a barrier lies between thought and speech, that any moral quality attached to the latter is easily transferred to the former; and that, since open slander is obviously opposed to the interests of society, injustice of thought, which is silent slander, must becoranting the utility to society of all kinds of benevolence and justice, why should the quality of those virtues involve the sense of ation?
Hume answers this question in the fifth section, entitled, _Why Utility Pleases_ He repudiates the deduction of moral approbation from self-love, and utterly denies that we approve of benevolent or just actions because we think of the benefits which they are likely to confer indirectly on ourselves The source of the approbation hich we view an act useful to society ht elsewhere; and, in fact, is to be found in that feeling which is called sympathy
”No man is absolutely indifferent to the happiness and ive pleasure, the second pain This every one may find in himself It is not probable that these principles can be resolved into principles more simple and universal, whatever attempts may have been made for that purpose”--(IV p 294, _Note_)
Other men's joys and sorrows are not spectacles at which we remain unmoved:--
”The view of the former, whether in its causes or effects, like sunshi+ne, or the prospect of well-cultivated plains (to carry our pretensions no higher) communicates a secret joy and satisfaction; the appearance of the latter, like a lowering cloud or barren landscape, throws a ination
And this concession being once made, the difficulty is over; and a natural unforced interpretation of the pheno all speculative inquirers”--(IV p 320)
The ard acts of justice or benevolence rests upon their utility to society, because the perception of that utility or, in other words, of the pleasure which they give to otherof syation to be just, or of the duty of justice, arises out of that association of moral approbation or disapprobation with one's own actions, which is e call conscience
To fail in justice, or in benevolence, is to be displeased with oneself
But happiness is impossible without inward self-approval; and, hence, every ard to his own happiness and welfare, will find his best reward in the practice of every moral duty On this topic Hume expends much eloquence
”But what philosophical truths can be eous to society than these here delivered, which represent virtue in all her genuine andcharms, and make us approach her with ease, familiarity, and affection? The dismal dress falls off, hich many divines and soentleness, humanity, beneficence, affability; nay, even at proper intervals, play, frolic, and gaiety She talks not of useless austerities and rigours, suffering and self-denial
She declares that her sole purpose is toevery period of their existence, if possible, cheerful and happy; nor does she ever willingly part with any pleasure but in hopes of ample compensation in some other period of their lives The sole trouble which she demands is that of just calculation, and a steady preference of the greater happiness And if any austere pretenders approach her, enemies to joy and pleasure, she either rejects them as hypocrites and deceivers, or if she ad the least favoured of her votaries
”And, indeed, to drop all figurative expression, what hopes can we ever have of engaging mankind to a practice which we confess full of austerity and rigour? Or what theory of morals can ever serve any useful purpose, unless it can show, by a particular detail, that all the duties which it recommends are also the true interest of each individual? The peculiar advantage of the foregoing system seem to be, that it furnishes proper mediums for that purpose”--(IV p 360)
In this paean to virtue, there is more of the dance measure than will sound appropriate in the ears of rims who toil painfully, not without h and steep roads which lead to the higher life
Virtue is undoubtedly beneficent; but the man is to be envied to whoh sheand self-denial, her silence on that topic may be accounted for on the principle _ca va sans dire_ The calculation of the greatest happiness is not performed quite so easily as a rule of three sum; while, in the hour of te has to be sacrificed, a bird in the hand is not worth two in the bush; whether it reater happiness in the future, for a certain great happiness in the present, and
”Buy theirksoaged in practices ”full of austerity and rigour,” by the love of righteousness and the fear of evil, without seeking for other coratification of such love and the consciousness of escape from debasement, they are in a bad case For they will assuredly find that virtue presents no very close likeness to the sportive leader of the joyous hours in Hume's rosy picture; but that she is an awful Goddess, whose hest reward is peace
It is not improbable that Hume would have qualified all this as enthusiasm or fanaticism, or both; but he virtually admits it:--
”Now, as virtue is an end, and is desirable on its own account, without fee or reward, merely for the immediate satisfaction which it conveys, it is requisite that there should be so, or whatever you please to call it, which distinguishes ood and evil, and which embraces the one and rejects the other