Part 9 (2/2)

With respect to the first question, Hume denies that it is a necessary truth, in the sense that we are unable to conceive the contrary The evidence by which he supports this conclusion in the _Inquiry_, however, is not strictly relevant to the issue

”No object ever discovers, by the qualities which appear to the senses, either the cause which produced it, or the effects which will arise from it; nor can our reason, unassisted by experience, ever draw any inference concerning real existence and matter of fact”--(IV p 35)

Abundant illustrations are given of this assertion, which indeed cannot be seriously doubted; but it does not follow that, because we are totally unable to say what cause preceded, or what effect will succeed, any event, we do not necessarily suppose that the event had a cause and will be succeeded by an effect The scientific investigator who notes a new phenonorant of its cause, but he will, without hesitation, seek for that cause If you ask him why he does so, he will probably say that it must have had a cause; and thereby imply that his belief in causation is a necessary belief

In the _Treatise_ Hume indeed takes the bull by the horns:

”as all distinct ideas are separable from each other, and as the ideas of cause and effect are evidently distinct, 'twill be easy for us to conceive any object to be non-existent thisto it the distinct idea of a cause or productive principle”--(I p 111)

If Hume had been content to state what he believed to besuperfluous reasons for that which is susceptible of being proved or disproved only by personal experience, his position would have been stronger For it seeht Anydream, may experience the existence at one moment, and the non-existence at the next, of phenoest no connexion of cause and effect Not only so, but it is notorious that, to the unthinking gest the relation of cause and effect; and they practically deny the existence of any such relation by attributing thea of a die on a particular face is as ; it is a proverb that ”the wind blohere it listeth;” and even thoughtful estion, that the form of the crest of every wave that breaks, wind-driven, on the sea-shore, and the direction of every particle of foaale, are the exact effects of definite causes; and, as such,determined, deductively, from the laws of ain, there are large nuent persons who rather pride themselves on their fixed belief that our volitions have no cause; or that the will causes itself, which is either the saument in support of what appears to be a true proposition, however, is of the circular sort, for the ht, assumes the question at issue

But the question whether the idea of causation is necessary, or not, is really of very little importance For, to say that an idea is necessary is simply to affirm that we cannot conceive the contrary; and the fact that we cannot conceive the contrary of any belief may be a presumption, but is certainly no proof, of its truth

In the well-known experile round object, such as a ers, it is utterly impossible to conceive that we have not two round objects under the in the brain, it is utterly impossible to conceive that it is not outside the retina In the sa with a rod, not only is irresistibly led to believe that the sensation of contact is at the end of the rod, but is utterly incapable of conceiving that this sensation is really in his head Yet that which is inconceivable is manifestly true in all these cases The beliefs and the unbeliefs are alike necessary, and alike erroneous

It is coed that the axiom of causation cannot be derived fros have causes, whereas the axioiss which come into existence have causes, A has come into existence: therefore A had a cause,” is obviously fallacious, if A is not previously shown to be one of the ”s” And this objection is perfectly sound so far as it goes The axioeneral proposition which simply embodies experience But it does not follow that the belief, or expectation, expressed by the axioenerated antecedently to, and altogether independently of, the logically unjustifiable language in which we express it

In fact, the axiom of causation rese the verbal syether extra-logical, and would be illogical, if it were not constantly verified by experience Experience, as we have seen, stores up enerate expectations or beliefs--why they do so ation of cerebral physiology But, to seek for the reason of the facts in the verbal symbols by which they are expressed, and to be astonished that it is not to be found there, is surely singular; and what Hume did was to turn attention from the verbal proposition to the psychical fact of which it is the symbol

”When any natural object or event is presented, it is iacity or penetration, to discover, or even conjecture, without experience, what event will result froht beyond that object, which is immediately present to the memory and senses Even after one instance or experiment, where we have observed a particular event to follow upon another, we are not entitled to foreneral rule, or foretell ill happen in like cases; it being justly esteee of the whole course of nature frole experiment, however accurate or certain But when one particular species of events has always, in all instances, been conjoined with another, weone upon the appearance of the other, and of e which can alone assure us of any matter of fact or existence We then call the one object _Cause_, the other _Effect_

We suppose that there is some connexion between them: some power in the one, by which it infallibly produces the other, and operates with the greatest certainty and strongest necessity But there is nothing in a nule instance, which is supposed to be exactly similar; except only, that after a repetition of similar instances, the mind is carried by habit, upon the appearance of one event, to expect its usual attendant, and to believe that it will exist The first time a man saw the communication of motion by impulse, as by the shock of two billiard balls, he could not pronounce that the one event was _connected_, but only that it was _conjoined_, with the other

After he has observed several instances of this nature, he then pronounces theive rise to this new idea of _connexion_? Nothing but that he now _feels_ those events to be _connected_ in his iination, and can readily foresee the existence of the one from the appearance of the other When we say, therefore, that one object is connected with another we ht, and give rise to this inference, by which they become proofs of each other's existence; a conclusion which is somewhat extraordinary, but which seems founded on sufficient evidence”--(IV pp 87-89)

In the fifteenth section of the third part of the _Treatise_, under the head of the _Rules by which to Judge of Causes and Effects_, Hu effects to their causes, upon which, so far as I am aware, no improvement was ic_ Of Mill's fourpassage:--

”where several different objects produce the same effect, it must be by st them For as like effects imply like causes, we must always ascribe the causation to the circumstance wherein we discover the resemblance”--(I p 229)

Next, the foundation of the _method of difference_ is stated:--

”The difference in the effects of two rese objects must proceed from that particular in which they differ For, as like causes always produce like effects, when in any instance we find our expectation to be disappointed, we ularity proceeds from some difference in the causes”--(I p

230)

In the succeeding paragraph the _method of concomitant variations_ is foreshadowed

”When any object increases or diminishes with the increase or diarded as a compounded effect, derived from the union of the several different effects which arise from the several different parts of the cause The absence or presence of one part of the cause is here supposed to be always attended with the absence or presence of a proportionable part of the effect This constant conjunction sufficiently proves that the one part is the cause of the other We must, however, beware not to draw such a conclusion from a few experi rule, though aardly stated, contains a suggestion of the _method of residues_:--

”an object which exists for any time in its full perfection without any effect, is not the sole cause of that effect, but requires to be assisted by some other principle, which may forward its influence and operation For as like effects necessarily follow frouous time and place, their separation for a moment shows that these causes are not complete ones”--(I p 230)