Part 11 (2/2)

Thus Hume appears to have sincerely accepted the two fundan; firstly, that a Deity exists; and, secondly, that He possesses attributes ence But, at this eress is arrested; and, after a survey of the developeneral corollary” is, that--

”The whole is a riddle, an enigma, an inexplicable ment, appear the only result of ourthis subject But such is the frailty of huion of opinion, that even this deliberate doubt could scarcely be upheld; did we not enlarge our view, and opposing one species of superstition to another, set the their fury and contention, happily ions of philosophy”--(IV

p 513)

Thus it may be fairly presumed that Hume expresses his own sentiments in the words of the speech hich Philo concludes the _Dialogues_

”If the whole of natural theology, as some people seeh souous, at least undefined proposition, _That the cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear soence_: If this proposition be not capable of extension, variation, or more particular explication: If it affords no inference that affects human life or can be the source of any action or forbearance: And if the analogy, imperfect as it is, can be carried no further than to the huence, and cannot be transferred, with any appearance of probability, to the other qualities of the mind; if this really be the case, what can the ious ive a plain, philosophical assent to the proposition, as often as it occurs, and believe that the arguments on which it is established exceed the objections which lie against it? Soreatness of the object; some melancholy froive no solution nificent a question But believe me, Cleanthes, the most natural sentiment which a well-disposeddesire and expectation that Heaven would be pleased to dissipate, at least alleviate, this profound ignorance, by affording so discoveries of the nature, attributes, and operations of the Divine object of our faith”[29]--(II pp

547-8)

Such being the sum total of Huical burden is a heavy one But, if we turn froion_, to the _Treatise_, the _Inquiry_, and the _Dialogues_, the story of what happened to the ass laden with salt, who took to the water, irresistibly suggests itself Hume's theism, such as it is, dissolves away in the dialectic river, until nothing is left but the verbal sack in which it was contained

Of the two theistic propositions to which Hume is committed, the first is the affiruues_, Philo, while pushi+ng scepticism to its utmost limit, is nevertheless made to say that--

”where reasonablethe _Being_, but only the _Nature_, of the Deity The former truth, as you will observe, is unquestionable and self-evident Nothing exists without a cause, and the original cause of this universe (whatever it be) we call God, and piously ascribe to him every species of perfection”--(II p 439)

The expositor of Huoes, cannot but fall into perplexity[30] when he contrasts this language with that of the sections of the third part of the _Treatise_, entitled, _Why a Cause is Always Necessary_, and _Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion_

It is there shown, at large, that ”every demonstration which has been produced for the necessity of a cause is fallacious and sophistical” (I

p 111); it is affirmed, that ”there is no absolute norof existence should be attended with such an object” [as a cause] (I p 227); and it is roundly asserted, that it is ”easy for us to conceive any object to be non-existent thisto it the distinct idea of a cause or productive principle” (I p 111) So far froins to exist”self-evident,” as Philo calls it, Hu but the product of custom, or experience

And the doubt thus forced upon one, whether Philo ought to be taken as even, so far, Hume'swith an acute reasoner; and that there is no difficulty in drawing the deduction from Hume's own definition of a cause, that the very phrase, a ”first cause,” involves a contradiction in terms He lays down that,--

”'Tis an established axiom both in natural and moral philosophy, that an object, which exists for any ti another, is not its sole cause; but is assisted by some other principle which pushes it froy, of which it was secretly possessed”--(I p 106)

Now the ”first cause” is assumed to have existed from all eternity, up to the moment at which the universe came into existence Hence it cannot be the sole cause of the universe; in fact, it was no cause at all until it was ”assisted by some other principle”; consequently the so-called ”first cause,” so far as it produces the universe, is in reality an effect of that other principle Moreover, though, in the person of Philo, Huins to exist must have a cause,” which he denies in the _Treatise_, he must have seen, for a child may see, that the assuined first cause and Z to be its effect Let the letters of the alphabet, _a_, _b_, _c_, _d_, _e_, _f_, _g_, in their order, represent successive _ represent the particular moment at which the effect Z makes its appearance It follows that the cause Y could not have existed ”in its full perfection” during the time _a_--_e_, for if it had, then the effect Z would have co that time, which, by the hypothesis, it did not do The cause Y, therefore,that comes into existence has a cause,” Yat _e_; X, a cause W operating at _d_; and, so on, _ad infinituument for the existence of a Deity, which Huoes to water” in the solvent of his philosophy, the reasoning fron does not fare much better If Huuues_, he has dealt unfairly by the leader in concealing it:--

”But because I know you are not much swayed by names and authorities, I shall endeavour to show you, a little more distinctly, the inconveniences of that Anthropomorphism, which you have eround to suppose a plan of the world to be for of distinct ideas, differently arranged, in the same manner as an architect forms in his head the plan of a house which he intends to execute

”It is not easy, I own, to see what is gained by this supposition, whether we judge the ed to her, in order to find the cause of this cause, which you had assigned as satisfactory and conclusive

”If _Reason_ (I mean abstract reason, derived froard to all questions concerning cause and effect, this sentence at least it will venture to pronounce: That a mental world, or universe of ideas, requires a cause as much as does a material world, or universe of objects; and, if siement, must require a similar cause

For what is there in this subject, which should occasion a different conclusion or inference? In an abstract view, they are entirely alike; and no difficulty attends the one supposition, which is not coain, ill needs force _Experience_ to pronounce some sentence, even on those subjects which lie beyond her sphere, neither can she perceive any material difference in this particular, between these two kinds of worlds; but finds theoverned by similar principles, and to depend upon an equal variety of causes in their operations We have specimens in miniature of both of theetable or anie froard to its causes, than thought: and as these causes never operate in two persons after the same manner, so we never find two persons who think exactly alike Nor indeed does the same person think exactly alike at any two different periods of tie, of the disposition of his body, of weather, of food, of company, of books, of passions; any of these particulars, or others more ht, and communicate to it very different etables and animal bodies are not reater variety or s and principles

”How, therefore, shall we satisfy ourselves concerning the cause of that Being who to your system of anthropomorphism, the ideal world in which you trace the material? Have we not the same reason to trace the ideal world into another ideal world, or new intelligent principle? But if we stop and go no farther; why go so far? Why not stop at theon _in infinitum_? And after all, what satisfaction is there in that infinite progression? Let us remember the story of the Indian philosopher and his elephant It was never more applicable than to the present subject If the material world rests upon a similar ideal world, this ideal world must rest upon some other; and so on without end It were better, therefore, never to look beyond the presentit to contain the principle of its order within itself, we really assert it to be God; and the sooner we arrive at that Divine Being, so o one step beyond the mundane system you only excite an inquisitive humour, which it is impossible ever to satisfy

”To say, that the different ideas which co, fall into order of themselves and by their own natures, is really to talk without any precise , I would fain knohy it is not as good sense to say, that the parts of the material world fall into order of themselves, and by their own nature Can the one opinion be intelligible while the other is not so?”--(II pp 461-4)

Cleanthes, in replying to Philo's discourse, says that it is very easy to answer his arguments; but, as not unfrequently happens with controversialists, he mistakes a reply for an anshen he declares that--

”The order and arrangement of nature, the curious adjustment of final causes, the plain use and intention of every part and organ; all these bespeak in the clearest language one intelligent cause or author The heavens and the earth join in the same testimony The whole chorus of nature raises one hymn to the praises of its Creator”--(II p 465)